POSTCOLONIAL INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

THE POLITICAL ECOLOGY OF COLONIAL CAPITALISM

Race, nature, and accumulation

BIKRUM GILL

The political ecology of colonial capitalism



Manchester University Press

POSTCOLONIAL INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Series Editors: Mustapha K. Pasha, Meera Sabaratnam and Robbie Shilliam

Postcolonial International Studies marks out a dedicated space for advanced critical inquiry into colonial questions across International Relations and beyond. The series embraces a multitude of methods and approaches, theoretical and empirical scholarship, as well as historical and contemporary concerns. It enquires into the shifting principles of colonial rule that inform global governance and investigates the contestation of these principles by diverse peoples across the globe. Critically re-interpreting popular concepts, narratives and approaches by reference to the 'colonial question', *Postcolonial International Studies* opens up new vistas from which to address the key political questions of our time.

Originally presented as *Kilombo,* this series retains the ethos reflected by the bricolage constituency of Kilombos – settlements of African slaves, rebels and indigenous peoples in South America who became self-determining political communities that retrieved and renovated the social practices of its diverse constituencies while being confronted by colonial forces.

To buy or to find out more about the books currently available in this series, please go to: https://manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk/series/postcolonial-international-studies/

The political ecology of colonial capitalism

Race, nature, and accumulation

Bikrum Gill

Manchester University Press

Cover credit: Water is taken from the Baro river in Itang and treated before being trucked to Kule and Tierkidi camps, Gambella, Ethiopia.
Photo: Oxfam/Aimee Brown

Published by Manchester University Press
Oxford Road, Manchester, M13 9PL

www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN 978 1 5261 8135 0 hardback

First published 2024

Typeset
by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India

Contents

Acknowledgments

This book would not have been possible without the support, guidance, patience, and inspiration offered by many friends, relatives, and teachers.

The questions and concerns motivating this work first arose during my time as a graduate student at York University. Conversations and debates located both in academic settings and in the context of collective struggle proved particularly formative in the development of this project's theoretical framework and political commitments. Zubairu Wai, Zahir Kolia, John Carlaw, Deepa Rajkumar, Salimah Vaiya, Kasim Tirmizey, Hironori Onuki, Nishant Upadhyay, Preethy Sivakumar, and Melanie Richter-Montpetit provided crucial intellectual engagement, support, and friendship during this time. Ananya Mukherjee-Reed, Anna Agathangelou, and Radhika Mongia offered important guidance and instruction as teachers and mentors.

I would like to give my special thanks to Zubairu Wai and Zahir Kolia, whose intelligence, creativity, and faithful friendship and support have been constant sources of inspiration throughout the writing process. Thank you to Zuba for all the conversations, from Assiniboine to London, and for reading and offering invaluable feedback on the draft. Thank you to Zahir as well for the conversations, and for sitting with me and reading through sections of the draft, and offering the encouragement and insights that were very much needed at that time.

Special thanks to Elleni Centime Zeleke, Demis Mengiste, Ojulu Owala, and Wuri Bah for assistance with fieldwork in Ethiopia. I further developed and presented key ideas and sections of the book during my time as a research fellow at the Center for Global Studies at the University of Victoria. Sincere thanks to Anita Girvan, Astrid Perez Pinan, Rita Kaur Dhamoon, Michael Carpenter, Marta Bashovski, and Neilesh Bose for the friendship and scholarly engagement they offered during this time. The book received generous engagement and encouragement from a community of scholars I first encountered at the International Studies Association, and with whom I have since had the fortune of developing meaningful relations of friendship and scholarly discussion. Thanks to Akta Kaushal, Quynh

Pham, Himadeep Muppidi, Narendran Kumarakulasingam, and Maria Jose Mendez Gutierrez.

The book took its final shape and form after I arrived at Virginia Tech in the fall of 2018. I am grateful to the Department of Political Science for providing resources and space that were crucial to the completion of the book. Special thanks go to Brandy Faulkner, who has provided a level of support, friendship, comradeship, and intellectual engagement that goes beyond anything I expected in the academy.

The ASPECT community at Virginia Tech has been both a generative intellectual space and one that has provided support and solidarity for anti-imperialist scholarship. Francois Debrix, Mauro Carracioli, Desiree Poets, Cara Dagget, Balbir Kaur, Alan Lumba, Brian Britt, Nick Copeland, Christine Labuski, and Zhange Ni have provided important scholarly engagement and mentorship. Special thanks to Desiree Poets for her friendship and comradeship, and especially for all the conversations and collaborations towards further developing third-world Marxist and anti-imperialist projects. Our students in the ASPECT program have been especially important in providing space in the classroom and beyond to think through many of the ideas in this book. I would like to particularly acknowledge and thank Muhammad Shah Shahjahan, Maria Siddiqui, Erin Hammond, Hannah Gignoux, Christopher Smith, Patrick Salmons, Leah Ramnath, Reed Byg, Elhom Gosink, June Jones, Rob Flahive, and Melissa Crew.

Over the course of the past few years, I have been fortunate to be included in the formation of a politically committed community of scholars that is proving to be the most important of any that I have encountered previously. Our "anti-imperialist scholars collective" has provided essential comradely support to continue with scholarship informed by commitments to anti-imperialist liberation. Without such a network of support, we are otherwise left feeling isolated in the hallways of the academy. My sincere thanks and solidarity here go out to Radhika Desai, Matteo Capasso, Manu Karuka, Jemima Pierre, Peter Hudson, Nina Farnia, Louis Allday, Max Ajl, Momodou Taal, Yara Shoufani, Farwa Sial, Navid Farnia, Helyeh Doutaghi, Corinna Mullin, and Walaa Alqaisiya.

This book owes its deepest debt of gratitude to the familial relations out of which my concerns with the intersections of race, labor, and nature have arisen. My parents, Sardul Singh and Balwinder Kaur, have sacrificed so much for the sake of my siblings and me. The core concerns of this book are, in many ways, inspired by their experiences working as farmers and laborers in fields, factories, hotels, and taxicabs across India and Canada. Kanwaljit, Manjinder, Binaipal, Yuvraj, and Sahaj are essential sources of love, inspiration, and support.

Ravinder Kaur, my partner, your patience, support, love, and guidance has provided the strength and clarity to continue on with this project and many others on the most difficult of days. I am so very thankful for the perspective and encouragement you have offered throughout the entire process. This would not have been possible without you. Vishav and Akash, it is in watching you grow and engage with the earth and the world, that I have been made constantly aware of the question of socio-ecological justice. I thank you for your big-eyed wonder and the endless conversations we have about the stars above, the soils below, and the struggle for the liberation of the land, and its peoples.

Introduction

> We have been trying to convince people who've been making these [land-grabbing] allegations that these are floodplains where nobody stays, where nobody can reside or graze their cattle because most of the time they are under four or five feet of water. (Ram Karuturi, managing director of Karuturi Inc.)

> It's because he [Karuturi] never consulted the local people about the seasons of planting, this is why he was victim of flood. There is no problem of Baro River for farming. He doesn't listen to any local people—they listened to the highlander experts, but naturally we know the nature of the land. (Ojulu, resident of Ilea village)

The above comments offer contending socio-ecological interpretations of the series of floods that ultimately sank the large-scale agricultural project initiated by the Indian multinational agribusiness firm Karuturi in the Gambella province of Ethiopia. I had been initially drawn to investigate the Karuturi project on account of it widely being identified by journalists and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as a paradigmatic case of an emergent post-financial crisis land-grabbing phenomenon. My primary objective was to examine, through the lens of agrarian political economy, to what extent the institution of such large-scale agricultural production in the peripheral frontier province of Gambella was informed by the class contradictions and accumulation imperatives of capitalist development in India. In this sense, I sought to understand the Karuturi land grab in relation to India's unresolved agrarian question—how Gambella might be constructed as the provisioning source of the food surplus necessary for India to consolidate its transition from "less developed" agrarian economy to developed industrial state. However, by the time I arrived to conduct fieldwork in Ethiopia in early 2014, the marquee Indian agricultural investment had clearly stalled, in significant part on account of the inability of the company to tame the floods emanating from the Baro River. This surprising turn of events (how were the promoters of the project precluded from knowledge of the river's rhythms?) compelled a deeper theoretical investigation into the paradoxical link between the constitution of Gambella as a source of "cheap food" and the ultimate demise of the project. As I undertook this

inquiry, what struck me, in particular, was the manner in which Gambella's reduction to a site of "pristine nature," implying the absence of human presence, as contended by Karuturi in the first comment cited above, stood, from the Indigenous perspective offered in the second comment above, as a definitive factor in the project's failure. It is here that I stumbled upon what would become a key dimension of the argument forwarded by this book: that the racialized construction of pristine nature, via the appropriation and erasure of Indigenous socio-ecological practice and knowledge, was imperative to the construction of Gambella as "cheap" and abundant while it simultaneously undermined the constituting socio-ecological conditions of such abundance.

This book thus centers the theme of the co-production of race and nature within the global land-grabbing literature,[1] which has until now been largely conducted through the framework of agrarian political economy mentioned above.[2] My intention here is not to dismiss the approach of agrarian political economy, but rather to expand and deepen it by elucidating how the (re) institution of the racialized society/nature distinction marks a fundamental qualitative condition of possibility for the achievement of the cheap food surplus which has historically underpinned capitalist development and further constitutes the key "post-crisis" motive force driving the global land grab. In order to do so, it is necessary to engage in a theoretical and historical reconstruction of the agrarian question and its principal transformative mechanism of primitive accumulation, a task to which this book thus dedicates significant attention. It does so by situating the global land grab within the *longue durée* of a colonial-capitalist world-system marked by accumulation cycles that rise and fall in association with the constitution, and ultimate exhaustion, of global ecological surpluses provisioned through racialized society/nature regimes.

Global land grab: an overview

The land rush of the opening decades of the twenty-first century constitutes a central dynamic of the neoliberal conjunctural crisis (financial, food, energy, ecological) of the capitalist world system. Land grabbing, or "large-scale agricultural acquisitions/investments," has been most commonly associated, in both academic and media accounts, with the acquisition of large allotments of agricultural land in poorer countries of the Global South by foreign investors. The rapid escalation of such land deals in the aftermath of the 2007–2008 food and financial crises—estimated to cover more than 50 million hectares globally, with a primary concentration in Africa—drew attention from academics, global developmental institutions, NGOs, and

social movements concerned with questions of development, global justice, and environmental sustainability (Cotula, 2012).

Initial studies on land grabbing mostly focused on immediate empirical questions, and among the various positions and responses articulated, it is significant that none offered an uncritical celebration of large-scale land transactions, suggesting serious potential for socially and ecologically harmful outcomes. Even the World Bank report titled *Rising Global Interest in Farmland: Can It Yield Sustainable and Equitable Benefits?*, one of the most systematic and thorough studies on the issue, recognizes a dominant pattern of investors targeting indebted states in order to more easily acquire land that might be of central importance to poor rural communities (Deininger et al., 2011). However, the position of the Bank is not that these risks should restrict, or even prohibit, large-scale transnational agricultural land transactions, but rather that investors should adhere to a voluntary "code of conduct" for responsible investment that will enable more sustainable and equitable outcomes. This reflects a faith in the power of profit-seeking capital, properly self-disciplined through the principle of "corporate social responsibility," to mobilize and organize resources in the most productive and efficient ways possible, while delivering ecologically sustainable and socially equitable development (Li, 2011, 293). Specifically, for the World Bank, large-scale agricultural investments by capital abundant investors potentially constitute a mechanism for operationalizing the "agriculture for development" framework that was the theme of the Bank's 2008 World Development Report (WDR) and has since been central to its vision for breaking out of the "development impasse" (Li, 2011; McMichael, 2012; WB, 2008). By operating within a voluntary code of conduct, the World Bank believes that investors can bring much-needed capital to lands that have been rendered "marginal" and "under-utilized" owing to a lack of available resources. In this sense, transnational investment can help in overcoming what the Bank identifies as massive "yield gaps"—the difference between actually existing and potential land productivity—and thus significantly increase agricultural production to levels that can address the world's increasing demand for food and biofuel while offering positive developmental outcomes such as increased employment on large-scale industrial farms (Deininger et al., 2011).

More critical positions have been articulated by development and human rights NGOs, peasant and ecological social movements, and critical academic scholars of agrarian relations. Notable among these have been the reports issued by Oxfam (2012), the Oakland Institute (OI, 2011), and Human Rights Watch (HRW 2012), which have uncovered widespread displacement, and even outright dispossession, of Indigenous people from ancestral lands as a consequence of the investor rush for the planet's

remaining "virgin" soils. Theorists and analysts of agrarian relations have further questioned a key premise of the land grab, namely that what the World Bank and others have designated as "marginal" or "empty" land, will often have crucial ecological, cultural, and even economic significance in ways not recognized by narrow productivist perspectives (Borras et al., 2011; McMichael, 2012). The loss of such lands, and their conversion into export-oriented industrial plantation farms, thus threatens the social, cultural, and ecological reproduction of Indigenous peoples, as land that was used for local consumption now produces according to the imperatives of return-seeking foreign investors. Compounding the issue of dispossession, critical observers have noted that it is not clear how exactly plantation agriculture or any other sector can sufficiently provide the degree of employment necessary to ensure development objectives of social security and welfare (Li, 2011).

In contrast to these two poles of the debate, which might be characterized as capitalist agrarian transition and an environmental-human rights approach respectively, a third position in these debates can be identified as a more radical "Agrarian South" path which is rooted explicitly in the perspectives of anti-systemic movements and states of the Global South (Agrarian South Editorial, 2012; Patnaik and Moyo, 2011). This approach has been advanced by Global South-based scholars and practitioners who have consciously set out to challenge the epistemic hegemony of Global North scholars in the fields of agrarian and development studies. The Agrarian South school shares the concern that agricultural sectors of the Global South, particularly in Africa, have suffered structural underinvestment, but departs from global governance institutions in emphasizing that this has been less an outcome of endogenous national constraints (e.g. inefficient state management) and more decisively should be understood as an outcome of the deflationary structural adjustment policies imposed by international financial institutions (Patnaik and Moyo, 2011). Revitalizing agricultural sectors of the Agrarian South cannot be achieved by soliciting investment from the very institutions—the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Western finance capital—that generated the agrarian crisis in the first place. This does not lead, however, to an outright rejection of transnational investment. The Agrarian South approach leaves open the possibility that "look east" or "South–South" agricultural co-operation initiatives could enhance agricultural sectors provided they are undertaken within a framework that allows for the effective exercise of national sovereignty over resources and a peasant-centered path of agricultural development (Moyo and Yeros, 2013). This would ensure that any "South–South" investments would be organized under the sovereign power of a national-popular authority directing

resources in the service of broad-based national development rather than in the primary service of capital accumulation.

Karuturi and the India–Ethiopia land grab

The empirical findings of this book's "India–Ethiopia" case study, presented in Chapter 5, reflect the concerns emphasized by critics of land grabbing and cast further doubt upon the potential of large-scale agricultural land acquisitions driven by the accumulation imperatives of the investing firms. I examine the India–Ethiopia land investments through a specific focus on the much-publicized case of the Karuturi investment in Gambella, a province located in south-western Ethiopia. This investment attracted much attention from international media and NGOs, as it was viewed in many ways as a paradigmatic case of land grabbing, particularly insofar as Karuturi, an Indian agribusiness firm centered in Bengaluru, was granted, in the midst of the food/financial crisis of 2007–2008, a large 300,000-hectare concession of prime fertile land from the Ethiopian state at a rate of one dollar per hectare per year (Sethi, 2013). While Karuturi represented the land concession, on account of its fertility and low costs, as a launching ground for its ascension into global supremacy in the agro-food sector (Dubey, 2012), the Ethiopian state, approaching the "land grab as development strategy" (Lavers, 2012), expected the project to facilitate national development by either enhancing food availability domestically or increasing the state's access to foreign exchange reserves through commodity exports. Both the Ethiopian state and Karuturi dismissed land-grabbing accusations by insisting that the land under question in Gambella was either unused or underused by the local population, who thus themselves stood to benefit through expanded employment opportunities on Karuturi's industrial farm (Dubey, 2012; Rowden, 2011).

As opposed to the scenarios put forward by the World Bank, the Ethiopian state, and Karuturi, wherein there is an imagined alignment of profits, poverty reduction, food security, and environmental sustainability, I found, through a combination of fieldwork at the Karuturi agricultural project in the Gambella province of Ethiopia and secondary research, that the Indigenous Anywaa community of the lands targeted for investment were not consulted as they were, variously, displaced outright (OI, 2011) or subject to the enclosure and degradation of ecological forces (forests, rivers, land) key to their livelihood security in order to make way for ostensibly more productive large-scale industrial agriculture. The area enclosed by Karuturi thus did not constitute unused or underused land, but rather provisioned the Anywaa with essential means of subsistence. Immediate

consequences for Anywaa communities included the loss of supplemental food and medicinal and home/building sources, land erosion, and intensified flooding. There was little to no evidence, on the other hand, of any significant poverty-reduction benefits, in terms of employment generation, infrastructural development, or food availability, generated by the Karuturi investment in Gambella.

The empirical findings presented in Chapter 5 further reveal that not only did the Karuturi land investment in Gambella prove deleterious for local peoples and ecologies, it also failed in its profit-making and developmental objectives, as repeated flooding prevented the company from getting production off the ground (Davison, 2013b; Sethi, 2013). As a consequence, the costs of Indigenous displacement/dispossession and ecological disruption were not offset by the expected benefits of development and profits. The Ethiopian state failed to secure increased food production and/or foreign exchange reserves, and the company, having invested large sums of capital which it was unable to recoup, was forced into bankruptcy by early 2015 (Fekade, 2015).

Theorizing the long history of the land grab

In order, however, to account for such failure, and to understand why the global land-grabbing phenomenon continues to persist (Oliveira et al., 2021) in the face of implementation challenges and pronounced criticisms regarding the socio-ecological consequences of the expansion of large-scale agriculture (Wolford et al., 2024), it is necessary to engage in deeper theoretical and historical contextualization than has been offered in the more empirically oriented literature. As White et al. have noted,

> faced with the rapid spate of big land deals in recent years and in all continents, there is plenty of reason for researchers, activists and policymakers to be concerned with the immediate problems of dispossession, exclusion and adverse incorporation that local communities face. Besides these immediate issues however, there is also a need to look for deeper understandings of the phenomenon and its longer-term implications for agricultural and rural futures, in other words to disentangle the immediate and fundamental dynamics at work. (White et al., 2012, 60)

This constitutes the central concern of this book. I address it by elaborating, over Chapters 2, 3, and 4, a theoretical and historical framework through which the global land grab in general, and the South–South India–Ethiopia

case in particular, can be located within the *longue durée*[3] of a colonial-capitalist world system. In so doing, the intention is to clarify, through the application of this framework in Chapter 5, the theoretical and historical significance of the motive forces and consequences of the contemporary global land grab.

This study's *longue durée* focus takes as its point of departure the emphasis placed by more theoretically inclined land-grab scholars on the importance of interpreting the global land grab in relation to two long-standing concerns of agrarian political economy: the agrarian question (Akram-Lodhi, 2012; Li, 2011; Oya, 2013), and primitive accumulation (Bush, Bujra, and Littlejohn, 2011; Hall, 2013; Ince, 2014; Levien, 2015). While primitive accumulation, with its emphasis on capital and labor formation through land enclosure, has been widely deployed as a theoretical framework, the agrarian question, surprisingly, has been very minimally engaged in the land-grab literature. This is reflected in Carlos Oya's remark that "there are no contributions to the vast recent literature on land grabs attempting to engage with long-standing debates about the agrarian question of capital and whether the current land rush marks a turning point in the resolution (or not) of this question" (Oya, 2013, 1548). For Oya, this is a serious omission, as the agrarian question, centering as it does upon the link between agricultural transformation and capitalist accumulation, can elucidate further dimensions of the drivers and consequences of land grabbing.

Although it has existed since at least the late nineteenth century as a long-standing problematique of classical Marxism (Engels, 1894; Kautsky, 1988; Lenin, 1899), the agrarian question was reintroduced in the 1970s as a key "development" imperative through the work of Terence J. Byres. Informed by the Marxian historical premise of the "agrarian origins of capitalism," which holds that revolutionary transformations in land and labor relations in the agricultural sector were imperative to the historical emergence of capitalism in Western Europe, Byres identified the context giving rise to the agrarian question as one defined by the "continuing existence in the countryside of a poor country of substantive obstacles to an unleashing of the forces capable of generating economic development, both inside and outside agriculture" (Byres, 2012, 13). The agrarian question consists, then, of investigating not only what specifically constitutes such obstacles in a given national context, but also, and more importantly, what transformative processes can allow for their progressive removal in the service of the "forces capable of generating economic development." More specifically, the concern of the "developmental"[4] agrarian question is with advancing the labor and property regimes through which agricultural productivity can be enhanced to a degree sufficiently capable of shifting greater proportions of capital and labor out of low-income agrarian

sectors to higher-value-producing large-scale industrial production. The latter necessitates, in particular, a cheap food supply that can simultaneously ensure the reproduction of the industrial labor force and the wage repression necessary for accumulation to proceed. For Oya, then, the relevance of the agrarian question framework to the study of the land grab consists of the way in which it can frame large-scale agricultural land acquisitions as processes either facilitating or hindering the productivity growth necessary for states in the South that remain mired in what Tania Li has referred to as a "truncated agrarian transition" (Li, 2011, 294). The potential link suggested here between land grabbing and development is clarified through the concept of primitive accumulation, which captures the specific mechanisms through which the revolutionary transformations in land and labor relations necessary for the resolution of the agrarian question have been historically effected. For Western Marxists, Europe, and especially England, constitutes the specific "originary" site within which the necessary changes in agrarian structure and relations occur (Brenner, 1976; Byres, 2009; 1985; Wood, 2009). Specifically, processes of what Marx identified as primitive accumulation functioned to forcibly separate peasants, engaged in subsistence agriculture, from the means of production and reconstitute them as *capital* and *labor*, with both now being mobilized and marshalled according to the exclusive imperatives of competition and profit, thus allowing for the unleashing of hitherto repressed productive powers and accumulation possibilities. The immense productive powers of the market-dependent capital–labor antagonism are held to substantially increase food produced per unit of input, thereby enabling more resources to be applied to higher-value-producing industry. The process of separation from land together with the progressive development of the productive forces crucially enables, then, the transition from "pre-modern" agrarian production to modern industrial production, which perhaps most significantly involves the profound reconstitution of rural peasants into a "free" urban proletariat. For regions of the South which have not yet resolved their agrarian question—in other words, where low-income agrarian sectors remain predominant—the land grab thus suggests, through the lens of primitive accumulation favored by critical land-grab scholars (Hall, 2013), a process reminiscent of the European enclosures which had, centuries earlier, induced short-term pain in the service of long-term economic growth.

The applicability of primitive accumulation to the study of the land grab has been questioned on the grounds that it seeks to fit the contemporary Southern agrarian context into a historical European experience which is no longer relevant (Levien, 2015; Martin and Palat, 2014). In particular, the South today faces distinctive challenges, on account of industrial technological development and globalization, in productively absorbing, within

the national space, the surplus labor released by projects of enclosure and dispossession such as the land grab. There is no certainty, in other words, of higher-income proletarian futures for dispossessed agrarian labor. It is for this reason that Tania Li (2011) characterizes the development impasse confronting Southern states as one of "truncated agrarian transition," which the global land grab can only promise to intensify rather than resolve.

Rather than discard the concept entirely, however, it is my view that primitive accumulation, and hence the agrarian question, can be made relevant to the study of contemporary land grabbing through its reconstruction as a global rather than national or endogenous process. Such a move emphasizes that, even in the classical European agrarian transitions, the surplus labor released through enclosures could not be sufficiently absorbed in the national space. Instead, "extra-national" enclosures in politically subjugated colonies, premised upon more exhaustive racialized forms of dispossession, underwrote agrarian transition in Europe by provisioning cheap food for the industrial proletariat and empty land, or *terra nullius*, for the settler-colonial absorption of surplus labor. The centrality of *terra nullius* further reveals that the global context of agrarian transition calls forth distinct conceptions of non-human natures. Combined, cheap food and free land thus prove essential to the hegemonic resolution of the emergent capital–labor contradiction in the transitioning core, as it specifically enables the reconcilement of the "right to live" demands of dispossessed labor and the wage repression imperative of capital accumulation.

Absent such a global, and ecologically informed, reconstruction, attempts thus far to interpret the global land grab through frameworks of agrarian question and primitive accumulation have been limited in their inability to perceive, and thus take into serious analytical consideration, the central role that processes of racialization/coloniality and changing human–nature relations have historically played in securing the necessary "rightless" beings from whom surpluses of food could be exhaustively drawn. In this sense, the problem with received frameworks of primitive accumulation has less to do with an assumption of surplus labor absorption that no longer has relevance for the South. Rather, it has more to do with its occlusion of the processes through which such absorption, in the classical European cases, was made possible via racialized and anthropocentric forms of cost externalization, which are increasingly unavailable, on account of the postcolonial state system and increasing environmental limits, to transitioning Southern states today. Reconceived in its global dimensions, the lens of primitive accumulation comes to center more prominently on how land grabbing implicates the ongoing agrarian questions of capitalist states encouraging their agribusiness capitals to expand production into the *terra nullius* of extra-national space.

Race, nature, and accumulation: toward a political ecology of colonial capitalism

It is, of course, the case that third-world Marxist and world-systems approaches to the agrarian question—associated most notably with food-regime analysis (McMichael, 2008), global value relations (Araghi, 2009b), and the Agrarian South school (Moyo et al., 2013)—have done important work in advancing a global conception of primitive accumulation. However, these approaches have primarily focused on global primitive accumulation as the hidden quantitative premise (stolen land and labor) of the supposed "productive powers" of the qualitative capital–labor relation in the core. This misses, in my view, the centrality of the qualitative socio-ecological relations, *racialized ecologies*, associated with the colonial dimensions of primitive accumulation, particularly insofar as they are imperative to both the constitution, and exhaustion, of capital's productive powers. The articulation of the qualitative racialized society–nature relations underpinning capitalist development and accumulation thus constitutes a key aim of this book.

I pursue this objective by combining an emergent Capitalocene framework with third-world Marxism and anticolonial theory in elaborating a theoretical and historical approach that I refer to as the *political ecology of colonial capitalism*. The Capitalocene has been advanced by the ecological Marxist tradition as a response to the Anthropocene framework that has become widely deployed across academic disciplines as a means of apprehending the underlying forces and consequences of planetary-scale ecological crises, and particularly those associated with the climate crisis. The framing of the Earth's contemporary geological epoch as the Anthropocene has been subject to growing critique for its implications that humanity in general is responsible for planetary ecological crises, which risks concealing, and hence reproducing, how specific historically produced systems of power have materially privileged particular groups of humans while harming marginalized groups of humans and non-human natures. Arguably, the most influential critique has been articulated from within the ecological Marxist tradition (Foster, 2000; Malm, 2016; Malm and Hornborg, 2014; Moore, 2015), which has emphasized that capitalism, as a system founded and reproduced through the intensive exploitation of labor and Earth, must be recognized as the principal systemic driver of contemporary geological processes. In short, it is not humans in general who are driving planetary ecological crisis, but rather primary responsibility should be assigned to the capitalist class and its guiding logic of endlessly pursuing profits and growth. This critique rejects the Anthropocene framing in favor of what it terms the "Capitalocene," which clarifies that we are living in the geological age of Capital.

I specifically build from the "world-ecology" approach to the Capitalocene (Moore, 2017) that combines ecological Marxism with a world-systems analysis in order to clarify how the two contradictory socio-ecological relations of capitalism—capital–labor and society–nature—have emerged and been reproduced across the distinctive zones of what is termed the capitalist world-ecology. World-ecology comprises, in part, an expansive ontological reconfiguration of the agrarian question wherein the revolutionary transformations of primitive accumulation involve the institution, in addition to the exploitative capital–labor relation, of the "appropriative" society–nature ontological distinction. This distinction captures the "Cartesian" process whereby the separation of laborers from the means of production unfolds within society's even broader, and more foundational, symbolic-material separation from, and mastery over, non-human nature (Moore, 2015). The latter comes to comprise a frontier zone of appropriation, wherein nature can be appropriated as "free gifts" insofar as it does not carry the reproductive costs associated with "rational" human value-producing labor. Historically, frontiers have been constituted by hegemonic states, in significant part, through the violence of colonial and imperial enclosures which release "unused" natures, such as fertile soils, minerals, forests, and abundant waters, for "rational" appropriation by the transitioning core. Seeking to transcend the Cartesian society–nature binary, Moore (2015) reconceptualizes such "free gifts" as having been constituted through the work performed by non-human natures over millennia, and it is the unpaid appropriation of such work that provisions the "ecological surplus" of cheap inputs (especially food) necessary, insofar as it ensures wage repression, for the initiation and renewal of capitalist accumulation and development in the core.

Such a Cartesian paradigm, premised as it is upon a mistaken notion that nature is in fact a passive object which can be mastered by rational humanity, proves incapable of recognizing signals of distress or resistance communicated by non-human natures in response to their attempted appropriation. The organizing Cartesian logic of appropriation thus eventually draws down, or exhausts, the ecological surplus and threatens the conditions of accumulation. This produces what Moore terms a "developmental crisis" which has historically been overcome through a hegemonic recentering of the world-system (e.g. Spanish to Dutch to English to American) and the forging of successive frontiers of "unused nature" through new rounds of global primitive accumulation.. Key historical moments of the latter include the colonization of the Americas and Asia, the Scramble for Africa, and, perhaps, the contemporary land grab. The latter, this book argues, can be understood as an attempted moment of frontier formation and appropriation in the service of an ecological surplus capable of overcoming the

exhaustion of neoliberal accumulation that manifested in the 2007–2008 financial and food crises.

A key omission, however, of the world-ecology approach to the Capitalocene as it has been thus far articulated relates to the absence of any serious analytical consideration given to the key part played by capital's encounter with the presence of the Indigenous peoples of the frontier in the constitution of the appropriative society–nature distinction. As a consequence of such an omission, we are not able to appreciate the extent to which the "free gifts" of the frontier zone of unused nature, such as soil fertility, are actively co-constituted by Indigenous socio-ecological practice and knowledge in relation to the work performed by non-human natures that the world-ecology framework emphasizes. In order to better account for the analytical significance of Indigenous presence in the frontier, this book stages a conversation between world-ecology and the coloniality concept articulated by decolonial scholars (Dussel, 1998, 2014; Maldonado-Torres, 2008; Quijano, 2000; Wynter, 1995, 2003). Of most significance here, coloniality foregrounds the colonial foundations of the Cartesian paradigm in arguing that the latter's society–nature distinction emerges through the racialized relations of colonial conquest, wherein Indigenous people are collapsed into the sphere of irrational nature. The racialized foundations of the capitalist world-ecology's society–nature distinction suggest, I argue, a "Cortesian"—reflecting the key role played by the conquistador Hernán Cortés in the coloniality argument—rather than "Cartesian" paradigm.

The Cortesian frame has, in its assumption of conquest as the first moment of analytical significance in the encounter between colonial capital and Indigenous peoples, thus far remained constrained in its capacity to fully grasp and articulate the key structuring dynamics of the foundational racialized society–nature distinction. By assuming conquest as point of departure, it specifically foregrounds European capitalist mastery over both non-European worlds and non-human natural worlds as the originary grounds from which the colonial-capitalist world-ecology emerges. Indigenous people only assume significance insofar as they are acted upon by European mastery, or to the extent that they can resist such mastery. My concern here is that this removes from analytical consideration the centrality, to the eventual articulation of the racialized society–nature distinction, of what I refer to as the "earth-worlding" capacity of Indigenous peoples in their originary encounters with Europeans.

I address this limitation by beginning the account of the emergence of the capitalist world-ecology from within the socio-ecological space of the contact zone (Pratt, 1991) that exceeds the space-time of conquest insofar as its originary constitution is marked by the dependence of European survival upon "earth-worlds" forged by Indigenous peoples. The earth-world

articulates the co-constitution of Indigenous worlding, in the form of socio-ecological practice and knowledge, and non-human natures. It is out of these earth-worlding capacities that the contact zones were opened as life-provisioning gifts enabling the survival of late-arriving European peoples. I aim to demonstrate how the racialized society–nature distinction is both generated from, and comes to enable the ongoing reproduction of, the colonial-capitalist reversal of the original relations of dependence upon Indigenous earth-worlds. This reversal involves, via the colonial register of global primitive accumulation, the simultaneous appropriation of the other's earth-world and the elimination of the underlying earth-worlding capacity. It is thus an emergent settler-master's refusal to recognize and, hence, reciprocate the "gift"—how its own world-making capacity in the contact zone is dependent upon the originary earth-worlding capacity of Indigenous peoples—that enables it, through a logic of conquest, rather than gift, to claim exclusive sovereignty over the contact zone.

It is the imperative of the "appropriation and erasure" of Indigenous earth-worlds to colonial-capitalist accumulation that then gives rise to a "by-nature" racialized distinction between the "rational" human—the settler–master—and the "irrational" Indigenous other (Wynter, 2003, 296–304). This racialized distinction opens further space for the conceptual reformation of the Indigenous earth-worlds of the contact zone into lands and bodies given by "non-human" geological and biological forces. Such a transmutation functions to conceal the underlying reproductive conditions—Indigenous earth-worlding capacity—of that which is now marked as nature/Earth. It is, I argue, the racialized production of nature that accounts, ultimately, for both the excess (from appropriation of Indigenous earth-worlds) and exhaustion (from erasure of their constituting conditions) of the political ecology of colonial capitalism.

This book thus further develops the Cortesian thesis by arguing that the collapse of Indigenous people into the sphere of irrational nature effectively makes space for the colonial-capitalist appropriation and erasure of the Indigenous socio-ecological practice and knowledge that has constituted the "natural" abundance of the frontier. The externalization and appropriation of nature, in other words, first requires that the racialized colonial register of global primitive accumulation erase Indigenous presence through the denial of the co-constitution of Indigenous practice and knowledge and the non-human natures of the frontier. The political ecology of the colonial-capitalism approach foregrounds, as such, the racialized appropriation and erasure of Indigenous earth-worlding capacity in frontier lands as imperative to the cheap food surplus underwriting, by facilitating wage repression, the productive powers of the capital–labor relation in the core. In so doing, it further suggests that the exhaustion of the ecological surplus, and

its associated accumulation crisis, is the contradictory outcome of both the subjugation of the Indigenous practices and knowledges co-constituting the frontier and the anticolonial resistance waged by those subject to such erasure.

The next/last frontier? Situating the global land grab within the *longue durée* of the colonial-capitalist world-ecology

The global land grab expresses the systemic colonial-capitalist logic of ecological surplus regeneration in the crisis context—rising food prices, economic recession—marking the exhaustion of the accumulation capacity of the neoliberal epoch of the capitalist world-ecology (McMichael, 2012, 2014; Moore, 2010a). The cheap-food basis of neoliberal accumulation had been secured by a combination of the food surpluses provisioned by the expansion of intensive industrial agriculture across Asia and Latin America—the "long green revolution" (Patel, 2013)—and the forced opening, or "liberalization," of the national agricultures of the South to the dictates of the global market (McMichael, 2005). This cheap-food regime has been brought to crisis, signaled most evidently by the sustained food-price rise, through a combination of the increasing costs associated with the ecological exhaustion of the long green revolution and the increasing resistance waged by both social movements and rising Southern states to the Northern dominated neoliberal agricultural order that has compromised the livelihoods of peasants and workers across much of the Agrarian South (McMichael, 2012, 2013). The renewal of capital's accumulation capacity is contingent upon the construction and appropriation of successive frontiers of unused nature capable, on account of the racialized denial of its reproductive conditions, of provisioning the "free gifts" of soil fertility and water abundance necessary for the lowering of production costs and the subsequent return of cheap food.

While frontier formation and appropriation has historically corresponded with North–South geopolitical power relations, a novel feature of the neoliberal conjunctural crises consists of an emergent South–South dynamic potentially challenging the foundational North–South order as the driving force of a successive accumulation cycle (Borras et al., 2011; Cammack, 2012; Golub, 2013). This suggests, moreover, that emerging states of the South are responding to the problematic of ecological exhaustion and "truncated agrarian transition" not through the derivative internalist frame suggested by the Eurocentric paradigm, but rather by seeking to overturn the North–South character of the capitalist world-ecological regime in favor of alternative world-ecological arrangements that could

recast such states as surplus-appropriating, rather than simply surplus-provisioning, zones. A crucial point of departure, I argue, for this challenge to the North–South framework of the capitalist world-ecology consists of the radical anticolonial socio-ecological articulations advanced by the Indigenous peoples—peasants, pastoralists, forest dwellers—of the South's frontier zones. The anticolonial resistance to the subjugation of the South as a "unit of nature" (Phillip, 2004) within the capitalist world-ecology would assume two distinct paths in the postcolonial era (Amin, 2016). The first, which was most fully articulated in China, overturned the property relations of the North–South capitalist world-ecology and rooted the sovereignty of the postcolonial state in socialized land reform that empowered the peasantry. The second form of the "rise of the South," which includes the path of India, failed to comprehensively overturn inherited colonial property relations and would come, as a result, to be captured within what the Agrarian South school has critiqued as a capitalist "catch-up" developmental paradigm (Agrarian South Editorial, 2012; Desai, 2016). For the second path, the inability to generate surplus through socialized land reform has meant that its form of anticolonial resistance has come to consist largely of challenging Northern world-ecological hegemony—what Samir Amin (2014) refers to as the "imperialist rent"—in order to make greater space for Southern led racialized frontier appropriation capable of resolving the South's agrarian question. This, then, expresses a key argument advanced by this book, namely that the capitalist South–South path of the global land grab signifies both a challenge to Northern world-ecological hegemony and the necessary post-crisis reinstantiation, albeit along South–South lines, of the foundational racialized society–nature paradigm of capitalist development. In making this claim, the book suggests that it is only by returning to the first path—the rooting of sovereignty in nationalized and socialized land reform—that Southern states can open a sustained path to challenging Northern world-ecological hegemony.

This claim finds particular expression in the attempted post-crisis transnationalization of Indian agricultural production into the Gambella province of Ethiopia. The combination of an internal ecological exhaustion of its green revolution frontier, expressed in declining soil fertility and water-table levels and increasingly mobilized constituencies of peasants and tribals constraining domestic agricultural frontier expansion, has resulted in a persistent food-price inflation crisis in India since 2007 (Anand et al., 2016; Gokarn, 2011). At the same time, India, like other emerging states of the South, is increasingly wary of securing a cheap food supply through a global market dominated by Northern agribusiness corporations, and has thus taken the lead in stalling Northern attempts to consolidate such market dominance in the Doha round of the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations

(Hopewell, 2015; McMichael, 2012; Rowden, 2011). In the absence of an internal frontier appropriation capacity, and resistant to the global surplus–provisioning capacity of Northern, and particularly American, agribusiness corporations, I argue that the Indian state has looked to support the global expansion of its own agribusiness sector in order to facilitate direct access to offshore food production. Within India's capitalist development path, the constraints imposed on "internal" frontier appropriation by the "right to live" demands secured by peasants and *adivasis* compels a "global" pursuit of *terra nullius* into extra-national space wherein Indigenous peoples and extra-human natures are cast, on account of their irrational waste of abundant "free gifts," as rightless beings incapable of making claims upon the "value" generated by their dispossession.

Deploying the framework of the political ecology of colonial capitalism, the argument advanced in Chapter 5 is that, within the neoliberal crisis conjuncture, the capitalist resolution of the agrarian question in the national space of India calls forth, through the practice of "global primitive accumulation," the racialized construction of frontiers of unused nature in an emergent extra-national zone of appropriation. As an examination of the expansion of Indian agricultural production into the Gambella province of Ethiopia reveals, the cheap food provisioned from the frontier remains premised upon the "Cortesian" racialized appropriation and erasure of Indigenous knowledge and practice. Specifically, the cheap-food imperative of Indian capitalist development constructs the fertile soils and abundant waters of Gambella as "unused" natures hitherto wasted by the "primitive" practices of the Indigenous Anywaa people. Indian state and capital thus simultaneously appropriate and erase the Indigenous practice and knowledge which has been historically integral to the socio-ecological foundation of Gambella's "natural" abundance. In this case, however, this book further argues that the Cortesian premise through which Gambella's reproductive conditions were denied, in order to recast its soils and waters as a "free gift" of nature, would rapidly shift the frontier from a condition of "surplus" to "exhaustion" as socio-ecological movements of Indigenous resistance and extra-human natures converged to sink the Karuturi project.

Structure of the book

Chapter 1 critically engages the implications of the agrarian question framework for the study of the global land grab. It begins by recognizing the important emphasis that the agrarian question framework places upon class struggle, particularly as it relates to an emergent capital–labor antagonism, as a key variable in agrarian transitions. While thus constituting

a necessary response to the more celebratory accounts of transition forwarded in classical political economy, Western Marxist approaches to the agrarian question, the chapter argues, nonetheless fall within what I call a "Eurocentric-anthropocentric" paradigm which privileges Europeans as the exclusive originary agents of agrarian transition. This, consequently, reduces much of the non-European world to a derivative space destined to follow the paths of transition forged earlier by autochthonous European societies. The chapter seeks to reveal that such an origins–diffusion framework informs much of the cautious optimism with which powerful developmental actors and organizations, particularly the World Bank, have identified the surge in global land deals as potential mechanisms for overcoming the stalled agrarian transition in the Global South. It then considers the extent to which more critical world-historical approaches to the agrarian question have overcome the "origins–diffusion" premise, particularly through a foregrounding of the "extra-national" colonial basis of the classical European transitions, and what the implications are, in terms of both potentialities and limitations, of such a "global" reconceptualization for the study of the land grab.

Chapter 2 both builds upon the potentialities and overcomes the limitations of the world-historical approaches engaged in Chapter 1 through a more direct theoretical and historical set of reflections on the relation between colonialism, capitalism, and planetary ecological crises. While retaining the world-historical premise of world-systems analysis and third-world Marxism regarding the colonial basis of the classical European transitions to capitalism, the chapter moves to overcome what I identify to be their "quantitative limitation." Specifically, world-historical approaches have largely conceived of the function of race to colonial capitalism as providing ideological legitimation for the theft of land and labor and the transfer of surplus from the periphery, which is understood to serve as the quantitative basis for the reproduction of the definitive qualitative capital–labor relation in the core. It is in integrating the ecological dimensions of the transition to capitalism, as Chapter 2 demonstrates, that we are able to grasp and articulate the qualitative social–ecological relations that emerge from, and continue to structure, the colonial foundations of the capitalist world-ecology. The chapter undertakes this objective through a close engagement with the world-ecology approach to the Capitalocene, and in particular with its claim that the capitalist world-ecology is reproduced through two distinct yet co-constitutive qualitative contradictions—capital–labor and society–nature. In drawing the Capitalocene into conversation with anti-colonial theory and historical ecology, the chapter ultimately demonstrates that capitalism's founding society–nature distinction is underwritten by the racialized denial of humanity to the Indigenous peoples of the frontier.

Chapter 3 deepens the Cortesian thesis introduced in Chapter 2 by moving beyond the premise of conquest in accounting for the analytical significance of Indigenous earth-worlding capacity. It demonstrates that the racialized society–nature distinction emerges out of the European settler's move to effect a "reversal of dependence" upon Indigenous peoples whose earth-worlding capacity had been vital to the survival of the settler. Specifically, the racialized society–nature distinction structures the "appropriation and erasure" of Indigenous earth-worlding capacity that comes to underpin both colonial capitalism's productive power and recurrent ecological exhaustions. The chapter demonstrates, in other words, that rather than being premised upon an appropriation of the "free gifts" of nature, as the world-ecology approach argues, capital accumulation finds its condition of possibility in the appropriation and erasure of the earth-worlding capacities of colonized Indigenous peoples. The chapter further clarifies the key contradiction of frontier appropriation, namely how the racialized denial of the reproductive conditions of the frontier, while setting in motion the ecological surplus underpinning capital's historical accumulation cycles, comes ultimately to exhaust the frontier's surplus provisioning capacity. This "surplus–exhaustion" contradiction is shown to be central to the rise and fall of successive accumulation cycles from the emergence, via the colonization of the Americas, of the capitalist world-ecology in the long sixteenth century to the anticolonial exhaustion of the British-led accumulation cycle of the long nineteenth century.

Chapter 4 shifts focus to account for the "rise of the South" in the contested reconstitution of the accumulation capacity of the capitalist world-ecology over the "long twentieth century." In so doing, the aim is to elaborate the necessary historical and geopolitical framework through which particular "South–South" transnational agricultural investments can be seen to simultaneously challenge the historically core Northern zone's exclusive claim to control over the global ecological surplus while potentially reinstantiating, though now in service of capitalist development centered in the South, its underlying premise of racialized frontier formation that was elaborated in the previous chapter. Key to this elaboration will be contrasting the divergence between those Southern states which overturned the property relations inherited from the capitalist world-ecology and those which were not able to do so. It will be suggested that postcolonial states that were able to consolidate sovereignty on the basis of comprehensive land reform, and thus established a broader "popular" basis of national development, have proven more capable of opening South–South relations de-linked from the colonial capitalist world-ecology than those, such as India, that were less successful in effecting such reform and thus remained captured by the bourgeois and landlord classes that had constituted the Indigenous beneficiaries of the colonial ecological surplus drain.

To this end, the chapter combines the "agrarian question of national liberation" framework developed by Frantz Fanon, Amilcar Cabral, and Sam Moyo and Paris Yeros, with Samir Amin's account of the contradictions of what he terms the "reawakening of the South" (2010). It does so in order to emphasize that the active opposition articulated to the motive forces of capitalist development, by those consigned to "primitive human" or "extra human" status, figures centrally into both the exhaustion, and attempted reconstitution, of the ecological surplus underpinning capital's accumulation capacity. The more radical dimensions of the anticolonial rejection of the South as a "unit of nature" were, however, compromised for those postcolonial states that embraced a conception of development as catching up with the North (Amin, 2016). This necessarily called for the appropriation of an "internal" ecological surplus oriented toward rapid national industrial development. The relation between the threat of recolonization and the imperative of rapidly "catching up" has historically been structured by both the accumulation imperatives of imperial capital driving recolonization and the degree to which postcolonial states had overturned the colonial property relations underlying capital accumulation in the core. In the case we will examine most closely, the postcolonial Indian state, having failed at instituting comprehensive land reform, did not so much contest the underlying racialized society–nature distinction as seek to reorder it in the service of what Fanon characterizes as bourgeois national development. A further argument of this chapter, then, is that the "long twentieth century" is marked by an ongoing North–South contestation over the imperialist rent (Amin, 2014) that, more specifically, expresses control over the mobilization and circulation of the world-ecological surplus.

Chapter 5 applies the theoretical framework of the political ecology of colonial capitalism to the neoliberal crisis conjuncture giving rise to the land grab, which necessarily situates the latter within the *longue durée* of the rise and fall of the successive cycles of the capitalist world-ecology. It locates the land grab in relation to the neoliberal accumulation crisis indexing the end of the long twentieth century, and thus considers how such attempted frontier formation potentiates the surplus necessary for a successive accumulation cycle. Building on the "agrarian question of national liberation" framework engaged in Chapter 4, I articulate the land grab as a strategy of "capitalist restoration" in the face of a global peasant countermovement that both was integral to bringing the neoliberal agrarian order to crisis and, in its more militant trajectories, advanced an alternative resolution to the neoliberal crisis in the form of a "re-peasantization" program premised upon renewing and deepening anticolonial land reclamation. The capacity of emerging Southern states to resolve the neoliberal crisis in an anticolonial direction would be contingent on the extent to which they

responded to agrarian counter-movements by restructuring their development paths upon Fanon's "peasant basis" via a renewed project of land reform. Ultimately, it has been the case that the majority of Southern states, including India, remained incapable of instituting the land-reform option, and thus found themselves structurally compelled to respond to the contradictions of the neoliberal accumulation crisis with a "land grab as development" strategy. Specifically, the foreclosure of a development path restructured upon the broad basis of land reform would intensify the contradictions between the welfarist response of Southern states to the neoliberal crisis and the imperatives of capitalist accumulation. The chapter focuses on how, in a context in which land reform is refused, the ecological exhaustion of the long green revolution and the "third movement" forces contesting the neoliberal zone of appropriation, while bringing the neoliberal accumulation cycle to crisis, poses particular problems, at both national and global scales, of ecological surplus regeneration to Southern states in pursuit of "development as catching-up-with-the-West" (Charkrabarty, 2010).

In India more specifically, the protective measures and large-scale welfare schemes the national state has been forced to institute in response to counter-movements generated by the neoliberal agrarian crisis, when combined with the ecological exhaustion of India's green revolution frontier, have contributed to a persistent problem of food-price inflation that threatens the ongoing consolidation of capitalist development. Propelled, then, by the imperative of enhancing the agrarian surplus in order to secure the cheap-food basis of capitalist development, the transnationalization of Indian agricultural production into the Gambella province of Ethiopia signifies the "triple movement" logic wherein the hegemonic resolution of the contradictions of primitive accumulation in the core national zone necessitates "global primitive accumulation" in extra-national spaces. The land grab in Gambella thus constructs the necessary frontier zone of unused nature that can be exhaustively drawn upon to provision India's cheap-food imperative. It reveals such racialized frontier formation through an extended empirical discussion, based upon fieldwork conducted in Gambella as well as secondary research, of how the Karuturi agricultural investment is premised upon the appropriation and erasure of the socio-ecological practice and knowledge of Indigenous Anywaa communities. The empirical discussion further captures how such erasure ultimately proved fatal to the project, as the epistemological inability to incorporate Indigenous knowledge that accounts for extra-human agency left the company dramatically unaware of the particular socio-ecological dynamics of the Baro River ecosystem on whose floodplain the land concession was located.

In light of the evident global inequalities, exclusions, and ecological exhaustion associated with the attempted reinauguration, via the global land grab, of the ecological surplus underpinning capitalist accumulation, this book concludes, in the final chapter, with some brief reflections upon the challenges involved in forwarding more sustainable and equitable socio-ecological relations in the contemporary context. It looks in particular to the potentiality of what the Agrarian South school has identified as a resurgent agrarian question forged across the Global South by land-reclamation movements driven by those dispossessed by the racial property regimes of the capitalist world-ecology. Insofar as it is driven by the dispossessed of the peripheries, this "new" agrarian question stands as a potential renewal of egalitarian and sustaining earth-worlds built upon land redistribution to Indigenous peoples and peasants.

Notes

1 For early articulations of race and nature in the land-grabbing literature, see Gill (2016) and Mollett (2016).
2 See for instance, the following special issues on land grabbing across a range of journals (Borras et al., 2011; Edelman et al., 2013; Oliveira et al., 2021; White et al., 2012).
3 I take the *longue durée* temporal framework from the world-systems analytical framework for the historical study of the capitalist world-system. See especially Giovanni Arrighi's *The Long Twentieth Century* (1994).
4 See Farshad Araghi (2009b) for a critique of this "developmentalist" agrarian question against its original political framing.

1

The world-historical agrarian question: global land rush and the reproduction of the capitalist world-system

This chapter takes as its specific point of departure the challenge of "scaling up the debate" on the global land grab to the level of the "agrarian transition in the global South" (Li, 2011, 294). Formulated by Byres (1977, 1996) as a key process in the successful resolution of the broader agrarian *question problematique*, agrarian transition signifies the process whereby radical structural transformations of the countryside enable poor developing countries to generate the agricultural productivity gains necessary to shift an increasing proportion of capital and labor out of the low-income agrarian sector and into higher-income industrial and service sectors. In this sense, the agrarian transition is further held to be expressive of the transition from stagnant pre-capitalist agrarian societies toward a wealthy and dynamic, if unequal and exploitative, capitalist modernity. The historical evidence for the centrality of agrarian transition to the emergence and consolidation of capitalist development is drawn from the successful achievement of European modernization wherein leading European states are assumed to have undergone a series of revolutionary transformations in agrarian land relations and property regimes that enabled rapid and substantial increases in agricultural productivity. While the Global South, upon achieving independence from the colonial powers, had been expected to follow a similar line of development, Li argues that the development impasse confronting much of the South today is largely attributable to a "truncated agrarian transition" (Li, 2011, 294). For Li, then, the central question at stake in the debates surrounding large-scale agricultural land acquisitions consists of the degree to which such deals promise to facilitate, or threaten to construct further obstacles to, the overcoming of the truncated agrarian transition in the South.

This chapter examines the implications of the agrarian question framework for the theoretical and historical interpretation of the post-crisis proliferation of large-scale agricultural land deals—the global land grab—in the South. While the framework of the agrarian question points us to necessary questions on the broader socio-economic implications of agrarian change, I

argue that its explanatory power in relation to the global land grab is limited in part due to a pervasive methodological internalism (Bhambra, 2011; McMichael, 2008) and anthropocentrism that has occluded from sufficient analytical and theoretical consideration the global and ecological dimensions of processes of agrarian transition. Such a methodological orientation emphasizes that political and socio-economic transformation of, and variation among, different human societies (e.g. underdeveloped agrarian societies, developed industrial/post-industrial states) is principally to be explained by endogenous social processes driven by self-contained (national, regional, racial, or civilizational) subjects. Delimiting the investigative focus in such a way, the initial historical examples of agrarian transition in Western Europe are understood as an outcome of internal transformations in class structures and property regimes, and the subsequent prescription for "late developers," particularly in the South, similarly places an exclusive focus on the national as the necessary scale at which to identify the obstacles to successful development. Conventional approaches to the agrarian *question problematique*, then, too often reproduce a Eurocentric "origins–diffusion" model of historical change (Blaut, 1993), through which it is assumed that transformative processes first set in motion in Europe will eventually be generalized to the rest of the world. As we will see in the first section of this chapter, such an origins–diffusion premise informs much of the cautious optimism with which developmental actors and organizations, such as the World Bank, identified the surge in global land deals as potential mechanisms for overcoming the stalled agrarian transition.

The second section of this chapter considers to what extent the "Eurocentric–anthropocentric" limitations of conventional approaches to the agrarian question are addressed by critical scholars seeking to situate the problematic in a world-historical context. Analytical frameworks of world-systems, food regimes, and global value relations reveal, significantly, how the agrarian question, since its inception, has been posed, resolved, and renewed in a global register. The transition, in other words, from agrarian to modern industrial capitalist society has, these approaches argue, historically been effected through global rather than national processes of land and labor transformations. More specifically, the historical transition toward higher productivity and self-sustaining growth in Western Europe was premised upon the extraction of an agrarian surplus from "rightless" labor in politically subjugated colonies. The world-historical approach to the agrarian question thus provides an important framework through which we can begin to elucidate the global dimensions of agrarian transition implicated in contemporary land grabbing.

A significant limitation, however, of the world-historical framework consists of the predominant *quantitative* emphasis it places on the global

extraction and circulation of agrarian surplus from the peripheral to core zones of the world-system. The concern here is that this risks occluding the specific qualitative world-scale socio-ecological relations forged in the making of agrarian transition. The global value relations approach has, to an extent, addressed this limitation in its foregrounding of the qualitative class relations comprising the world-historical agrarian question, particularly in terms of labor differentiation across the core (rights-bearing labor) and peripheral (rightless labor) zones of the world-system. Nonetheless, it too has failed to sufficiently articulate the specific socio-ecological relations—the co-constitution of race and nature—through which, I argue, the agrarian transition has historically proceeded on a world scale.

Agriculture and development within the Eurocentric–anthropocentric paradigm of capitalist modernity

The World Bank and the epistemological foundations of land grabbing

In the attempt to understand the deeper systemic dimensions of the global land grab, critical agrarian scholars have identified the World Bank as a principal epistemic actor in the mobilization, and legitimation, of large-scale land deals as potential win–win scenarios through which the profit-seeking imperatives of transnational capital can converge with the development goals of environmentally sustainable agricultural productivity enhancement and poverty reduction in the "Agrarian South" (Borras et al., 2011; De Schutter, 2011; Deininger et al., 2011; Li, 2011; McMichael, 2012). Such an active role in the land-grab debate reaffirms the Bank's long-standing commitment to serve as the central knowledge storehouse for all questions relating to development, and to do so in ways that particularly foreground the superiority of capitalist development as the path that inevitably awaits the developing world (Goldman, 2006). In line with such a self-understanding, the Bank offered arguably the most robust policy response to the proliferation of large-scale land acquisitions in a detailed report titled *Rising Global Interest in Farmland: Can It Yield Sustainable and Equitable Benefits?* (Deininger et al., 2011), which presented the empirical need for the continuation of profit-driven, yet socially and environmentally responsible, investments in the undercapitalized agricultural regions of the South. While this report serves as an important example of the Bank's response to the land-grab criticisms leveled by NGOs and human-rights organizations (GRAIN, 2008; OI, 2011), and it is one to which I will shortly return, critical observers (Akram-Lodhi, 2009; Li, 2009; 2011; McMichael, 2012; Watts, 2009) of the land grab have identified the Bank's earlier 2008 WDR,

titled *Agriculture and Development*, as a foundational text setting the stage for the mobilization and legitimation of large-scale agricultural land acquisitions in the years that have followed the report's publication.

The 2008 WDR signified the first time in twenty-five years that the Bank centered agriculture as an economic sector and livelihood strategy vital to the development prospects of developing states in the South. The report was considered in some ways to be a welcome attempt to rectify a long-standing neglect of agriculture, which was largely an outcome of the Bank's imposition of neoliberal loan conditionalities that forced indebted states in the South to remove public support for their agricultural sectors (Akram-Lodhi, 2009). At a more structural level, however, the attempted recalibration did not represent a "paradigm-shifting reimagining of the policy and practice of rural development" (Akram-Lodhi, 2009) but rather remained overdetermined by the Bank's foundational self-constitution as a modernizing agent uniquely capable of, and therefore responsible for, uplifting a generic pre-modern agricultural producer—the peasant—who otherwise risks remaining trapped in a timeless poverty across much of the South. The peasant first came to figure centrally in the Bank's imagination during what Michael Goldman (2005) has termed the "McNamara era" (1968–1981) when, under the helm of former US secretary of defense, Robert McNamara, it sought to reconsolidate the hegemony of capitalist accumulation on a world scale in the face of threats posed by militant, peasant-based, anticolonial nationalisms in the third world. McNamara, as defense secretary during the defeat of US imperialism in Vietnam, experienced the evident failure of military power to tame the "unruly" figure of the third-world peasant, particularly in the era of decolonization, which propelled him during his tenure as World Bank president to center the potential of economic modernization and development in attenuating the threat of anti-imperialist radicalism emanating from "peasant wars" (Wolf, 1968). This mandate, while centering the peasant as the baseline of development, ultimately sought to re-secure the hegemony of the capitalist North by casting it as the catalyzing agent in the transformation of the pre-modern peasant, "living on the bare margin of subsistence" (Goldman, 2005, 68) in a stagnant agrarian economy, into modern subjects, whether as productive capitalist farmers, waged farm workers, or urban-based factory workers.

The 2008 WDR, though claiming to think afresh the relationship between agriculture and development, recalls this foundational premise of peasant as eternally entrapped in a timeless "original" condition of poverty as it attempts to renew, in the context of the growing assertion of South–South initiatives that challenge the hegemony of the capitalist North, the Bank's self-defined historical mission of leading the development project. Thus, the opening sentence of the report calls forth the twenty-first century's signifier

of the stagnant peasant, the "African woman bent under the sun, weeding sorghum in an arid field with a hoe, a child strapped on her back," embodying as such the "vivid image of rural poverty" that secures the institutional and ideological mandate of development organizations such as the Bank (WB, 2008, 1). This condition of life situates the peasant African woman in a wretched "original" state of dependence upon, and subjugation to, an adversarial natural environment from which she must be uplifted, for otherwise the "meager bounty of subsistence farming is the only chance to survive" (WB, 2008, 1). The horizon against which the report measures the impoverished African peasant is that of Europe (Li, 2009), understood as the civilizational space that occupies the lead in humanity's evolutionary promise of mastering, rather than being mastered by, nature, and in so doing reaching levels of agricultural productivity and efficiency that can facilitate the transition of a greater proportion of human labor out of the primitive stage of low-productivity agriculture into the more properly human stage of scientifically based, technologically advanced industrial production. The resolution to the problem of the enduring poverty of the peasant in the Agrarian South, then, is to apply the lessons revealed through the historical European evolution from agricultural to industrial society. Corresponding with such an evolutionary trajectory, the report categorizes the South into three worlds of agriculture: (i) agricultural-based countries (Africa); (ii) transitioning countries (Asia); and (iii) industrial countries (Latin America) (WB, 2008, 31). These three worlds are assumed to signify the successive stages traveled by the early developers in Europe, and the report, reaffirming the "agro-pessimism" of modernist thought (Akram-Lodhi, 2009, 1153), ultimately calls for movement from the lower agrarian stages to the highest urban industrial stage. Recalling the specific preconditions of the European transition, the report foregrounds the centrality of capitalist market reforms, such as strengthening property rights, integration into global markets, and profit-driven production, which, when properly implemented, mobilize and harness a logic of competition exclusively capable of rationally utilizing agricultural resources in ways that ensure maximum productivity and efficiency (Akram-Lodhi, 2009; Li, 2009; Oya, 2008; WB, 2008).

The theoretical and historical framework through which the report locates structural transformation in the countryside as central to harnessing "agriculture for development" draws upon, as several commentators (Akram-Lodhi, 2009, 1153; Watts, 2009) have noted, two of the most influential approaches to "agriculture and development"—modernization theory's advocacy of the liberal capitalist path, and the political economy framework of the agrarian question.[1] The antagonism between the developmental agrarian question[2] and modernization theory regarding the superiority of either capitalist or socialist development paths does not result here

in a paralyzing contradiction, as the report is more fundamentally drawing from the two schools of thought at their broader points of convergence within what we might identify, building upon Enrique Dussel's notion, as the "Eurocentric–anthropocentric" paradigm of modernity. Dussel (1998), in reflecting upon the late-twentieth-century crisis of modernity, identifies a dominant Eurocentric paradigm encompassing a wide range of epistemological orientations which locate the origins of modernity, whether as an emancipatory or oppressive signifier, as an exclusive property of Europe. The point of extending Dussel's conceptualization to include anthropocentrism as a co-constitutive ideological and material force is to take seriously, though perhaps at a wider scale, Marx's own insistence that the exercise of capital as a relation of power fundamentally rests upon the mutually reinforcing domination of the earth and human labor (Foster, 2000, 74). In broadening Dussel's conceptualization to the register of a Eurocentric–anthropocentric paradigm of modernity, my claim is that European modernity's founding moment of "mastery over nonhuman natures" is bound up within the domination of the dehumanized non-European other, and ideological approaches cultivated within such a paradigm reproduce such relations of power by reaffirming the exclusion of the non-human and the dehumanized from the constitution of modernity. Such an exclusion renders "nature" and the racialized non-European as passive figures to be acted upon by the active, civilizing force of European modernity. In working through how the report has been influenced by modernization theory and the *problematique* of the agrarian question, the broader impact of this Eurocentric–anthropocentric paradigm on the question of "agriculture and development" becomes evident.

Modernization theory and the defense of the capitalist path

The report's framing of "three worlds of agriculture," through which developing countries must pass in successive order to achieve the goal of development, constitutes a rather explicit restatement of the "stages of development" evolutionary ontology forwarded by modernization theory in the immediate Cold War context in which the postcolonial era, and the question of the development of the South, emerged (Akram-Lodhi, 2009, 1157). Informing the constitution of the Bank's institutional self-identity (Goldman, 2005), modernization theory emerged as a defense of the superiority of the path of capitalist development at a moment when militant anticolonial movements were increasingly rejecting integration into a Northern-dominated capitalist world-system. Originally formulated by Walt Rostow (1990) as a "non-communist manifesto" for the decolonizing world, modernization

theory sought to offer a powerful explanatory and analytical response to the central questions of the decolonial era, namely how to account for the historical divergence between the "advanced" developed world and the "backwards" underdeveloped world, and what measures might allow for a greater convergence between the two. Rostow forwarded an evolutionary schema which held that while all human societies shared a common origin in a primitive "agricultural stage," only the most advanced societies had hitherto fulfilled their evolutionary potential of reaching full maturity through ascension to the fifth and final stage of "high mass consumption." Within such a schema, the "traditional society" of the initial agricultural stage is defined by "limited production functions," whose growth is constrained by its "pre-Newtonian attitudes towards the physical world" (Rostow, 1990, 4). For a society to achieve "take-off" from the primitive stage, it is necessary that the predominant agricultural sector experience exponential increases in productivity—more food and industrial inputs produced per unit of labor—that would enable sufficient quantities of capital and labor to be transferred out of agriculture and into the emergent modern industrial sectors. Rostow identifies the fundamental pre-conditions for the unleashing of such productive powers as the introduction of a Newtonian worldview, which is understood as signifying "that watershed in history when men came widely to believe that the external world was subject to a few knowable laws, and was systematically capable of productive manipulation" (Rostow, 1990, 4). This watershed moment is exclusively located as an endogenous epistemological innovation of seventeenth-century Western Europe (Rostow, 1990, 31), where the concept first took hold that "man need not regard his physical environment as virtually a factor given by nature and providence, but as an ordered world which, if rationally understood, can be manipulated in ways which yield productive changes and, in one dimension at least, progress" (Rostow, 1990, 19).

Rostow's reduction of nature to an external world existing for the sake of human productive manipulation constitutes a reaffirmation of the anthropocentric "mastery over nature" epistemological paradigm, which has long been widely held to constitute the distinctive orientation of Western modernity (Connolly, 1990; Leiss, 1972). Deeply troubled by repeated outbreaks of plagues, famines, and wars, early modern European thinkers attributed such catastrophes to the untamed irrationalities of nature, which included the so-called human passions, and identified the pressing need to distinguish the rationality of the human mind from the irrationality of nature (including the base "unthought" desires of the body). Only through the effecting of such an ontological distinction between mind/body and society/nature could the non-human natural world be apprehended in its objective truth, and thus subjected to the dominion of rationally developed and applied human

knowledge. Within such a modernist epistemology, the mastery of nature, in so much as it allows for greater control and manipulation of the external non-human world, is held to secure human life against the vulnerabilities to which it is subjected by the irrational rule of nature. Such an epistemological and ontological shift, Rostow argues, has been the exclusive point of departure for the unleashing of humanity's evolutionary potential of progressing to higher "stages of development."

While the pre-conditions for "take-off" from the primitive agricultural stage to the higher industrial and consumerist stages are produced endogenously in Europe through the innovation of the Newtonian worldview, for inhabitants of the non-European world—whom enlightenment thinkers positioned closer to irrational nature, or trapped in an irrational despotism, than as rational human thinkers—such processes could only be triggered if their "traditional societies" were "taken over and organized" by the more advanced societies of Europe (Rostow, 1990, 107–109). In so doing, European colonial powers assumed their historical responsibility of "bringing about the transformation in thought, knowledge, institutions and the supply of social overhead capital which moved the colonial society along the transitional path" (Rostow, 1990, 112). Thus, modernization theory reconfirms the Eurocentric–anthropocentric paradigm of modernity, through which European scientific thought and practice are understood as the origins of the productivity-enhancing mastery-over-nature praxis, which then can only be generalized through the diffusion of knowledge effected successively by the colonial and postcolonial developmental "aid" projects.

Agrarian question: primitive accumulation and class forces in the transition to capitalism

The principal critical alternative to the study of agriculture and development, and one which, as mentioned above, the Bank's 2008 report draws upon in addition to modernization theory, consists of the agrarian question framework (Watts, 2009). Originally conceived in the late nineteenth century by leading European Marxist intellectuals (Engels, 1894; Kautsky, 1988; Lenin, 1899) concerned with the place of pre-capitalist agrarian social classes, such as the peasantry, in socialist revolutionary movements, the agrarian question inquired into how capitalism was seizing hold of, and transforming, the agricultural sector. This concern can be understood in light of the historical complication of Marxism's political strategy, which located the dissolution of the peasantry as a necessary premise of the transition from feudal agrarian pre-modern societies to industrial capitalist modernity. Marxism maintained that in the future emancipatory transition

to communism, the decisive contradiction was between the capitalist and the proletarian, with the latter's victory heralding the necessary transcendence of the capitalist epoch. Thus, the persistence of the peasantry in maturing capitalist societies posed serious questions for revolutionary strategies, particularly concerning the position that socialist parties and movements should take regarding potentially reactionary pre-capitalist feudal demands (Akram-Lodhi and Kay, 2009, 7). This led to a critical reengagement with Marx's foundational inquiry into the role of agrarian change in the emergence of capitalist modernity, and whether, in particular, the peasant's unique mode of production could facilitate, or at least be incorporated into, transitions to first capitalist and then socialist modernities.

Reading the agrarian question back into Marx, then, highlights a further dimension of this analytical framework. Rather than focus on how capital was transforming the agrarian, Marx centered the question of what changes in agrarian structures and relations constituted the necessary condition of possibility for the generalized emergence of capitalist accumulation. This emphasis on the agrarian origins of capitalism (Wood, 2000) emerged out of his critique of both Hegelian idealist and classical political economy interpretations of social transformation and development. Hegelian approaches centered changes in human ideas and consciousness as the propulsive force of history, which corresponds with Rostow's identification of the "Newtonian worldview" as the force propelling the takeoff of human society beyond the stage of limited agricultural productivity. For Marx (Marx and Engels, 1940), this represented an obfuscation of the primacy of the material transformations in social relations through which supposedly progressive forms of consciousness emerge. While classical political economy, as seen in particular in Adam Smith's explanatory account of the *Wealth of Nations* (1993), did center economic change as key to broader social transformation, for Marx (1946) this approach did so in ways that served to ideologically legitimize the supremacy of the bourgeois class in the emergent capitalist order. Seeking to challenge this supremacy, and in so doing facilitate the liberation of the subjected working class, Marx undertook the task of critically interrogating an underexplored, yet fundamental, premise—previous, or original, accumulation—of Smith's account of the rise of capital. It was in this historical reconceptualization of what Marx would term "primitive accumulation" that he uncovered material processes of agrarian transformation as the ground upon which capitalist modernity emerges.

While within an existing capitalist order the accumulation of capital proceeds through the appropriation of the surplus generated through prior investments of capital, a key theoretical question for political economy consists of how such a process historically comes into being (Akram-Lodhi and Kay, 2010; Perelman, 2000). In other words, how does a sufficient stock

of capital initially come to be held by a class motivated by the imperative of competition and profit? Identifying such a moment as the previous accumulation of capital, Smith implied that this was largely a natural outcome of the innate human tendency to "truck, trade, and barter." Over generations, those who had been capable of saving and efficiency slowly came to accumulate the necessary stock of capital, while those, on the other hand, who had been incapable of saving were eventually left without any assets (Smith, 1993, 159–161). In this sense, the "natural" concentration of capital was achieved, as those most capable of efficient use of resources came to direct the investment and production process, while those without such foresight were to, "naturally," fulfill the requirements of manual labor (Marx, 1946, 873–874).

Marx, refusing to accept such naturalization of bourgeois class rule, emphasized, in contrast, the role of violence in the primitive accumulation of capital (Marx, 1946, chapter 26). Reconceptualizing capital as a social relation of power, Marx argued that capital accumulation was more than simply the realization of profit from investments, but rather fundamentally consisted of capital's forced appropriation of surplus value generated by a class of dispossessed wage-laborers. Within such a framework of a "critique of political economy," the investigation of the original, or "primitive accumulation of capital," moved beyond the concern over the emergence of the initial stock of capital, and thus centered more on how capital as a social relation of power came to be constituted. The key question to consider, in particular, was the emergence of a class of dispossessed laborers with no means of reproducing their lives from one day to the next other than selling their labor to the class which held exclusive ownership over the means of subsistence. Contra classical political economy, which normalized such inequalities as a natural and just distribution of capabilities, Marx centralized the violent enclosures which swept through Western Europe, and especially England, in the late medieval and early modern era (Marx, 1946, 877–895). The enclosures specifically consisted of the forcible dispossession of agricultural producers—peasants—from land, whether held privately or in common, by an emergent class of capitalist landlords, backed by the state, looking to enlarge the lands available for increasingly profitable sheep farming. It was, thus, out of these radical material transformations in agrarian relations and property regimes, that we could find the basis of capital's immensely productive powers. In particular, Marx's point was that feudal and peasant modes of production were based on social relations that had fettered the further development of the forces of production. It was only with the emergence of capital and proletarianized labor, and the unique set of relations through which these two classes encountered one another, that the productive capacities necessary for the transition to industrial society could be realized.

While Marx provided, through his historical materialist account of primitive accumulation, the foundations for a critical agrarian political economy, he did not sufficiently elaborate upon his own theoretical and empirical innovations. A more robust historical materialist interpretation of the agrarian origins of capitalist modernity was provided by Robert Brenner in the 1970s and 1980s, in a seminal intervention into the renewed postwar debates among historians concerned with transitions to capitalist modernity (Akram-Lodhi and Kay, 2010, 196). Contesting the prevailing "demographic" and "commerce" orthodoxies, which respectively argued that variations in population growth or trade levels were the primary motor of modernization, Brenner (1976) sought to shift focus onto the primacy of class struggle and underlying social property relations, particularly in the agrarian context. Building from the theoretical and historical framework introduced by Marx in his chapter on primitive accumulation, Brenner's premise recalled Marx's dictum that the potentiality of the objective forces of production is dependent upon the specific set of class-based social property relations underlying a given society's reproduction. Thus, Brenner argued that variations in demographic trends and trade volumes assume significance for the transition to capitalism only when they can be mobilized by the right balance of class forces expressed in the capital–labor relation (Brenner, 1976, 31).

Following Marx in identifying agrarian England as the originary historical-geographical ground of primitive accumulation, Brenner argued that it was the specific English resolution to the class struggle that had emerged from the contradictions of feudalism which set in motion the necessary conditions for the establishment of capitalist class relations and the self-sustaining productivity growth they would engender (Brenner, 1976, 47). This resolution or reconstitution of the balance of class forces involved a "two-sided process of class development and class conflict" (Brenner, 1976, 47) that first freed the peasantry from the extra-economic coercion imposed by feudal landlords, and then, through the landlord class's attempt to reconsolidate its power via wide-scale land enclosures, effectively dispossessed the peasantry from direct access to the means of subsistence that they had won in their earlier struggle against serfdom. The second moment did not, however, entirely negate the first, as the peasants' resistance against serfdom continued to deny the landlord class the ability to extract from them a surplus employing extra-economic coercion. The end result of this process, Brenner argues, was that neither landlord nor peasant could reproduce themselves outside of increasingly competitive market relations (Brenner, 1985, 214–215). The landlord, unable to use extra-economic coercion to increase the proportion appropriated from a tenant farmer's constant surplus, was now compelled to lease out land to those capable of continually

increasing their production levels. This emergent capitalist tenant class was, in turn, motivated to seek constant improvement of their agricultural methods in order to meet the increasingly competitive leases sought out by the landlord class. As a result of these common market–based compulsions, there emerged a "landlord/tenant symbiosis which brought mutual co-operation in investment and improvement" (Brenner, 1976, 65). For the dispossessed peasantry, the loss of direct access to the means of subsistence left them with no means of securing their reproduction without selling their labor power to the emergent capitalist farmer. This provided the necessary exploitable class of labor required by the capitalist farmer in his quest to enact agricultural improvement.

Brenner thus concludes that "it was the emergence of the 'classic' landlord/capitalist tenant/wage-laborer structure which made possible the transformation of agricultural production in England, and this in turn, was the key to England's uniquely successful overall economic development" (Brenner, 1976, 49). While this recalls Rostow's emphasis on the link between agricultural productivity and the "take-off" into self-sustaining economic growth more broadly, for Brenner, the point is that the emergence of a "technological rationality," through which the self-interest of each actor, regardless of class position, converges with systemic growth rather than stagnation, is itself grounded upon the material transformations of agrarian social property relations that produce a radical market dependence for social reproduction. Unable to reproduce themselves outside of competitive market relations, the emergent "economic" actors of the capitalist mode of production were driven to maximize efficiency and minimize costs, which thus set free the hitherto constrained potential for technological innovation in the production process. This technological dynamism, in combination with the large-scale farms which came into being as a result of the enclosures and the dissolution of small-scale peasant holdings, enabled, in particular, more food to be produced per unit of labor, which had the wider systemic effect of propelling industrial production by provisioning both the necessary labor force and "home market" for industrial development. Specifically, increasing food surpluses facilitated the transfer of a growing proportion of labor from agriculture into industry, while the corresponding decline in food prices enabled more income for the purchase of industrial goods.

While the progressive resolution of feudal agrarian class struggles in favor of capitalist class relations is thus understood as the foundation for the self-sustaining overall economic development achieved first in England, and then eventually generalized to its home region of Western Europe, Brenner (1977) holds that the absence of such resolution in the non-European world is the primary explanation for global inequality, poverty, and "underdevelopment." The implication here is that efforts by poorer regions to achieve

"successful overall economic development" must by necessity involve the right balance of agrarian class forces and property relations first introduced to the world by European modernization. Although Brenner does not, explicitly at least, endorse Rostow's insistence that the development of the non-European world is dependent upon its being "taken over and organized" by European colonialism, his thesis on the agrarian origins of capitalism remains, nonetheless, firmly rooted within the Eurocentric–anthropocentric paradigm identified above. For Brenner, as much as Rostow, the historical agents of modern social development are Europeans acting autonomously of ecological forces and non-European societies. The place of the non-European and the non-human in constituting the original transition to capitalist modernity thus remains obscured.

In terms of the agrarian question beyond the European experience, Brenner's explication of a Eurocentric–anthropocentric Marxian account of the "agrarian origins of capitalism" was complimented by Bill Warren's (1980) elaboration of Marx's diffusionary framework for capitalist modernization in non-European societies. In particular, Warren looked to build upon the dimension of Marx's thought which emphasized that capitalism, though incredibly exploitative and dehumanizing, was, nonetheless, superior to all previous modes of production. If, then, the poverty and stagnation of the non-European world was, as Brenner argued, primarily attributable to their endogenous failure to revolutionize the agrarian class structures and property relations underpinning their primitive modes of production, thus it was that Warren argued that European colonialism provided the necessary exogenous force that would, following Marx's note on British colonization in India, provide the dual function of both destroying the old mode of production and implanting, with violence if need be, the more progressive Western capitalist mode of production. This reading of Marx led Warren to urge socialists to embrace imperialism as the driving force behind the emancipatory diffusion of capitalist development into the agricultural sectors of the underdeveloped world.[3] In this sense, the European experience of capitalist transition is held to be generalizable to the rest of the world, and becomes the standard by which the development of "other" societies is to be measured. Within agrarian and development studies, an influential "Warrenite" Marxian approach to the agrarian question in the South has emerged, which replaces the more controversial embrace of imperialism with an emphasis on globalization as an important exogenous force capable of facilitating transitions from low-productivity, small-scale peasant agricultures to highly productive, large-scale capitalist farm enterprises employing wage labor (Kiely, 2009; Kitching, 1989, 2001; Sender and Johnston, 2004; Sender and Smith, 1986).

Broadening the agrarian question: toward differentiation and diversification

The unilinear "path dependent" approach to the agrarian question forwarded by Warren and Brenner, which argued that the diffusion of an essential European model of agrarian change was critical to the development prospects of the South, was challenged by Byres's important clarification and elaboration of the organizing problematics of the agrarian question. Byres's seminal intervention emerged from his specific location as a development scholar of Asia, which, although it impressed upon him the ongoing centrality of the agrarian question to the broader development project, also revealed the limitations of conventional approaches. A careful evaluation of the Asian context problematized, in particular, the notion that there was a singular model of successful agrarian change against which all other subsequent attempts at modernization were to be evaluated (Byres, 1986, 5). This would unnecessarily constrain the analytical ability to identify, and construct, alternative resolutions to the agrarian question that did not accord entirely with the definitive features of the classic path articulated by Brenner and Warren. In an attempt to reconstruct its framework to account for greater diversity, Byres identified three constituent problematics—production, politics, and accumulation—of the agrarian question which, when considered in relation to one another, methodologically allowed for the illumination of a wider range of potential resolutions (Bernstein, 1996, 7; Byres, 1986, 6–19). The production problematic was concerned with agrarian transition—the processes whereby agrarian relations were transformed in favor of the capitalist mode of production. The politics problematic referred to processes of class struggle both underpinning and reshaped by the transition, while the concern of the accumulation problematic was the means through which an agrarian surplus could be generated and transferred to emergent industrial sectors. The generation and appropriation of the surplus was itself informed by, and gave rise to, the particular balance of class forces present in a given social order. Thus, contra Brenner's exclusive focus on class struggle, Byres's approach emphasizes the co-constitutive dialectic between the agrarian relations and forces of production (Heller, 2013, 48–49).

The particular historical synthesis of this dialectic within given national formations determined the characteristics of "peasant differentiation," the key process identified by Byres in the transition from feudalism to capitalism. The degree of differentiation within pre-capitalist peasantries determined, to a large extent, the particular context-specific resolution of the agrarian question. Contesting, with regards to the "classic" case of England, Brenner's thesis of a landlord-led agrarian transition, Byres posited instead that the landholding peasant classes that had differentiated themselves from

the now landless peasant population were in fact the driving force behind the introduction of impulses toward continual agricultural improvement (Byres, 1986, 21). Thus, insofar as it centered relatively subaltern social classes, Byres argued that the classic English case was an example of an agrarian transition from below. In contrast to the singular transition path thesis of Brenner and Warren, Byres's careful historical comparative analysis cautioned, however, against making the English case generalizable. In particular, Byres argued that a comparative approach to the study of multiple agrarian transitions revealed that alongside the "from below" model revealed by the classic English case, there existed an agrarian transition "from above" model in which the agents of transition consisted of a landlord-capitalist class which had more successfully contained the resistance of differentiating peasants. The classic case for the "from above" path was drawn from the transition experience of the Prussian region east of the Elbe (Byres, 1986, 25–28). Within these two broad paths themselves existed considerably diversity, with Byres in particular noting the more radical articulation of a "from below" path in the American experience, where the presence of a sizeable "internal" land frontier combined with the absence of an established feudal landlord class enabled the emergence of a class of "family farmers" who were able to combine innovative technologies, rich "virgin" lands, and the efficiencies of family labor in producing low-cost, highly productive agricultural outputs (Byres, 1986, 29–34).[4] With regards to Asia, Byres similarly argues that the instructive cases of Japan and Taiwan/South Korea reveal unique context-specific articulations of "from below" and "from above" transitions informed by the particular synthesis between class forces and the means of production (Byres, 1986, 43–58).

Byres's historical comparative approach to the agrarian question thus makes the powerful point that the transition to capitalist social relations of production can proceed along a multiplicity of paths, determined, in the end, by a given society's particular history of class struggle, state formation, and economic development. At the same time, however, the comparative method preferred by Byres reproduces, in spite of its emphasis on diversity and differentiation, the Eurocentric–anthropocentric paradigm for the study of agriculture and development forwarded variously by modernization theory and the more conventional Marxian approaches to the agrarian question. In particular, Byres explicitly identifies the "national" as the necessary scale at which to conduct comparative analysis, and the resulting methodological nationalism, while attentive to diversity across, and differentiation within, the selected cases, nonetheless assumes the existence of an autochthonous national developmental space (Byres, 1986, 5; 1996). In other words, methodological nationalism precludes a consideration of inter-national or trans-national relationalities and further privileges the

national subject as the primary agent of transition (McMichael, 2013, 70). In this sense, the lessons that Asian states can draw from the diversity of historical models on offer are determined by the extent to which their own unique autochthonous national developmental trajectories bear similarity to or express divergence from the national characteristics of class struggle and economic development specific to earlier cases of successful agrarian transition. The non-European is again read as derivative here, as the "diversity" of agrarian transitions is conceived as degrees of convergence or divergence from the two definitive paths—from below and from above—first revealed in the originary and endogenous European experience (Byres, 1986, 43–58; 2003).

This derivation from original European experience comes to more powerfully inform Byres's prescriptive arguments, wherein he appears to render developing states in Asia, and across the South more broadly, analogous to the economically backward late-nineteenth-/early-twentieth-century Russian state that Lenin sought to modernize in favor of both development and justice. Lenin argued that the "from below" American path offered the best model for Russian revolutionaries to emulate in their pursuit of agrarian transition, particularly on the grounds that it would involve much less social dislocation and violence than the Prussian "from above" path.[5] Byres (1991, 2003) similarly seems to favor, for developing Asia, reforms that would remove landlord control over land, and thereby free an emergent enterprising peasant class that could forward agrarian transition along a more egalitarian path. However, due to the differentiation that such a "from below" path inevitably involves, Byres does caution that even here there will be considerable pain and dislocation as the peasantry divides into landholding and landless classes. In particular contexts, it may even be necessary to support the establishment of landlord-dominated, large-scale capitalist farms. In either case, however, the pain of dispossession and displacement involved in the change from rural to urban life is considered a necessary cost that must be borne if developing societies are to transition from minimally productive agrarian societies to highly productive industrial states with higher standards of living. It is for this reason that Byres (2004, 41) has little patience for positions he terms as "neo-populist," which seek to defend small-scale, ecologically sensitive forms of agrarian production, as they do not lend themselves to the national transformation necessary for the achievement of economic development.

The endogenous national scale at which Byres both historically compares the diversity of agrarian transitions and prescribes the lessons therein learned for contemporary developing states can also be found to constitute the unit of analysis and prescription in the World Bank's 2008 WDR. While the report, as was discussed earlier, explicitly takes as its foundations

the "originary" European agrarian transitions, and follows modernization theory's stages-of-growth model in articulating its "worlds of agriculture" framework, the prescriptions offered by the report for effecting the "evolutionary" movement from lower to higher worlds within contemporary developing societies draws specifically (if rather implicitly) from the sorts of reflections on agrarian question and transition offered by Byres, Brenner, Warren, and others.[4] Thus, the report emphasizes, much like Byres's emphasis on diversity, a variety of possible policy measures with which states, depending upon the particular "world of agriculture" they inhabit, can effect agricultural transformation in the service of development. These range from "from below" small farmer–led improvements in land use and productivity to more "from above" corporate agribusiness–led large-scale plantation agricultures which would involve a more classic division of agricultural production into relations of capital and wage labor. The ultimate aim, regardless of the path pursued, is to follow the historical "national" paths first set forth by European societies, and mobilize agricultural transformation for the purpose of transitioning developing societies away from the agrarian and toward industrial and service centered economies (Li, 2009).

While the 2008 WDR reaffirms the methodological nationalist approach to the study of agriculture and development, it was in the Bank's response to the global land grab that it drew on the diffusionary assumptions of the Eurocentric–anthropocentric paradigm that, as we saw earlier, are core to the Warrenite Marxian approach to the agrarian question. As Tania Li (2011) has observed, the Bank's response to land grabbing, in the form of its 2011 document titled *Rising Global Interest in Farmland* (RGIF), constitutes an attempt to conceive of the rapid explosion in transnational land deals as opportunities to operationalize the transition trajectory forwarded in the 2008 WDR. The RGIF centers, in particular, the power of properly self-disciplined foreign capital in resolving the persistence of the problem of "unused" or "underused" land in the underperforming—in terms of agricultural productivity—agrarian worlds of the South (Deininger et al., 2011, xxxi). The assumption here is that transnational capital can introduce the capital, technology, and management skills necessary for revolutions in agricultural production, something which underperforming agrarian societies have been hitherto unable to generate on their own. If the pursuit of profits through large-scale agricultural farms leads transnational capital to effectively displace small farmers and peasants from such "underused" land, the focus needs to be placed upon ensuring sufficient avenues for shifting such labor into waged work on plantations, non-farm rural industries, and urban sectors more broadly. As Li (2009) notes, the Bank thus envisions the spread of large-scale transnational agricultural projects as necessary to both the full productive realization of underused land in the South and the

facilitation of an "exit from agriculture" for peoples of these regions who have been unable to initiate such a transition on their own. If, then, the 2008 report reaffirmed that the future for the developing world is to follow the paths of agrarian transition first laid down by the European experience of agricultural modernization, the 2011 RGIF report foregrounded the diffusionary framework of Warrenite Marxism and modernization theory, which maintained that such movement could only be realized for the South by way of exogenous shocks that could overcome their endogenous inertia.

Agrarian questions in the age of globalization: limits of the classical approach

In a critical engagement with Byres's reconstruction of the agrarian question framework, Henry Bernstein (1996, 2006, 2009) problematized the application of what he called an "internalist framework," developed from the historical experience of European agrarian transition, to the Marxian study of agrarian change for contemporary developing countries. By "internalist," Bernstein refers to approaches which conceive of the transition to capitalist modernity as emerging out of endogenous agrarian modes of production and class struggles within "individual social formations outside any international framework" (Bernstein, 2009, 242). While such a framework may have been appropriate to the study of the original European, and particularly English, experience of agrarian transition, the subsequent development of capitalist production and accumulation from national to global scales brings into question the continuing relevance of the internalist approach for contemporary developing countries with unresolved agrarian questions. The point here is that the emergence of capitalist social relations, though originally realized through endogenous transformation of national agrarian sectors, unleashes, due to the radical market dependence highlighted by Brenner, a logic of endless accumulation which necessitates the construction of new markets and, crucially, new frontiers which can provision the cheap inputs necessary for expanded reproduction. This expansionary drive is the means through which the remaining non-European pre-capitalist agrarian world, via coercive relations of imperialism and colonialism, is incorporated into the globalizing capitalist mode of production. Thus, the agrarian basis of transition—the agrarian question—while operating at the national level in the classical European experience, comes to be defined principally in world-historical terms for the colonized South (Bernstein, 2009, 247). This non-internalist world-historical agrarian question thus considers the extent to which the globalization of capitalist production either facilitates or hinders the transition from pre-capitalist to capitalist agrarian property regimes and class relations in the South.

Contra Byres, then, Bernstein does not establish a common national scale at which the agrarian question for contemporary developing countries can draw comparative lessons from the classical cases of European transition. Instead, he points toward the incommensurability of the two experiences, arguing that "the transition to capitalism in social formations where it is deemed yet incomplete are affected by both earlier transitions to capitalism elsewhere, and subsequent transformations within capitalism in its dominant formations and global circuits—the latter is exemplified by contemporary globalization" (Bernstein, 2009, 247). The contemporary world-historical agrarian question for the developing South has, in particular, been profoundly reshaped by the "earlier transition" of the American path, which, beginning in the nineteenth century, introduced the modern industrial agribusiness form of agricultural production and accumulation. The enormous advances in productivity that this model eventually achieved, with technical innovations such as petroleum-based fertilizers and chemical pesticides, in the second half of the twentieth century promoted the globalization of agriculture in order to dispose of the massive surpluses generated through the industrial-scientific agribusiness model (Bernstein, 2009, 249–250). As a result, Bernstein argues, capital's foundational requirement of an agrarian surplus—what he calls the agrarian question of capital—has today been resolved for capital on a global scale. In other words, the prospects for effecting an agrarian transition in the South, and in the process enhancing agricultural productivity and surplus, today no longer have any relevance for capital accumulation on a world scale. The globalization of finance and trade has further rendered agrarian transition irrelevant to national development trajectories, as it has opened non-national, non-agrarian sources capable of funding investment in higher income industrial and service sectors (Lerche, 2013, 386). Bernstein, seeking to reformulate theory in light of capital's changing materiality in its globalizing manifestation, thus forwards the radical claim that the agrarian question of capital has been resolved, or rendered irrelevant, on both national and global scales.

The irrelevance of the agrarian transition in the South to capital accumulation across North and South does not, however, resolve what Bernstein calls the "agrarian question of labor." Specifically, Bernstein's point here is that while agrarian classes are increasingly being rendered redundant by the massive productivity gains of globalizing "advanced capitalist" agriculture, there are limited prospects for shifting such labor into higher-income industrial and service sectors, as is understood to have happened in the earlier national transitions of the European experience (Bernstein, 2009, 250–253). Global capitalism, with its increasing dependence upon labor-reducing technologies in both the industrial and service sectors, cannot offer a proletarian future to peasants in the South rendered redundant by globalizing industrial

agriculture and global finance. It is in light of this problematic of "surplus" labor that Bernstein argues it is necessary today to conceive of an "agrarian question of labor." This reformulation urges agrarian studies to shift its focus away from the now resolved agrarian question of capital and center, in its place, the persistent question of what will become of agrarian classes of labor no longer relevant to capital and unable to secure employment in non-agrarian sectors.

Bernstein's agrarian question of labor framework has significant implications for the global land-grab debate, particularly insofar as it problematizes the national comparative premise of the classical agrarian question of capital which, as we saw earlier, informs much of the cautious optimism with which the World Bank has approached the intensification of large-scale land deals. These implications have been considered seriously by Tania Li (2011) in her penetrating critique of the Bank's RGIF report, where she argues that, in light of the context of contemporary globalization, the report proceeds on the flawed assumption that countries in the South today can, within a singular national frame, replicate the European model of agrarian transition. Seeking to "center labor in the land grab" debate, Li effectively uses the Bank's own data to reveal that the report's faith in industrial agriculture providing sufficient employment to absorb labor displaced by large-scale land acquisitions is undermined by such a production model's dependence upon labor-displacing technologies (Li, 2011, 282–284). Beyond employment on large-scale farms, Li argues that there is likewise little evidence to support claims that non-agrarian sectors, whether rural or urban, can support displaced labor in making the celebrated "exit from agriculture" (Li, 2009). Thus, Li deploys the agrarian question of labor framework to highlight the impossibility of mobilizing large-scale agricultural land deals in the service of agrarian transition. In the absence of employment alternatives, Li insists that small farmers and peasants across the South are right to resist any attempts to dispossess them of land vital to their social reproduction, regardless of how "unproductive" their agricultural practices are deemed to be by development organizations and experts.

Proponents of the agrarian question of labor approach do not, however, propose that small-scale, agrarian centered development futures are the only alternative to the impossibility of the agrarian transition. Agrarian transition, Li argues, often speaks to the desires of many agrarian populations to leave the poverty trap and isolation of locally oriented small-scale agriculture and access the fuller life, in terms of health, education, and connectivity, offered by urban modernity (Li, 2010, 84). Thus, those engaged in small-scale agriculture can be quite willing to accept being rendered redundant by large-scale industrial agriculture provided there is alternative employment or income security to be found elsewhere. In light of global capitalism's

failure to provide such alternatives, the political and social mobilization of rural populations becomes imperative to resolving the agrarian question of labor intensified by the global land grab, whether this means the defense of labor-intensive, small-scale agriculture or securing the right to alternative forms of income security, such as a "right to employment" or a basic income grant. As an example of the form that such a resolution would take, Li highlights the political and social mobilization of agrarian classes of labor in India in response to the agrarian crisis of the late 1990s and early 2000s, which forced the Indian state to formulate and implement a national "right to employment" program titled the Mahatma Gandhi Rural National Employment Guarantee Act (Li, 2010, 82–83). The point here is that the cost-cutting imperatives of profit-seeking in competitive markets leave capital structurally incapable of ensuring the social reproduction of those it renders surplus. Recalling Karl Polanyi's seminal history of the market, Li points out that even during the classical European agrarian transition—Polanyi's "great transformation"—socially inclusive development was dependent upon a sustained social and political countermovement against the logic of the capitalist market (Li, 2010, 79). Within the context of contemporary global capitalist accumulation, and the rapid advance of labor-displacing technologies, political and social mobilization of agrarian classes of labor is all the more central to the achievement of more inclusive resolutions to the "truncated agrarian transition" in the South today.

There is, however, a significant extra-national premise of exclusion underpinning the very condition of possibility for such socio-political mobilization and inclusion which remains obscured within the agrarian question of labor framework through which Li analyzes the global land grab. While Bernstein and Li are right to problematize the applicability of the national scale of the classical agrarian question to the South in the context of contemporary globalization, they do so in a way which reproduces the Eurocentric–anthropocentric assumption that agrarian transition in Europe was historically achieved through transformative processes endogenous to European national formations. The implication here is that the classical agrarian question is only coherent within national frames, and is thus rendered impossible within globalization's undermining of autonomous national developmental space. It is this assumption—that there ever was an endogenous national basis to the agrarian question—which I aim to problematize in the remainder of this chapter. In place of the national basis of the classical agrarian question, I engage world-systems and third-world Marxist approaches which reveal how the agrarian question has always been resolved in a global register and, moreover, that such resolution is not achieved once and for all, but rather must recur as a necessary structural basis for the renewal of globalizing capital's "systemic cycles of

accumulation" (Arrighi, 1994; Patnaik and Moyo, 2011). In this sense, the implications of the global land grab for agrarian transition are not reducible to societies receiving large-scale investments, but rather also crucially involves how capitalist states are seeking to renew the global agrarian basis of capitalist development. The global dimension of what we might term the "ongoing" agrarian question, as revealed in the global land grab, necessarily draws our attention to how agrarian transitions involve more than just class forces, narrowly conceived. Specifically, a world-historical view of the agrarian question reveals the constitutive role played by relations of colonialism and racialization in enabling the costs of agrarian surplus making to be externalized. Thus, within the context of capitalist development, the social and political mobilization endorsed by Li, whether in nineteenth-century Europe or twenty-first-century India, is itself expressive of a global process of transition necessarily involving processes including national-citizen subjects, whether bourgeois, proletarian, or peasant, on the basis of the exclusion of "extra-national" rightless categories of labor. The elaboration of such a world-historical approach to the agrarian question, and how it can elucidate important dimensions of the global land grab, is the concern of the remainder of this chapter.

The world-historical agrarian question

The era of globalization gave rise, in addition to Bernstein's "agrarian question of labor" framework, to a second alternative rethinking of the classical agrarian question, forwarded, in this case, by Philip McMichael. Conceived in the same historical moment, both approaches sought to reconsider the classical agrarian question in light of the evident shift of capitalist accumulation and development from the national scale of the Keynesian-developmental regime to the global scale of the neoliberal regime. For Bernstein (1996), as we saw above, globalization signaled the death of the classical "agrarian question of capital," which, on account of its national basis, was no longer relevant to either globalizing capital or developing states pursuing agrarian transition. While McMichael converged with Bernstein in identifying globalization as a fundamental challenge to the continued relevance of the classical agrarian question, it presented, for him, a radically different historical reinterpretation and subsequent set of contemporary implications than it did for Bernstein. Specifically, globalization did not render an earlier national basis "irrelevant," but rather constituted an attempt to reaffirm, after the national Keynesian-developmentalist interregnum, the global basis of the agrarian question which had been established during the "classical" European transitions. McMichael's initial intervention (McMichael, 1997)

into the renewed agrarian question debates thus introduced two propositions: "first, that the agrarian question has always been a national interpretation of a global process; and second, that current processes of globalization crystallize this issue in new and challenging ways" (McMichael, 1997, 632–633). In emphasizing the agrarian question, whether situated in the era of European nation-state development or globalization, as a fundamentally global process, McMichael explicitly seeks to unsettle its "Eurocentric" foundations, which occlude the role of the non-European world in effecting Europe's "national" agrarian transitions.

Engaging attempts, such as that put forward by McMichael, to reconceptualize the agrarian question on a global scale rather than simply discarding the problematic as bereft of any analytical import, signifies a recognition, which is fundamental to this book, that agrarian relations are analytically central to evaluating the conditions of possibility for a diverse range of socio-economic and socio-ecological formations. For the classical approach, as we have seen, agrarian relations were conceived on a national scale, and their transformation through endogenous processes of primitive accumulation are understood as giving rise to the ontological coordinates through which capitalist development could emerge. In particular, the emergence of absolutely market dependent beings—capitalist landlord, capitalist tenant farmer, and dispossessed labor (Brenner, 1976)—is held as effecting the necessary shift toward a competitive profit driven, rationally organized, social order uniquely capable of initiating self-sustaining economic growth. The challenge, then, in rethinking the agrarian question on a global scale lies in articulating agrarian relations, and their transformation, on a wider geographical plane. This must necessarily involve a broader ontological conceptualization than that offered in the narrow class based horizon of the classical approach, so as to better capture how agrarian relations are configured beyond the bounds of formal socio-political units. Further, as we will see in the next chapter, this ontological broadening of the agrarian question must necessarily center relations between human and non-human ecologies as key to the reproduction or transformations of agrarian relations and, thus, broader projects of socio-ecological change, capitalist and beyond.

Broadening and extending the analytical scale of the Marxian agrarian question to a world-historical plane does not require, however, rejecting Marxism as a framework that is irreducibly and hopelessly Eurocentric. Rather than discard historical materialism, my approach here will be to follow Frantz Fanon's recognition of both the necessity and capacity for Marxism to be "stretched" in order to account for how race and colonialism are integral to the emergence and reproduction of the qualitative relations of capitalism. The third-world tradition of Marxism, within which I would locate Fanon, emerges from those who look out at capitalism from the peripheries and in so doing apprehend a system that has operated on a

world-scale from its very inception. From this vantage point, Marx's own writings on the emergence of capitalism are cast in a different light, one that illuminates the "chief momenta of primitive accumulation" that have been otherwise concealed by the Eurocentric tradition of Western Marxism. The point of departure here is Marx's clear identification of colonialism as the foundation of capitalism, where he observes that

> The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of black-skins, signalised the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings are the chief momenta of primitive accumulation. On their heels treads the commercial war of the European nations, with the globe for a theatre. It begins with the revolt of the Netherlands from Spain, assumes giant dimensions in England's Anti-Jacobin War, and is still going on in the opium wars against China. (Marx, 1946, 915)

Colonization and enslavement of non-Europeans are positioned here as the chief momenta, enabling conditions, for the emergence and subsequent unfolding of capitalism as a mode of production. Primitive accumulation, then, must be reconsidered as a world-scale process involving both the enclosures in Europe and the colonization of non-European worlds by Europe. For our concerns here, the key question that Marx's broader account of primitive accumulation provokes is the following: if the register of primitive accumulation in Western Europe gives rise to the distinctive qualitative relation of capital–labor, what are the distinct qualitative relations which emerge from primitive accumulation in the colonies and how do these bear upon the emergence and reproduction of capitalism?

It is in setting out to answer this question that we do, however, reach a limit in terms of the content of Marx's account of the relation between colonialism and capitalism. Specifically, there is a gap between Marx's empirical observation, noted above, that colonialism underpins capitalism and the analytical and theoretical categories that he devises to apprehend the capitalist mode of production. There are no, in other words, distinct qualitative relations which emerge for Marx through the colonial register of primitive accumulation. The latter appears to only provision a quantum stock of capital, in contrast with the European register of primitive accumulation which is given exclusive analytical and theoretical significance by Marx in terms of the emergence of the core qualitative relation—capital–labor—structuring capitalism.

Third-world Marxism intervenes here by deploying the Marxist method, historical materialism, to overcome the Eurocentric limits of the content of Marx's account of the transition to capitalism. It is thus that Samir Amin (2010), a pre-eminent third-world Marxist, argues that "to be a 'Marxist'

is to continue the work that Marx merely began … the radical critique that he initiated is itself boundless, always incomplete, and must always be the object of its own critique" (Amin, 2010, 9). Though Marx did not, for Amin, analytically account for the role of the "underdevelopment of Asian and African societies" in the formation of capitalism as a world-system, this did not necessitate "'abandoning Marx' and counting him outdated" but rather that he had simply "not finished … the opus he had set out to complete, and that included not integrating the global dimensions of capitalism into his analysis" (Amin, 2010, 11). Utsa and Prabhat Patnaik (2021) have further developed a third-worldist critique and extension of historical materialism, arguing that the "Marxian system … gets beset with serious contradictions if its extraordinarily insightful analysis of a money-using economy is combined with a conceptualization of capitalism as an isolated sector consisting of only capitalists and workers" (Patnaik and Patnaik, 2021, 53). The Patnaiks, along with Amin, Rodney (1972), and other third-world Marxists, have, as we will see, effectively applied Marx's method in generating concepts and categories of "global value," "core–periphery," "underdevelopment," and "exognerous stimuli" that open space for apprehending—beyond an isolated sector of capitalists and workers—the qualitative relations of capitalism which emerge from, and continue to structure, its colonial foundations. These concepts and categories point, in particular, to a set of underlying relations that are forged through the colonial register of primitive accumulation and secure for capital a provisioning of surplus from colonized periperhies to colonizing core that itself underpins the surplus appropriation effected through the capital–labor relation.

The emphasis on core-periphery surplus transfer, and an associated world-scale development/underdevelopment contradiction, would come to be most systematically organized through the world-systems analytical framework formulated by Amin and others working at the intersection of Marxism and decolonization. This framework has served as the foundation for the world-historical reconceptualization of the agrarian question beyond Eurocentrism, and it is to working through the potentiality and limitation of this reconceptualization that we now turn.

World-systems analysis

The world-systems approach argued that capitalist development could find its origins not in endogenous agrarian transformations within Europe, but rather in the formation of a European centered world-economy organized around differentiated regimes of labor control. For Immanuel Wallerstein, who offered the most systematic articulation of the world-systems

framework, the transformation of agrarian relations remained central to such a process, but these processes and orderings were conceived on a world scale. In such an account (Wallerstein, 1974), the European centered world-economy emerged through Europe's great expansions of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, which were themselves dictated by food needs arising out of the crisis of feudalism. Eventually, the expansionary response to the food crisis in Europe led to the formation, through violent processes of primitive accumulation, colonization, and subjugation, of three distinct labor regimes—wage labor (Western Europe), serf labor (Eastern Europe and the Americas), and slave labor (Atlantic sugar plantations). The minimal returns to labor in the peripheral (slave) and semi-peripheral (serf) zones enabled the "large-scale accumulation of basic capital which was used to finance the rationalization of agricultural production" in the core zone of wage-labor. For Wallerstein, then, the "solidarity of the system was based ultimately on this phenomenon of unequal development" in which "those who grow food sustain those who grow raw materials who sustain those involved in industrial production" (Wallerstein, 1974, 86). Broadening, then, the horizon of Eurocentric Marxian accounts of agrarian change, which identify the wage–labor relation in the core as exclusively responsible for the productivity increases underpinning agrarian transition, Wallerstein uncovered the "unfree" labor regimes sustaining, through the provisioning of cheap food and raw materials, the emergent capital–labor relation in the core.

Such a world-scale analysis, in so much as it identified the production and transfer of agrarian surplus, via the unequal returns afforded to differentially constituted and controlled labor, from the peripheral and semi-peripheral zones to the core, necessarily called for a more expansive and complex ontological framework than the class-determined subjects of Western Marxism. Wallerstein (1979, 1991) thus sought to account for "differentiated" labor control by identifying racism as the central cleavage of the world-system, enabling as it did the institution of a racialized hierarchy of being across the three zones, and thus providing ideological coherence to the "denial of consumption" for labor situated in the semi-peripheral and peripheral zones. This incorporation of race as a key ontological concept in the emergence and reproduction of capitalist development constituted an acknowledgment that the labor and resources of colonially subjugated territories were configured as "other" in ways that enabled profoundly more exhaustive forms of appropriation and exploitation than those that could be visited upon the formally free laborers of the core.

While this insistence on the centrality of race does constitute a very necessary corrective to Eurocentric Marxian approaches to agrarian political economy, Wallerstein's articulation, nonetheless, does not entirely elide the "quantitative" or "circulationist" charge that Brenner (1977) directed

against world-systems analysis. In particular, the central cleavage of race appears to simply stand here as justification of what is little else than the outright theft of the labor time and resources of the colonially subjugated peripheral zones. This theft is thus the quantitative origin of capitalist development, enabling as it does the initial "large scale accumulation of basic capital" which comes to ultimately "finance the rationalization of agricultural production" in the core. Such an emphasis on quantitative origins risks, argues Brenner, obscuring the qualitative import of the capital–labor relation which, owing to its absolute market dependence, is uniquely capable of initiating the productivity gains necessary for self-sustaining economic development. Beyond simply revealing race as the ideological justification of the quantitative basis of the capital–labor qualitative relation in the core, the task, then, that this book is undertaking is to articulate how race itself operates as a qualitative ontological relation fundamental to the conditions of possibility for agrarian transition and, ultimately, capitalist accumulation and development. Race, my argument will reveal, does not simply justify the theft of the originary "large scale accumulation of basic capital," but more fundamentally makes possible the socio-ecological relations that enable the provisioning of the surplus necessary for the transition to industrial capitalism. Crucially, conceiving of race as a constitutive force structuring agrarian transitions will necessarily require, as we will see, that we center Indigenous presence on colonized lands—its appropriation, erasure, and restoration/resurgence—within our analytical field of vision. This has been strikingly absent from not only Wallerstein's world-system account, but also much of the literature on race and transition more broadly, which has often focused more exclusively on the role played by enslaved labor (Blackburn, 1998, 2011; Singh, 2016; Williams, 2021).

Food regimes

Prior to articulating a deeper understanding of the role played by race, as core organizing world-ecological relation, in the world-scale constitution of agrarian transition, it is necessary that we first work through those approaches which have attempted to further employ the world-historical orientation of world-systems analysis in accounting for agrarian relations and agricultural production in the transition to capitalist development. This takes us back to McMichael and Friedmann's important conceptual innovation of the "food regime," which has come, since it was first developed, to be established as a distinctive analytical approach, and field of study, explicitly focussed on the institution of successive international regimes of food provisioning and agricultural production associated with correspondingly

successive eras of capitalist accumulation and development. Informed by the premise that "food and agriculture have all along invisibly underpinned relations of power and property in the world system" (Friedmann, 2004, 124), McMichael and Friedmann's intervention was further motivated by a desire to "offer a critique of the nationalist presuppositions that inform the literature on development and dependency" (Friedmann and McMichael, 1989, 94). Food regime conceptualization specifically sought to combine world-systems analysis with regulationist theory's focus on the emergence, within the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, of international regimes—defined as those specific constellations of relationships, rules, institutions, and norms established and enforced across the state system by hegemonic powers—necessary for stabilizing capitalist accumulation and development.

The first food regime, organized under British hegemony in the late nineteenth century, signified the shift from the era of empires, in which food provisioning remained informed by mercantilist logics, to the era of capitalist nation-states co-producing one another through "inter-national" price-based rules and norms governing the production, circulation, and exchange of agricultural and manufacturing goods. In particular, the first food regime involved European imports, via a "unified price-regulated world market," of wheat and meat produced by family farmers in settler-colonial states. The capital and labor necessary for organizing settler agriculture was itself exported from Europe which, combined with the highly fertile colonized lands being brought under cultivation, substantially cheapened the costs of agricultural commodity production. This access to consistently large, and cheaply produced, agrarian surpluses enabled European states to transition more labor, capital, and resources away from agriculture and toward industry. The expansion of the wage labor relation, through which European industrial capitalist accumulation and production proceeded, was a direct consequence of the cheap wage foods flooding Europe from the settler colonial states.

The initial articulation of the food regime framework, however, did not go far enough in addressing the "circulationist" limitation of world-systems analysis, as the qualitative relations it sought to highlight failed to sufficiently trouble the Eurocentric disposition of debates concerning the transition from agrarian to industrial society. On the one hand, it did further advance the world-systems challenge to the classical account of endogenously produced agrarian transition, particularly in so much as it provided more specific and detailed "empirical mappings of class relations and geographical specializations" related to the international provisioning of cheap wage goods for industrial capitalist accumulation and development in nineteenth-century Europe (Friedmann, 2009, 335). This emphasized the integration of wage labor and non-wage family farm labor within a unified,

yet internally differentiated, global process of capitalist development. On the other hand, however, this narrow privileging of the link between wage labor and settler agriculture as the "core of the first food regime" (Friedmann and McMichael, 1989, 100), occluded the qualitative significance of the violent relations of appropriation and exclusion established by Europeans—metropolitan and settler alike—over both Indigenous societies and enslaved Africans on colonized lands. Certainly, the food regime framework, particularly as it evolved, has been attentive to the forced dispossession of Indigenous people, but only in so much as this provided a quantum of fertile land for settler agriculture (Friedmann, 2004). The possibility that relations between colonizing Europeans and Indigenous peoples and their lands held a deeper qualitative significance for the forging of international food regimes was not sufficiently considered. Moreover, while this thus reproduced Wallerstein's reduction of the non-European presence to a quantitative basis for the qualitative relations forged across European metropolitan and settler states, the food regime approach failed to analytically incorporate Wallerstein's important, if limited, emphasis on the role of race and racism in stabilizing inherently world-scale capitalist development.

Global value relations

The potentiality of food regime analysis to forward a richer world-historical, non-Eurocentric, account of the agrarian question, one which more substantively integrates colonial and imperial relations, has been significantly extended through Farshad Araghi's theoretical and historical interventions into global agrarian and food studies. While Araghi's intervention is premised upon a recognition that "the concept of food regime is central for a labor-oriented perspective on imperialism" (Araghi, 2003, 41), his critical engagement stems from a concern that "the theoretical omission of global value relations from food regime analysis has served to blur world-historical analysis of the peasant question" (Araghi, 2009b, 119). The conceptualization of "global value relations" here refers to the concrete spatial differentiation of labor relations through which the surplus value which constitutes and enables capitalist accumulation and development is produced, distributed, and transferred on a global scale. Though Araghi is quite careful to distinguish his approach from world-systems analysis, critiquing the latter for its functionalism, the introduction of global value relations into the food regime framework recalls both Amin's "law of worldwide value" (Amin, 2010) and Wallerstein's differentiation of three complementary zones of labor control across the world-system. Araghi identifies the central contradiction of global value relations as the realization of surplus value through

the co-production of relations of underconsumption/underreproduction in the South and subsidized consumption/overconsumption in the North, further recalling here Wallerstein's insistence that the definitive, and contradictory, relation of capitalist accumulation on a world scale is the production of surplus value through both the "denial of consumption" in the peripheries and subsidized consumption in the core. More specifically, the low cost of the food and raw materials, which sustain the cycle of investment, production, consumption, and profit in the core, is itself actively produced through the imposition of underconsumption upon the unfree agrarian laborers of the peripheries.

This recentering of colonial and imperial "global value relations," pivoting on the contradiction of under/over consumption, troubles the initial food regime premise that the specifically capitalist international production and circulation of foodstuffs is defined by complementary exchange between settler and metropolitan states, organized in particular around classes of settler family farmers in the former and wage laborers and industrial capitalists in the latter. In particular, an insistence upon the colonial/imperial premise of global value relations compels us to look beyond emergent settler-metropolitan nation-state relations in the nineteenth century toward, instead, adopting a longer historical, and broader spatial/geographical, view of the emergence and consolidation of the implicit norms, regulations, and relations governing food production and circulation on a world scale. Araghi thus situates the emergence and reproduction of global value relations within the *longue durée* of what he terms "global primitive accumulation," which crucially extends beyond a narrow Eurocentric focus on English enclosures to include processes of labor and capital formation through dispossession of colonized peoples.

Conditioning the rise of capital, the original era of global primitive accumulation (1492–1834) on the one hand involved the denial of non-market means of subsistence to peasants being expelled from the land via the Tudor and parliamentary enclosures in England, and on the other, marked the "beginning of systematic colonial and racialized enclosures in the Americas as well as in Castilian Spain" (Araghi, 2009b, 120–121). In describing the enclosures as "racialized" in the Americas, Araghi opens space for us to consider how the concept of global primitive accumulation does not seek to transcend Eurocentric accounts of primitive accumulation by simply suggesting that the same form of enclosures through which the capital–labor relation emerged in Europe were simultaneously proceeding in the colonized non-European world. Rather, the colonial register of the original era of global primitive accumulation was fundamentally informed by a thoroughly more violent rejection of the presence of the dispossessed racialized "other," and hence of any consideration of political inclusion,

than was the case for those dispossessed via the English enclosures. This was manifested particularly in the brutal violence underpinning the enslavement of African laborers on plantation farms in the Americas, as well as in the "separation of Indigenous populations from the land and the alienation of their customary (communal or tribal) rights to land usage either through massacre (white settlements) or enslavement (physical removal from ancestral or tribal land" (Araghi, 2012, 2). Within Europe, not only did the forcible separation of labor from the means of production not involve massacre or enslavement, but, moreover, those dispossessed were often able to find socio-political inclusion through participation in the genocidal colonial appropriation of non-European lands.

The unrestrained violence which marked global primitive accumulation in the colonies did more than simply provide colonizing European polities with access to a quantum of land—or what Wallerstein refers to as the "large scale accumulation of basic capital." Moving beyond such a narrow quantitative interpretation of colonialism (Araghi, 2003, 51), Araghi links the varied logics of global primitive accumulation across core and periphery to the emergence of a more complex and contradictory qualitative capital–labor relation than the one visible through Eurocentric accounts of primitive accumulation (Araghi, 2009b). Whereas the English enclosures centralized by Western Marxism are held to produce free laborers who participate, albeit unequally, within an emergent productivity enhancing, competitive market dependent mode of social reproduction, the colonial enclosures, Araghi argues, produce "global supplies of dispossessed, racialized, undocumented, gendered and rightless surplus populations [which] have given rise to highly uneven geographies of consumption" (Araghi, 2009b, 119). The key point here is that the racialized violence of colonial primitive accumulation institutes an unfree "rightless" category of "labor power stripped from social protection and social compact" (Araghi, 2009a, 124) upon whom the costs of "agrarian surplus" could be externalized in the form of underconsumption. This underconsumption, often taking the form of undernourished and overworked unfree labor on plantation farms in the Americas, enabled the provisioning of cheap foods which subsidized the consumption of proletarianized labor in the transitioning European core. Expressive, then, of "global value relations," the "racial subsidy" of cheap food facilitated relative' capitalist surplus accumulation in the core by both repressing capital's wage and resource bill and enabling the proletariat, and urban consumers more generally, to access the purchasing power necessary to widen the home market for the consumption of industrial goods. The cheap inputs procured from the zone of underconsumption "eradicated the need for wage supports and non-market subsistence alternatives in the North" (Araghi, 2009b, 122), and the invisibility of the former allowed for the illusion of autonomous

market forces driving productivity in the core (Blackburn, 1998). Araghi's global theory and history of primitive accumulation and value relations—the broad conditions of possibility for capitalist development—thus complicates the narrow capital–labor ontology of classical theories of agrarian change by incorporating within its field of vision the racialized "other" labor whose "rightless" constitution enables the absolute market dependence that has been celebrated as the engine of transition in the core.

Historically, the first epoch of global primitive accumulation gave rise to global value relations organized around the provisioning of cheap stimulants and raw materials—particularly sugar, coffee, tea, and cotton—from the peripheries of the Americas and the Atlantic islands to the emergent proletariat and capitalists in the European core. As Mintz (1985) and Blackburn (1998; 2011) have shown in their seminal histories on slavery and capitalism, such stimulants were of particular importance in adapting the diets of European laborers transitioning from the countryside to the intensive work regimes of urban factories, while the unconstrained cotton supply facilitated consistent and rapid expansion of the English textile industry. In so much as the cheapness of these foodstuffs and raw materials was dependent upon the racialized violence underpinning land theft in the Americas and labor theft from Africa, Blackburn echoes Araghi in challenging the Eurocentrism of classical Marxian theories of agrarian transition by arguing that the "colonial and Atlantic regime of extended primitive accumulation allowed metropolitan accumulation to break out of its agrarian and national limits and discover an industrial and global destiny" (Blackburn, 1998, 554). Moreover, Blackburn argues that the historical development and transformation of capitalist development and accumulation has not overcome this foundational relation, but instead has "repeatedly produced regimes of extended primitive accumulation" (Blackburn, 1998, 554).

This notion of reconstituted regimes of extended primitive accumulation underpinning transformations in capitalist accumulation more broadly is further advanced by Araghi's location of McMichael and Friedmann's first settler-colonial food regime within a second epoch of global primitive accumulation, this time conditioned by, rather than conditioning, the rise and consolidation of industrial capitalism. In particular, by the nineteenth century, capital's attempt to constantly increase its rate of relative surplus extraction from labor in the industrial core constrained the purchasing power of the proletariat, and therefore both heightened class conflict and reduced outlets for the sale of industrial goods. The "most immediate way out" of the nineteenth-century accumulation crisis, Araghi argues, was to reconstitute global primitive accumulation on an even broader scale by incorporating, alongside the "continued extermination of Indigenous populations and the seizure of extremely productive lands" in the Americas, land

and labor colonized through the conquest of Ireland, scramble for Africa, and the subjugation of large parts of Asia (Araghi, 2009b, 122). The expansion of industrial production and accumulation necessarily involved an extension of political and economic rights to the proletariat, such as the shortening of the working day, and access to a broader basket of cheap foodstuffs and raw materials, particularly the massive quantities of wheat and cotton imported from the newly colonized regions of the Americas, India, and Africa. The racialized underside of such expansion—the logic of underconsumption—has been powerfully revealed through Mike Davis's (2001) uncovering of the "late Victorian holocausts" which starved to death millions from the wheat and cotton exporting colonized lands.

Araghi's theoretical and historical interventions, along with those offered by Davis, Blackburn, and Mintz, thus significantly advance the task of articulating a non-Eurocentric global account of the "original" agrarian transitions of European states during the long sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. While his emphasis on the centrality of rightless labor as the externalized figure upon whom the costs of agrarian surplus are ultimately visited, via underconsumption, constitutes an important widening of our ontological field of vision, the substance of racialization as a distinct ontological relation underpinning the constitution and resolution of the agrarian question, remains underdeveloped. More specifically, Araghi reduces racialization to a function of capital's need for a fragmented global labor supply, and thus is not capable of thinking race as a distinctive social relation of power and being which puts in place qualitative ontological orientations not reducible to the market dependent logic of capital, yet still historically necessary for enhanced productivity and agrarian transition.

Agrarian South

We can push the "global value relations" perspective on the agrarian question further, on questions of race and colonial/imperial relations, by engaging more seriously with agrarian studies scholarship emanating, self-consciously, from the Global South. While often ignored, or dismissed, by agrarian studies and development scholars of the North,[6] a rich tradition of anticolonial and anti-imperial Marxist praxis on the agrarian question has been forwarded by those situated in the South, ranging from political revolutionaries such as Mao, Fanon, and Cabral, to the radical world-systems scholarship of Samir Amin, and third-world Marxisms of thinkers such as Amiya Kumar Bagchi, Utsa Patnaik, and Sam Moyo. More recently, those working within such a tradition have launched a journal titled *Agrarian South*, which positions itself as a distinct South based school of agrarian

political economy quite explicitly seeking to challenge the hegemony of Northern scholarship on the agrarian question, with a particular concern to trouble existing Eurocentric and economistic tendencies.

Taking issue with Bernstein's thesis on the death of the agrarian question of capital, the Agrarian South school adopts as its central premise a belief that the "agrarian question is the most fundamental question of the twenty-first century" (Agrarian South Editorial, 2012, 1) and, further that the "classical agrarian question remains the pillar of all further struggles" (Moyo, Jha, and Yeros, 2013, 111) for just and sustainable socio-ecological relations. The point here is not to oppose Bernstein's thesis by uncritically resurrecting the internalist approach that he has critiqued as irrelevant, but rather to engage in a critical world-historical reconstruction of the classical agrarian question in order to reveal the Eurocentric limitations of its historical, Northern based, formulations. In particular, the Agrarian South position argues that it is only by maintaining the Eurocentric historical misconception that the classical agrarian question operated within an endogenous national, or internal, framework, that one could possibly conceive, as does Bernstein, that it was ever fully resolved for the transitioning societies of the North during the long sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, let alone rendered dead through the transition to neoliberal globalization. By reconstructing the classical agrarian question as a world-historical problematic, we are able to grasp how its foundational relations, however much they have been obscured, center on North–South hierarchies enabling violent appropriations of the land and labor of the South. Moreover, such a "global" basis of the agrarian question is in constant need of renewal, and as such the classical agrarian question, reconstructed world-historically, remains relevant to both the reproduction, and the potential overturning, of colonial-capitalist development. It is on this latter point that the Agrarian South emphasizes a return to the "national question" framework of anti-imperial Marxism (Ajl, 2021a), which held that national sovereign reclamation by colonized peoples, via anticolonialism, remains integral to overthrowing the world-scale capitalist system and thereby enable the reorientation of labor and resources toward sustainable national development rather than the accumulation imperatives of the core capitalist states.

The Agrarian South school's empirical mapping of the world-historical reconstruction of the agrarian question has largely been undertaken by Utsa Patnaik (2003; Patnaik and Moyo, 2011). Patnaik's careful attention to historical data has led her to question whether in fact primitive accumulation in the English countryside, with its forwarding of the wage-labor relation and capitalist agriculture more broadly, produced the productivity-enhancing agricultural revolution necessary for industrial transition, as claimed by Brenner and Byres. While allowing that there were some gains in

productivity, Patnaik nonetheless finds that these were insufficient to "cope with the wage good (the basic necessities, such as food and cloth, bought by workers with their wages) and raw material demands of industrial transition and these demands were actually increasingly met by transfers from the heavily taxed peasantry and from the plantation agriculture set up in subjugated colonies" (Patnaik and Moyo, 2011, 12). Beyond simply the insufficient quantity of food and materials produced endogenously, Patnaik points to the further important material constraint represented by the cold climate of the North, which is incapable of the range of crop production necessary to provision the consistent supply of stimulants (sugar, tea, coffee, cocoa) and raw materials (cotton) required for industrial transition. This latter constraint could only be overcome by the North's colonization of the tropical lands of the South, an outsourcing relation which remains fundamental, Patnaik argues, to the year-round diversified food baskets and high real incomes of the North (Patnaik and Moyo, 2011, 14–20). In this sense, the global agrarian basis of Northern industrial development remains dependent upon access to tropical lands, and the agrarian question can only be considered resolved if we accept the naturalization of the global hierarchies upon which this is based.

The reduction of the South to abundant lands naturally endowed for provisioning the "cheap inputs" required for the North's transition thus necessitated, as argued variously by Araghi, Bagchi (2009), and Patnaik, that global primitive accumulation involve de-peasantization, via enclosure, in the core, and a concomitant peasantization in the peripheries. The colonial destruction of Indigenous societies involved their subsequent reconstruction as "naturalized" peasant societies inherently suited for working the land and producing the food and other raw materials needed by the ostensibly higher value producing industrial societies of the North (Bagchi, 2009, 84). However, Patnaik further argues the essential point that primitive accumulation in the core, while certainly involving dispossession and de-peasantization, did not, in fact, sufficiently absorb, as proletarianized labor, those displaced by processes of land enclosure. Rather, the surplus labor of Europe's transitioning societies was crucial in propelling the levels of outmigration necessary for the violent colonial displacement of Indigenous peoples, and the subsequent institution of the settler-colonial mode of frontier agrarian production. In addition to provisioning cheap foodstuffs and raw materials, colonial primitive accumulation thus offered the necessary outlet for absorbing the surplus labor of the European core, which crucially "allowed the industrializing nations to externalize the acute internal contradictions which would otherwise have torn their societies apart" (Patnaik, 2012, 7).

Informed by this broader historical-geographical vantage point of the agrarian question, Patnaik offers a radical interpretation of contemporary

prospects for agrarian change. In particular, she argues that the contention surrounding the contemporary global land grab concerns more than what such processes mean for the South's prospects for overcoming a "stalled agrarian transition" (Li, 2011; Patnaik and Moyo, 2011). Rather, the rapid intensification of land acquisition across the Global South in the post-crisis context reveals that the resolution of the North's agrarian question remains an ongoing and contested global process. The global land grab, Patnaik argues, signifies, in large part, an attempt by Northern based global capital and states to renew the global agrarian basis—the forced exploitation and/or displacement of peasant agriculture in the south—of capitalist accumulation (Patnaik and Moyo, 2011, 49). Conversely, Patnaik emphasizes, it is precisely the inability to access the historical conditions for colonial primitive accumulation—importing cheap foodstuffs and exporting surplus labor—and not some imagined shift from the era of nation-states to the era of globalization, as argued by Bernstein and Li, which precludes the South from today following the North's path of agrarian transition. Thus, the core aim of progressive social forces in the South should consist of forwarding an anti-imperial resolution to the ongoing agrarian question. This principally involves the militant defense of peasant agriculture by sovereign Southern states against attempts by global capital, whether through neoliberal agrarian restructuring or global land grabbing, to forcibly orient its labor and resources toward the productive and consumptive needs of the North. Such a defense would then enable the articulation of an agrarian-based, peasant-centered alternative development trajectory for states in the South for whom the historical conditions of possibility—global primitive accumulation—of the North's agrarian transition remain foreclosed (Patnaik and Moyo, 2011, 50–53).

Patnaik's work thus further bolsters, particularly through her empirical focus on the colonized peripheries as both source of cheap inputs and sink for surplus labor absorption, Araghi's "global value relations" framework in forwarding a world-historical reconstruction of the agrarian question. The articulation, however, of the latter's racialized ontology, which Araghi gestured toward but leaves underdeveloped, has been considered more seriously by fellow Agrarian south theorists, Sam Moyo, Praveen Jha, and Paris Yeros (Moyo, Jha, and Yeros, 2013; Moyo, Yeros, and Jha, 2012). Though converging with Araghi in identifying global primitive accumulation as a "basic determinant of industrial transition in England and Europe, which would have otherwise been stifled and reduced to a lesser event" (Moyo, Jha, and Yeros, 2013, 98–99), Moyo and his collaborators place more emphasis upon the "racialized global culture" (Moyo, Yeros, and Jha, 2012, 184) which both enabled, and was woven through, global primitive accumulation. In pointing out that such a racialized global culture has "yielded

an enduring 'hierarchy' of peoples, including a special paternalism towards the African continent" (Moyo, Yeros, and Jha, 2012, 184). Moyo, Jha, and Yeros open space for a deeper conceptualization of the distinct logics of difference and othering that have situated zones of underconsumption and rightless labor in the Agrarian South. The "race consciousness" of "arrogant, bourgeois industrial society," within which they locate Marx's own denial of history to the "Indigenous peoples and slaves of the old and new colonies" (Moyo, Jha, and Yeros, 2013, 106) effectively de-humanized the latter as unworthy of economic compensation and political inclusion, and thus set in place the necessary ontological conditions for the overconsumption/underconsumption contradiction at the core of the world-historical agrarian question. In centering racialized dehumanization as core to the European agrarian transition, Moyo, Jha, and Yeros argue that the world-historical agrarian question comes to fundamentally pivot on the reproduction, or overturning, of its racist, colonial foundations. In so doing, they continue, the "agrarian question becomes fully consonant with the national question [of anticolonial liberation] and the victims of primitive accumulation fully human, thereby closing the circle which began with imperialist partition and ideological domination" (Moyo, Jha, and Yeros, 2013, 111). The return, again, to the national question, makes evident that the Agrarian South approach, while foregrounding the North–South world-historical scale of the classic agrarian transitions, insists that the overturning of this uneven relationship necessitates the national sovereign reclamation of the labor and lands of the Agrarian South.

Unlike Patnaik, however, Moyo, Jha, and Yeros do not reproduce the South as an undifferentiated geographical space when considering contemporary prospects for agrarian change. Taking seriously the role of Southern states and capital, particularly in the case of emerging economies such as India acquiring agricultural land on the African continent, they argue that the "enduring hierarchy of peoples, including a special paternalism towards the African continent" yielded by the "race consciousness" of colonial-capitalist modernity, while remaining "deeply rooted in the Western psyche," risks now being reproduced by the "new non-Western competitors" for African agrarian labor and land (Moyo, Yeros, and Jha, 2012, 184). Whereas, then, Araghi and Patnaik point the way toward reconceptualizing the global land grab as expressive of a broader world-historical, rather than Eurocentric-anthropocentric, agrarian question, Moyo, Jha, and Yeros shift our attention toward accounting for the significance of its "South–South" dimensions, particularly in terms of what this means for the integral "race consciousness" of capitalist development. In following Moyo, Jha, and Yeros, we can locate the global land grab within a "contested transition" wherein states and capital across both North and South seek to variously

renew, fundamentally reconstitute along "South–South" lines, or overturn through de-linking, the racialized global agrarian surplus through which "national" agrarian transitions have been historically (re)produced.

Conclusion

In order to more fully forward such a reconceptualization, we must build upon Moyo, Jha, and Yeros' critical intervention here by articulating, in further theoretical and historical detail, how "race consciousness" operates as a core ontological relation in the material constitution of the world-scale agrarian surplus underpinning national agrarian transitions. This will necessarily compel us to consider, in particular, the key historical function of racialization within the ontological distinction between an active, rational humanity and an irrational, passive nature which has been, it will be argued, a fundamental condition of possibility for capitalist productivity. We thus return, here, to a deeper investigation of the Eurocentric-anthropocentric paradigm of the agrarian question, wherein the conditions of transition involve the co-produced externalization of non-human natures and non-European peoples. Whereas the first section of this chapter considered the Eurocentric-anthropocentric paradigm in terms of how agrarian scholars ignored the presence of colonized people and non-human natures in their account of historical European agrarian transitions, we will now turn, over the next two chapters, to explicating how precisely such presence, and its political and ideological externalization, have been indispensable to both the constitution and collapse of the world-ecologies through which capitalist accumulation and production have proceeded.

Notes

1 Michael Watts (2009) has noted that such a convergence between the World Bank and historical materialism is reflective of the 2008 WDR being authored by the Marxist agrarian studies scholar Alain de Janvry.

2 It is necessary to distinguish between those forms of Marxism that were captured with Eurocentric ideological frames and those that remained more faithful to the historical materialist method. The latter have been more commonly associated with the label "third-world Marxism," which would include the Agrarian South school discussed earlier and in more detail below, and, I would further add, constitutes the principal approach of this book as well.

3 Warren's reading exists, of course, in tension with a more integral anticolonial and ecologically informed position that can be found elsewhere in Marx's writings on primitive accumulation and the metabolic rift (Marx, 1946). This other

dimension of Marx has been taken up by world-systems (Wallerstein, 1974), world-ecological (Moore, 2015) and third-world Marxist approaches to the study of capitalism.

4 In positing the American experience as a more radical variant of the "from below" path, Byres engages here in a Eurocentric dehumanization of the Indigenous peoples whose violent, genocidal dispossession opened the material conditions of a large internal frontier distributed among family farmers. This will be discussed in further detail below.

5 This claim must, by necessity, ignore and discount the violence that was inflicted upon Indigenous peoples in the forging of the American family farm settler-colonial path. While Lenin remains a pre-eminent theorist of the relation between capitalism and imperialism, his discounting of settler-colonial violence against Indigenous peoples can be understood as an outcome of a limitation in his framework identified by Samir Amin (2015). Specifically, Amin points out that Lenin erred in locating imperialism exclusively in a late stage of capitalism, and in so doing he occluded from his analysis the significance of settler-colonialism to the emergence of the capitalist world-system.

6 This is expressive of the epistemological colonization which continues to dominate North–South relations, with the North viewed as the space of theory/abstraction, and the South as the space of empirical observation. For a critique, see Wai (2020).

2

Colonialism, capitalism, and planetary crisis

In addition to the "social" agrarian question—the implications of the global land grab for development and global inequality—addressed in Chapter 1, the post-2008 surge in transnational agricultural land deals has implications for ecological questions that have been intensifying in an era in which existential threats to non-human natures have become increasingly evident. The existential threat to life posed by the planetary scale of contemporary ecological crises has motivated much reflection upon the destructive relations of domination that humanity has exercised over non-human natures and the earth-system taken as a whole (Burke et al., 2016; Chakrabarty, 2014; Latour, 2016). In such a context, McMichael has suggested that, insofar as it promotes an ecologically exhaustive industrialization of agriculture across the Global South, the "land grab—to the extent that it is incapable of recognizing the salience of low-carbon bio-diverse agriculture—is the ultimate death wish as industrial biofuels and value-added agriculture will not resolve the combined problems of climate change and food insecurity" (McMichael, 2013, 697). At the same time, however, the evidently uneven racialized distribution of both the costs of ecological crises and the benefits of the processes fueling them, as shown in Chapter 1, have made clear the limits of conceiving of the "ecological problem" in terms of an undifferentiated humanity dominating nature (Chandler et al., 2017; Davis et al., 2018; Luke, 2020; Verges, 2017). A key question that emerges, then, is how can we best account for the underlying structural relations and logics of power that are both driving planetary ecological crises and racializing their consequences?

Building upon the investigation into the world-historical dimensions of the land grab undertaken in Chapter 1, this chapter demonstrates how our understanding of the uneven effects of planetary ecological crises is advanced and clarified by the development of a "political ecology of colonial capitalism" framework that moves us beyond a "conceptualization of capitalism as an isolated sector consisting of only capitalists and workers" (Patnaik and Patnaik, 2021). The conceptualization of such a framework was opened in Chapter 1 through a critical reappraisal of the potential of the concepts

of the agrarian question and primitive accumulation to make sense of the global land-grab phenomenon. In reconceiving the agrarian question and primitive accumulation as global scale processes, Chapter 1 clarified how the emergence and reproduction of the capital–labor relation at the heart of industrial capitalist modernity is itself premised upon a world-scale generation and transfer of surplus value from periphery to core. The task, however, of extending the conceptualization of capitalism beyond an "isolated sector consisting of only capitalists and workers" remained unsatisfactory insofar as the theorization of the core–periphery relation only suggested a quantitative input rather than a qualitative relation underlying the qualitative capital–labor relation. Race was foregrounded as a key organizing relation structuring the transfer of surplus from periphery to core, but it remained insufficiently theorized as a distinctive social relation of power and being which puts in place qualitative ontological orientations not reducible to the market-dependent logic of capital, yet still historically necessary for enhanced productivity and agrarian transition. It is in turning to integrate the ecological forces and consequences of agrarian transition and capitalist development into our framework that, as this chapter demonstrates, we can begin to fully apprehend the qualitative relations of capitalism which emerge from, and continue to structure, its colonial foundations. In this sense, our theoretical framework of a "political ecology of colonial capitalism" is not only applied to planetary ecological crises, but itself emerges out of an integration of the latter into the analysis of colonial capitalism.

The chapter proceeds through a close engagement with an emergent Capitalocene framework that has most prominently challenged the Anthropocene account of human-driven planetary ecological crises. Rather than an emphasis on "humanity in general," as the Anthropocene proposes, the Capitalocene framework emphasizes that capitalism, as a system founded, and reproduced, through the intensive exploitation of labor and Earth, must be recognized as the principal systemic driver of contemporary ecological crises. The Capitalocene approach opens space to reconceptualize the agrarian question as "world-ecological" in scope (Moore, 2015), and to consider in particular how the colonial register of primitive accumulation gives rise to a second qualitative contradiction of capitalism—the society–nature contradiction—that stands as the principal condition of possibility for the capital–labor contradiction that is generated through the European register of primitive accumulation. The society–nature contradiction centers upon "unpaid" appropriation from the sphere of nature, which simultaneously enables the generation of an ecological surplus underpinning capital accumulation while setting in motion an eventual ecological exhaustion that undermines capitalist development. Combined, "surplus" and "exhaustion" are demonstrated to constitute distinct moments that generate, collapse, and

potentially renew the successive "systemic cycles of accumulation" (Arrighi, 1994) through which capitalism has developed over its long centuries. Within the Capitalocene framework, the evident racialized consequences of its "world-ecology" (Verges, 2017) are accounted for by positioning race as an uneven distributional mechanism that derives from the distinctive "Cartesian" society–nature dualism emerging out of capital's founding moments of primitive accumulation (Moore, 2015, 18). Race is positioned here as one particular form of a broader category of "cheap natures" necessary for capital to repress labor costs and increase profits.

While the Capitalocene has, in articulating the centrality of the qualitative society–nature contradiction, significantly advanced our task of moving beyond a "conceptualization of capitalism as an isolated sector consisting of only capitalists and workers," it has insufficiently elaborated upon, and even risked reproducing, how racialized and colonial power is implicated in the structuring relations of what it terms the "capitalist world-ecology." In particular, the Capitalocene approach remains unified with the Anthropocene in the reproduction of a Eurocentric power-knowledge regime that functions to confirm the historical priority of Euro-Western presence, the corollary of which is the rendering derivative of non-European presence. While the Anthropocene paradigm obscures, via the generalized language of "humanity over–against nature," the disproportionate responsibility of white Euro-Western and settler-colonial capitalist systems in instigating planetary ecological crises, the Capitalocene paradigm risks, in privileging Euro-Western capitalism as the originary and exclusive agency directing humanity's emergence as prime geological force, reducing the non-European world to a passive historical spectator whose significance emerges only after being acted upon by colonizing Euro-Western capitalism. Both approaches are premised upon an assumption that humanity's shift from biological to geological being, and its resultant disruption of deep Earth time, corresponds with the historical rise of the West.

Troubled by such Eurocentrism, and particularly the challenges it poses to recognizing the distinctive non-reductive capacity and presence of non-Europeans in the constitution of the contemporary geological epoch, this chapter engages decolonial interventions that center the experience and knowledge of Indigenous peoples and African and African-descendant peoples. Within the Anthropocene debates, these interventions have been advanced from two distinct perspectives: Indigenous Climate Change Studies and the Plantationocene paradigm articulated from within Black geographies (Davis et al., 2018; Davis and Todd, 2017; Whyte, 2017; Yusoff, 2019). Both approaches insist that the relations and logics of power structuring the contemporary epoch, and thus driving the climate crisis, originate from within the very processes that subjected Indigenous peoples

and African/African-descendant peoples to colonization and enslavement. In reconceiving colonialism as a foundational structure, rather than derivative effect, of capitalism's ecological order, we will be able to apprehend how race underpins rather than derives from the society–nature contradiction fueling the ecological surplus and exhaustion of capital's accumulation cycles. It is here, building upon the intervention of Enrique Dussel and Nelson Maldonado-Torres, that I contend that it makes more sense to speak of a Cortesian, rather than a Cartesian, dualism governing the capitalist world-ecology's zone of appropriation, as this foregrounds the racialized "by-nature" (Wynter, 2003) distinction between the "rational" settler-conqueror and the "irrational" subjugated-indigenous other as a fundamental condition of possibility for the articulation of the society–nature distinction.

This chapter aims to further clarify the constituting role played by non-European presence and earth-worlding capacity in the constitution of the colonial capitalist world-system. Projects of "decolonizing the Anthropocene" (Davis and Todd, 2017) have yet to fully transcend the Eurocentric assumption that planetary ecological crises are an outcome of an epoch set in motion exclusively by European capitalist mastery over both non-European worlds and non-human natural worlds, and, as such, within these frames, non-Europeans assume significance insofar as they have either been violated by the same logic of mastery or can express resistant knowledges that can help realize more sustainable futures. The limitation with regards to accounting for non-European presence arises, I argue, out of the assumption that conquest stands as the first moment of significance in the encounter between colonizer/colonized, and from which can be explained the emerging logic of mastery through which European capitalism unleashes humanity's potential as geological agent. By assuming conquest, we miss out on the centrality of what I refer to as the earth-worlding capacity of Indigenous and Black peoples in their originary encounters with the European settler-to-be/master-to-be (King, 2015). Uncovering this capacity is fundamental to constructing a "political ecology of colonial capitalism" framework, as it both asserts the non-European as non-derivative vis-à-vis the European and clarifies the key structuring dynamic of the colonial-capitalist system driving planetary ecological crises.

Ecology of the capitalist world-system

Beyond the evident Eurocentrism, the agrarian question approach has generally neglected to consider seriously the ecological transformations and consequences involved with the transition to industrial capitalist modernity. It has, rather, clearly reproduced an anthropocentric framework concerned

exclusively with investigating how changing agrarian social relations impact the productive capacities of human societies, and what this means for broader socio-economic development. This, it can be argued, reflects the dominant anthropocentrism of the nineteenth-century conceptualization of the agrarian question, where a belief in the moral imperative of progressive human mastery over nature contributed to the exclusion of non-human ecologies from the analysis of agrarian change (O'Connor, 1998). With the risks posed to the ecological conditions of life by capitalism, however, becoming increasingly evident by the close of the twentieth century, there has emerged a growing recognition of the need to construct historical and theoretical frameworks of transition and development which account for the presence of non-human natures both as sites of impact and forces of change.

The most prominent and influential of the emergent paradigms for investigating how changing society–nature relations have both impacted and been impacted by the transition from agrarian to industrial society consist of what might be termed the "epoch debates." These debates are centered upon the political implications of how we name, and frame, our contemporary geological epoch, and proceed on the assumption that the scale of planetary ecological crisis demands a profound rethinking of our understanding of humanity's relation with geological processes hitherto understood to be unfolding in a deep temporality beyond human time scales. This rethinking was first set in motion by earth-systems scientists who, in light of the dramatic impact of the transition from agrarian to industrial society upon planetary ecological change, advanced the provocation that such a shift suggested that our geological age had shifted from the Holocene era that had enabled the rise of human agriculture toward an Anthropocene era in which the Anthropos, or the human, had emerged as determinative agent shaping Earth's geological processes (Chakrabarty, 2009; Crutzen, 2002; Steffen et al., 2015). This implies that intensifying planetary ecological crises have been fundamentally shaped by the mastery and dominance exercised by industrializing humanity over the Earth, and that such mastery should be either undone or deployed in the service of more sustainable ecological futures.

As put forward originally by earth-systems scientists, the Anthropocene approach argues that the impacts of industrial society upon the Earth have become so great—as seen most urgently in the form of changing atmospheric conditions, but also through intensifying human-centered land cover—that it is now appropriate, even politically and morally necessary, to speak of the human as having emerged as the principal agent shaping the geosphere of planet Earth (Chakrabarty, 2014; Crutzen, 2002). For Anthropocene scholar Dipesh Chakrabarty, this represents a profound break from the

received heterotemporality of planet Earth, which is understood to have hitherto been divided between deep geological time, more medium-run biological time, and the more immediate, perceptible time of human history (Chakrabarty, 2014). According to the Anthropocene argument, the proper order of earth-systems functioning is understood as beginning with an autonomous geological sphere unfolding slowly in deep time, which acts as the stage upon which first life emerges and evolves and, finally, human history unfolds. The intrusion of human agency and temporality into this stage of deep geological time represents a potentially fatal transformation, as "we" now risk destroying the stage (the geological Earth) upon which "our" life and history depends. Although human agency is spoken about in the general sense, it is implicitly specified as European when the origins of the Anthropocene, or the human's geological becoming, are located with the rise of industrialization through the steam engine. It is thus European inventiveness that allows for the full realization of human geological power. While this is dangerous, insofar as it threatens the conditions of life on Earth, it can also potentially be the solution—some Anthropocene scholars (Crutzen, 2002; Lynas, 2011) have turned to geoengineering as a possible solution. Thus, humanity in general is responsible, but it is the Euro-Western subject that is the primary agent of historical and geological change.

The apparent contradiction between "the age of the human" and the elevation of Euro-Western historical agency as the driver of this age provides evidence of how the Anthropocene paradigm reproduces the movement between "concealment" and "visibility" that Siba Grovogui (2006) has identified as integral to the consolidation of Eurocentric imperial hegemony in the modern world-system. Concealment, via the language of "humanity over/against nature," allows Euro-Western domination to elide responsibility and thus to be protected against any calls for systemic change in addressing the planetary crisis, whereas visibility, in the privileging of Euro-Western geological agency, normalizes the reproduction of Euro-Western epistemic supremacy as the necessary framework through which global scale technological fixes and management of ecological crises can be realized.

The imperative of both clarifying how the Anthropocene paradigm risks reproducing the very systems of power responsible for the planetary ecological crisis, and constructing a framework that can overcome such limitations, has motivated the articulation of the Capitalocene paradigm from within the ecological Marxist tradition. This emphasis upon the "age of Capital" foregrounds how planetary ecological crises of a geological scale are an outcome of the specific relations of power, forms of (re)production, and ways of knowing and being associated with capitalism. The ecological Marxist tradition emerged out of attempts to address the ecological blindspots of much of conventional Marxian analysis by uncovering, and elaborating upon, the

link between ecological crisis and capitalism. Returning to Marx, scholars of this tradition rediscovered that the historical emergence of capitalism through the process of enclosure or primitive accumulation gave rise to a second "capital–nature" contradiction in addition to the primary "capital–labor" contradiction. This ecological Marxist rethinking of primitive accumulation reveals that, insofar as capital's founding dispossession separates the primary producer from the means of production, it institutes, in addition to the capital–labor contradiction, a contradictory capital–nature relation wherein nature is reproduced as external to society (O'Connor, 1998) and, as a result, is rendered non-consequential to the human-centered production of value (Burkett, 1999). Whereas the "capital–labor" contradiction generates surplus value through the compulsion of dispossessed workers to sell their labor to profit-seeking capitalists, it is itself dependent upon the extraction of entirely unpaid, or perhaps "uncosted," work from the site of "nature." The latter, the secondary contradiction, operates through the concealment and, hence, discounting of the reproductive conditions of natures conceived as virgin, thus enabling them to be acted upon, and extracted from, without having to take account of the "cost" of their reproduction. This denial of reproductive costs constitutes the condition of possibility for the provisioning of "cheap" inputs from nature into the space of "capital–labor," which allows for both wages to be repressed and profits to be realized. While the repression of the reproductive costs of nature, along with the surplus value extracted from dispossessed labor, have thus been integral to the unprecedented levels of industrial production, and associated consumption, achieved by capitalism, they eventually come to stand, even more significantly, as the principal determinant of intensifying planetary ecological crises.

While there is broad agreement regarding capitalism as principal systemic driver of planetary crisis and geological change, debates have emerged among scholars working within the ecological Marxist tradition regarding, in particular, the temporal origins of the contradictory socio-ecological relations—capital over/against labor and capital over/against nature—structuring the Capitalocene epoch. Broadly, two competing temporal frameworks have been articulated from within this tradition. The first reproduces the Anthropocene paradigm's centering of the eighteenth-century European industrial revolution, and specifically the rise of the steam engine and its reliance upon fossil-fuel extraction, as the singular event from which the deep time of geological processes were first disrupted, though again the emphasis here is upon locating responsibility with an emergent European capitalist class privileging profit, commodification, and exchange value rather than with the power of humanity unleashed by European inventiveness (Malm, 2016). The second approach to the time of the Capitalocene is

premised upon a rejection of such a "two century model" (Moore, 2015) on the grounds that the latter "obscures the essential fact that industrial capitalism was intensely prepared for by the 'mercantile capitalism' that begun [*sic*] in the sixteenth century, not least in its destructive relationship to nature" (Bonneuil and Fressoz, 2017, 229). As the mercantile capitalism of the long sixteenth century was centered upon European colonial expansion into the Americas, Africa, and Asia, the "two century model" further risks, in assuming eighteenth-century Europe as point of departure, reproducing a Eurocentric framework that discounts the foundational role played by the subjugation of colonized peoples in the constitution of the Capitalocene.

Moving beyond the eighteenth-century European industrial revolution, the second approach to the Capitalocene builds from the *longue durée* framework for the study of capitalism, as articulated by world-systems analysis, and thus foregrounds how capitalism emerges, and is reproduced, through world-scale rather than intra-European relations that rise and fall under successive capitalist hegemonies from the "long sixteenth century" onward. The world-systems tradition, as we saw in Chapter 1, emphasizes that capitalism's founding relations and contradictions were forged through world-scale processes of primitive accumulation, including both enclosures in Europe and the violent colonization of the extra-European world. Moving to a world-scale analysis of primitive accumulation makes evident how the capital–labor class relation was itself dependent upon a racialized core–periphery distinction through which cheap wage goods and industrial inputs could be secured. The combination of ecological Marxism with such a world-systems analysis has given rise to the "capitalism as world-ecology" approach, which foregrounds how the two contradictory socio-ecological relations of capitalism—capital–labor and capital–nature—have emerged and been reproduced across the distinctive zones of what it now terms the capitalist world-ecology. In the move from capitalist world-system to world-ecology, the principal zones of the Imperial core and colonized periphery are reconceived as zones of commodification/exploitation and appropriation. While the core zone of commodification remains governed by the capital–labor antagonism, the colonized peripheral zone of appropriation is revealed, through the emergent world-ecological frame, to be governed by the second principal contradiction of capital–nature.

The agrarian question as world-ecological

The "capitalism as world-ecology" approach to the Capitalocene, while sharing the foundational concerns of the agrarian question, namely the relationship between changing agrarian relations, agrarian surplus, and industrial

capitalist modernity, is premised upon a critical rethinking in which the "agrarian question is also the question of nature, and therefore it is also the question of ecological crises in the modern world" (Moore, 2008). This conceptual broadening from agrarian question to world-ecology further rests upon the recognition of agriculture as a particularly acute expression of "how humans make the rest of nature, and of how nature makes human organization" (Moore, 2015, 247). In expanding the ontological coordinates of agrarian relations to include the co-constitution of human and non-human natures, the world-ecology approach forces us to move beyond the anthropocentric register of the classical agrarian question wherein the production of agrarian surplus centered, as we saw earlier, on the productivity enhancing changes in intra-human agrarian social relations. Neither exclusively privileging or discarding the import of the competitive compulsion of the market dependent capital–labor relation, world-ecology forwards an expansive analytical frame which can reveal how changing society–nature boundaries and relations are fundamental conditions for the production of the "ecological surplus" underpinning the possibility of capitalist accumulation.

Articulated through the wider ontological frame of world ecology, surplus is conceived as ecological rather than simply agrarian, and consists of what Moore identifies as the four cheaps—food, labor power, energy, and natural resources—which enable capital to repress its wage and input costs and thus sustain the cycle of investment, production, consumption, and accumulation (Moore, 2015, 17). Crucially, the production of ecological surplus necessarily involves a geographically expansive, and differentiated, production and appropriation of nature's "free gifts." Specifically, this expansive and differentiated geography involves the formation of Wallerstein's core–periphery relation, alternatively conceived by Araghi as the institution of zones of underconsumption/overconsumption. However, unlike the world-systems and global value–relations approaches, Moore extends the analysis of surplus value extraction beyond the appropriation of coerced "rightless" labor. Rather, Moore emphasizes how it is the latter's imbrication with the mastery and appropriation of non-human natures that enables the emergent capital of the core to produce, and appropriate, the ecological surplus of the colonized peripheries (Moore, 2015, 16). The synthesis of ecological Marxism and world-systems analysis, making possible the transcendence of the former's Eurocentrism and the latter's anthropocentrism, thus defines capitalism as a world-ecology framework. This synthesis, and the particular way it reveals the co-production, on a world scale, of rightless labor and externalized nature, enables, as we will now see, the world-ecology approach to move beyond the limitations we encountered in Chapter 1 with Araghi's global value–relations framework in articulating the qualitative ontological relations set forth through global primitive accumulation.

Moore's spatio-temporal mapping of the ontological framework—the constitutive beings and relations—of the capitalist world-ecology centers the geographical expansions of the "long sixteenth century" as the necessary point of departure of the Capitalocene. The "long sixteenth century" (1450–1640), a periodization borrowed from the Braudelian historiographical approach of world-systems analysis, signifies here the epoch within which the crisis of the European feudal world gave way to the emergence of the first hegemony of historical capitalism organized under Spanish leadership. Contra the dominant social property–relations approach of the agrarian question, which privileges the social feudal class struggle, the world-ecology framework reads the crisis as irreducibly socio-ecological insofar as collapsing soil fertility combined with an empowered peasantry to undermine the symbolic-material reproduction of the feudal world (Moore, 2015, 126). Further problematizing the agrarian question's Eurocentric-anthropocentric disposition, the emphasis of "capitalism as world-ecology" constitutes a reaffirmation of the world-systems and global value–relations insistence that the productive, surplus-generating resolution of the feudal crisis could only be advanced through the institution of world-scale "European" and "extra-European" relations which enabled differentiated forms of labor control (Moore, 2003, 358). However, Moore's emphasis on the irreducible "socio-ecological" character of both the feudal crisis and its resolution extends his analysis beyond the social anthropocentric concerns of world-systems and global value relations. In particular, the world-ecological account of the rise of capitalist development considers the geographical expansions of the European centered world-economy as constitutive of the co-production of European–extra-European and human–extra-human relations that simultaneously enabled the production and capture of the rightless labor forces and fertile lands necessary to overcome the socio-ecological crisis of the feudal world.

Concretely, world-ecology locates the conditions of possibility for this ontological framework (capital, labor, nature) of capitalist accumulation in the waves of primitive accumulation unleashed by the early global capitalist hegemonies of the Spanish and Dutch states. This involved the expansive separation of producers from the soil, expressed in particular through the massacres, and expulsions from their lands, of Indigenous peoples in the Americas, the enslavement of African laborers, peasant enclosures within Europe, and the imposition of a second serfdom in Eastern Europe. Combined, primitive accumulation as a global process formed an emergent capitalist world-ecology, consisting in particular of what Moore refers to as the "global Baltic" and "global Atlantic" regimes through which the "ecological surplus" of grain, sugar, silver, and labor-power was produced and transferred from the peripheries and semi-peripheries of the Americas,

Africa, and Eastern Europe into the core commodity-producing zones of Western Europe (Moore, 2015, 87). While this emphasis on surplus transfer from the peripheries to the core is quite evidently influenced by Wallerstein's world-systems analysis, Moore joins with Araghi's global value–relations approach in conceptualizing such transfer beyond a quantitative "large-scale basic accumulation of capital." Rather, the production, capture, and circulation of the surplus is more fundamentally understood as expressive of the qualitative ontological relations, constituted within and across the differentiated zones of the world-system, defining capitalist development's immanent global structure (Moore, 2015, 105). However, as was noted earlier, Araghi's ontological framework, though offering a vital global corrective of differentially constituted rightless and rights-bearing labor in zones of under–overconsumption respectively, nonetheless reproduces classical Marxism's emphasis on capital–labor as the definitive relation of capitalist development. For Moore, such an exclusive focus on the capital–labor relation fails to capture how the co-production of the distinctive zones (core–periphery, under–overconsumption) of world-scale capitalism involves a fundamental reorganization of not only the relation between labor and the means of production, but of society and nature more broadly.

The qualitative society–nature distinction and the surplus–exhaustion cycles of the capitalist world-ecology

In order to elucidate the qualitative dimensions of the core–periphery, or under–overconsumption, dialectic beyond the capital–labor relation, Moore reconceptualizes the co-constitutive zones of the capitalist world-ecology as consisting of what he terms the zone of appropriation and the zone of commodification–exploitation (Moore, 2015, 66–73). While the zone of commodification–exploitation signifies the site of the endless accumulation of capital through the capture of relative surplus value from exploited labor in the core, and thus can be apprehended through the capital–labor relation, it is premised upon an enabling zone of appropriation, located predominantly in the imperially subjugated peripheries, signifying the qualitative production of the distinctive society–nature relations of capitalist modernity. These co-productive relations of appropriation and exploitation express what Moore identifies as the two principal abstractions both informing, and further constituted through, global primitive accumulation: (i) abstract social labor, encompassing capital formation via labor dispossession; and (ii) abstract social nature, encompassing the "Cartesian dualism" advancing human society's separation from, and mastery over, nature (Moore, 2015, 21, 199–202). The process of forcibly separating the producer from the soil involves, in addition to the imposition of the exploitative capital–labor

relation organized according to profit and commodification, the elevated distinction, on account of its capacity for rationality, of the properly active human subject from an irrational passive nature (Moore, 2015, 48). Enclosure of land, in other words, both effects and is effected by an emergent rational epistemological and ontological orientation—the "Cartesian dualism"—that aims to objectively isolate, apprehend, and manage the interests of the human self against the multitude of non-human natures.

Within Cartesian dualism, the rational human can alone actively harness the latent potentiality of the "free gifts," or resources, bestowed upon, but not realized by, an irrational passive nature. This renders natures left undeveloped by human rationality as "waste" or "unused" lands. Insofar, then, that rational human activity, in the form of both capital and labor, can alone produce value, its other—nature—is constructed as a non-value-producing space whose appropriation does not thus involve any reproductive cost (Moore, 2015, 54).

Within such a distinction, the evident reproductive costs—food, housing, clothing, fuel—of the human production of value are not applicable to nature, where soil fertility and water abundance, for example, are not viewed as actively reproduced by a diversity of extra-human natures, but rather as simply given, or "virgin" (Moore, 2015, 60). This reduction of nature to a bounty of unharnessed "free gifts" finds concrete expression in the displacement of sustainable cyclical forms of socio-ecological metabolic exchange with a linear extractive form through which extra-human natures are appropriated for the "higher" value of rational human industry without accounting for their reproductive costs. Moore's zones of appropriation and commodification, then, signify, through global primitive accumulation and its attendant knowledge regimes, the qualitative production of a specifically capitalist world-ecology comprising socio-ecological relations which partition the world into invisible non-human realms of non-value, where work, on account of its naturalization, is not recognized and therefore "unpaid," and the more visible human arenas of value, where the struggle over wages, profits, and productivity is engaged. The realm of non-value, or zone of appropriation, is associated predominantly with the colonized peripheries, whereas the value-producing zone of commodification corresponds with the metropolitan core of the capitalist world ecology.

The production of an externalized nature—what Moore refers to as "frontiers" beyond human presence—which can be acted upon by human rationality without concern for its reproductive conditions enables the extraction of the ecological surplus of cheap food, energy, resources, and labor which constitute the fundamental condition of possibility for capitalist accumulation and development to proceed in the zone of commodification–exploitation (Moore, 2015, 17). Recalling that the frontier emerges, by and

large, through the colonial dimensions of global primitive accumulation, externalized nature thus includes, alongside extra-human natures such as virgin soils, the categorization of particular forms of human labor as "naturalized" and thus not expressive of the value-producing capacity of rational human management and labor. The labor of "human nature" corresponds with Araghi's deproletarianized or rightless labor, and is qualitatively produced through gendered and racialized distinctions which assign particular bodies a naturalized capacity for labor (Moore, 2015, 63–73). Such labor, insofar as it is an expression of nature rather than rational human activity, does not produce value but rather constitutes a "free gift" which thus does not carry reproductive costs and can be appropriated for the services of the "higher" value producing rational human. Moore's attention to the differentiation of labor through the society–nature boundary recalls the long-standing emphasis feminists (Federici, 2004; Mies, 1986) have placed on the centrality of unpaid women's work—constructed as such through the naturalization of women's bodies with domestic labor—to the emergence and reproduction of capitalist modernity, and points to a further elaboration of the claim advanced by the Black Marxist tradition (James, 1989; Robinson, 2000; Yusoff, 2019) regarding the naturalization of enslaved Black bodies with forms of agrarian and extractive (i.e. mining) labor.

Combined, the unpaid work of nature—both human and non-human—provisions the cheap inputs mobilizing the capital–labor relation in the zone of commodification–exploitation to initiate and sustain the cycles of investment, production, consumption, and accumulation necessary for the presumed "self-sustaining" growth of capitalist development. The constitution and penetration of frontiers of "unused natures" under the Spanish hegemony of the long sixteenth century involved the application of the enslaved labor of Indigenous Americans and Africans to the "virgin" colonized lands of the Atlantic islands and the Americas, enabling thereby the surplus production of the food, minerals, and resources necessary for effecting the transition from agrarian to industrial society in the European core (Blackburn, 1998; Mintz, 1985; Moore, 2010b, 2015). The production and mobilization of ecological surplus, then, involves more than the competitive profit-driven logic of the market-dependent social antagonism (capital–labor) or the world-scale differentiation of "rightless" and rights-bearing labor. Rather it is fundamentally dependent upon a particular epistemic frame of seeing and constructing nature as consisting of separable "free gifts" whose efficient and productive realization beyond "waste" can only be facilitated by superior human rationality. Thus, for example, soil fertility and enslaved racialized labor, insofar as they are separated from their wider socio-ecological entanglements, can be intensively drawn upon for the singular aim of provisioning rational human activity. Informed by such a

Cartesian dualism, the emergent Spanish state–capital nexus of the long sixteenth century deployed enslaved labor to mobilize, or bring to productive life, what Moore (2015, 220) refers to as the millennia of stored nutrients hitherto contained in the colonized soils of the Americas.

The logic of abstract social nature organizing the production of the frontier of "unused nature" from which the ecological surplus necessary for accumulation can be drawn does, however, express a fundamental contradiction undermining the systemic reproduction of capital. The production of nature as a passive externalized object necessarily denies how a variety of ecological actors co-produce one another in forging, and responding to, a wider ecosystem. In occluding nature's own reproductive conditions, and subjecting it instead to the imperative of "endless accumulation" driving rational human activity in the zone of commodification–appropriation, the capitalist world-ecology simultaneously secures an ecological surplus while undermining its condition of possibility (Moore, 2015, 114–115). Specifically, the conception of nature as passive and external, and the occlusion of its reproductive conditions, precludes the recognition of nature's agency in both constituting the conditions of possibility for capital's ecological surplus and in responding to the latter's logic of endless accumulation. As a consequence, Moore argues, the very abstraction—the Cartesian dualism—which enables the ecological surplus ultimately exhausts the frontier of "unused nature" from which the surplus is drawn, thereby undermining the cheap inputs necessary for capitalist accumulation and development in the zone of commodification. Where the millennia of stored content of the frontier's fertile soils once lowered costs, on account of their abundant productive capacity, the soil's eventual exhaustion requires the application of more capital (e.g. machinery, artificial fertilizers) to sustain production, which has the effect of raising commodity costs to a degree which renders wage and profit levels unsustainable for the accumulation and reinvestment of capital in the zone of commodification–exploitation (Moore, 2015, 111).

Ecological exhaustion in the zone of appropriation, combined with the class struggle (over the distribution of the shrinking surplus) which it engenders in the zone of commodification, undermines the hegemony of the state-capitalist bloc which had constituted the frontiers of "unused natures" and broader world-ecology necessary for capitalist accumulation and development. Moore emphasizes that exhaustion should not be understood here to signal solely the quantitative limit of finite natures such as soil fertility, forest cover, minerals, and so on, but rather more fundamentally expresses the exhaustion of the qualitative bundle of human–extra-human relations expressing the particular society–nature boundary enabling the constitution of the frontier of "unused natures" (Moore, 2015, 123–125). More specifically, exhaustion signifies the inability of the particular society–nature

configuration—what Moore also refers to as "historical natures"—forged by the hegemonic state–capital bloc to compel extra-human and human natures to co-operate with the imperatives of capitalist accumulation. Such an exhaustion of relations can include, for example, the death of enslaved laborers from the absolute appropriation of their "natural" labor, the increasing resistance to such slavery, soil degradation in the frontier, Indigenous resistance to colonial land appropriation, and flooding or drought in response to hydrological disruptions.

Engaging Giovanni Arrighi's (1994, 2007) *longue durée* framework for the study of historical capitalism, wherein capitalist development has proceeded on a world scale through the rise and fall of successive "systemic cycles of accumulation" organized by particular (Spanish, Dutch, British, American) state–capital hegemonic blocs, Moore locates the production of the ecological surplus, and its eventual exhaustion, as fundamental to both the constitution and collapse of "all great waves of capital accumulation" (Moore, 2010a, 392). Capital, owing to its foundational "mastery over nature" Cartesian epistemic premise, cannot respond to the exhaustion of its ecological surplus with a heightened concern for the reproductive conditions of the human and extra-human natures co-producing its world-ecology. Such a concern would, after all, fatally compromise the fundamental conditions of possibility—appropriating nature's free gifts—for the accumulation of capital. Rather, exhaustion of the ecological surplus of a particular "systemic cycle of accumulation" of the capitalist world-ecology, though undermining the accumulation capacity of the existing state–capital hegemony, propels emerging capitalist states to organize successive "historical natures" capable of delivering the necessary ecological surplus. This primarily involves the production and mobilization of new frontiers of "unused" natures through a combination of imperial violence and scientific knowledge production. Thus, the ecological exhaustion of what Araghi terms the first epoch of global primitive accumulation, corresponding roughly with the early Spanish and Dutch state–capital hegemonies which had mobilized an ecological surplus via serfdom in the semi-peripheries of the "global Baltic" and the slave-holding plantations of the "global Atlantic," was overcome by the violent institution of new frontiers, first in the American Midwest and Ireland and subsequently in South Asia and Africa, by an emergent British imperial hegemony (Moore, 2000, 2010a). These new frontiers were constituted as "unused" dormant natures by what we might call the British scientific-colonial power-knowledge regime, expressed most prominently in the Lockean theory of property and the Kew Gardens botanical research institution. Conceived as "free gifts" hitherto "wasted" by an irrational passive nature, the colonized frontiers of British North America, Australia, South Asia, and Africa were mobilized as "virgin" fertile soils and

"natural" agrarian labor sources underpinning a global agro-ecological revolution capable of delivering the ecological surplus of cheap inputs which enabled British industrialization to serve as the engine of accumulation for a reconstituted zone of commodification–exploitation. Inevitably, the logic of externalized nature and endless accumulation, insofar as it denied the reproductive conditions of the frontier, would come, by means as varied as anticolonial revolt and ecological degradation–disruption, to exhaust the ecological surplus of the British hegemonic organization of the capitalist world-ecology.

The global land grab in the Capitalocene: a reconstructed world-ecological agrarian question

The world-ecological intervention thus moves us beyond the Eurocentric-anthropocentric approach, where an exclusive focus on national, or internal, intra-human transformation of agrarian social property relations enables a linear temporal conception of a resolved agrarian question giving way to a higher stage of industrial capitalist development. The world-ecology approach reveals not only how the production of the surplus underpinning the European agrarian transitions of the long sixteenth and nineteenth centuries involves an expansive ontological reconfiguration of society–nature relations on a global scale, but moreover how the latter's organizing episteme—the Cartesian dualism—propels both the exhaustion and reconstitution of the surplus across capital's "systemic cycles of accumulation." Conceived world-ecologically, the agrarian question thus remains ongoing, rather than fully resolved, even for leading capitalist states, as exhaustion of the ecological surplus poses the agrarian question, and its requirement for a world-scale society–nature ontology capable of delivering cheap inputs, anew for each successive accumulation cycle of the capitalist world-ecology. While the world-ecological conceptualization of an "ongoing agrarian question," whose renewal constitutes the basis of successive accumulation cycles, recalls the temporal structure of capitalist development advanced by food-regime analysis and global value–relations theory, it extends, as we have now seen, beyond the latter's limitations insofar as it articulates a more qualitative interpretation of the core–periphery, under–overconsumption dialectic of world-scale capitalism. In particular, the renewal of the underlying conditions of capitalist accumulation involves more than simply the differentiated reconstitution of the capital–labor relation across zones of rightless and rights-bearing labor, as suggested by global value–relations theory in its account of the shift between the first and second epochs of global primitive accumulation. The vital contribution of Moore's world-ecological

approach consists, rather, in the emphasis placed on the reinstitution of the logic of abstract social nature organizing the frontier as the basis of the renewal of abstract social labor, and hence accumulation, in the core. More precisely, the ontological occlusion of the wasteful-irrational "non-being" of nature, encompassing both human (racialized and/or gendered) and extra-human natures in the colonized peripheral zones of appropriation, enables the (re)emergence of the visible value-producing rational human "being," encompassing both capital and labor in the core zone of commodification, uniquely capable of mobilizing the free gifts wasted by nature for the service of the "higher value" of human industrial development.

The contemporary geological epoch, reconceived as Capitalocene through the world-ecology approach, thus originates in the long sixteenth century, and emerges through, and remains structured by, two distinct yet co-constituting socio-ecological relations of power—capital–labor and the society–nature distinction of the Cartesian dualism—that respectively govern the core zones of commodification and peripheral zones of appropriation which co-produce the capitalist world-ecology. The logic of appropriation, premised as it is upon the denial of the reproductive conditions of that which it externalizes as nature, ultimately exhausts such natures, which has the effect of both bringing to crisis the existing world-ecological capitalist hegemony and provoking a subsequent hegemonic contestation that is resolved when an emergent "state–capital" bloc succeeds in organizing a new zone of appropriation capable of underwriting a successive cycle of accumulation. The age of capital thus moves through cycles of accumulation that rise and fall in correspondence with the "surplus" and "exhaustion" of the historically ("symbolic-material") produced natures constituting the zones of appropriation. Eventually, such exhaustion reaches planetary scales and provokes a terminal crisis of the capitalist world-ecology, which our contemporary moment of intensifying planetary ecological crises is held to constitute.

As the final chapter of this book reveals, reconceptualizing the agrarian question in the Capitalocene as an ongoing world-ecological process has important implications for how we situate and interpret the contemporary global land-grabbing phenomenon. While consistent with the Agrarian South school's emphasis on the global land grab as an attempted reconstitution of the global agrarian basis of capitalist development, an ongoing world-ecological agrarian question framework deepens such a conceptualization by drawing attention to its spatial, temporal, ontological, and epistemological structures, transitions, and relations. Specifically, this framework centers as a pivotal point of departure the role that the exhaustion of the neoliberal accumulation cycle's ecological surplus, organized through its particular historical nature of "long green revolution" (Patel, 2013), has

played in the "multiple crises" or "Great Recession" epoch that took hold following the global food and financial crises of 2007–2008. Situated within this context, the global land grab constitutes a potential "ecological surplus" generating response pursued, both in competition and co-operation with one another, by particular state–capital blocs seeking to advance their own particular "national" or "regional" developmental interests in the succeeding accumulation cycle. Following the historical constitution of earlier accumulation cycles, the ecological surplus here continues to be pursued through the co-productions of global primitive accumulation and Cartesian knowledge production, instituting as they do zones of appropriation and commodification–exploitation. In this instance, developmental actors, such as the World Bank, intervening states, and profit-seeking capital, have advanced an emergent post-neoliberal frontier, or historical nature, organized through the episteme of the "yield gap"—suggesting "dormant" free gifts of irrational nature awaiting mobilization by value-producing rational human production—and secured through practices of global primitive accumulation dispossessing Indigenous peoples across the targeted lands of the South identified as "virgin" and "unused." Thus, the Eurocentric-anthropocentric paradigm mobilizes the "yield gap" concept to advance a colonial-Cartesian solution to the crisis of neoliberal ecological exhaustion, wherein the rational management and organizing capacity of transnational capital can bring development to the "virgin" lands of the South. The world-ecological approach reveals, on the other hand, how such "ecological surplus"–generating processes deny the reproductive conditions of those spaces constructed as frontiers of "unused natures." This denial comes to subsidize, via cheap inputs of food and energy, the reproduction of the accumulation capacity of the capital–labor relation in the core zones of commodification–exploitation.

Indigenous practice and knowledge in the Capitalocene

It is the task of the last chapter of this book to elaborate in greater empirical detail how the global land grab constitutes an emergent "historical nature" potentiating an ecological surplus, and hence successive accumulation cycle, capable of overcoming the ecological exhaustion of the neoliberal accumulation cycle. Thus far, we have combined food-regime analysis, global value–relations theory, the Agrarian South school, and world-ecology in articulating a theoretical and historical framework of an "ongoing world-ecological agrarian question." There remains a further step we must take in order to articulate an approach through which we can, building upon the Agrarian South school's important opening regarding race and the agrarian

question, theorize and historicize race and coloniality more prominently as foundational relations in the constitution of the society–nature boundary underlying capitalist accumulation, and therefore move more comprehensively beyond the Eurocentric-anthropocentric paradigm. Araghi's global value relations and Moore's world-ecology approach have, without question, deepened our understanding of the role that race plays in the qualitative relations structuring the differentiated zones of the world-system. The conceptualization of racialization rendering "rightless" labor as a central category of irrational nature, alongside the fertile soils of the frontier, reveals the distinctive qualitative orientation—the Cartesian "mastery over nature"—mobilizing the production and appropriation of "ecological surplus" across the core–periphery or commodification–appropriation zones. Applied at the scale of planetary ecological crises, world-ecology's Capitalocene paradigm clarifies how it is not humanity in general but rather capitalism, as a particular historically produced system of world-ecological power unevenly distributing the costs and benefits of "surplus" and "exhaustion," that has emerged as the principal geological force destabilizing the planetary foundations of life. Attending to planetary ecological crises calls, in the first instance, then, for an overturning of world-scale capitalist relations of power, and their particular governing logics.

There is, however, an evident reproduction of Eurocentric primacy within the Capitalocene paradigm as it has been articulated thus far. Within this paradigm, racialization is not considered beyond the unfree labor put to work by the appropriating "mastery over nature" logic in the frontier, which precludes any substantive engagement with the qualitative significance of both the presence and attempted erasure of Indigenous peoples of the colonized "virgin lands." It is, I would argue, this analytical occlusion which allows Moore (2015, 18) to conceive of race as a secondary, or derivative, binary which functions more as an effect of what he terms the foundational Cartesian "nature–society" binary. Insofar as the "Cartesian" label suggests origins endogenous to early modern European philosophical debates regarding the nature of knowledge, Moore risks here reproducing a Eurocentric "origins–diffusion" approach in which an episteme of externalizing and mastering nature is first produced in Europe and subsequently comes to motivate and organize the colonization of the non-European world. Euro-Western capitalist agency is elevated as distinct in its capacity to exercise geological scale power, while non-European peoples are denied such capacity, and their significance to the constitution of our contemporary geological epoch is reduced to the fact of their being colonized and enslaved—or acted upon—by Euro-Western capitalist agents. The social-ecological and potentially even geological-scale relations through which Indigenous and Black peoples co-constituted earth-worlds is entirely

occluded from analytical significance. Even more troubling in its erasure of Indigenous presence, the Capitalocene reproduces a society–nature dualism that suggests that Indigenous peoples could be analytically separated from the "millennia of stored nutrients" of their lands that Euro-Western capital is held to have exclusively set in motion through its secondary contradiction of the Cartesian dualism. The Capitalocene, in privileging Euro-Western subjects as the originators of humanity's movement into geological time, reproduces here the temporality of colonial power, wherein the colonizer is separated from the colonized by temporal distancing, or what Fabian refers to as the "denial of coevalness." In this instance, the Euro-Western colonizer, through the powers unlocked by the Cartesian dualism and capitalist rationality, transcends historical and biological time and enters into geological time, while the colonized remain within historical and biological time until mobilized by Euro-Western power. This is no mere academic concern, as an unintended consequence here can consist of diminishing the role that Indigenous presence–erasure play in both constituting and disrupting the ecological surplus underwriting accumulation on a world scale. In light of such consequences, and in line with Kay Anderson's important call to refuse the "rush to cast race as above all a legitimatory discourse" and instead consider how racialization itself shapes the human–nature distinction (Anderson, 2007, 24), I now turn to articulating the political ecology of colonial capitalism.

In seeking to articulate here the qualitative significance of the presence, and attempted erasure/displacement, of Indigenous peoples in the constitution of the frontiers of unused nature, I take as my epistemological and methodological point of departure the emphasis placed by Schneider and McMichael (2010), in their critical intervention into the "metabolic rift" literature, on centering agrarian labor practices in order to, on the one hand, deepen our understanding of capital's reshaping of society–nature relations; and, on the other, think beyond capital in advancing sustainable forms of socio-ecological reproduction. Their intervention is motivated by a concern that the conceptualization of the metabolic rift, as the defining relation of capital's socio-ecological regime, has hitherto remained too abstract, thereby limiting our ability to identify vital socio-ecological forces both beyond, and constitutive of, the emergence and reproduction of the capitalist world-ecology. In order to move the analysis of capital's socio-ecological regime onto a more concrete plane, Schneider and McMichael suggest two key sites of agrarian labor practice which should be incorporated into the concept of the metabolic rift: (i) where practice leads to the degradation of the soil and the worker and (ii) where practice leads to sustainable socio-ecological reproduction. Moore, they argue, has contributed significantly to this project insofar as he has engaged in rich empirical articulation of how capital's

specific world-ecological practices have degraded both human and extra-human natures. Particular credit is given here to Moore's detailed historical illustration linking the erosion and exhaustion of soil and enslaved labor "on the Atlantic island of Madeira in the late fifteenth century to intensive agricultural practices employed to produce sugar for the world market," and how he further illustrates how subsequent relocations of sugar production to Brazil and the Caribbean have been mobilized, and exhausted, by agrarian labor practices associated with specific accumulation regimes of capital (Schneider and McMichael, 2010, 475). However, Schneider and McMichael note the absence in Moore's work of agrarian labor practices which sustain, rather than degrade, the human and extra-human natures co-producing particular socio-ecological orders. In other words, while Moore does well, on the one hand, to identify how capital mobilizes and exhausts human and extra-human natures, he fails, on the other, to analytically incorporate the significance of socio-ecological labor practices which actively produced, and sustained, the fertility of the soils which would come to be constituted, and acted upon, by capital as "naturally fertile" virgin lands.

Schneider and McMichael suggest that such sustainable practices, both in their presence and displacement, enable the conditions of possibility (soil fertility and the externalization of nature) for capital's appropriation of unused natures, and, thus, further argue that a "fuller analysis would explore how the soil and conditions of soil fertility present at the time of the transition to capitalism (for Moore) … came to be, taking into account the role of soil management" (Schneider and McMichael, 2010, 470). The absence of such an accounting in Moore's world-ecology framework risks, paradoxically, the suggestion that the fertility of the soils is reproduced exclusively by extra-human natures, rather than co-produced socio-ecologically. Pointing the way, instead, toward a "fuller analysis," Schneider and McMichael engage the works of Colin Duncan (1996) and Harriet Friedmann (2000), who have investigated the productive and sustainable labor practices of the early modern English "high farming" model "present at the time of the transition to capitalism." These analyses reveal how the fertile soils enabling the transition were themselves produced, and sustained, through agrarian labor practices, and the ecologically embodied knowledges informing them, which recycled nutrients back into the land from which they were extracted. However, such practice and knowledge, insofar as it affirms the intimate co-production of human society with extra-human natures, precludes the possibility for appropriating an externalized nature, and thus, the material and epistemic displacement of agrarian producers embodying such practice and knowledge via processes of primitive accumulation constitutes a key condition of possibility for the Cartesian epistemic premise—the metabolic rift—underlying capital's originary agrarian, or ecological, surplus.

While Schneider and McMichael thus provide an important opening to consider the significance of both the presence and displacement of sustainable local agrarian labor practices and embodied knowledges, they do not, unfortunately, develop their approach beyond an endogenous focus on the transition to capitalism within Europe, and specifically England. The question of analytically incorporating the practice and embodied knowledge informing how the "conditions of soil fertility present at the time of the transition to capitalism … came to be," insofar as it is not engaged through a world-ecological framework, does not come here to bear upon the organization of colonized lands as frontier zones of appropriation. Thus, Schneider and McMichael, while centering the practice and embodied knowledge of English high farmers in the production of fertile soils, do not engage in such an analytical approach when referencing the settler agriculture of the "Great Plains in America," which, they argue, undermined, on account of its production of cheaper grains, the sustainable high farming model of England. In particular, they argue that insofar as settlers took "advantage of nutrients stored and cycled in grassland soils over thousands of years … [s]oil fertility, in the early years of American monocrop agriculture, was not a problem" (Schneider and McMichael, 2010, 474). This makes clear how capitalist agriculture acted upon the fertile soils of the Americas but occludes, however, what role Indigenous socio-ecological labor practices and embodied knowledges played in constituting the "nutrients stored and cycled in grassland soils." In so doing, Schneider and McMichael reproduce Moore's repeated emphasis on the Americas providing millennia of stored nutrients for capital to appropriate as ecological surplus. Insofar as this suggests that soil fertility in the Americas was "naturally" given by nutrients stored over millennia, it risks reproducing the very "virgin lands" episteme mobilizing capital's appropriation of these soils as unused frontiers of nature. As a consequence, we are not able to recognize the co-constitution between Indigenous practice, knowledge, and the millennia of stored nutrients, and how their subsequent disarticulation from one another is fundamental to the emergence and reproduction of capital's Cartesian episteme. It is here, in attempting to overcome this occlusion of the qualitative significance of both the presence and erasure/disarticulation of Indigenous practice and knowledge in the forging of capitalism's foundational society–nature distinction, that the racialized ontology of the world-ecological agrarian question is revealed.

Cartesian or Cortesian? Race and the externalization of nature

My approach, insofar as it constitutes an effort to overcome a lingering Eurocentric determinism in world-ecological theory by analytically

incorporating Indigenous socio-ecological practice and knowledge, echoes Eric Wolf's much earlier vital corrective to world-systems theory's exclusive focus on investigating "how the core subjugated the periphery" (Wolf, 1982, 23). Wolf was concerned, in particular, with how such a "choice of focus" leads world-systems theorists to "omit consideration of the range and variety of such [peripheralized] populations, of their modes of existence before European expansion and the advent of capitalism, and of the manner in which these modes were penetrated, subordinated, destroyed, or absorbed, first by the growing market and subsequently by industrial capitalism." Taking up such a consideration of the "modes of existence" of the Indigenous peoples of the peripheries constituted the key point of departure for Wolf's seminal text *Europe and the People without History* (1982), as it was only in so doing that we could come to "understand how Mundurucu or Meo [signifying specific Indigenous life worlds] were drawn into the larger [modern capitalist world-] system to suffer its impact and to become its agents" (Wolf, 1982, 23). This corresponds with our concern to afford more central consideration to both the presence (the moment of agency) and erasure/disarticulation (the moment of suffering) of Indigenous socio-ecological practice and knowledge (or "mode of existence") in the constitution of the capitalist world-ecology.

This shift toward a non-Eurocentric and non-anthropocentric epistemology and ontology necessarily draws global value relations and world-ecology into conversation with the field of decolonial scholarship, which has advanced the paradigmatic concept of coloniality. Originally conceived by Peruvian scholar Anibal Quijano, and further developed by a community of decolonial scholars with roots in Latin America and the Caribbean (Dussel, 1998, 2014; Maldonado-Torres, 2008; Wynter, 2003), the concept of coloniality refers to how the constituting epistemological and ontological relations of modernity emerge through, rather than precede, the colonial encounter. In other words, there is no pre- or postcolonial capitalist modernity, as the foundational relations expressed by the concept of coloniality constitute, even after the formal end of colonial rule, the "dark underside" of modernity. Race is posited as the principal structuring framework for these foundational epistemological and ontological relations of (what we will now refer to as) colonial-capitalist modernity and, as such, remains an ever-present force informing the "development" of political, economic, cultural, and epistemic processes across the world-system.

Coloniality and the Cortesian premise

In terms of the task that we have currently set out for ourselves, that of addressing the Eurocentric limitations of the world-ecology approach to the

Capitalocene, decolonial theorists have been particularly concerned with centering the emergence and operationality of the Cartesian dualism of rationality/irrationality within the conceptual field of coloniality. As argued variously by Wynter (2003), Quijano (2000, 2007), Dussel (1995, 2014), and Maldonado-Torres (2008), the roots of the Cartesian separation of the active, rational mind/subject from the passive, irrational body/object, rather than reflecting endogenous intra-European philosophical innovation, can be traced to the supremacist colonial impulse initiated in response to the "unsettling" effects that were inflicted upon European Christian subjectivity through the originary colonial encounter in the Americas which initiated the long sixteenth century and the transition to the capitalist world-ecology.

This question of the Americas "unsettling" the Euro-Christian world-view has been most actively engaged by Sylvia Wynter, who has argued that the "theocentric," or "by-God," ontological frame carried with the Spanish colonizers across the Atlantic proved incapable of adequately rendering the Americas intelligible, and hence incorporable, within the broader Christian world of the Spaniards. Specifically, Wynter (2003) argues that "the theological grounds of the legitimacy both of Spain's sovereignty over the New World and of its settlers' rights to the Indigenous people's lands … had come to founder upon a stubborn fact … the Indigenous peoples of the New World could not be classified as Enemies-of-Christ, since Christ's apostles had never reached the new world, never preached the Word of the Gospel to them" (Wynter, 2003, 293). Thus, Indigenous Americans could not be cast, since they had never rejected the word of Christ, as infidels, a "central obstacle" which negated the theological legitimation that the "lands of non-Christian princes were terra nullius and as such justly expropriable by Christian princes." It is here, in response to the failure of the theocentric frame of believer/unbeliever to offer legitimacy to Spanish sovereignty over the Americas that, Wynter argues, Spanish scholars forward an emergent legitimating framework of "race" wherein Christian sovereignty over pagans "could be said to rest on the nature of the people being conquered, instead of the supposed juridical rights of the conquerors" (Wynter, 2003, 283). Expressive of a shift from a theocentric, "by-God," hierarchy to a "by-nature difference," this emergent framework of race, or what Wynter refers to as "coloniality of being," posited that beings—human or otherwise—could be distinguished and ranked according to their degree of rational perfection/imperfection. Through such a framework, the "Indigenous peoples of the New World, together with the mass-enslaved peoples of Africa, were now to be reclassified as 'irrational' because 'savage' Indians, and as 'subrational' Negroes" (Wynter, 2003, 296), thereby legitimating the rational Spaniards' "ongoing expropriation of New World

lands and the subsequent reduction of the Indigenous peoples to being a landless, rightless, neo-serf work force" (Wynter, 2003, 290). This "ratiocentric" ontological distinction between those "determined by nature to be the possessors of reason, and those predestined by it to remain enslaved to a lack of such reason" (Wynter, 2003, 304) constitutes, for Wynter, the "foundational basis of modernity," enabling as it does both the "large-scale, one-sided accumulation of lands, wealth, power and unpaid labour by the West" (Wynter, 2003, 295) which set in motion capitalist development and the separation of society from nature as a "new order of human cognition" (Wynter, 2003, 305). The society–nature distinction underpinning the capitalist world-ecology thus emerges out of, rather than prior to, the unique challenges posed to European settler-colonial subjectivity in distinguishing itself from, and hence legitimating, its rule over the Indigenous people of the Americas.

This point has been further emphasized and elaborated by Enrique Dussel (1998, 2014), who, in a line of inquiry he terms "anti-Cartesian meditations," has argued that an emergent "I conquer therefore I am," or "ego conquiro," subjectivity articulated by the Spanish conquerors of the Americas, forms the proto-history of the Cartesian "I think therefore I am," or "ego cogito" (Dussel, 1995, 38–43), subjectivity constituting what Moore has identified as the capitalist world-ecology's founding society–nature distinction. Thus, rather than privileging an intra-European Cartesian innovation, Dussel argues that modern human subjectivity finds its origins in the conquering perspective with which Spanish conquistadors, beginning with Columbus, viewed the subjugated Indigenous peoples of the Americas, and which ultimately fully "surfaces in the person of Hernán Cortés presiding over the conquest of Mexico, the first place where this ego effects its prototypical development by setting itself up as lord-of-the-world and will-to-power" (Dussel, 1995, 26). The significance of Cortés, for Dussel, lies in how his personal transformation from poor Spanish noble to invincible lord of Mexico powerfully expresses the larger shift that the Euro-Christian Iberian world was experiencing from periphery of the Islamic Mediterranean world to center of an emergent Euro-American Atlantic world. The materiality of conquest—the subjugation of the Indigenous Other—is what enables the Spanish conqueror to elevate a superior rational human subject-ego over and against an inferior irrational object-body. In so doing, the conquistador covers over the distinct ways of knowing and being of the Indigenous Other and instead reduces the latter to a "docile, oppressed instrument" to be put to its proper use by the rational ego of the conquistador (Dussel, 1995, 44). Insofar, then, that this "ratiocentric" distinction between

rational human self and irrational barbarian Other would come to constitute the "obligatory context of all reflection on subjectivity, reason, the cogito" (Dussel, 1996, 133), I suggest here that it is more apt to speak in terms of a "Cortesian" rather than "Cartesian" dualism framing the capitalist world-ecology's frontier zones of appropriation. This move from "Cartesian" to "Cortesian" centers the racialized "by-nature" distinction between the rational settler-conqueror and the irrational subjugated-Indigenous Other as a fundamental condition of possibility for the articulation of the society–nature distinction.

Anibal Quijano engages, and further elaborates upon, Dussel's Cortesian thesis, arguing that the rational "individual differentiated ego" upheld as the "mark of modernity" was "not constituted from the individual (nor from the collective) subjectivity of a preexisting world" but rather "began with American colonization" and thus "has a place not only in Europe but also in the entire world that American settlement configured" (Quijano, 2000, 546). Emphasizing a co-constitutive "confluence between coloniality and the elaboration of rationality/modernity" (Quijano, 2007, 172), Quijano specifies in particular how the ratiocentric distinction legitimating the Spanish conquest of the Americas enables the emergence of the more generalized subject–object, or society–nature, distinction integral to modern epistemology. The settler/conqueror underpins the conception of the self-referential rational subject, uniquely constituting "itself in itself and for itself, in its discourse and in its capacity of reflection" (Quijano, 2007, 172) while the conquered Indigenous Other underpins the conception of the object, which is held to be, by its very nature, passive material external to the subject and, hence, whose purpose consists of being studied and acted upon by the active, thinking subject. Elucidating further how Wynter's "by-nature" ratiocentric distinction grounds an emergent society–nature dualism, Quijano clarifies how the subject comes to stand as the "bearer of 'reason,' while the 'object' is not only external to it, but different nature. In fact it is nature" (Quijano, 2007, 173). This necessarily calls forth, for Quijano, an emergent Eurocentric-anthropocentric conception of the "history of human civilization as a trajectory that departed from a state of nature and culminated in Europe" (Quijano, 2000, 546), thus assigning the uniquely rational European human subject the natural-historical responsibility of acting upon those beings remaining trapped in a state of irrational and passive nature. Such a distinction, Quijano further argues, must necessarily simultaneously appropriate and deny the place of Indigenous peoples of the Americas in the "history of the cultural production of humanity"

(Quijano, 2000, 552), as recognition of the latter would undermine attempts to configure the Indigenous as "objects of study … bodies closer to nature" (Quijano, 2000, 555).

Thus, a central dimension of the Cortesian framework is what Nelson Maldonado-Torres (2007), in his own important elaboration of Dussel's thesis, has identified as a "racist/imperial Manichean misanthropic skepticism" which signifies how just as the "ego conquiro predates and precedes the ego cogito, a certain skepticism regarding the humanity of the enslaved and colonized sub-others stands at the background of the Cartesian certainties and his methodic doubt" (Maldonado-Torres, 2007, 245). Maldonado-Torres offers a powerful articulation of the significance of this misanthropic skepticism as enabling the conditions of possibility for the Cartesian dualism:

> The Cartesian idea about the division between res cogitans and res extensa (consciousness and matter) which translates itself into a divide between the mind and the body or between the human and nature is preceded and even, one has the temptation to say, to some extent built upon an anthropological colonial difference between the ego conquistador and the ego conquistado. (Maldonado-Torres, 2007, 245)

The Cortesian framework, as advanced by decolonial scholars thus far, emphasizes, then, that the misanthropic skepticism directed toward the humanity of the Indigenous others of the Americas, racializing them as it did within the emergent ratiocentric order as "bodies closer to nature" who "by-nature" were to be acted upon by the superior organizing capacity of the rational European human subject, constitutes an integral moment in the unfolding of the particular society–nature distinction of the capitalist world-ecology. As Maldonado-Torres argues, the ratiocentric distinction enables the "redefinition of the purpose of land as being one for us, whereby for us meant for us who belong to the realm of Man vis-à-vis those outside the human oecumene" (Maldonado-Torres, 2007, 246–247). The denial of Indigenous people as thinking beings, as contributing to the "cultural production of humanity," must thus be considered as integral to the constitution of a frontier zone of externalized nature that can be acted upon without regard for its reproductive conditions. Racialization of the Other is not, in other words, to be situated as one among many other irrational "natures"—such as soil fertility, water abundance, and so on—externalized as an effect of an a priori society–nature binary. Rather, a key implication of the shift from the "Cartesian" to the "Cortesian" frame for the world-ecological analysis of the ongoing agrarian question consists

in centering the imperative of denying the humanity of Indigenous peoples, of collapsing them into the sphere of nature, to the production and appropriation of frontier zones of unused natures capable of delivering the "surplus" necessary for effecting the transition from agrarian society to capitalist modernity.

The move here in pushing world-ecological analysis of the agrarian question in a decolonial direction is definitively marked, then, by the shift from the "Cartesian" to the "Cortesian" premise of the capitalist world-ecology. However, the Cortesian frame, as articulated thus far by decolonial scholars, while pointing us toward the integral racial/colonial basis of the society–nature distinction, has not adequately, I argue, engaged the analytical significance of the presence and disarticulation/erasure of Indigenous socio-ecological practice and embodied knowledge in the constitution, and penetration, of the frontier of externalized nature. In failing to do so, it risks reproducing the Indigenous Other as a figure whose significance is a consequence only of the way in which it is seen and acted upon by the conquering ego. Whether the conquering ego confronts the limitations of an earlier theocentric framework or seeks to make sense of its move from periphery to center, the moment of conquest, and hence subjugation of Indigenous peoples, is already assumed, thereby rendering Indigenous practice and knowledge irrelevant to the articulation of the emergent legitimating framework. Recalling here Schneider and McMichael's challenge of analytically incorporating within the world-ecological framework the agrarian labor practices that constituted the "soils … present at the time of transition," it is necessary that we consider how the Cortesian premise of the Capitalocene constitutes a response—both appropriative and disarticulating—to Indigenous socio-ecological practices and embodied knowledges not reducible to an assumed premise of conquest. This will enable us to further uncover critical dimensions of the co-constitution of race, coloniality, and the society–nature distinction in the emergence and reproduction of the frontiers grounding the systemic cycles of accumulation of the capitalist world-ecology.

Decolonizing the epoch debates

Within the epoch debates, the decolonial emphasis on the irreducible colonial constitution of the modern society–nature distinction finds resonance with the "Orbis Spike" thesis forwarded by geographers Lewis and Maslin (2015), which argues that the origins of the Anthropocene should be located at the dawn of colonialism, where the first concrete evidence of anthropogenic earth-systems transformation can be found in the climatic shifts

engendered by the genocide and ecocide inflicted by European settler colonialism in the Americas. Though the timeline of the Orbis Spike Anthropocene thesis corresponds with the "long-sixteenth-century" origins proposed by the *longue durée* approach to the Capitalocene, the former places primacy on colonial violence as generative of the emergence of human-driven geological change, whereas the latter privileges a more Eurocentric rise of capitalism that is generative of both colonial violence and Earth-scale ecological transformation. It is perhaps for this reason that decolonial interventions into the epoch debates have more prominently centered the Orbis Spike thesis as their point of departure, rather than the Capitalocene, as it offers more of an opening to elaborate upon how the colonial foundations of capitalist modernity are integral to the geological transformations driving planetary crises in the contemporary epoch. Recalling the concerns raised earlier regarding the limitations of the Anthropocene frame, decolonial scholars have sought to push the implications of the Orbis Spike thesis toward a "decolonizing the Anthropocene" framework, which would be "more explicit about the logics and processes" (Davis et al., 2018) of colonialism that effected violent distinctions both between different human societies and between human and non-human ecologies.

The decolonial intervention has articulated these underlying colonial logics and processes of planetary ecological crises from two perspectives: Indigenous Climate Change Studies (ICCS) and Black geographies. From the perspective of ICCS, the appropriation of land from Indigenous peoples necessarily instigates a material and conceptual social-ecological transformation (Sluyter), wherein the consolidation of European sovereignty calls forth both dispossession and the material reengineering of landscapes and ecosystems, or what Kyle Whyte has referred to as "terraforming," in service of settler colonial capitalist imperatives of resource extraction. Crucially, dispossession and ecological transformation are not two distinct moments of colonial domination, but are necessarily co-constitutive processes through which Indigenous dispossession opens space for colonial terraforming, which, in turn, further intensifies dispossession by disrupting and altering the "ecological conditions that supported Indigenous peoples' cultures, health, economies, and political self-determination" (Whyte, 2017, 154). The material social-ecological transformation effected by dispossession and colonial terraforming ground a conceptual transformation that divides the human world from the natural world, and subsequently privileges acting upon "nature" in ways that advance human-centered production and consumption while neglecting underlying ecological reproductive conditions. From the ICCS decolonial perspective, then, it becomes clear that the specific underlying relations and structures—capital's society–nature contradiction—driving planetary ecological crises find their origins

in the imperative of European colonial rule and, further, that colonized peoples were the first to experience such crisis, in the form of the ecological disruption of their homelands. This approach clarifies, first and foremost, that "climate change is an intensification of environmental change imposed on Indigenous peoples by colonialism" (Whyte, 2017) or, as Davis and Todd argue, that the "ecocidal logics that now govern our world are not inevitable or 'human nature,' but are the results of decisions that have their origins and reverberations in colonization" (Davis and Todd, 2017, 763).

In addition to settler-colonial land theft and terraforming, the "productive" and "exhaustive" social-ecological worlds instituted by colonial capitalism have been fundamentally shaped by the violent relations of enslavement and terraforming that constitute the plantation and its afterlives. Rather than view the settler colony and plantation as two distinct sites in the social-ecological foundation of colonial capitalism, scholars of both settler-colonial and plantation studies are increasingly considering how these two sites have been historically co-produced through the "intertwined and interdependent violences of the Transatlantic slave trade and the genocidal dispossession of Indigenous peoples and territories" (Davis and Todd, 2017). Further emphasizing this co-production, scholars of Black geographies have conceptualized the figure of the "settler-master" in order to foreground that historically, the "Settler and Master are one and the same" (King, 2015). The settler-master figure clarifies how the constitution of the specific society–nature distinction underpinning capitalist accumulation emerges out of processes of colonial terraforming that inextricably link Indigenous dispossession and the disruption of Indigenous socio-ecological worlds forged in deep time and place with the replacement of these worlds according to the plantation logic driving the enslavement of African and African-descendant people.

While the Black-geographies approach has long centered the plantation and its afterlives as constitutive of the logic and relations animating capitalist modernity (McKittrick, 2011; Wynter, 1971), within the epoch debates the plantation was introduced as a potential structuring framework by scholars associated with posthumanist and multispecies approaches (Haraway, 2015; Tsing, 2015). For the latter, centering the plantation as foundational to the constitution of the emerging geological epoch—referred to as the "Plantationocene"—is integral to any projects of "decolonizing the Anthropocene," as it illuminates how the logics of scalability, interchangeability, homogeneity, and control driving planetary ecological crises originate out of the plantation. The Plantationocene specifically emphasizes how the plantation blueprint for expansion involves the simplification and homogenization of landscapes through first the "decimation of local peoples and plants" and then the importation of enslaved peoples and crops who are

acted upon in ways that discount both their own sustenance and those of the landscapes onto which they are imported.

Recognizing the Plantationocene framework as an important opening for "decentering the Eurocentric narrative by which coal, the steam engine, and the industrial revolution constitute the epicenter of global environmental change," recent interventions into the epoch debates from the Black-geographies perspective have nonetheless expressed concern with how initial Plantationocene scholarship, in its emphasis on multispecies assemblages of "plants, animals, and peoples" (Haraway, 2015, 162), risks minimizing the significance of "racial oppression and resistance" to an understanding of both the productive/exhaustive socio-ecological worlds set in motion by the plantation and the more sustaining worlds cultivated out of Black resistance to the plantation. The singular focus, in the initial Plantationocene scholarship, on overcoming the human–nature conceptual divide has compelled the articulation of a "flattened multispecies ontology" that collapses enslaved peoples into the same ontological category as plants, animals, and microbes (Davis et al., 2018). In locating a key moment in the origins of our contemporary geological epoch in the human–non-human hierarchy through which the plantation master exhaustively exploits the different categories of the non-human, the Plantationocene, in its initial articulation, becomes complicit in concealing how racialized power, forged first as a mechanism of control over enslaved Africans, constitutes an irreducible condition of possibility for the specific colonial-capitalist human–non-human distinction underpinning planetary ecological crises.

In foregrounding race as a constitutive relation and logic of power, the Black-geographies intervention into the epoch debates opens space for the recognition of the centrality of Black presence to the emergence and reproduction of the colonial-capitalist geological epoch. Drawing upon the Black-geographies tradition, Katherin Yusoff has advanced a "billion Black Anthropocenes" approach that clarifies how the materiality of the Anthropocene is constituted by Black flesh shaping the geographies of mineral extraction that both fuels capitalist accumulation and exhausts its reproductive conditions. For Yusoff, a central contradiction at the heart of the "billion Black Anthropocenes" consists of how the originary material processes "marking" human impact upon earth-systems processes—for example, exhaustive mining—are fundamentally set in motion by Black labor, and yet the latter are excluded from access to the accumulation and wealth generated therein. Key to the management of this contradiction is the emergence of race as a technology of power that draws a distinction between the human and the inhuman as a specific instantiation of a more general distinction between life and non-life. Race, then, grounds the emergence of geology as both a discipline of inquiry and a world-making power

that exhaustively harnesses what it categorizes as the "inhuman" properties of Earth—beginning with Black flesh—in the service of that which is elevated to the category of human life.

The decolonial intervention has significantly addressed the Eurocentrism of the epoch debates by uncovering the centrality of Indigenous and Black presence to the understanding of the formation, reproduction, and ultimate exhaustion of our contemporary geological age. It has advanced the Capitalocene's conceptualization of the society–nature contradiction by clarifying how the externalization of nature from society, and the geological distinction between life and non-life, the human and the inhuman, arises from within the relations of domination forged between the settler-master, dispossessed Indigenous people, and enslaved Black people. More specifically, the modes of appropriating non-human natures that underwrite both capital accumulation and planetary ecological crises are themselves fundamentally constituted through the displacement of Indigenous people, the settler colonial terraforming of their lands, and the contradiction of excluding the material Black flesh enacting extractive processes from the wealth generated therein. Decolonial approaches, from both the ICCS and Black-geographies approaches, have further addressed the Capitalocene's occlusion of the social-geological dimensions of Indigenous and Black worlds. Indigenous interventions have foregrounded Indigenous social-geological worldings through the concept of "rock-flesh" (Davis and Todd, 2017; Povinelli, 1995; Watts, 2009), emphasizing an inextricable co-constitution between the geological landscape and Indigenous ways of knowing and being. Rather than simply acting upon a "millennia of stored nutrients" given by a nature/Earth beyond Indigenous presence, as suggested by the Capitalocene approach, Euro-Western capital enacts, or terraforms, its own particular social-geological world by first destroying the social-geological worlds, or "rock-flesh," co-constituted by Indigenous peoples and their more-than-human relatives. Black-geographies perspectives have further emphasized that the excess of Black life not captured by the logic of the plantation, particularly the reproductive dimensions cultivated in the space of the "plot" adjacent to the plantation, birthed more sustaining social-geological world-making capacities that have much to offer in overcoming the planetary ecological crises instigated by the terraforming of the settler-master.

In pointing toward the social-geological world-making capacities of non-Euro-Western peoples, the project of "decolonizing the Anthropocene" has begun to unsettle what I view as the principal Eurocentric assumption of the Epoch debates—that humanity's geological agency has been uniquely set in motion by the Euro-Western subject. The remainder of this chapter aims to further develop the analytical significance of Indigenous and Black

social-geological worlding to an understanding of the underlying structures and relations constituting our contemporary geological age. Specifically, it will address two significant limitations of the decolonial engagement with Indigenous and Black social-geological worlding. The first is that concepts such as "rock-flesh" (Davis and Todd, 2017; Watts, 2009) and "social-geological" (Yusoff, 2019) have primarily foregrounded how Indigenous and Black ways of knowing and being have been shaped by geological forces, and, as such, have insufficiently elaborated upon how Indigenous and Black social-ecological knowledge and practice have impacted earth-systems processes. Secondly, the decolonial articulation, whether in the form of "decolonizing the Anthropocene" or a "Billion Black Anthropocenes," continues to operate on a premise of conquest that accords originary agency to Euro-Western settler-master capital. While Indigenous and Black social-geological world-making capacities are gestured toward, they are nonetheless largely rendered analytically irrelevant in the decolonial accounting of the determinative colonial-capitalist relations and structures reshaping Earth's geological foundations. Indigenous and Black presence is centered only to the extent that it constitutes the original, and determinative, site of violence and subjugation giving rise to human–nonhuman distinctions. It is necessary to push the decolonial intervention beyond the premise of conquest by recentering, as a point of departure, how Indigenous and Black social-geological co-constitution of earth-systems processes fundamentally shapes and informs the world-making/world-destroying project of settler-master Capital.

Recentering Indigenous presence: the historical ecology of the frontier

The first necessary move, then, in articulating a non-Eurocentric account of the contemporary geological age is transcending the assumption of the Epoch debates that the Euro-Western subject is the originator of humanity's move into geological time. This calls, in particular, for a more robust elaboration of how non-Euro-Western peoples have, over millennia, impacted earth-systems processes such as atmospheric cycles, vegetation cover, and soil and mineral formations. The imperative of articulating a longer, and more differentiated, account of social-geological co-constitution has been recently advanced by interventions from the perspective of historical ecology that share this chapter's concerns with the Eurocentric basis of the Epoch debates (Ellis et al., 2016; Morrison, 2018). Historical ecology, as a field of inquiry, was constituted as a challenge to the key premise of the epistemological divide between science and the social sciences/humanities, which held that a "pristine nature" or "wilderness" beyond the contamination of human agency could be objectively studied separately from

the "subjective" parameters of human society. Identifying the European encounter with the Americas as the fundamental condition of possibility for the conceptualization of such "pristine nature," scholars of historical ecology (Cronon, 1983; Denevan, 1992; Sauer, 1966; Sluyter, 1999, 2001) have focused, in particular, on challenging the virgin/empty lands narratives that promoted a view of the lush forests, fertile soils, and abundant waters of the "new world" as constitutive entirely of a sphere of nature external to human activity. As opposed, then, to a conception of pre-colonial American lands as sparsely populated and materially undisturbed by human activities, historical ecology has documented the presence of a diversity of Indigenous peoples abundantly populating, and materially co-producing, vibrant socio-ecological worlds. Insisting on an ecological "philosophy that recognizes the significant role of people in the evolution of landscape" (Denevan, 2011, 582), historical ecology scholars have revealed how even those natures externalized as most pristine, such as the Amazon ecosystem or the fertile grasslands of North America, have fundamentally been co-produced by the deep relation between Indigenous practices and knowledges and extra-human natures.

The entry of historical ecology into the epoch debates has been motivated by a desire to address the absence of the recognition that the "significant role of people in the evolution of landscape" beyond colonial-capitalist systems should be of analytical significance to how we articulate the contemporary geological epoch. Anthropocene scholars, it should be noted, do recognize that humans have always been biological agents impacting ecosystem processes such as landscape formation. The Anthropocene as a novel geological epoch, however, depends upon the assumption that such biological agency does not have geological or earth-systems consequences, and that it is only with the rise of the industrial, or colonial-capitalist, Euro-Western subject that humanity becomes a geological agent. The significance of the historical ecology intervention into the epoch debates consists of the challenge it poses to such an assumption of a "distinction between humans as 'biological' agents of ecology versus humans as 'geological' agents of climate that arguably warrants the designation Anthropocene." In place of such an assumption, the historical ecology approach emphasizes that the biological and geological spheres have always been fundamentally co-constitutive and that it is, consequently, exceedingly difficult to imagine "a realm of geophysics somehow disconnected and separate from the biological world in the past."

The premise of the historical ecology intervention thus not only transcends the divide between the sciences and the social sciences/humanities, insofar as it asserts the deep co-production of human history and Earth history, but it goes further in questioning the fundamental temporal order of the Anthropocene debates, which posits an autonomous and originary

geological sphere that constitutes the stage upon which Earth's biological sphere emerges and reproduces itself. Here, historical ecology draws upon niche construction theory, an approach developed first within the field of evolutionary biology as a challenge to a key assumption of the Darwinian theory of evolution. Darwinian evolutionary theory, operating within the same temporal order as the Epoch debates, asserts that geology precedes biology and that the base unit of biological life, organisms, both emerge out of, and continue to evolve in adaptation toward, an externally determined environment. Complicating such unidirectionality, niche construction theory foregrounds how life, from its origins, has not simply happened on Earth but has fundamentally reshaped the latter's systemic properties. Organisms shape, as much as they adapt in response to, their environment. Prominent instances of earth-systems as sites of "niche construction" range from how the earliest plants and bacteria reshaped Earth's atmosphere through oxygenation, ultimately producing the ozone layer and consequently making "Earth's land habitable to multicellular organisms for the first time" (Bauer and Ellis, 2018, 213), to the role played by life, ranging from microbes to animals, in forming and reconstructing the Earth's crust and continents.

The Euro-Western subject, as initiator of industrial colonial-capitalism, cannot, then, be held to constitute a form of life uniquely powerful in its capacity to exercise geological-scale agency; rather, the relation between life and Earth has always been one of inextricable co-constitution. Returning to the specific relation between human history and Earth history, the historical ecology approach has empirically demonstrated how varying human societies have, since their emergence, significantly contributed to the shaping of earth-systems processes. The geological consequences of human niche construction are evident in the atmospheric impacts of human fire use, agricultural land alterations, and forms of animal husbandry that extend back millennia and have functioned to reshape "animal populations, vegetation communities, and the ecological and geomorphic trajectories across large regions of the globe" (Bauer and Ellis, 2018, 213). Perhaps the strongest evidence of a long "coupled 'human–Earth' system" cited by historical ecology consists of the impacts that the "prehistoric expansion of rice agriculture, irrigation, and pastoralism" had upon rises in atmospheric methane, which has led some to suggest that the "Holocene has 'long been the Anthropocene'" (Morrison, 2018). Recognizing the location of these rice-farming systems in the non-Euro-Western worlds of West Africa and South and East Asia, along with the evident terraforming, or geological-scale, dimensions of Indigenous socio-ecological worldings in the Americas, such confirmation of non-Euro-Western geological agency functions to effectively "provincialize the Anthropocene," rendering it less exceptional in both space and time.

The historical ecology move toward "provincializing the Anthropocene," and, more specifically, of provincializing the Euro-Western as the sole geological agent, while moving the Epoch debates beyond a particular key component of their original Eurocentric premise, nonetheless risks reproducing, in generalizing a transhistorical human–earth-systems relationship grounded in an even more general niche construction theory, the Anthropocene's obfuscation of differentiated responsibility for the contemporary ecological crisis. When power and inequality are considered, it is suggested that the uneven distribution of socio-ecological costs and benefits that the Capitalocene locates as unique to a "capitalist world-ecology" can be read back into the long "coupled 'human–Earth' system" as a generalized form of power relations that transcends time and place. Atmospheric and landscape-shaping rice-farming systems from earlier medieval and classical eras, particularly those that were central to empire-making in South Asia, are emphasized for their unequal allocation of costs and benefits to both human and non-human beings. This is taken as evidence that a "coupled 'human–Earth' system" has been grounded, over its *longue durée*, in a generalized form of power relations that risks exhausting those considered as either "lower" human or non-human. Contemporary planetary ecological crises, insofar as they are driven by systems of socio-ecological power enriching the powerful at the expense of the marginalized, must thus be understood as an intensification of a social-geological agency that has long constituted the "human–Earth" system.

The key implication of the historical-ecology intervention, then, is that our contemporary epoch can be distinguished as a "difference in degree, not in kind" in relation to what amounts to a transhistorical human–Earth relation spanning earlier epochs. If the Epoch debates have been beset by a Eurocentrism that reproduces Euro-Western exceptionalism in positing a distinct capacity for initiating the human into the sphere of geological agency, the historical ecology challenge risks generalizing a single form of "human–Earth" system that obfuscates the distinctive logic of power and social-ecological relations constituting the colonial-capitalist system. In other words, the task of articulating a non-Eurocentric framework of the contemporary geological epoch necessitates an account of both non-Euro-Western social-geological worlding and of how such forms of earth-worlding are fundamentally distinct "in kind" from the colonial-capitalist system. In emphasizing a distinction in kind, we can begin to inquire into how colonial capitalism's distinctively productive/exhaustive earth-worlding, or terraforming, is constituted in response to encounters with Indigenous and Black earth-worldings situated in more sustaining relations in deep time and place. The question of restoring the Earth then no longer becomes one of removing the human, in general, from the geological sphere, but rather

one of uncovering, and elevating, those particular forms of social-geological agency that both brought into being, and sustained over a *longue durée*, the earth-system as composition of distinct, yet co-constituting, worldings.

Conclusion

In placing the Capitalocene framework into conversation with decolonial thought and historical ecology, this chapter has further developed our aim of constructing a "political ecology of colonial capitalism" framework that can move beyond the "conceptualization of capitalism as an isolated sector consisting of only capitalists and workers." It has demonstrated how capitalism emerges through differentiated processes of global primitive accumulation that gives rise, in its "core" European register, to a capital–labor relation, and, in its underlying colonial register, to a society–nature distinction through which capital's founding surplus is generated through the "unpaid" appropriation of that which is constituted as a frontier of "extra-human" nature. Applying decolonial thought to the Capitalocene framework has revealed how race, via the dehumanization of colonized and enslaved peoples, functions as a premise, rather than being derivative, of the society–nature contradiction. However, a limit encountered here consists of how both decolonial thought and the Capitalocene operate upon a premise of conquest which begins with an emergent settler-master constituting conquered colonized peoples and lands as an externalized frontier of nature to be appropriated in the service of the rational human society of the colonizer. Such a premise discounts the earth-worlding capacity of the Indigenous peoples of the frontier, and how such a capacity shapes and informs the emergence of colonial capitalism. This limit was addressed by engaging "historical ecology" scholarship that suggested that the frontiers of nature underlying colonial capitalism had been brought into being and sustained through Indigenous earth-worlding capacities. This opens space to consider how the society–nature contradiction fueling the ecological surplus and exhaustion of capitalist accumulation involves more than simply an appropriation of non-human natures, but rather constitutes an appropriation and erasure of the earth-worlds of colonized and enslaved peoples. Such a theorization and demonstration of the racialized society–nature contradiction is the principal concern of the next chapter, which will look to move fully beyond the premise of conquest in accounting for the political ecology of colonial capitalism.

3

Beyond the premise of conquest: the political ecology of colonial capitalism

The particular concern of this chapter is to demonstrate how race underwrites, rather than derives from, the society–nature dualism fueling both the excess and exhaustion of capital accumulation. This objective will be approached through an engagement with an underexplored premise of Cedric Robinson's (2000, 74–100) original articulation of the racial capitalism framework in Black Marxism—what I would characterize as the reversal of dependence. This premise, which I read as an integral point of departure for the unfolding of capitalism, begins not with an assumption of achieved colonial conquest, but rather by locating Euro-Western subjects in an originary peripheral relation of dependence upon the "Other" worlds of Africans and Indigenous Americans. Race, as an ontological condition of possibility for capitalism, emerges in significant part as a material-conceptual project centered upon overcoming, and indeed reversing, these originary relations of dependence. This chapter further explores how race consolidates such a reversal by opening material-conceptual space (Sluyter, 2001) for the articulation of the distinctive society–nature dualism underlying capitalism's productive power and ecological exhaustion.

The account offered here of the "political ecology of colonial capitalism" will thus begin from within the socio-ecological space of the contact zone (Pratt, 1991) that exceeds the space-time of conquest in so much as its originary constitution is marked by the dependence of Euro-Western survival upon "earth-worlds" forged by Indigenous and Black peoples. In centering both Indigenous and Black contestations with an emergent Euro-Western settler-master, I am following Sylvia Wynter's (2003) "coloniality of being" framework that foregrounds how the racialized ontology of capitalism emerges and functions through relational, yet distinctive, "society–nature" forms that both locate Indigenous people as closer to nature so as to enable the usurpation of sovereignty and transmute Black peoples into "bodies" of nature to be exhaustively exploited under conditions of enslavement. I aim to build on Wynter's framework by demonstrating how such distinctive co-productions of race and the society–nature dualism are generated from an emergent settler-master's attempted "reversal of dependence" on Indigenous

and Black earth-worlds. The earth-world signifies here the co-productive relationship between Indigenous and Black worlding, in the form of socio-ecological practice and knowledge, and non-human earth-system properties such as soil fertility and mineral deposits. It is out of these earth-worlding capacities, this chapter suggests, that the contact zones were opened as life-provisioning gifts enabling the survival of late arriving European peoples.

The concept of the gift, while significant to the argument of this chapter, should not be taken to suggest that sovereignty over land and control over labor were freely "gifted" to an emergent Euro-Western settler. Rather, it stands here as confirmation, and not negation, of Indigenous and Black sovereignty over earth-worlds that were co-produced through their distinctive socio-ecological capacities. The dependence of the Euro-Western self upon the earth-worlding gifts of the Other generates, however, an affective disposition of vulnerability which, though being the condition of love in other contexts (Butler, 2004; Maldonado-Torres, 2008), comes here to motivate a hate-based project of mastery and supremacy (Mendoza, 2006) that seeks to reverse the original relations of dependence by simultaneously appropriating the other's earth-world while eliminating the underlying earth-worlding capacity. It is thus the emergent settler-master's refusal to recognize and hence reciprocate the "gift"—how its own world-making capacity in the contact zone is dependent upon the originary earth-worlding capacity of Indigenous and Black peoples—that enables it, through a logic of genocidal conquest rather than gift, to claim exclusive sovereignty over the contact zone. In refusing to reciprocate the gift, the settler-master forecloses the possibility of mutual love and co-existence of multiple co-constituting worlds.

Informed by a desire to overcome its dependence upon Indigenous and Black earth-worlds, an emergent settler-master articulates a "by-nature" racialized distinction between the rational human—the settler-master—and the irrational Indigenous and Black other (Wynter, 2003, 296–304). This racialized distinction further opens space for the conceptual reformation of the Indigenous and Black earth-worlds of the contact zone into lands and bodies given by non-human geological and biological forces. Such a transmutation functions to conceal the underlying reproductive conditions—Indigenous and Black earth-worlding capacity—of that which is now marked as nature/Earth. It is, then, the racialized production of nature that accounts, ultimately, for both the excess (from appropriation of Indigenous and Black earth-worlds) and exhaustion (from erasure of their constituting conditions) of the political ecology of colonial capitalism.

In elaborating such a framework, I forward the argument that the consolidation of agrarian transition and the resolution, in the process, of the broader agrarian question is historically premised upon the violent and hierarchical forging of world-scale, racially differentiated, socio-ecological

relations of power and production. The socio-ecology underpinning, and further affirmed by, agrarian transitions is principally defined by the transitioning society's epistemological and ontological distinction from, and mastery over, non-human nature, which fundamentally includes, in this instance, bodies racialized as less evolved humans. Such a hierarchical distinction enables colonizing states to forcibly, and exhaustively, appropriate from extra-national colonized "virgin" lands, rendered unoccupied and unused through the violent dehumanization of racialized Indigenous people, the surplus of cheap agrarian inputs required to provision the "internal" national transformations of class structures and property regimes associated with the emergence and consolidation of industrial capitalist society. The second dimension of this argument is that particular world-ecological regimes of capital have their own internal contradiction, principally that the paradigm of human mastery over nature, which mobilizes an agrarian surplus on a world scale, simultaneously sets in motion the exhaustion of such a surplus and the subsequent need to identify and colonize further frontiers of virgin lands from which the cheap inputs necessary for a successive cycle of colonial-capitalist production and accumulation can be drawn. Taken together, this theoretical and historical articulation will then enable the contemporary global land grab to be understood as a conjunctural moment in which the attempted reinstitution of emergent racialized world-ecologies by states seeking to either renew their global agrarian basis or overcome their own "stalled agrarian transitions" converges with the broader global systemic imperative of capital to reconstitute its socio-ecological regime in light of the ecological exhaustion of the neoliberal accumulation cycle.

This argument is being made on a world-historical scale insofar as it presents the political ecology of colonial capitalism, and its specific emergence and reproduction through the appropriation and erasure of Indigenous and Black earth-worlds, as a key structure and logic of power-generating contemporary planetary ecological crises. The chapter will, as such, proceed first through an elaboration of a theoretical framework that foregrounds the centrality of race to capitalism's society–nature distinction. It will then turn to applying this framework to a historical examination of the processes of world-scale primitive accumulation held to be foundational to the emergence of capitalism's qualitative relations of capital–labor and society–nature. Here, I will focus in particular on reconsidering how the founding plantations and mines of capitalism emerged through the racialized appropriation and erasure of earth-worlds located in the Caribbean (Ayiti), the Andes (Huacas of Tawantinsuyu), and West Africa. The chapter will conclude by demonstrating how such a structure of racialized appropriation of "nature" has informed the productive power and ecological exhaustion of capital across its successive historical cycles of accumulation.

The contact zone: from gift to conquest

Contact zones have been defined as "social spaces where cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in contexts of highly asymmetrical relations of power, such as colonialism, slavery, or their aftermaths" (Pratt, 1991, 1). The contact zone, in its original rendering, is opened through acts of colonization and enslavement, wherein the European settler-master[1] acts upon the bodies and lands of Indigenous and Black others, who then forge the space with which to respond by initiating processes of transculturation which produce hybridized cultures that are not solely authored by the colonizer. I aim here to hold on to the conceptual space of the contact zone as a social-ecological zone of encounter, but the concerns of this chapter necessitate that we reverse the original staging. Specifically, I will deploy the contact zone as a social-ecological space first opened as a gift provisioned by Indigenous and Black earth-worlding, situated in deep time and place, to the late-arriving European.

In reconstructing the contact zone, in its originary becoming, as a gift, we are returning to a key premise of the first anticolonial critique articulated by sixteenth-century Indigenous Quechuan thinker Felipe de Guaman Poma (Dussel, 2014; Guaman Poma, 2009) in his text *New Chronicle*, where he argued that European colonial sovereignty had, in its very constitution, created a "world in reverse" (Pratt, 1991, 3). The world in reverse, insofar as it signifies the subjection of Indigenous peoples to European sovereignty, has as its implicit premise that the originary world of the contact zone and, moreover, its rightful ordering, was/is one in which European survival is contingent upon Indigenous world making. To restore the rightful world, or to undo the colonial world's reversal, is not to now subject Europeans to the genocidal violence that they inflicted upon Indigenous peoples. Rather, the reversal of European sovereignty grounded in genocidal violence is the revelation that motivates such violence in the first instance: the grounding of Indigenous sovereignty of the contact zone in the earth-worlding gifts encountering the late-arriving European.

The gift, as the first act opening the contact zone, the reversal of which brings into being the settler-master, signifies what Maldonado-Torres (2008), drawing on Frantz Fanon (1952) and Emmanuel Levinas (1969), identifies as the ethical relation, expressive of infinite love, that precedes the ontological and epistemological bases conventionally considered in Western thought to be the irreducible substance of the social world. Being in, and knowing of, the world necessitates first the very creation of worlds through intersubjective relations in which the self provisions the other with the gift of life. The self comes into being only through giving, out of love, to the other, for the sake of the other's life, so that the world of the other may

come to be realized.[2] The grounding of world-building in ethical frameworks centered upon the gift has been substantively demonstrated, in terms of its significance to understanding the opening of the contact zone, by Leanne Betasamosake Simpson's discussion of the mode of "gift-giving" diplomacy through which "our diplomats were negotiating when settlers first arrived in our territory" (Simpson, 2017, 9). Simpson clarifies how the gift underwrites a distinctively Indigenous sovereignty insofar as it is generated from within a "grounded normativity" that signifies an ethical framework expressive of the deep relational co-constitution between Indigenous ways of being and the sustenance of the land. As an ethical mode of life foregrounding the creation of lands and peoples through co-constitutive gift-giving, "grounded normativity compelled us to assist our neighbors" when, for example, they were "asking to hunt or farm in our territory during times of famine," and revealing thereby a "gift giving" mode of "diplomacy … designed to reinforce and nurture relationships" (Simpson, 2017, 77). Simpson draws a distinction between this mode of "gift giving" and the mode of conquest, which informs the refusal of the emergent settler to recognize Indigenous sovereignty and thus precludes a reciprocation of the gift. This recalls Fanon's emphasis on how a world-creating movement, what he refers to as a "movement of love, a gift of self, the final stage of what is commonly called ethical orientation," confronts, from its inception, a "movement of aggressiveness engendering servitude or conquest" (Fanon, 1952, 24).

The movement of colonial conquest, as I am conceptualizing it here, is underwritten by what Audra Simpson (2014) has referred to as an originary and enduring "settler precariousness" (Simpson, 2014, 22), insofar as it emerges in response to the vulnerability felt by the settler-master in light of the dependence of their life upon the gift provisioned by Indigenous and Black peoples' earth-world-making capacity. Anne McClintock's (1995) account of the "fear of engulfment" further clarifies the "settler precarity" propelling the rejection of the "movement of the gift" in favor of the "movement of conquest." McClintock reveals how settler-colonial acts of "discovery" are evidently compromised by their dependence upon Indigenous geographical knowledge and practice, which "guides" the settler across the "newly discovered" landscape. The anxiety generated by dependence upon the gift of Indigenous geography—the fear that the self will be engulfed by the other—is overcome by the settler-colonial "myth of the virgin land" encompassing the "new world," for "if the land is virgin, colonized peoples cannot claim aboriginal territorial rights" (McClintock, 1995, 30). The rejection of a gift-giving diplomacy expressive of grounded normativity in favor of a colonial conquest of virgin nature generates a

form of violence—extraction—that Betasamosake Simpson identifies as a "cornerstone of capitalism, colonialism, and settler colonialism" and which involves "taking something, whether it's a process, an object, a gift, or a person, out of the relationships that give it meaning, and placing it in a nonrelational context for the purpose of accumulation" (McClintock, 1995, 202). This transmutation of land created through co-constitutive gift giving into de-contextualized discrete "resources" to be extracted, signifying both the appropriation of Indigenous earth-worlding gifts and the erasure of their underlying reproductive relations, will be shown to be central to the political ecology of colonial capitalism, particularly in terms of understanding its distinctive productive powers and ecological exhaustion.

The settler-master emerges, then, in a movement of conquest aimed at repressing the "paradox of the gift" that, since it "makes evident the incompleteness of the master," generates a fear and anxiety in relation to the vulnerability associated with such incompleteness (Maldonado-Torres, 2008, 150). The specific interest of this chapter is the life-giving provisioning that Europeans were gifted by Indigenous and Black social-geological worlding capacities, and how this underlying premise of gift comes to be repressed through the material-conceptual articulation of what I have identified in Chapter 2 as the *Cortesian* society–nature distinction. Reconceptualizing capitalism's founding society–nature dualism as *Cortesian*, rather than *Cartesian*, foregrounds a conquering subjectivity—the *ego conquiro* that most completely "surfaces in the person of Hernán Cortés presiding over the conquest of Mexico" (Dussel, 1995, 26)—as the principal condition of possibility for Descartes's distinction of the rational human—*ego cogito*—over irrational unthinking nature (Maldonado-Torres, 2008, 245). The *Cortesian* dualism, more specifically, operates through the articulation of a racialized "by-nature" distinction between the rational settler-master and irrational Indigenous and Black others that enables the latter's earth-world to be transmuted into a space of virgin nature/Earth. The settler-master's repression of the gift, via the Cortesian dualism, thus sets in motion its own distinct earth-worlding—racial capitalism—which can specifically be articulated as one which proceeds through the simultaneous appropriation of Indigenous and Black earth-worlds and the erasure of their underlying reproductive conditions. The movement of the "gift of self," since it is necessary for settler survival, must be simultaneously appropriated and repressed by the movement of conquest, which is expressed in the transmutation of the gift into virgin "resources" extracted from an externalized and unused "nature." This effectively erases the gift's underlying reproductive conditions—the earth-world-making capacities from which it is first offered.

Race, nature, and the rise of capital: appropriation and erasure in the long sixteenth and nineteenth centuries

Concretely, the conceptual revelation of both the Indigenous and Black earth-worlds opening the contact zone, and of how racial capitalism emerges through transmuting such opening into a "world in reverse," casts the spaces and times from which the Capitalocene is held to emerge in a fundamentally different light. Whereas, for instance, the capitalism as world-ecology approach begins the Capitalocene with the epoch-birthing role played, across the long sixteenth century, by European capitalist organizational and technical forms, expressing a "dialectic of productivity and plunder" (Moore, 2010b, 392) in bringing to historical life hitherto "stored nutrients" such as the silver in the mines of Potosi and the fertile soils of Caribbean and Brazilian plantations (Moore, 2015, 220), the approach developed in this chapter begins the unfolding of our contemporary geological age instead with the life-gifting capacity of Indigenous and Black earth-worldings such as the *Conucos* of the Caribbean, the Black Rice of West Africa, and the *Huacas* of the Andean highlands.

Conucos*: from Ayiti to Hispaniola*

The *conucos* was the name given by the Indigenous Taino peoples of the Caribbean Islands to the elaborate agro-ecological system they had created and through which they had actively shaped, rather than simply received, "earth-system" properties such as soil fertility.[3] Engaging a mountainous landscape with particular biophysical challenges to soil fertility, the Taino birthed a form of earth-worlding—the *conucos*—that responded to such challenges through intercropping complementary plants in raised earth mounds, enriched with plant residue, that effectively enhanced soil fertility, guarded against soil erosion, and was remarkably indifferent to the steepness of the mountainous terrain (Sauer, 1966, 51). It is this earth-world that constituted the first space of encounter, when Columbus's first voyage landed on the Taino island of *Ayiti*, between the European settler-to-be/master-to-be and the Indigenous peoples of the Americas. The survival of the Europeans, whose journey across the Atlantic left them in a state of hunger and homesickness, was ensured by the generous hospitality and provisioning capacity of the Taino people of *Ayiti* (Sauer, 1966, 76). Such provisioning cannot be understood to be drawn from a "millennia of stored nutrients," as the Capitalocene approach would maintain (Moore, 2015, 220), but rather expressed the Tainos' social-geological capacity to create an agro-ecological system—the *conucos*—that was "productive as were few

parts of the world" and was, hence, capable of immediately nourishing the starving Spanish settlers whose survival would otherwise not have been ensured (Sauer, 1966, 68). Here, then, we have the opening of the contact zone, not through a completed European self imposing itself, via the movement of conquest, as mind/society upon an Indigenous othered as body/nature, but rather through the movement of love, wherein the Taino offer the gift of self—the *conucos*—in securing the world of the European other.

However, this generated, insofar as their survival depended upon the provisioning capacity of the *conucos*, a profound feeling of vulnerability on the part of the settlers toward the Taino people and their distinctive earth-worlding capacities (Mendoza, 2006, 939; Sauer, 1966, 84). Having grown increasingly paranoid and suspicious in their belief that the Taino were "entering into a conspiracy to get rid of the Spaniards by agreeing not to plant crops" (Sauer, 1966, 87), the Spanish attempted to overcome this felt vulnerability both materially, by violently attacking Taino leadership and taking entire Taino communities captive; and conceptually, in first disarticulating the co-constitution of *Ayiti* as a deep temporal relation between Taino knowledge, practice, and the earth-system in order to then rearticulate it as *Hispaniola*—a bounteous virgin land given by a nature held to be hitherto external from rational human society. Evidence for such rearticulation can be drawn from Columbus's journal writings, speeches, and letters to the Spanish crown, wherein he encouraged further Spanish settlement of *Hispaniola* as it promised a "life of ease in a bounteous land, supported by willing Indians" who though they consisted of the "laziest people in the world" could nonetheless be put to work in service of Spanish wealth accumulation (Sauer, 1966, 100). For the latter, what was necessary was the importation of more Spanish settlers capable of bringing the "bounteous" fertile land to social-historical life through the cultivation of "wheat fields and vineyards, cattle and hogs and draft animals so that the colony could live in the Spanish manner," a rendering that made "no mention of [the] native foodstuffs" that had ensured the survival of the Spanish (Sauer, 1966, 76).

Columbus's "material-conceptual" (Sluyter, 2001) transmutation of *Ayiti* into *Hispaniola* both informed, and was further consolidated by, the original colonial policies legislated by the Spanish crown, which aimed to advance Spanish settlement through the distribution, or *repartimiento*, of lands, now reconceptualized as idle commons or *baldios*, to Spanish settlers as private property (Sauer, 1966, 96). In making "no mention of the native economy," the private property rights that emerge through the *repartimiento* come to be grounded in the supposed distinctive rational capacity of the European settler-master to bring the *baldios* to life through the cultivation of European crops that would then provision the material basis

for an autonomous, and hence internally complete, Spanish colonial state. The original rendering of the *repartimiento*, while perhaps successful in conceptually overcoming dependence on the Taino earth-world of *Ayiti* through the latter's rearticulation as a *baldios* to be brought to life by private-property rights, failed materially to secure the provisionings—such as food stuffs—for an internally completed Spanish settler-master that was no longer dependent upon the other's earth-world. Specifically, the "European grains proved unsuited to the tropical island," and as a result, the Spanish continued to depend upon the provisioning capacity of the *conucos* (Sauer, 1966, 96). Rather than recognize the sovereignty of the Taino earth-world, the Spanish instead overcame this limit to their completeness by reformulating the *repartimiento* to now consist of the distribution, as private property, of entire Taino communities and their *conucos* to the Spanish settler-master. In so doing, the Spanish were able to secure the Taino foodstuffs, such as the cassava bread, without subjecting themselves to dependence upon a sovereign *Ayiti*. It was not land, given by nature, that was enclosed and appropriated as private property, but rather the entirety of the Taino earth-world, including the Taino people, was subjected as the property of Spanish settlers under Spanish sovereignty.

The account offered here of the transmutation of the Taino earth-world of *Ayiti* into the private property of *Hispaniola* affirms Indigenous Dene scholar Glen Coulthard's assertion that the colonial arena of primitive accumulation generates a contradictory relation that, though underwriting the productive power and ecological exhaustion of the capital–labor relation, expresses a structural logic of power and subject formation distinct from the latter (Coulthard, 2014, 8–15). Coulthard thus expands, beyond the capital–labor relation, the ontological co-ordinates brought into being through primitive accumulation to include what he terms the "colonial-relation" (Coulthard, 2014, 11). The colonial relation expresses an enduring structural logic of power, brought into being through colonial dispossession, that transmutes the grounded normativity of Indigenous peoples into detached "resources" that come to stand as the necessary mobilizing premise for the emergence and reproduction of capital accumulation. Applied to the transmutation of *Ayiti* into *Hispaniola*, Coulthard's colonial relation opens space for rethinking how race emerges in relation to primitive accumulation. My concern here is in theorizing race as integral to the transmutation of grounded normativity—or what I refer to in this chapter as the earth-world—into detached resources, or "virgin" nature, placed at the service of capital accumulation.

The primitive accumulation of the Taino earth-world is premised upon the positing of what Sylvia Wynter (2003) has identified as the "by-nature"—racialized—distinction between the unique active "rationality"

of the completed human, the Spanish settler-to-be, and the passive or lazy irrationality of the insufficiently human—because too close to nature—Taino. This racialized distinction opens space for the rearticulation of *Ayiti* as *Hispaniola*, wherein the Taino earth-world becomes unused lands given by a virgin nature. This foundational moment of colonial capitalist enclosure discloses that primitive accumulation, in its primary colonial register, generates a racialized distinction that comes to underpin the society–nature contradiction fueling the productive excess and ecological exhaustion of the colonial capitalist social-ecology. Colonial primitive accumulation thus sets in motion the conditions of possibility for the settler-master to appropriate Indigenous earth-worlds while, insofar as they are now rendered as a virgin resource given by nature, erasing their underlying social-ecological/social-geological reproductive conditions. If primitive accumulation in the core generates a category of dispossessed labor that is exploited by capital, in the colony it generates a racialized category of nature that is subject to absolute exhaustion on account of the denial of its underlying reproductive conditions. In the case of the "world in reverse" reconstruction of *Ayiti* as *Hispaniola*, the original colonial capitalist frontier of virgin nature would come, in relatively short order, to exhaustion as the Taino people were subject to racist, genocidal violence (Sauer, 1966, 294). This form of colonial primitive accumulation would ground the emergence of racial capitalism, and evidence of its foundational significance can be found in other early contact zones of the long sixteenth century, the most notable of which may be Cortés's "material-conceptual" transformation of the Indigenous orchards and agricultural fields of Central Mexico into a space of virgin nature/Earth rightfully conquered by the Spanish settler-master (Sluyter, 1999).

Appropriation and erasure of Indigenous socio-ecological practice and knowledge

The particular supremacist response to the vulnerability revealed by the settler's dependence upon the earth-worlding capacity of Indigenous peoples further involved the advancement of what Andrew Sluyter (1999, 2001), in a close historical ecological study of the contact zone encountered by Cortés in Central Mexico, has identified as "material-conceptual" landscape transformations that aimed to effectively disarticulate the co-constitutive relations between Indigenous practice, knowledge, and extra-human natures. The "conceptual" dimension in Sluyter's formulation emphasizes "the colonial recategorization of the Americas as a pristine wilderness" (Sluyter, 1999, 379) which echoes, and in fact offers a substantive elaboration upon, McClintock's "myth of the virgin land." Like McClintock, Sluyter's notion

of the "pristine myth" references efforts to reconceptualize the Americas as a "land without people," but goes further in empirically detailing how such a construction of "unused nature" necessarily obscured the role of Indigenous practice and knowledge in co-producing the soils, forests, and waters of the emergent colonial frontier of the Early Spanish Main. This specifically involved the inability, or refusal, of Spanish colonizers to recognize the complex, place-based, socio-ecological presence of "native orchards and agricultural fields," which were instead reconceptualized as "baldios or yermas—as wastelands or wild lands, as wilderness in the sense of empty, idle, unimproved land" (Sluyter, 1999, 390). While such a view may have been suggested by the land being "fallow at the time of inspection and thus overgrown with grass and thickets," it should more properly be seen as a fundamental misrecognition, driven by the desire to overcome the "fear of engulfment," of lands co-produced, even in their fallow state, as "part of the native subsistence system." In denying the role of Indigenous practice and knowledge in co-constituting the productive capacity of the landscapes upon which the settlers' survival depended, the emergent colonial "conceptual landscape" maintained instead that "native cultures therefore lacked the rationality to effectively use their lands" (Sluyter, 1999, 378). Such a lack was expressive, moreover, of an evident failure, on the part of Indigenous people, to extricate themselves from the sphere of passive, irrational nature, and realize the rational capacity for productive resource development (or "improvement") distinctive to fully formed human subjectivity.

The "conceptual" dimension of colonial landscape transformation involves, then, a simultaneous disarticulation and rearticulation of Indigenous peoples and landscapes. Disarticulation expresses the obfuscation of the co-constitutive role of Indigenous labor practices and embodied knowledges in shaping the productive capacity of the soils, forests, and waters of the landscape, whereas rearticulation signifies how such obfuscation necessarily calls forth the collapse of Indigenous people into the sphere of irrational nature. Such rearticulation renders both Indigenous people and the "idle lands" into which they are now subsumed as primitive forms of a "given nature" that has been "wasted" insofar as it has not been acted upon by the superior organizing and productive capacity of human rationality. It thus falls upon the rational Euro-Christian settler to both "improve" the wasted landscape and civilize the primitive Indigenous other. As was the case with the "coloniality" approach, Cortés, and in particular his "pastoral vision" for the development of what he perceived to be the bounteous, yet idle, lands of central Mexico, is elevated by Sluyter as a significant reference point for the simultaneous disarticulation/rearticulation of the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the non-human natures of the Americas (Sluyter, 1999, 389).

Sluyter's "material-conceptual" framework suggests that such conceptual transformations were both generative of, and further reinforced by, material landscape transformations involving the violent physical removal and depopulation of Indigenous people from the landscapes they had co-produced in order to make way for Spanish settlement. As Indigenous people increasingly resisted settler-colonial encroachment, often by refusing to provision the latter's food needs, the Spanish settlers responded by violently disrupting what Sauer had identified as the existing socio-ecological balance (Sluyter, 1999, 392). Key to such a process was the coercive measures imposed on Indigenous people to force them to work for settlers as both a source of extractive mining labor and as provisioners of food goods. The resulting neglect of Indigenous orchards and fields, allowing as it did the overgrowth of uncultivated plants and grasses, further reinforced the conceptual transformation being forwarded—that the lands of Indigenous peoples were "wastelands or wildlands."

Combined, the colonial "material-conceptual" landscape transformation effected in the Americas both appropriated and erased the earth-worlds of Indigenous peoples, insofar as their place-based labor practices and embodied knowledges were both fundamental to the co-constitution of the bounteous "idle" lands and interruptive to the settler-colonial claims to such lands. The disarticulation of Indigenous socio-ecological co-constitution enables the settler-colonial subjectivity to displace its own "fear of engulfment" through the rearticulation of the Americas as a passive frontier of bountiful nature awaiting its rightful mastery by the rationality embodied in the person of the Euro-Christian settler. This formulation of the "pristine myth" of the Americas would, Sluyter further argues, infuse and become "axiomatic to every expression of the Western worldview, from science to literature" (Sluyter, 1999, 380). The colonial "material-conceptual" landscape transformations of the Americas constitute, in particular, the "originary" ground for the emergence, in inextricable concert with one another, of the "two conceptual dichotomies axiomatic to modernism": European–non-European and society–nature. Based upon such a reconceptualization of the "augral scene of discovery" of the Americas as generative, rather than derivative, of the epistemic and material transformations informing capitalist development, Sluyter suggests that historical ecology's uncovering, and problematization, of the "pristine myth" unsettles the Eurocentric-anthropocentric premise of both modernization theory and the agrarian question framework:

> If some could argue that through Westernization "traditional societies" would "take off" and eventually "catch up" to the West, then others could argue for a similar progression through "primitive accumulation" and "advanced capitalism," albeit with a somewhat different telos in mind. In both cases the

> transformation of natives and landscapes is immanent to Europeans, who are assumed to arrive in North America, for example, with "capitalism in their bones." (Sluyter, 2001, 417)

In place of such a Eurocentric-anthropocentric thesis of the transformative application of a pre-formed Cartesian-capitalist modern subjectivity upon the passive natives and landscapes of the Americas, the historical ecology thesis centers the encounter of European settler subjectivity with the earth-worlding capacity of Indigenous socio-ecology as the fundamental condition of possibility for the emergence, in concert with one another, of modernity's axiomatic society–nature and European–non-European dichotomies.

Transplanting landscapes: black rice in the Carolinas

The renewal of colonial capitalism after the original repartimiento was undone by the genocidal exhaustion of the Indigenous peoples of the Caribbean would involve a further development of the racialized society–nature distinction in the form of the plantation system. With the genocide of the Tainos eliminating the Spanish access to Indigenous foodstuffs, the *conucos* were repurposed for sugarcane that was cultivated in a plantation system by enslaved African labor. The plantation system thus emerges through the continued appropriation and erasure of the Indigenous earth-world of the *conucos*. What I want to consider now is how the encounter between the European settler-master and enslaved African labor can be reconceptualized beyond the premise of conquest, and beyond, moreover, the Black body of stolen labor, so as to reveal how West African earth-world-making capacities both open a contact zone and are subsequently subject to appropriation and erasure by the settler-master's institution of a "world in reverse."

Such a reconceptualization of the role of slavery in the forging of the colonial capitalist geological age necessitates that we begin our account not with European slave raiders seizing and putting to work Black bodies, but rather with the coastal West African earth-worlds that were shaped through complex and elaborate agricultural systems. Of particular significance, the Mande people of West Africa created, in the freshwater wetlands of the inland Niger river delta in Mali, one of the two varieties of rice to have ever been domesticated (Carney, 2002, 31–62). The Mande diffused rice cultivation across West African coastal regions, and established, along with other West African peoples such as the Baga, Baniouk, and Diola, a range of cultivation methods and practices that varied in correspondence with the diversity of non-human actors and forces co-constituting the West African coastal landscape. The most intensive, and productive, cultivation system

was developed in river estuaries by transforming lands, whose fertility was compromised by heavy salination into coastal rice fields by clearing mangroves and engineering an elaborate hydrological system of embankments, canals, and sluices that reduced salinity and enhanced fertility (Sluyter, 2014, 60). The coastal landscape was thus an expression of the earth-worlding capacities of Indigenous West Africans, and it is their highly productive and intensive earth-world that constitutes the space within which the originary encounter, or contact zone, between West Africans and Europeans was established.

Beginning with the Portuguese encounter with West Africa in the fifteenth century, the ability of European traders and mariners to extend their voyages along the coast en route to the Indian Ocean, or further into the Atlantic en route to the Americas, would come to depend upon the surplus grains that could be provisioned from the highly productive rice systems of the Mande, Baga, Baniouk, and Diola peoples (Carney, 2002, 11–13). While early European accounts recognized the role of Indigenous West African engineering and cultivation in the highly productive earth-worlds they encountered and depended upon, an emergent settler-master mode of being would nonetheless reject West African sovereignty of the contact zone, grounded in the gift of rice provisioning, and institute in its place a movement of conquest that could ground European sovereignty (Carney, 2002, 15). This mode of conquest was not motivated solely, then, by the pursuit of African bodies to be put to work on plantations, but was also fundamentally informed by the desire to appropriate the earth-worlds produced by Indigenous African social-geological knowledge and practice. Important evidence for this particular movement of conquest can be found in a well-known chronicle of the raids into Sierra Leone conducted by a prominent English pirate and slaver, John Hawkins, which stated that the Indigenous peoples had "inhabited there 3 yeeres before our coming thither, and in so short space have so planted the ground, that they had great plentie of mill, rise, rootes, pompions, pullin, goates … In addition to seizing all the captives they could, the English stole all the inhabitants' grains and fruits they could conveniently transport" (cited in Carney, 2002, 15). Beyond what even this account suggests, the European appropriation of the West African earth-world would proceed through the violent enslavement of West African peoples so that their engineering and cultivation knowledge, and not simply labor, could be subjected in service of European sovereignty and capital accumulation.

The slave trade, and the plantation system it underpinned, is most clearly expressed as an appropriation of African earth-worlding capacity in the rice plantations established in the Carolinas in late-seventeenth-century British colonial America. Having been dependent upon African rice surpluses

for the Atlantic voyages, and having encountered the sophisticated agro-ecological systems of the West African coast, the settler-master sought to transplant West African earth-worlding capacities to the Carolinas in service of an emergent colonial capitalist plantation system. West African peoples holding sophisticated hydrological engineering and rice cultivation skills were particularly targeted for violent capture by slave traders/raiders, and were consequently enslaved for the purpose of reconstructing their productive rice systems in the Carolinas (Carney, 2002, 89–98). The most productive rice plantations in the Carolinas consisted of those located, as in West Africa, in estuaries where enslaved Africans engineered "embankments, canals, and sluices to regulate the salinity and depth of water in the fields" and enhance soil fertility (Sluyter, 2014, 61). The rice exported from these plantations to Europe would both subsidize the further development of industrial capitalism in Europe and provide American plantation owners with sustained high rates of profit and capital accumulation. Capital accumulation proceeds here, then, not simply through the exhaustive extraction of labor from enslaved Africans but equally through the racialized appropriation of West African socio-geological knowledge and practice. The racialized "by-nature" distinction between the "rational" European settler-master and the "irrational" enslaved African, which elevated the former to the position of mind/society and subjugated the latter to the sphere of body/nature, transmuted the settler-master into the inventor of the rice-plantation system and reduced African peoples to bodies of nature being put to work in service of the settler-master's higher rationality (Carney, 2002, 80).

Huacas of Tawantinsuyu: celestial slingshot to geological good fortune

The constitution of the racial capitalist form of earth-worlding is further evident in the intensive silver mining of Potosi, which world-systems scholars have widely identified as a moment of primitive accumulation in the long sixteenth century that proved essential to the emergence of capitalism (Moore, 2010b; Stern, 1988). In this particular region of the Andes, Quechua and Aymara-speaking Indigenous peoples co-produced a sacred landscape in which agricultural terraces were carved out of the mountains and enabled the creation of an immense diversity of crops, such as potatoes, quinoa, corn, peppers, and coca, that could be grown at different elevations (Lane, 2019, 27). Indigenous Andeans venerated the mountain peaks as "powerful animate residents of the landscape" whose divinity was recognized, and worshiped, through the building of *Huacas* that established a "semiotic relationship" between the silver contained within Andean mountains and the "life-giving light of the sun" (Van Buren and Weaver, 2012, 82–83). This specifically cast the silver as the "'light' of the inner world," the adornment

of which upon political and theological edifices stood as embodiment of an earth-world—*Tawantinsuyu*—governed by "solar dominion," signifying the centrality of the worship of the life-giving power of the sun to Andean peoples (Van Buren and Weaver, 2012). The *Huacas*, as shrines revealing the sacred sites at which the sun had sown the Earth with its light, consisted of three stones and a lump of silver, placed near the mountain peak, that marked the divinity of the mountain and signified the concentrated fertility contained within (Platt and Quisbert, 2007, 115). In partaking in the sacred practices and rituals prescribed by *Tawantinsuyu*, Indigenous Andeans were imbued with the capacity to enter into "communication with the patron of silver" and thus be directed toward where they could discover the "indexes and signs of the veins" of silver that had grown out of the sun's "celestial slingshot" (Platt and Quisbert, 2007). Once discovered, these signs would be marked by Huacas that would function as a "sacred 'door' to the mine" which was guarded by a shaman who "administered the sacraments to the entrants" (Platt and Quisbert, 2007).

In beginning our account with the sacred earth-world of *Tawantinsuyu*, co-produced by Indigenous Andean socio-ecological-cosmological knowledge and practice, the Eurocentric limitations of the Capitalocene's assumptions regarding the role of Potosi in the rise of the colonial-capitalist epoch become evident. In the Capitalocene account, early Spanish settlers of the long sixteenth century discovered the silver of Potosi in a "stroke of geological good fortune," and even as an "unparalleled geological fluke," that acted for the Spanish as a "free gift" of nature provisioning silver deposits on a hitherto unseen scale (Moore, 2010b, 41–42). This account accords originary world-making capacity entirely to an emergent European capitalist logic, which was propelled outwards from Europe due to endogenous socio-ecological contradictions (mining exhaustion in Central Europe, food crisis in Western Europe), and was ultimately able to transcend such contradictions through acts of "discovery" such as the "stroke of geological good fortune" at Potosi. Potosi's silver provisioned Spain, and ultimately all of Europe, with a scale of primitive accumulation that proved essential to the formation of capitalist agencies that would set in motion further productive/exhaustive enterprises and colonial appropriations elsewhere (Stern, 1988). While centering colonialism, through the specific conquest of Potosi, in the rise of the capitalist world-ecology, the Capitalocene account here nonetheless erases the distinctive Indigenous earth-worlding capacity without which the Spanish could not have accessed the mountains of silver that propelled the rise of the European-centered capitalist world system.

In our approach, then, rather than beginning with a European earth-world making capacity motivated by the transcendence of internal socio-ecological contradictions, we accord constitutive significance to the *Tawantinsuyu*

earth-world that encountered Europeans in the long sixteenth century. A key moment of departure here is the Andean revelation of silver, through its sacred adornment, to the Spanish, who would subsequently transmute the silver into a potential means to overcome the "internal" socio-ecological contradictions they confronted in Europe. The Spanish, in other words, do not here discover mountains of silver made available to them by a "stroke of geological good fortune" but rather encounter an Indigenous earth-world—*Tawantinsuyu*—with a distinctive capacity to access, and produce, silver from the venerated mountain peaks. Recognizing the value that the early settlers attached to silver, Indigenous Andeans opened the contact zone through gifting a major source of silver ore—the Porco mountain—to the Spanish (Platt and Quisbert, 2007, 114–115; Van Buren and Weaver, 2012, 85). Here, again, we find that the emergent settler refuses the vulnerability associated with the dependence made evident by the gift of the Indigenous earth-world, for in those moments where "native Andeans failed to lead them to gold or silver mines, the Spanish claimed they hid them out of malice" (Lane, 2019, 22). The decision of Indigenous Andeans to conceal particular sources of mineral wealth, it bears emphasizing, was informed by concern that Spanish settlers were responding to the gift by undermining, rather than recognizing, Indigenous sovereignty over the contact zone (Platt and Quisbert, 2007, 117). As in *Ayiti*, the emergent settler state moved to overcome dependence upon Indigenous earth-worlding capacity by deploying violence to institute an *encomienda* system that would subject entire Indigenous communities as the private property of Spanish settlers (Platt and Quisbert, 2007, 128). This would enable the emergent settler to appropriate the silver prospecting capacity of the *Tawantinsuyu* earth-world without being subjected, as incomplete self, to the sovereignty of the Indigenous other. In resistance to the abuses inflicted by the Spanish settlers' movement of conquest, Indigenous Andeans sought to restore the premise of the gift underlying Indigenous sovereignty of the contact zone by appealing directly to the Spanish crown's own concerns about the increasingly unaccountable independent power exercised by the settlers. It is here that Indigenous Andean leaders revealed Potosi, a mountain with silver far in excess of Porco, and specifically offered to the Spanish crown the "gift of the *huaca* of Potosi" as an act of "allegiance to His majesty, in exchange for recognition of the 'natural lords of the land, under the local sovereignty of an Inka'" (Platt and Quisbert, 2007, 128).

In addition to the gift of revelation of silver deposits, Indigenous Andean metallurgical knowledge and practice proved essential to the production of silver from the ore extracted from Potosi. While the role of Indigenous *guaryas*, or wind ovens, in enabling the Spanish to begin silver extraction

at Potosi has been widely acknowledged, the renewal of mining after the exhaustion of the initial silver-ore deposits has been more typically attributed to the Spanish settler's introduction of superior metallurgical technologies (Bigelow, 2020, 251). This rendering, however, has been challenged by recent scholarship (Bigelow, 2020; Lane, 2019), which clarifies that the new metallurgical technique of mercury amalgamation was significantly informed by Indigenous expertise that "allowed refiners to profitably process a wider variety of ore than traditional methods permitted" (Bigelow, 2020, 239). Taken as a whole, the centrality of Indigenous earth-worlding capacity to the flow of silver from Potosi to Europe is evident in accounts from the sixteenth century such as the recommendations made by Spanish scholar Barba to the Spanish crown that the introduction of Andean metallurgical technologies and skilled prospecting knowledge within Spain could reinvigorate the latter's unrealized mining potential (Bigelow, 2020, 232–233, 255).

Over time, the centrality of Indigenous earth-worlding capacity would come to be concealed in the European quest to institute a "world in reverse" that would consolidate an internally completed sovereign settler state. The Spanish authorities would forge the conditions necessary to simultaneously appropriate Indigenous earth-worlding capacity, while erasing its underlying creative force, by effecting a "material-conceptual" transformation of *Tawantinsuyu* into an unused virgin space of nature given by God, and discovered by the Spanish (Platt and Quisbert, 2007, 130). Again here we see how the society/nature distinction underpinning the colonial capitalist earth-world co-constitutively emerges alongside the racialized "by-nature" distinction between the European settler-master and Indigenous peoples. Recent scholarship has demonstrated how, both in regards to prospecting and refining, "specialized Andean mining knowledges [were] transmuted into a racialized scientific vocabulary" that reduced Indigenous peoples to a sub-human realm of beasts and elevated European settlers to the category of rational human uniquely capable of both discovering and refining silver (Bigelow, 2020, 267). Within this emergent colonial-capitalist earth-world, primitive accumulation proceeded through an unfree labor system—the *mita*—that forced Indigenous miners and refiners to extract and produce silver for the Spanish. The *mita* system as primitive accumulation both appropriated Andean earth-worlding capacity, as Indigenous miners continued to draw upon the sacred practices and rituals of *Tawantinsuyu* to access the mines (Nemser, 2014; Platt and Quisbert, 2007, 132), while undermining its sacred reproductive conditions, leading to both the "entombment" of Indigenous peoples in the mines (Marx, 1978, 435) and the eventual exhaustion of the silver deposits of Potosi.

The racialized Cortesian premise of the colonial-capitalist world-ecology

We can now clarify the role of the presence and erasure of Indigenous practice and knowledge in the formulation of the Cortesian premise of the political ecology of colonial capitalism. We are now able, in particular, to advance a non-Eurocentric account of the construction of the Americas as the capitalist world-ecology's original frontier of externalized nature. Moving beyond Moore's articulation of the frontier's emergence through a pre-formed European Cartesian subjectivity acting upon the millennia of stored nutrients of the Americas—suggesting as it does non-human natures hitherto undisturbed by human agency—our first step consists of revealing how the nutrient base of the frontier, rather than being stored passively, was co-produced by the distinctive earth-worlding capacities of Indigenous people. The settler subjectivity's drive to master the vulnerability—or "fear of engulfment"—triggered by its dependence upon such capacity propelled a "material-conceptual" landscape transformation which functioned to simultaneously disarticulate Indigenous socio-ecological co-production and rearticulate the Indigenous peoples and lands of the Americas as primitive beings within a sphere of externalized nature. The Cortesian thesis thus insists that the erasure, via racialized dehumanization, of the integral role of Indigenous practice and knowledge in the formation of ostensibly non-human natures such as soils, forests, and waters constitutes a fundamental condition of possibility for the emergence of the qualitative society–nature distinction underpinning the frontier zone of appropriation of the capitalist world-ecology. Such erasure is, furthermore, vital to the construction of externalized nature as simply given as free gift, rather than reproduced through a complex co-constitution of Indigenous practice, knowledge, and non-human forces. Recalling our earlier discussion of Moore's original world-ecological formulation, it is this qualitative denial of the reproductive conditions of the frontier of externalized nature—now revealed to include the erasure of Indigenous earth-worlding capacity—which enables the mobilization of the ecological surplus of cheap natures underpinning the transition to capitalist development.

Having clarified the foundational significance of Indigenous presence and erasure in the constitution of the colonial-capitalist frontier, the central thesis of this book can be finally articulated regarding how race operates as a core ontological relation in the world-scale generation and transfer of agrarian, or ecological, surplus across the distinctive zones (core–periphery; over–underconsumption; exploitation–appropriation) of the capitalist world-ecology. Moving beyond the functional notion of race as "legitimatory discourse" sanctioning a rightless category of labor, as one among

many "irrational natures" derived from the foundational society–nature binary, my argument is that the racialized figure of the "primitive" or "savage" human, whose humanity is rendered suspect—the act of "misanthropic skepticism"—on account of its inability to extricate itself from the sphere of nature and, hence, productively act upon and shape it, stands as the necessary category of "non-being" against which the rational, uniquely value-producing, human can emerge and realize itself. The "appropriation" of the surplus of cheap natures from the colonial frontier operates on an assumed premise of "primitive humans" whose subjection to dispossession and appropriation need not require any form of compensatory accounting as they had not contributed any value to the rich, yet idle, virgin lands they had, therefore, hitherto "wasted." It is this racialized ontological framework, privileging as it does the rational value-producing human while simultaneously appropriating and denying the presence of "primitive humans," which sets the stage for the former to set in motion, by exhaustively acting upon the frontier lands without concern for their reproductive conditions or limits, the world-ecological surplus of cheap natures necessary for effecting the transition from agrarian society to industrial capitalist modernity. The appropriation and transfer of this surplus subsequently enables, through the repression of basic reproduction costs, the emergent core zone of commodification/exploitation to shift more capital and labor toward value-producing industry. The "cheap natures" transferred from the non-value-producing peripheral zone of appropriation stands, furthermore, as the invisible other to the value ascribed to the "finished" goods produced by rational human activity, governed by the "market-dependent" competitive calculus of the organizing capital–labor contradiction, in the core zone of commodification–exploitation. The racialized ontological framework of the capitalist world-ecology thus consists of the visible space of value-producing being—capital and labor in the core zone of commodification/exploitation—and the invisible space of "non-value" and "non-being" wherein the distinctive knowledge and practice of the "primitive human" is simultaneously appropriated and erased.

The Cortesian thesis, and the racialized ontological underpinnings of the capitalist world-ecology it reveals, emphasize, furthermore, the centrality of Indigenous presence and erasure to Moore's articulation of the paradoxical "surplus–exhaustion" cycles through which the enabling conditions of the surplus—the denial of the frontier's reproductive conditions—simultaneously ensure its eventual exhaustion. While the reduction of Indigenous people to "non-value"-producing "primitive humans" makes clear the centrality of the racialized erasure of Indigenous practice and knowledge, the latter's presence nonetheless remains a haunting force constituting the

materiality (the millennia of stored nutrients) of the colonial-capitalist frontier.

Haunting here signifies the pending "exhaustion" of the surplus on account of the incapacity of the Cortesian ontology to recognize Indigenous agency as imperative to the constituting reproductive conditions of the frontier's bountiful "free gifts" of nature. Sauer has documented how the violent settler-colonial disruption of the Indigenous peoples' "excellent but delicate ecological balance," while enabling rapid mobilization of the nutrient and mineral wealth of the "new world," simultaneously undermined such wealth's reproductive conditions and, as such, exhausted, in relatively short order, the productive capacity of the Indigenous peoples and lands of the Caribbean islands (Sauer, 1966, 203). The Cortesian ontological frame informing this original "systemic cycle of accumulation" of the capitalist world-ecology compelled the Spanish settler-colonial regime to respond to such exhaustion, Sauer argues, by shifting "attention to neighbouring islands" whose frontier of "pristine nature" had not yet been acted upon (Sauer, 1966, 157). Ultimately, however, the entirety of the "early Spanish Main"—Sauer's term for what we would identify as the capitalist world-ecology's original frontier zone of appropriation—would experience an "exhaustion" of its particular racialized society–nature configuration, resulting in the destruction of both the Indigenous peoples and the non-human natures of the frontier (Sauer, 1966, 294).

As our initial discussion of Moore's world-ecological theory revealed, such exhaustion of a particular society–nature configuration, while undermining the state–capital hegemonic bloc that constituted it, is transcended by the expansion of the capitalist world-ecology's frontiers by a succeeding state–capital hegemony capable of renewing the ecological surplus of cheap natures. In light of the exhaustion of the previous cycle's distinctive racialized society–nature order, the successive hegemon's frontier expansion must inevitably extend the racialized technology of "misanthropic skepticism" to newly encountered Indigenous peoples. Our Cortesian reconceptualization of this moment of renewal of the "ongoing" world-ecological agrarian question thus emphasizes the centrality of the simultaneous appropriation and erasure of Indigenous socio-ecological co-production to the particular society–nature distinction forged, in order to deliver the ecological surplus capable of underwriting a renewed "cycle of accumulation," by the succeeding hegemon.

Within Araghi's first epoch of global primitive accumulation, the Dutch ascension to hegemonic status in the wake of the exhaustion of the Spanish cycle of accumulation involved the expansionary construction of "new" racialized frontiers of externalized "pristine" nature across the Caribbean, Southeast Asia, and Southern Africa. As Michael Niblett (2011) has shown

in his particular account of the renewal, via Dutch colonialism, of the Caribbean frontier, the construction of an "externalized nature" depended, fundamentally, upon the appropriation and disruption of Indigenous socio-ecological co-productions. Niblett identifies a key moment in the Dutch conceptual landscape transformation of the Caribbean as a space of externalized nature in Walter Raleigh's late-sixteenth-century declaration of Guinea as a

> virginal land whose "Maydenhead" has yet to be penetrated; "she" is a place of marvellous landscapes and exotic encounters, a fount of untold riches requiring only the industrious hand of the European to convert her into a hive of productivity. (Niblett, 2011, 238)

Niblett identifies the link between such an accounting of the Dutch Caribbean and the emergent Dutch cycle of accumulation, clarifying that "behind the discursive construction of new and wondrous lands lay the material demands of the emerging capitalist economies on the other side of the Atlantic" (Niblett, 2011, 239). Such discursive construction, or conceptual landscape transformation, was fundamentally premised, Niblett's work further reveals, by both an appropriation and denial of the "closed-cycle system" of Indigenous subsistence agriculture, which had been essential to both bringing into being, and sustaining, the "fount of untold riches" that had activated Raleigh's fantasies regarding the productive transformation possible under the "industrious hand of the European." The material dimension of such conceptual landscape transformation involved the "destruction of the Indigenous system of subsistence agriculture and the imposition of the plantation economy" (Niblett, 2011, 241), which led, moreover, to the "clearance of huge areas of forest" (Niblett, 2011, 240). Such appropriation and erasure of Indigenous socio-ecological practice and knowledge enabled the "material-conceptual" construction, and penetration, of the Dutch Caribbean as a space of externalized nature capable of delivering the ecological surplus of cheap natures necessary for the successive accumulation cycle driving the renewal, and expansion, of Europe's transition from agrarian to industrial society. Niblett puts such surplus appropriation and transfer from the zone of appropriation to the zone of commodification/exploitation more clearly, arguing that the Dutch "integration of the Caribbean into the capitalist world-system was thus also its integration into a flow system, where it became the external nutrient supply for the industrializing nations of the core." However, the Cortesian denial of the "haunting" presence of Indigenous "creative agency" as a key constituting reproductive force of the frontier's "fount of untold riches" sets in motion the eventual exhaustion of the latter's ecological surplus, or "external nutrient supply." In this case,

Niblett argues that the "destruction of the Indigenous system" had the effect of disrupting "nutrient cycles and exacerbated soil depletion, as well as dramatically increasing rates of soil exhaustion" (Niblett, 2011, 240).

While the capitalist world-ecology emerged through the Spanish conquest of the Americas, and was initially renewed through Dutch frontier expansion, it achieved a more thoroughgoing consolidation under the British accumulation cycle. Marking the emergence of the long nineteenth century and corresponding with the consolidation of the settler-colonial food regime, the hegemonic ascension of the British state–capital nexus was underwritten by, and further advanced, processes of global primitive accumulation that resecured the visible value producing capital–labor relation of the core zone of commodification, premised as it is on the provisioning of cheap food, through expansionary colonial frontier production and appropriation across North America, South Asia, Africa, and Australia. Within North America, Cedric Robinson (2000) has articulated the supremacist response of "mastery" forwarded by early British settlers to overcome the heightened vulnerability, or "fear of engulfment," triggered by their initial dependence for survival on the deep place-based practice and knowledge of Indigenous people. Robinson's citation of Edmund Morgan's reconstruction of the "relations of the earliest Virginian colonists with native peoples" is particularly instructive in this regard:

> If you were a colonist … [t]he Indians were supposed to be overcome with admiration and to join you in extracting riches from the country. But your superior technology had proved insufficient to extract anything. The Indians, keeping to themselves, laughed at your superior methods and lived from the land more abundantly and with less labour than you did. They even furnished you with the food that you somehow did not get around to growing enough of yourselves … So you killed the Indians, tortured them, burned their villages, and burned their cornfields. It proved your superiority. (Robinson, 2000, 77)

Such "material" landscape transformation was accompanied, Robinson proceeds, by a conceptual transformation in which Indigenous people were reduced, in spite of the cornfields which the settlers felt compelled to burn, to non-cultivating hunters who could only take from, and not productively harness, the rich bounty naturally given by the virgin soils of America. The productive realization of the land's hitherto wasted potential and the civilized maturation of the Indian were dependent, according to the settler supremacist response, upon the rational capacity of British settlers. Combined, such "material-conceptual" landscape transformation functioned, insofar as it rendered the "dependence of 'new Comers' on natives already reversed," to

cover over the settler inferiority complex with the "curtain of supremacist ideology" (Robinson, 2000, 77–78).

Such an ideology, Jacob Pandian (1985) has argued, insofar as it denied the constitutive role played by Indigenous practice and knowledge in the shaping of the American landscape, allowed the British to resolve the "problem of the Indians' possession of the land by refusing to accept them as humans" (Pandian, 1985, 66–67). This refusal implied that the lands were being wasted by the irrationality of both primitive humans and non-human natures, a point explicitly captured in Pandian's citation of an early Virginian settler: "Although the Lord hath given the earth to children of men … the greater part of it [is] possessed and wrongfully usurped by wild beasts, and unreasonable creatures, or by brutish savages" (Pandian, 1985, 67). These early settler-colonial encounters would come to ground the emergent racialized society–nature ontology governing the frontier expansions that provisioned the "global agrarian surplus" underwriting the British accumulation cycle.

This particular rearticulation of the Cortesian premise of the capitalist world-ecology was advanced, most prominently, in the liberal political philosophy articulated by the English philosopher John Locke. While Locke's foundational arguments regarding nature, property, and individual rights are often situated, in more Eurocentric accounts, in exclusive relation to the English enclosures, postcolonial environmental scholarship has emphasized the centrality of the settler-colonial encounter with prior Indigenous presence in North America to the development of Locke's human–nature philosophy (Moore et al., 2003). The material-conceptual recategorization of North America as pristine, undisturbed nature was vital "empirical" evidence for Locke regarding the transformative capacity of rational human labor and the relation to land—private property—it entailed. In particular, Locke's theory of human development was premised on his assertion that "[i]n the beginning all the World was America," which suggested an original pristine nature, bestowed with bountiful potential, common to all of humanity in its primitive state (Moore et al., 2003, 7). The productive realization of nature's free gifts depended, Locke argued, on the rational application of labor, which is unique to fully formed human subjectivity, and which is definitively achieved with the practice of agricultural cultivation. It is only in so doing that the rational human can claim sovereign appropriation of the portion of the "primordial commons" its labor has improved through cultivation. Insofar as the British material-conceptual landscape transformation of North America reduced them to non-cultivating hunters, who took from but did not improve upon the bounty of nature, Indigenous peoples could make no claim of sovereign appropriation of the lands they inhabited, which therefore remained in their original condition of "primordial commons."

Locke's reduction of America to an original state of non-appropriated pristine nature was premised upon the erasure of both the cornfields cultivated by Indigenous peoples, and later destroyed by settlers, and the larger Indigenous socio-ecological co-production of landscapes, such as the great plains and forests of North America, which, though not perhaps immediately discernible as "cultivated," had been fundamentally shaped by practices and knowledges embodying the co-constitution of Indigenous and extra-human "creative agency." In terms of the latter, scholars of historical ecology have emphasized, in particular, how Indigenous people participated in the reshaping of the ostensibly uncultivated plains of America by employing fire to "keep down underbrush and create the open, grassy conditions favourable for game," leading to the conclusion that "rather than domesticating animals for meat, Indians retooled whole ecosystems to grow bumper crops of elk, deer, and bison" (Mann, 2002). The "uncultivated" designation is further problematized in its application to the expansive forests of America, whose formation, as William Cronon's seminal work has revealed, was fundamentally co-produced through "selective Indian burning" and preservation of a variety of plant species which "promoted the mosaic quality of New England ecosystems, creating forests in many different states of ecological succession" (Cronon, 1983, 51). Thus, while Indigenous practice and knowledge was fundamental to both the cultivated cornfields and "uncultivated" plains and forests ensuring settler survival and prosperity, the paradigm of "mastery over nature" through which settlers could overcome the "fear of engulfment" triggered by such dependence would necessitate the disarticulation of such a socio-ecological order in favor of Locke's rearticulation of primitive hunters and pristine lands "evoking the fallow condition of a continent awaiting the redemptive touch of European labour and private property" (Moore et al., 2003, 7). In this emergent racialized colonial socio-ecology, we can see the embodiment of the Cortesian subjectivity in the British settlers' self-awareness, insofar as they had "alone received the divine command to subdue and replenish the earth," as redeeming figures of those natures which had been "unjustly neglected" by "wild men" embodying the new world's "unpardonable laziness" (Merchant, 2003, 143).

Reflecting Michel-Rolph Trouillot's insight that the "conquest of America stands as Europe's model for the constitution of the Other" (Trouillot, 2003, 14), this racialized production of externalized nature, though originally centered in the Americas, would, as an integral component of the British accumulation cycle's thoroughgoing consolidation of the capitalist world-ecology, serve as the enabling framework for an exponential increase of frontier expansion into India, Africa, and Australia. The cheap natures underwriting the British accumulation cycle of the long

nineteenth century necessitated, in particular, the frontier expansion of "two types of tropical agriculture, namely, peasant agriculture and plantations, [which] emerged as the solutions to the problem of dramatically increasing the supply of crops for the world market" (Phillip, 2004, 87). Within colonized India, the advancement of both of these "types of tropical agriculture" was fundamentally premised upon a "misanthropic skepticism" directed toward, in the case of plantation production, the shifting cultivation practices of Indigenous peoples inhabiting forested regions and, in the case of the intensification and expansion of peasant agriculture, the pastoral practices of nomadic communities of the northern plains of Punjab.

With regards to the "material-conceptual" recategorization of the forested regions of south-western India, Kavita Phillip has demonstrated how the British state–capital nexus, on the one hand, appropriated Indigenous knowledge and practice essential to the sustainable reproduction of the Western Ghats forests (Phillip, 2004, 67), while, on the other, erased such co-constitutive presence by reconceptualizing the particular local "kumri" shifting cultivation practices as wasteful of the "pleasant climate and rich soil of the region" (Phillip, 2004, 116). Such waste was evidence, from the British colonial gaze, of the Indigenous peoples' "nonproductive relationship with nature" (Phillip, 2004, 116), which suggested, moreover, that they had failed to "separate themselves, as self-acting autonomous subjects, from their surroundings, in order to truly act upon a separately conceived nature" (Phillip, 2004, 36). Since the Europeans had achieved the uniquely human rational capacity of thought and labor that such a society–nature separation enables, British colonial officials and planters argued that

> forest clearing must be done under the supervision of Europeans, and must be for the purpose of planting crops other than the kumri crops, paddy and millet. It is only the plantation crops that truly bear the potential for the liberation of the land from its unhealthy state and of the population from its parochial agricultural practices. (Phillip, 2004, 51)

A further statement from a colonial official in South India captures the explicit link between such frontier expansion and the accumulation imperatives of the core zone of commodification:

> [T]he northern powers will not permit that the rich and as yet comparatively undeveloped countries of the tropics should be entirely wasted by being devoted merely to the supply of the food and clothing wants of their own people, when they can also supply the wants of the colder zones in so many indispensable products. (Phillip, 2004, 89)

Thus, by erasing the co-constitutive force of the earth-worlding capacity of Indigenous kumri cultivation in shaping the Western Ghats landscape, British colonial forces were able to recast the forested regions as comprised of primitive humans and pristine "unused" natures. Insofar as this suggested that the bountiful resources of the Western Ghats were passively "given" as "free gifts," rather than actively co-produced by Indigenous peoples and extra-human life forces, such landscape recategorization set in place the conditions for appropriating, without "payment" to Indigenous people and extra-human natures, the "rich soil of the region" as cheap natures—in this case coffee and tea plantations—serving as "external nutrient supply" for the metropolitan core.

While colonial plantations provisioned stimulants such as coffee, tea, or sugar, the vital imperative of securing a consistent and cheap supply of grains to support the reproduction of the capital–labor relation in the core involved the intensification and expansion of settled peasant agriculture. Within India, this particular form of frontier expansion was concentrated in the northern plains of Punjab, and involved the appropriation and erasure of the labor practices and knowledges of nomadic pastoral communities. At the time of British colonization, the socio-ecology of Punjab consisted of semi-arid regions inhabited by nomadic pastoralists and cultivated agrarian regions inhabited by peasants, which combined "formed two distinct geo-ecological zones, intimately related in complex ways" (Bhattacharya, 1996, 59). In short, the complementarity consisted of cyclical nutrient recycling involving the flow of manure and cattle from the pastoral zones to the agrarian zones, contributing to the rich soil fertility of the region, and the reverse flow of grain and feedstuffs from the agrarian to the pastoral zones. However, informed by the particular racialized Lockean society–nature premise of the British accumulation cycle, in which cultivation was taken as the affirmative sign of the distinctively human act of separation from, and mastery over, nature, the colonial regime obscured this agrarian-pastoral co-production of the Punjab landscape and instead dismissed nomadic pastoralism as an irrational activity which "contributed nothing to augment or regenerate the productive capacity of the soil" (Bhattacharya, 1996, 72). This reconceptualized the pastoral regions as externalized pristine natures, whose redemption from a state of idle waste was contingent upon the rational application of human cultivation. Such conceptual landscape transformation expressing a "contrast between pastoral land—subject to uncontrolled, untamed nature—and agricultural colonies where we 'feel ever the beneficent hand of man'" (Bhattacharya, 1996, 75) had, as its material component, processes of racialized enclosure wherein "over twenty lakh acres of grazing lands were taken over by the state, pastoralists were expropriated, agricultural colonies were set up, canals were constructed, and blocks of lands were

granted to the 'sturdy peasants' of Central Punjab" (Bhattacharya, 1996, 74). The racialized dehumanization of the pastoralists, enabling as it did the appropriation and erasure of their co-production of the Punjab landscape, was thus vital to the conversion of the former pastoral regions into a key frontier for the provisioning of cheap wheat supplies to the "post-agrarian" industrial labor of the British metropolitan core.

Beyond India, similar processes of constituting, and appropriating, racialized frontiers of pristine natures and primitive humans were advanced across Australia (Anderson, 2007; Povinelli, 1995), Kenya (Neumann, 2005), and Southern Africa (Magubane, 2003). Combined, these racialized frontiers formed the expansive zone of appropriation necessary, insofar as it delivered the cost-reducing surplus of cheap food to the core zone of commodification, for the provisional resolution of the "renewed" world-ecological agrarian question posed to the hegemonic British state–capital nexus in its drive, over the long nineteenth century, to enlarge the accumulation capacity of the capitalist world-ecology. More specifically, such appropriation and redistribution of the ecological surplus enabled what Arrighi refers to as an enlargement of the "spatial and social foundations" of accumulation (Arrighi, 1994, 80) insofar as cheap food allowed for a greater measure of consent for, and participation in (as consumers), the system of capital accumulation on the part of dispossessed labor in the core. However, the logic of the Cortesian racialized society–nature distinction organizing the zone of appropriation, obscuring as it did the frontier's constituting conditions of Indigenous and extra-human "creative agency," would, as with earlier accumulation cycles, come to exhaust the ecological surplus underwriting the core's industrial development during the long nineteenth century of British hegemony. In this instance, such exhaustion of the prevailing society–nature complex, though manifesting at one level in the "late Victorian holocausts" (Davis, 2001) of millions of colonized peoples starved to death across the varying frontiers of the British capitalist world-ecology, was most prominently driven by the anticolonial resistance waged by inhabitants of the "Agrarian South" against the racialized socio-ecological regime which had both denied their humanity and disrupted their own long-standing place-based co-constitutive relations with extra-human natures (McMichael, 2007, 220).

Conclusion

Having both articulated a theoretical framework of "political ecology of colonial capitalism," and deployed it to clarify the racialized global agrarian basis of capitalist development across its successive accumulation cycles,

I will now conclude by briefly gesturing toward its implications for the analysis of the global land grab. Put simply, the global land grab, in my estimation, signifies, in the context of the increasing ecological exhaustion of the society/nature regime of the accumulation cycle of the "long twentieth century," the logic of racialized frontier formation and appropriation, advanced by contending state–capital blocs, in the "contested transition" over the successive accumulation cycle. The deployment, by promoters of the land grab, of the concept of the "yield gap" to signal frontiers of unused nature, calls forth yet again the racialized appropriation and erasure of the co-constitutive creative agency of Indigenous peoples and extra-human natures comprising the frontiers marked for investment.

Prior, however, to articulating a reading of the global land grab based on a political ecology of colonial capitalism, it is necessary that we first account for the theoretical and historical significance of its distinctive "South–South" dimensions. While some analysts (Margulis and Porter, 2013) have rushed to interpret the increasing role of Southern actors in global land grabbing as evidence of the collapse, and hence irrelevance, of the North–South paradigm of the capitalist world-ecology, I will emphasize instead that "South–South" transnational agricultural investments constitute a challenge to the North's claim to "exclusive access to the planet's resources" (Amin, 2010, 2014) that can, depending on the underlying property relations, open the road toward a radical decolonized remaking of the world-ecology or, contrarily, toward the reinstantiation of the racialized frontiers of unused nature. In the next chapter, I will thus account for the significance of the "rise of the South," both in terms of the socio-ecological promise of its origins in the anticolonial movements exhausting the British-led accumulation cycle, and the potential "compromise" of such a promise as particular Southern states increasingly centered the need, across the contested "long twentieth century," to "catch up" to the core Northern zone through a strategy of rapid industrial capitalist development.

Notes

1 The term "settler-master" has been advanced by Black-geographies scholars in order to foreground that historically the "Settler and Master are one and the same" (King, 2015).

2 As Fanon asks, "Superiority? Inferiority? Why not simply try to touch the other, feel the other, discover each other? Was my freedom not given me to build the world of you, man?" (1952, 206). Leanne Betasamosake Simpson (2014) has recently developed a similar notion of "decolonial love" that

centers the "tremendous capacity to love" under Indigenous grounded normativity as both an alternative and challenge to the supremacism imposed by settler-colonialism.

3 The following discussion on the Taino–Spanish encounter draws significantly from Carl Sauer's (1966) seminal text on historical ecology, *The Early Spanish Main*.

4

The "reawakening of the South" within and against the capitalist world-ecology

In this chapter, we shift our focus to accounting for the significance of what Samir Amin has referred to as the "reawakening of the South" for the contested reconstitution of the accumulation capacity of the capitalist world-ecology over the "long twentieth century." In so doing, the aim is to elaborate the necessary historical and geopolitical framework through which particular "South–South" transnational agricultural investments can be seen to simultaneously challenge the historically core Northern zone's exclusive claim to control over the global ecological surplus while potentially reinstantiating, though now in service of capitalist development centered in the South, its underlying premise of racialized frontier formation that was elaborated in the previous chapter. Key to this elaboration will be contrasting the divergence between those Southern states which overturned the property relations inherited from the capitalist world-ecology and those which were not able to do so. It will be suggested that postcolonial states that were able to consolidate sovereignty on the basis of comprehensive land reform, and thus established a broader "popular" basis of national development, have proven more capable of opening South–South relations de-linked from the colonial capitalist world-ecology than those, such as India, that were less successful in effecting such reform and thus remained captured by the bourgeois and landlord classes that had constituted the Indigenous beneficiaries of the colonial ecological surplus drain. Since I will focus, in the following chapter, on the case of the investment of the Indian state–capital nexus in agriculture in Ethiopia, I will specify, in this chapter, the "rise of the South" through the various "agrarian transition" strategies employed by India across the long twentieth century.

To this end, this chapter further develops the political ecology of colonial capitalism framework by combining the concept of the "triple movement" advanced by Nancy Fraser (2013); the "agrarian question of national liberation" framework developed by Frantz Fanon, Amilcar Cabral, and Sam Moyo; and Samir Amin's account of the contradictions of what he terms the "reawakening of the South" (Amin, 2010). Specifically, I will emphasize that the active opposition articulated to the motive forces of capitalist

development, by those consigned to "primitive human" or "extra human" status, figures centrally into both the exhaustion, and attempted reconstitution, of the ecological surplus underpinning capital's accumulation capacity. Extending beyond the limitations of the Polanyian double movement framework, I argue that this represents a "triple movement" contestation between what I will identify as an anticolonial socio-ecological articulation, emanating from the experiences of those discounted in the zone of appropriation, and the hegemonic resolution of the capital–labor contradiction in the core zone of commodification. This triple movement dynamic captures, then, the centrality of anticolonial socio-ecological movements, defined by a militant rejection of the consignment of the South as a "unit of nature," to both the exhaustion of the colonial-capitalist world-ecology of the long nineteenth century and its contested reconstitution, marked particularly by the challenges posed by the "reawakening of the South," across the long twentieth century.

The more radical dimensions of the anticolonial rejection of the South as a "unit of nature" were, however, compromised, as postcolonial states, shaped by the imperative of securing their sovereignty in the face of an emergent "neocolonialism," embraced a conception of development as catching up with the North (Amin, 2016) which necessarily called for the appropriation of an "internal" ecological surplus oriented toward rapid national industrial development. The relation between the threat of recolonization and the imperative of rapidly "catching up" has historically been structured by both the accumulation imperatives of imperial capital driving recolonization and the degree to which postcolonial states had overturned the colonial property relations underlying capital accumulation in the core. In the case we will examine most closely, the postcolonial Indian state, having failed at instituting comprehensive land reform, did not so much as contest the underlying racialized society/nature distinction as it did seek to reorder it in the service of what Fanon characterizes as bourgeois national development. In so much, however, that such a "national developmentalist" strategy placed obstacles in the way of the realization of the global ecological surplus necessary for the centering of capitalist accumulation and development in the North, it would compel an attempted "reappropriation" by the latter, via the hegemonic US state–capital nexus, in the form of neoliberal structural adjustment. A further argument of this chapter, then, is that the "long twentieth century" is marked by what Amin has identified as an ongoing North/South dispute over the reproduction of the imperialist rent (Amin, 2014) that, more specifically, expresses control over the mobilization and circulation of the world-ecological surplus. The chapter concludes by situating the collapse of the accumulation cycle of the "long twentieth century" in relation to both the rising Southern resistance to the neoliberal

"reappropriation" of the global ecological surplus and the deepening ecological exhaustion implied by such a "North/South" contestation over the imperialist rent.

Class struggle on a world scale: the "triple movement" of the political ecology of colonial capitalism

Our theorization, thus far, of the structuring qualitative socio-ecological relations and logics constituting the capitalist world-ecology has remained exclusively focused on the directive power exercised by capital in its pursuit of surplus value and the contradictory—productive and exhaustive—outcomes this entails. Such a level of analysis, while necessary to demonstrate the form and content of capitalism's contradictory relations, cannot sufficiently account for the substantive role played by social contestation in both reproducing capitalism and bringing the system to crisis and potential revolutionary transformation. As Marx and Engels' famous opening lines of the Communist Manifesto emphasized, the method of historical materialism necessitates such an accounting of how a mode of production both structures and is structured by a class struggle—"now hidden, now open"—over, in times of reform, the distribution of the surplus, and, in times of revolution, its underlying social-ecological structure. However, Marx and Engels, remaining here within a conception of capitalism as an isolated setting of capitalists and workers, simplify class struggle to a conflict between bourgeois and proletarian classes at the point of production. Such a framework of class struggle cannot account for the significance of the broader social contestations that are structured by the more expansive world-scale contradictory socio-ecological relations that have been articulated by third-world Marxists, and that I have attempted to further clarify in the first three chapters of this book. It is in elaborating a broader framework of class struggle that Samir Amin (2010) has identified the "essential contributions of the Marxists of the Third World," with Amin himself advancing such a project by articulating a conception of "class struggle on a world scale" wherein the capital–labor confrontation in the core is variously stabilized, and brought to crisis, based upon the balance of forces in the core–periphery confrontation. Amin introduces, moreover, a broader category of the "social struggles"—the "totality of social and political struggles and conflicts, national and international"—constituting the capitalist world-system, and that involve, in addition to the bourgeois–proletarian conflict at the site of production, anticolonial contestations at the site of primitive accumulation.

Amin's framework of "social struggles" corresponds with the "triple movement" analytical framework developed by Nancy Fraser (2013) in her

attempt to move beyond the Eurocentric and androcentric limitations of the Polanyian double movement framework. In locating the anticolonial socio-ecological contestation of the racialized society–nature distinction within the triple-movement framework, I am drawing attention to how the capitalist world-ecology's reproduction generates complex and contradictory contestations for and against its foundational co-constituting zones of exploitation/commodification and dehumanization/appropriation. In this sense, I am seeking here to both build upon and critique efforts by Massimo De Angelis (2001, 2004, 2007) to deploy Polanyi's double-movement framework to reveal how capitalist society is both challenged and reproduced through social struggles for and against the constitutive "capital–labor" antagonism instituted through "ongoing" primitive accumulation. Operating within the limitations of the "Eurocentric-anthropocentric" paradigm we identified in the opening chapter, De Angelis identifies primitive accumulation as capital's constitutive form of violence, centering in particular how the forced enclosure of common lands denies the emergent dispossessed proletarian class non-market means of social reproduction. Rather, however, than submit to the total subjection of social life to the commodity form, which would risk, beyond the immiseration of dispossessed labor, the destruction of society itself, marginalized social classes (proletariat and peasantry) engage in ongoing social contestations at the site of primitive accumulation to secure non-commodified forms of social reproduction. Engaging Polanyi's double movement framework, De Angelis locates such a "self-preserving action of the community" (Polanyi, 2001, 210) as expressive of the "other movement of society," which, in aiming to construct institutions through which dispossessed social classes could reclaim a critical measure of control over their social reproduction, constitutes a fundamental challenge to the very basis of capitalist development.

The Polanyian double-movement framework thus forces a rethinking of capital's founding violence of primitive accumulation as a site of social contestation rather than an uninterrupted coherent linear transition from pre-capitalist agrarian society to capitalist society and, as such, it reveals further dimensions of the agrarian question. The implications of the double movement for the agrarian question have been considered, as we discussed briefly in Chapter 1, by Tania Li (2010), who argues that, even in the classical European cases, primitive accumulation, in and of itself, has not historically been sufficient to secure the conditions necessary for the emergence of the capitalist development path. Li's point here is that the forced separation of peasants, and direct producers more generally, from the means of production, does not automatically produce, for those dispossessed, a straight line into market-determined, and hence highly productive, capitalist employment sectors. Rather, capital's cost-repressing imperative creates

a survival crisis for large portions of the dispossessed who are rendered structurally surplus to the emergent capitalist system. Recognizing the incapacity of the emerging capitalist market society to ensure their livelihoods, those rendered dispossessed by the founding violence of primitive accumulation engage in social struggles which generate a crisis of legitimacy for ruling classes overseeing the transition. Thus, for example, in the paradigmatic case of England, the legitimacy of agrarian transition was secured, as Polanyi reveals in an early identification of the double movement, through the introduction, in the late eighteenth century, of state subsidization of "wages on a scale related to the price of bread, thereby countering the emergence of a 'free' market in labor, and inventing the 'right to live'" (Li, 2010, 79). Beyond legitimation, the state's intervention on behalf of the "other movement of society," in the form of non-commodified subsidization of livelihoods, invests the dispossessed and marginalized social strata with the higher real incomes necessary for the broadening of the "home market" capable of absorbing, via consumption, the goods produced by the emergent, market-dependent, industrial capitalist sector.

While the "other movement" against capital's constitutive relations of dispossession and commodification thus proves, on the one hand, necessary to securing the agrarian transition, both in terms of its legitimation and material reproduction (broadening of the home market), on the other hand, it simultaneously forces into sharp relief the potentially fatal contradictions of the social relations underpinning capitalist development. The securing of non-commodified means of social reproduction places, by necessity, limitations upon the "endless accumulation" imperative of capital, whether in the form of welfare institutions which exclude particularly critical sectors of social reproduction (health, education, water provisioning, etc.) from commodification, or in terms of the upward pressure that state subsidies place upon wages demanded by labor no longer exclusively dependent upon the market for social reproduction. Viewed thus, the "other movement" forces an accumulation crisis upon capital, which the latter, De Angelis argues, responds to by renewing its foundational movement of primitive accumulation, involving, in this instance, the dismantling (privatization, withdrawal of subsidies) of the obstacles placed by dispossessed classes to the "reproduction of their separation from the means of production" (De Angelis, 2001, 13). The double movement, consisting of an ongoing social contestation, then, between capital's (re)assertion of its founding premise (ongoing primitive accumulation) and the "other movement" against such a premise, contradictorily constitutes both the enabling conditions of capitalist development and the latter's moments of crisis and transition between its successive accumulation regimes.

The application of the Polanyian double-movement concept to the processes of primitive accumulation integral to the agrarian question problematizes, as demonstrated by Li and De Angelis, approaches—including the political ecology of colonial capitalism as I have articulated it thus far—which give insufficient analytical weight to movements constituted in opposition to the motive forces of capitalist development. Conventional approaches to the agrarian question too often assume that, once instituted through primitive accumulation, capital subsequently imposes its logic upon the social and, in so doing, sets in motion a "self-sustaining," productivity-enhancing developmental path. Within such a "concept of capitalism that cannot be tamed or directed" (Li, 2011, 294), both the crises—whether of overaccumulation or underproduction—that confront capitalist development, and their inevitable resolution or transcendence, are attributed wholly to the directive capacities of the capitalist class (Amin, 2010). Thus, while what Amin has referred to as "Marxian economics" has long held overaccumulation crises to be expressive of constraints imposed on profitability by markets oversaturated by capital, even the "underproduction" crises central to Moore's world-ecological reconceptualization remain expressive of the "ecological exhaustion" generated by capital's denial of the reproductive conditions of externalized nature. My own attempted decolonial intervention into world-ecological theory has only gone as far as centering how such ecological exhaustion must fundamentally be linked to the colonial-capitalist denial of Indigenous knowledge and practice in the constitution of the frontier. Here, Indigenous presence matters only insofar as it has been appropriated and erased, and not in terms of how it variously reconstitutes and contests the capitalist world-ecology. In each of these approaches, moreover, it is capital which, via the spatial fix (Harvey, 2001), resolves its own contradictions by, in the case of overaccumulation, expanding into new spheres of profitable investment or, in the case of underproduction, penetrating and mobilizing newly constituted frontiers of externalized nature. In contrast, the merit of the Polanyian double-movement framework consists of revealing how the "other movement" of society, constituted in opposition to the commodifying movement advanced by primitive accumulation, is fundamental to the materiality and legitimacy of the "agrarian transition" to capitalist development, its conjunctural crises, and the renewed constitution and resolution of the agrarian question posed to the successive "post-crisis" accumulation regime.

While it is analytically necessary to take seriously the imperative of accounting for how the "other movement" challenges and reconstitutes the capitalist world-ecology, Nancy Fraser (2013) has recently foregrounded how the Polanyian framework's Eurocentric and androcentric limitations obscure both the externalizations and exclusions upon which the double

movement is itself, however provisionally, resolved, and the other "other movements" constituted in opposition to such cost externalization. In relation to the specific concern motivating this book, that of challenging the Eurocentric-anthropocentric paradigm of capitalist modernity, Fraser notes that anticolonial and anti-imperial movements problematized the "double movement" framework by criticizing the

> national framing of first-world social protections, which were financed on the backs of postcolonial peoples whom they excluded; they thereby disclosed the injustice of "misframed" protections, in which the scale of exposure to danger—often transnational—was not matched by the scale at which protection was organized, typically national. (Nancy Fraser, 2013, 5)

Returning to Li's affirmative example of "double movement" securing the English agrarian transition, the celebrated late 18th century state subsidization of "wages related to the price of bread," proving in short order to be in contradiction with capital's accumulation drive, would, as Araghi (2003, 2009b) has argued, give way, over the course of the "long 19th century," to a strategy of reducing the price of bread via the imposition of forced underconsumption in the colonized peripheries. As I have argued, this replacement of the wage subsidy with the cheap food strategy is further premised upon the racialized construction of frontiers of "primitive humans" and "virgin lands" that could be appropriated without accounting for their reproductive conditions. The "other movement," in its confrontation with capital's commodifying logic, ultimately, then, comes to secure what Li calls the "right to live" through the obscured arenas of global primitive accumulation wherein "rightless" beings—human and extra-human—are rendered absolutely exhaustible.

Rather than suggesting, however, that, in light of such limitations, we entirely discard the Polanyian emphasis on the key role played by oppositional movements in securing and challenging the transition to capitalist development, I further follow Fraser here in extending such an imperative to account for what we might call the other "other movements" calling into question the cost externalizations securing the resolution of the double movement in the core. For Fraser, this "missing third" movement interrupts the Polanyian contestation between marketization and social protection with a struggle for emancipation from the oppressive imperial/colonial, racialized, gendered, ableist, and anthropocentric structures through which "rightless" beings are externalized in order to bear the costs of the struggle between marketization and social protection. In juxtaposing this missing third movement of "emancipation" alongside the already visible arena of contestation between "marketization" and "social protection," Fraser

argues that it is necessary to go beyond the double movement framework and reconceptualize the contested reproductions of capitalist market society in terms of a triple movement.

For our purposes here, the implications of this extension from double movement to triple movement are clarified when we recall our earlier extension of primitive accumulation from its conventional methodologically nationalist register to the scale of "global primitive accumulation." Whereas conventional approaches, such as the one offered by De Angelis, identify primitive accumulation as a process of enclosure or separation bringing forth the capital–labor relation and its associated commodification of social reproduction, my approach has utilized a more expansive concept of "global primitive accumulation" which renders the "internal" zone of commodification dependent upon an "external" zone of appropriation constituted through racialized colonial enclosures. If, then, De Angelis's methodologically nationalist conceptualization of ongoing primitive accumulation foregrounds the Polanyian double movement of social protection against commodification, our expansive reconceptualization of ongoing "global primitive accumulation" elucidates Fraser's "missing third" movement of emancipation. In this case, the third movement centers upon the fundamental opposition constituted by colonized peoples to the racialized technologies of "misanthropic skepticism" through which their socio-ecological knowledges and practices are appropriated and erased in the service of the cheap food regime resolving the double movement in the core.

The triple movement approach furthers, then, the political ecology of colonial capitalism, in so much as it emphasizes that the latter encapsulates both the colonial appropriation and erasure of "cheap natures" from the colonized frontier as well as the anticolonial opposition to this structural foundation of the capitalist world-ecology. If the opposing movement in the double movement takes the political form of class struggle, the anticolonial oppostion to the structural foundations of the capitalist world-ecology has historically taken the political form of national liberation struggles centered upon restoring substantive sovereign right to colonized peoples. In this sense, the triple movement framework returns us to Moyo, Jha, and Yeros' vital intervention (discussed in chapter one) that, reconceived from the vantage point of anticolonial movements, the agrarian question corresponds with the "emancipatory" national question of the form of sovereign reclamation capable of restoring the humanity of the victims of racialized primitive accumulation (Moyo, Jha, and Yeros, 2013, 111). In returning to Moyo, Jha, and Yeros, it is necessary to engage in more detail here with their contention that, in the Global South, the "agrarian question is the national question," as doing so will allow us to further clarify the constraints and contradictions

that have constituted what Amin has identified as the "reawakening of the South" both within and against the capitalist world-ecology.

The form of the third movement: toward an agrarian question of national liberation

The national question has long constituted a key concern of Marxist praxis and the international socialist movement more broadly. While it rose to prominence in the debates of the third socialist international, as a means of clarifying the place of rising anticolonial national liberation struggles in the movement for international socialism, the origins of the national question can be traced to Marx's reflections on the geopolitics of capitalism. Lenin, the foremost theorist of the national question during the third international, grounded his position in an application of Marx's analysis of the "Irish question" to the "national and colonial questions" posed to African and Asian peoples denied sovereignty by European and American capitalist imperialism (Lenin, 1914, 1920). What was of particular significance to Lenin was how Marx came to reverse his original formulation of the relation between proletarian revolution and national liberation, wherein he ultimately realized that the English working class would not come to attain revolutionary consciousness so long as it was materially located as part of a national formation oppressing the subjugated Irish nation. Lenin returned to these insights in the course of a debate with Rosa Luxembourg over whether socialists should support Polish independence, and further developed them, in his famous text *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism* (Lenin, 1917), into a broader theoretical framework that emphasized that the national oppression of colonized peoples—in the political form of the denial of sovereignty—enabled the European bourgeoisie to stabilize the contradictions of capitalism and thus blunt the revolutionary consciousness of the working classes of the core European states. It was necessary, Lenin (1920) argued, to therefore prioritize the national liberation of colonized peoples in the international socialist movement, as doing so would call into question the colonial markets and surplus drain that stabilized capitalist accumulation in the core. This would likely require, Lenin further argued, the need for proletarian movements in the core to tactically support bourgeois-led national liberation movements in the periphery, as the latter were historically tasked with transitioning the colony from dependent to autonomous capitalist state at which point a proletarian class could emerge to lead a further socialist revolution.

The national question came to be most clearly linked to the agrarian question when both questions were taken up and advanced by revolutionary

theorists engaged in anticolonial struggle for national liberation. Fanon (1961), identified (along with Cabral) by Moyo, Jha, and Yeros (2013) as having given "fullest expression" to what they term the "agrarian question of national liberation," complicated Lenin's "theses on the national and colonial questions" by demonstrating that such questions could not be resolved by a bourgeois-led national liberation movement that would result in a bourgeois form of national sovereignty. Whereas Lenin had urged the international socialist movement to, where necessary, provisionally support bourgeois nationalist forces in their fight to overthrow colonialism, Fanon argued that such a form of national liberation could be nothing more than a false dawn that would inevitably lead to neocolonial subjugation and the degeneration of nationalism into chauvinism and racism.

The assumption that the newly liberated nations would follow a European "stagist" path of first bourgeois, then socialist, revolutions was flawed on two grounds. The first is that European bourgeois social formations were only able to achieve historical progress, in the form of the development of the productive forces, through a colonial foundation that would not be available to bourgeois national development projects in the ex-colonies. Second, what bourgeois class that did exist in the colonized world had been structured, not as an independent national class capable of directing autonomous national development, but rather as an intermediary dependent class that profited from the appropriation of surplus from the colony to the metropole. Such a class would, even after formal independence, not be capable of overturning the inherited colonial structure of the national economy. Rather, it would only go so far as claiming for itself, under the guise of "nationalization," a greater share of the "unfair advantages which are a legacy of the colonial period." It would seek to preserve its material interests by maintaining a colonial economic structure which allowed "certain sectors of the colony to become relatively rich" while the "rest of the colony follows its path of underdevelopment and poverty" (Fanon, 1961, 159). Such an extractive structure would continue to impoverish the majority of the country and prevent national resources from being oriented toward a coherent economic development program that could build up, on a broad basis, a domestic productive base capable of securing real sovereign power. Instead, the national bourgeoisie—both urban and the rural landed classes—would "not hesitate to invest in foreign banks the profits it makes out of its native soil," thereby inhibiting the accumulation of a domestic source of investible capital that could allow for an overcoming of dependence on foreign capital. It is thus that Fanon concludes that the historic mission of the national bourgeoisie in the independence era consists of nothing more than "being the transmission line between the nation and a capitalism, rampant though camouflaged, which today puts on the mask of

neocolonialism. The national bourgeoisie will be quite content with the role of the Western bourgeoisie's business agent, and it will play its part without any complex in a most dignified manner" (Fanon, 1961, 153).

It is here that Fanon grasps and articulates the convergence between the national question and the agrarian question, giving rise in the process of doing so to what Moyo, Jha, and Yeros (2013) identify as an "agrarian question of national liberation." Neocolonialism, and its associated degeneration of nationalism into chauvinism and racism, could only be avoided, and thus substantive decolonization achieved, by "closing the road to the national bourgeoisie" (Fanon, 1961, 177) and instead conducting anticolonial national liberation struggle, and ultimately securing sovereignty, upon the basis of the upward surge of the "wretched of the earth"—those classes of the colony subjected by colonial capitalism to what we have described as "appropriation and erasure." Fanon is specifically speaking here of the Indigenous peasantry, whether still working the land in the countryside or reconstituted as a landless lumpenproletariat in the city, who "alone are revolutionary, for they have nothing to lose and everything to gain. The starving peasant, outside the class system, is the first among the exploited to discover that only violence pays. For him, there is no compromise, no coming to terms; colonization and decolonization are simply a question of relative strength" (Fanon, 1961, 61). This integral anticolonial articulation arises out of the peasant's structural location on the margins of the colonial economy, wherein through their outright dispossession or through colonial debt mechanisms, they were absolutely excluded from access to the surplus extracted from their traditional lands. The intensive "appropriation and erasure" of the peasantry and their lands is enforced by the "intermediary" class of the rural landed bourgeoisie. From the point of view of the peasantry, and unlike the national bourgeoisie, there can thus be "no compromise, no coming to terms" with the colonial structure, and an anticolonial national liberation program organized around the interests of the peasantry centers the imperative of not only "taking back the land from the foreigner" but of ensuring that such a "taking back" is of a form that insists that "the land belongs to those that till it." Constructing national sovereignty on the basis of peasant centered nationalization and land reform will necessarily compel a broader overturning of the inherited colonial structure so that the labor and resources of the national territory are reorganized in service of a "national-popular" form of sovereign economic development.

Fanon clarifies, then, that the emancipatory potential of the "third movement" of anticolonial national liberation is itself contingent upon its structuring basis—i.e. whether it will take the bourgeois or peasant road. Both roads would, as we will see, have to confront the recolonizing forces emanating from the imperial core, as anticolonial national liberation, at its most

general, imposes a reproduction crisis upon capitalism (Patnaik and Patnaik, 2021) that compels the latter to seek to impose neocolonial conditions that can resecure the ecological surplus necessary for the stabilization of the capital–labor relation. The neocolonial counter-revolutionary movement, in turn, forces emergent postcolonial states to prioritize rapid industrialization as a means of building the material power through which national sovereignty could be defended. This, Moyo, Jha, and Yeros argue (2013), regrounds the "agrarian question of national liberation" as the pillar of all struggles, as the form of agrarian relations—bourgeois, landed property, or peasant-centered land reform—that underlie third-world industrialization projects will have a principal bearing upon whether they will lead up the "blind alley" of neocolonialism or potentiate decolonized social-ecological futures. In turning to a historical investigation of the role of anticolonialism in both contesting and reconstituting the capitalist world-ecology, we will see that the realization of such futures is contingent upon an emancipatory project of sovereign reclamation of agrarian socio-ecologies reoriented toward national development and sustained by a recognition of the co-constitutive reproduction of Indigenous/peasant knowledge, practice, and extra-human natures.

The "third movements" in the collapse of the accumulation cycle of the long nineteenth century

My concern here is to show how the "third movement" of the "agrarian question of national liberation" assumes particular prominence as a disruptive/reconstituting force over the course of the rise and fall of the British-led accumulation cycle of the "long nineteenth century," and the subsequent transition to the "long twentieth century." It is necessary, however, to first briefly engage the early example of the Haitian revolution as an instructive case of how an other "other movement" against the racialized frontier of appropriation that enabled the "long sixteenth century" accumulation cycle was countered by a remobilization of ongoing "global primitive accumulation" in light of the challenges it posed to the constituting relations of the capitalist world ecology. As shown by Robbie Shilliam (2008), the Haitian anticolonial movement was fundamentally constituted in opposition to the "racialized nature of political being in the Atlantic world order," whereby the key "cheap nature" of sugar was provisioned to the visible human arenas of the core zone of commodification on the basis of the ascription of the status of political "non-being" to enslaved plantation workers (Shilliam, 2008, 791). In opposition to this relation between political "non-being," or racialized dehumanization, and export-oriented, ecologically exhaustive,

plantation agriculture, insurgent Haitian claims to political being were tied to the replacement, by force, of the plantation system with an "'African' form of agrarian autonomy" signifying the revalorization of the particular agrarian knowledge of emancipated peasants on smallholder plots (Shilliam, 2008, 790). However, as Kwame Nkrumah (1965) argued, decolonization, in overturning the colonial relations of production that provision the surplus enabling and stabilizing the core "capital–labor" relation, structurally compels colonizing capital to visit, anew, violent primitive accumulation upon the newly liberated state so as to reconstitute "neocolonial" relations of production that can stabilize accumulation in the core. Thus, the success of the Haitian revolution in overthrowing the slaveholding plantation order, in so much as it called into question the racialized ontological basis of the capitalist world-ecology, brought forth a renewed project of militarized ongoing "global primitive accumulation" seeking to resecure such a basis. This took the specific form of French and American naval ships blockading Haiti, and imposing upon the Haitian state the payment of an indemnity to France as "reparation" for the property it lost due to the revolution. Both the indemnity and the blockade imposed a condition of "dependency" that is characteristic of neocolonialism as theorized by Nkrumah, wherein postcolonial states are compelled by force, whether military or financial, to re-peripheralize their national economies in service of the accumulation imperatives of the capitalist core. Anticipating the postcolonial national developmental constraints of the "long twentieth century," the post-revolutionary Haitian leadership was itself compelled, by the imperative of maintaining national independence from the recolonizing forces of the capitalist world-ecology, to engage in a "catch-up" or replication strategy that could provision the material capacity necessary to stave off imperialist counter-revolution. This necessitated an abandonment of the peasant centered "African" form by effecting a "reseparation of peasants from the direct access to their means of reproduction that smallholding farming had so far fleetingly afforded" (Shilliam, 2008, 792). Reseparation created the necessary space for the reinstitution of the plantation system, and, in so much as this maintained the supply of cheap sugar to the core zone of commodification, it thus pointed toward the neocolonial reproduction of the racialized cheap nature basis of the capitalist world-ecology.

As I have suggested above, such anticolonial socio-ecological articulations, simultaneously mobilized and arrested in the Haitian case, would converge to constitute a profoundly disruptive force for the capitalist world-ecology of the long nineteenth century. Substantive evidence, produced from across much of the colonized world, of the unfolding of this "triple movement" dimension, can be drawn from two magisterial studies—Eric Wolf's *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* (1968) and Mike Davis's *Late*

Victorian Holocausts (2001)—on the position of the colonized Indigenous peasantry in the capitalist world-ecology. Wolf argues that a common theme motivating revolutionary anticolonial movements in China, Mexico, Cuba, Vietnam, and Algeria, consisted of an abiding offense experienced by the peasantry over the socio-economic, ecological, and cultural devastation wrought by the racialized colonial enclosures which had disrupted Indigenous social-ecological practices premised upon a "stable combination of resources … underwrit[ing] a minimal livelihood" (Wolf, 1968, 280). It was thus, Wolf further argues, that at the center of these great revolutionary movements was a demand for the restitution, via land reform, of Indigenous and peasant land rights, and their associated socio-ecological and cultural frames, through which the question of production could be reinscribed within a larger imperative of the survival and prosperity of the human and extra-human inhabitants of the newly decolonized lands. Similarly, Davis, citing examples from across Asia, Africa, and Latin America, has centered the socio-ecologically exhaustive "drought-famine" crisis confronting the colonized Indigenous peasantry as central to the "eschatological ferocity" of the anticolonial "millenarian movements that swept the future 'third world' at the end of the nineteenth century" (Wolf, 1968, 13). Further elaborating upon this critical "juncture between nineteenth-century famine and twentieth-century revolutionary politics," Davis documents the extent to which the question of land relations—in their varied socio-ecological dimensions—were placed at the center of anticolonial movements by a "poor peasantry for whom the stabilization of the natural and social conditions of production…had become a revolutionary life and death issue" (Davis, 2001, 209).

The conceptualization of an anticolonial socio-ecological articulation, and its primacy in the exhaustion of the British hegemonic cycle of the colonial-capitalist world-ecology, has been further elaborated upon, both theoretically and empirically, in the "environmentalism of the poor" political ecology framework advanced by Ramachandra Guha (2000). Corresponding with our own problematization of "pristine nature" as a colonial construction, Guha's thesis constitutes an important corrective to the dominant tendency in "environmentalisms of the North" to organize around a conservationist conception of unspoilt nature under threat from poorly informed, potentially irrational, local resource users in the South. The emphasis, rather, should be upon how, from the onset of its colonial subjection as a "unit of nature" (Phillip, 2004, 96–97) for the North, the construction of "pristine nature" in the South—whether to be more rationally exploited or conserved—has had particularly adverse livelihood implications for the Indigenous peoples of these lands. Focusing, in particular, on the socio-ecological implications of the British colonization of India, Guha has centered how the response of peasants, pastoralists, and forest dwellers

constituted what he calls an "environmentalism of the poor" which foregrounded the link between sovereignty, livelihood security, and environmental sustainability in the anticolonial movement.

Guha, in a series of collaborations with Madhav Gadgil, explicitly situates this triple movement dynamic of colonial socio-environmental degradation and Indigenous anticolonial socio-ecological regeneration as expressive of the ecological surplus/exhaustion cycle encompassing British colonization of India. Centering in particular the imperative of what was earlier, following Moore, referred to as "cheap natures" in the achievement of capitalist development, Gadgil and Guha argue that

> one expects an imperial power to withdraw from a colony when the value of resources usurped is no longer attractive enough to offset the cost of such usurpation. When the British conquered India in the later eighteenth century and early nineteenth centuries it had a substantial surplus of agricultural production. This surplus had largely disappeared by 1920 … for the British this meant that the costs of usurping the dwindling resource base of their colony were becoming excessively high. (Gadgil and Guha, 1995, 12)

The disappearance of the surplus, and the end of the "cheap nature" relations it implied, was an outcome of the convergence of the increasing exhaustion of extra-human natures, on account of the racialized denial of their reproductive conditions that was detailed in the previous chapter, and the growing anticolonial reassertion of Indigenous claims to their sovereign rights over the lands which the colonial state had sought to appropriate as frontiers of externalized nature. Such resistance was particularly prominent in the forested regions of India which, via their racialized "material-conceptual" transformation into frontiers of primitive humans and virgin lands, provisioned, as we saw in the previous chapter, the British accumulation cycle with key low-cost agrarian inputs for the industrializing core. Gadgil and Guha argue that such displacement, in the forested regions, of Indigenous systems of shifting cultivation with monocrop plantations, focusing as they did on the industrial imperatives of the colonial state to the detriment of the sustainability of the hitherto existing socio-ecological balance, was "acutely felt by different [Indigenous and peasant] communities" (Gadgil and Guha, 1992, 176). Indigenous peoples of these territories responded by launching uprisings which, through acts such as the burning of lands appropriated for plantation crops, sought to restore the primacy of the "subsistence orientation of the hill peasant." In particular instances, these uprisings constrained the colonial state's ability to further extend, "for fear of renewed unrest," the plantation economy deeper into the forested regions (Arnold, 1984, 116), which, combined with the exhaustion of those forested regions

that were brought under commercialization, accounted substantially for the "disappearance of the [ecological] surplus" provisioned, as the necessary "cheap nature" premise of British industrial capitalist development, from the colonized Indian zone of appropriation.

As Guha, and other subaltern studies historians (Arnold, 1984, 1996; Pandey, 1988) have shown, these tribal and peasant uprisings, motivated by the restoration of Indigenous sovereignty and socio-ecological practices, constituted some of the earliest and most sustained forms of anticolonial insurgency which, when brought into the organized independence movement led by the Congress, "swelled the tide of anti-imperialist agitation in the latter part of British rule in India" (Pandey, 1988, 241). Contesting both colonial and elite nationalist historiographies, which reduced peasant insurrection to either "a sign of manipulation by 'outside agitators'" or "evidence of mobilization by popular urban leaders" (Pandey, 1988, 241), the subaltern school emphasized the propulsive role that peasants and tribals played in clarifying the motive forces of both colonial rule and its anticolonial negation. Such a reorientation recalls Fanon's elucidation of the distinct capacity of the peasantry, on account of its material location in the most exhaustible rural peripheries of the colonial state, to clarify, for intellectuals and trade union leaders located in the more integrated urban industries, the centrality of land reclamation in the anticolonial contestation. As Pandey notes, far from being passive instruments of elite urban actors, tribal and peasant insurrections, in making clear that independence from colonial rule involved more than the "narrow vision of the eviction of the white man from India," advanced instead the "real and immediate possibility of an anti-imperialist movement very different from any until then contemplated by the urban nationalist leadership" (Pandey, 1988, 277–278). This deeper articulation of anticolonialism influenced the broader nationalist movement to link liberation, and the claim to political being, to the overthrow of the colonial agrarian regime and the restoration of free and common access to forests and waters existing in a vital co-constitutive relationship with Indigenous agricultural knowledge and practices (Guha, 1989; Pandey, 1988). Evidence of such a peasant reorientation of elite urban-centered nationalism can be most prominently found in what Gadgil and Guha identify as Gandhi's "political 'appropriation' of the peasantry" (Gadgil and Guha, 1992, 180) wherein the most influential anticolonial voice came to celebrate "village society as providing building blocks for the construction of an environmentally and socially harmonious alternative to modern industrial development" (Guha and Arnold, 1996, 19).

As an anticolonial world-ecological force, Indigenous peasant insurrections expressed, then, the "third" movement of emancipation which accelerated the disappearance, or exhaustion, of the ecological surplus underpinning

the British-led accumulation cycle. Extending De Angelis's claim regarding the obstacles placed in the way of capital's founding "separation" by society's "other movement," we can conceive of these "missing third," or other "other movements," in their advancement of the socio-ecological basis of emancipation from colonial rule, as placing obstacles in the way of the construction of the racialized frontiers enabling capital's accumulation capacity. In particular, the emergent "postcolonial" international state system, by way of Southern sovereign reclamation of agrarian social ecologies, would constrain the capacity for "colonial-capitalist" agencies to freely roam the earth in the pursuit of successive zones of appropriation. Rather, however, than heralding the overthrow of the capitalist world-ecology, emergent state-capitalist agencies regrouped to resolve a renewed world-ecological agrarian question fundamentally defined by the contradictory imperative of securing the postcolonial dismantling of the obstacles to cheap natures forged by Indigenous peasant insurrections. It is to this reconstructive and legitimating moment of the triple movement of the "long twentieth century" (Arrighi, 1994) to which I now turn.

The "long twentieth century" North–South dispute over the ecological surplus

The project of advancing decolonized socio-ecological relations, through which could be realized "an environmentally and socially harmonious alternative to modern industrial development," was beset from the outset by the contradictions inherent to the integration of the Indigenous peasant movement with the landlord- and capitalist-led nationalist movement (Gadgil and Guha, 1992; Gupta, 1998; Pandey, 1988). While the organized national movement did, on the one hand, as argued above, recognize the insurgent socio-ecological claims of peasants and tribals, it was, on the other hand, significantly driven by the colonized society's "comprador" rural and urban classes and castes who had served as the local proxies implementing, and benefitting from, the colonial state's project of frontier formation via racialized enclosure. In particular, the colonial state's "material-conceptual" production of the frontier of externalized nature, undermining as it did socio-ecological regimes organized around "the commons" in favor of private property rights, entrenched the surplus appropriating power of large rural landlords who subsequently profited, as the revenue collecting local proxy, from the colonial agro-export regime. In addition, a bourgeois form of anticolonial agitation had eventually come to force the British colonial state to allow greater space for an emergent industrial capitalist class to itself draw upon the cheap nature regime and accumulate profits and power

as an Indigenous intermediary provisioning the core zone of commodification (Gadgil and Guha, 1992). However, both the landlord and capitalist class would come to recognize that their overall share of power and capacity for profit-taking would be enhanced if they could wrest political control over India's resource mobilization, in the name of "nationalization,, from the colonial state. Thus, while "Indian nationalists had charged the British with exploitation of the peasantry," the landlord/capitalist nexus of support, in tension with the more decolonial socio-ecological articulation, advanced a "catch-up" or "replication" strategy wherein the emancipation of the peasantry would be linked to the reorientation of Indian resources toward the imperative of national capitalist development.

The emphasis on overthrowing colonial rule in order to free India to catch up with the developed core of the capitalist world-system through a program of rapid national industrial capitalist development, stands in marked contrast to the more "independent thinking about the relations between society and nature" (Adams and Mulligan, 2002, 5) advanced by the peasant and tribal insurrections against colonial appropriation. Guha thus refers to the "apparent paradox" of the "juxtaposition of a peasant-based politics with the increasing influence of Indian capitalists over the Congress organization." This paradoxical "catch-up" orientation would come to characterize a particular strand of the decolonization movement, evidence of which can be found, as Dipesh Chakrabarty has shown, in the organizing themes of the historic Bandung conference of "Afro-Asian solidarity" against colonialism. Chakrabarty (2010) argues that

> the discourse and politics of decolonization in the nations that met in Bandung often displayed an uncritical emphasis on modernization. Sustaining this attitude was a clear and conscious desire to "catch up" with the West. As Nehru would often say in the 1950s, "What Europe did in a hundred or a hundred and fifty years, we must do in ten or fifteen years" … This emphasis on development as a catching-up-with-the-West produced a particular split that marked both the relationship between elite nations and their subaltern counterparts as well as that between elites and subalterns within national boundaries. Just as the emergent nations demanded political equality with the Euro-American nations while wanting to catch up with them on the economic front, similarly their leaders thought of their peasants and workers simultaneously as people who were already full citizens—in that they had the associated rights—but also as people who were not quite full citizens in that they needed to be educated in the habits and manners of citizens. (Chakrabarty, 2010, 53)

The nationalist project to contest attempts to reconsolidate Western hegemony by recasting decolonization as a developmental strategy of "catching-up-with-the-West," suggesting as it might an Indigenous replication of

the racialized basis of the capitalist world-ecology, recalls the contradictions and tensions revealed in our earlier discussion of Haitian attempts to secure "postcolonial" independence in the face of "recolonizing" forces. Samir Amin (2016) has elaborated a useful framework for capturing such tensions, wherein he specifically identifies three distinctive trajectories animating the contestation over the postcolonial geopolitical order: Western imperialism, interdependent national capitalist development, and the radical socialist delinking path. Such a framework helps in further elaborating Guha's "apparent paradox" of the co-existence of the peasant and landlord/capitalist bases of the independence movement, with the peasant orientation's more "independent thinking about the relations between society and nature" finding expression in the radical socialist delinking trajectory built upon land redistribution, and the bourgeois "catch-up" orientation finding expression in the trajectory of the interdependent national capitalist path built upon the denial of land redistribution. While both of these trajectories share a premise of what Amin (2010, 2014) has identified as a calling into question of the "imperialist rent," specifically referring here to the Southern challenge to the Northern imperialist claim to monopolize "access to the planet's resources" (Amin, 2010, 108), the two approaches diverge in defining the ultimate aims of such a challenge. In particular, Amin's framework suggests that while the socialist delinking option articulates an anticapitalist and anticolonial socio-ecological future, the national capitalist trajectory seeks to engage the forces of Western imperialism in an interdependent contest and cooperation over the distribution of the imperialist rent. The national capitalist approach does not, then, fundamentally challenge the racialized colonial basis of the capitalist world-ecology but, rather, seeks to reorder it in order to secure the "cheap natures" premise of the rapid industrial development necessary for Southern states to achieve a measure of equality, and hence sovereignty, in confronting the recolonization trajectory of Western imperialism.

The contradictory relation between Western imperialism and national capitalist development in the South was fundamental to the shaping/constraining of the attempted expanded reconstitution of capitalist accumulation and development over what Arrighi (1994) refers to as the "long twentieth century." The evident marginalization this suggests of the anti-imperialist delinking path, as much as it troubles the "emancipatory" promise of the collapse of the British cycle, should not, however, lead to a dismissal of the historic shift signified by the national developmentalist challenge to the Northern claim to exclusive access to the "imperialist rent." It is thus that I follow Amin (2010) and Araghi (2003, 2009a, 2009b) here in questioning conventional world-systems influenced periodizations of the long twentieth century, including those of food regime analysis and

world-ecology, which assume, in their emphasis on the shift from British to American hegemonic leadership, the ongoing power of Western states in determining the production and circulation of the "cheap natures" underpinning the capitalist world-ecology. By contrast, and in place of the food-regime characterization of the "US mercantile-industrial food regime" or the world-systems/world-ecology identification of the "US accumulation cycle," Araghi (2009b) speaks of an era of "long national developmentalism" that I would characterize as being defined by the Southern challenge to the North's exclusive "access to the planet's resources." Amin echoes Araghi's characterization of the development era as directed, in significant part, from below by movements for decolonization:

> The dominant forces in world capitalism did not spontaneously create the model or models of development; they had "development" imposed on them. It was the product of the third world national liberation movement. (Amin, 2016, 89)

While the national capitalist "catch-up" orientation is premised upon an enduring coloniality, it does, in its promise of protecting and appropriating the ecological surplus provisioning capacity of national resources for the project of rapid national industrial development, nonetheless present nationalist obstacles to the capacity of colonial-capitalist agencies to roam the earth unencumbered in the aim of constructing successive racialized frontiers of externalized nature. However, as we will also see, the "apparent paradox" besetting postcolonial development planners—that of advancing the "peasant basis" of decolonization within the capitalist "catch-up" orientation—would simultaneously replicate the surplus/exhaustion cycle and constitute an ongoing opening for forces of imperialism to reconsolidate Northern hegemony over the capitalist world-ecology.

Land reform and "internal" frontier expansion

Initially, as anticolonial movements produced independent postcolonial states, the peasant/bourgeois contradiction would both shape, and ultimately undermine, an "agrarian question of development" (Araghi, 2009b). Two broad projects of agrarian change were forwarded across the third world as potential resolutions of the poverty and "underdevelopment" that had resulted from colonial rule: (i) a "from below" social project that emphasized institutional and organizational reform of agrarian relations, potentially involving the construction of what De Angelis would refer to as "obstacles to the reproduction of their [peasant] separation from the means of production" (De Angelis, 2001, 13); and (ii) a "top-down" project,

modeled on the US experience, that centralized technologically intensive forms of agricultural production that risked deepened peasant dependencies on global commodity circuits. The "from below" approach was fundamentally driven by anti-imperialist revolutionary peasant movements that located questions of agricultural productivity within a larger concern for the social and economic rights of those working the land, and was perhaps best expressed in the agrarian revolutions of Mexico and China. In Mexico concentrated land ownership—"95 percent of the rural population had no land at all" and haciendas owned over 90 percent of the land—came to be contested in the "bloody revolutionary war" of 1910–1917 in which over "one million peasants died fighting for their land" (Lappe and Collins, 1978, 123). The radical land reform program put forth by peasant leaders after the revolution, initially "curbed by the generals and politicians who eventually established themselves in power," was seriously implemented after the rural-born general Lazaro Cardenas was elected president in 1934 (Ross, 2003, 442). During the Cardenas presidency, agrarian reform was located in the broader social relations that surrounded the land, and thus included not only sweeping land reforms that broke up the large haciendas "into communal units called *ejidos*" (Ross, 2003) but also the provision of peasant-oriented social services—including "channeled credit and technical assistance … literacy programs, health services, farm-relevant schooling, and modest rural communication" (Lappe and Collins, 1978, 123)—that could better ensure that land reform enabled the effective contestation of entrenched power structures. These reforms and provisions, combined with the emphasis placed on investing in scientific research that aimed to engage with indigenous agricultural practices, produced serious social and economic gains: significant decline in the rate of landlessness among the rural workforce; rapid slowdown of rural out-migration; increased food availability as highly productive *ejidos* "produced just more than half the value of all Mexican farm output" (Ross, 2003, 442); and the quadrupling of the real income of *ejido* producers in some parts of the country (Lappe and Collins, 1978, 123–124). However, the movement toward the reclamation of land and resources for the benefit of peasants and workers, which also included the nationalization of oilfields, would be aggressively countered in the 1940s by landed interests and US capital working together to undo the reforms and instead incorporate Mexican land and food relations within an emerging US-centered international food regime through the imposition of a top-down, technologically centered project of agrarian change (Lappe and Collins, 1978, 124–125).

The establishment of the People's Republic of China by a revolutionary peasant movement in 1949 opened the space for a "from below" project for agrarian change that could more effectively defend itself against

the "counter-revolutions" of capitalist imperialism. The Maoist project in China, while similar to Cardenasmo in Mexico, realized more sustained social and economic gains from the armed overthrow of landlord and moneylender power in the countryside, and its replacement with a profoundly more inclusive and egalitarian agrarian social order that emphasized local control through cooperative and participatory forms of planning and labor in the production process (Lappe and Collins, 1978, 173–174; Patnaik, 1995). The armed overthrow of landlord power in the countryside enabled an agrarian program in China that advanced agricultural productivity through reforms which redistributed land to peasants on a collective basis. This freed control over production and distribution from rent-seeking intermediaries, such as moneylenders and landlords, in order to invest it in a cooperatively empowered and organized peasantry (Gupta, 1998, 48–50). The resulting rapid socio-economic gains made in the Chinese countryside included the elimination of hunger and malnutrition, significant declines in the rate of poverty and inequality, and strengthened agricultural productivity and growth (Lappe and Collins, 1978, 18, 197–198, 201; Patnaik, 1995).

Peasant centered land reform in China, the experience of which Fanon closely studied in the course of arriving at his own theorization on the "agrarian question of national liberation," set in motion a distinct form of sovereign national development based upon labor, rather than capital, accumulation (Brammal, 2009; Cheng, 2020; Saith, 2008) that overcame the principal impediment confronting postcolonial states (Tiejun, 2021). China, like all imperialized and colonized peripheries of the capitalist world system, confronted at the moment of independence the challenge of a deficit of capital that had resulted from the colonial surplus drain. The capital that had been generated from the colonized economy had been largely appropriated by the imperial core of the world-system. As a result, newly independent states were left dependent on the core for access to the capital necessary to address the material legacies of colonialism (poverty, hunger, and underdevelopment). Such dependency, as anticolonial theorists warned, opened space for the core to demand a renewal of the inherited colonial structure and the associated surplus drain in exchange for access to capital investment (Fanon, 1961; Nkrumah, 1965). The peasant-centered land reform path undertaken in China demonstrated a means of overcoming such dependency. Universal access to land motivated peasants to undertake labor intensive infrastructural and commodity production in the countryside which produced surpluses that were recycled back into villages for the undertaking of labor intensive industrialization. As Ashwani Saith further articulates, the Chinese "commune resembled a modern small-scale industrial estate, but one owned by the peasants who had thereby also managed to invest a substantial part of the surplus back into agriculture, infrastructure and social

development" (Saith, 2008, 740–741). Here, we see in practice the argument advanced variously by Amin and Fanon regarding the necessary relation between the upward surge of the "wretched of the earth"—the land redistributed to the peasantry—and the structural transformation of a dependent colonial structure into a sovereign national development structure. In this way, the Chinese revolutionary state opened a development path distinct from the Western colonial path (Ajl, 2021b; Arrighi, 2007). Whereas the Western path was centerd upon the dispossession of the laborer, and thus requried, as we have seen, a colonial reproductive subsidy, the Chinese development path came to be structured upon universal access to land in the countryside, which had the effect, as world systems and third-world Marxist scholars have argued, of offering a non-colonial reproductive basis for the labor intensively mobilized in service of infrastructural development in agriculture and industry (Amin, 2013; Arrighi, 2007; Tiejun, 2021).

The political leadership of newly independent India, initially dismissing the costly US model of input-intensive agriculture as beyond the reach of the great majority of Indian farmers, drew inspiration from these impressive gains of the Chinese model and set out to pursue a similar agrarian program of peasant empowerment through institutional and organizational reform (Gupta, 1998, 48–50; Patel, 2007, 121). Reports from two high-level Indian state delegations that visited China in the 1950s "noted that the remarkable Chinese success derived from their transformation of the rural class structure and that little could be expected from India without similar change" (Alavi, 1975, 162). The reports thus concluded that for India "to create an atmosphere favorable to the formation of agrarian cooperatives … the atmosphere should be one of equality and non-exploitation. In creating such an atmosphere, land reform will play a vital role" (cited in Alavi, 1975, 162–163). Efforts in postcolonial India toward realizing a populist agrarian program of "growth with social justice" were, however, beset by the evident contradiction of landlord power *over* the very political institutions through which the necessary reforms *against* landlord power and for peasant empowerment were to be implemented (Das, 2007, 425–426; Varshney, 1998, 46). Unlike China, where political institutions responsible for radical agrarian restructuring themselves expressed power shifts emanating out of a peasant revolution, one of the defining moments in the consolidation of Indian political sovereignty was the mobilization of the state in defense of landlord power against the revolutionary peasant movement in Telengana that was in fact engaged in a genuine "from below" project for agrarian change to challenge property structures inherited from colonial and caste relations of power, and in so doing establish more autonomy for direct cultivators of the land. As Das notes,

> During the early 1950s, three million peasants in some 3,000 villages in Telengana established "village soviets," drove out landlords, and seized one million acres which were redistributed to the landless/land-poor through popular committees. But under the direction of Patel, the pro-landlord Home Minister, the state repressed the movements, killing 4000 and jailing 10,000 rural inhabitants. (Das, 2007, 425–426)

The Indian state, then, actively participated in the repression of emergent shifts in power that were in fact necessary for the effective realization of the "agricultural growth through social justice" agrarian program forwarded within national planning objectives. As a result, entrenched rural power holders mediated, and thus constrained, the institutional and organizational changes—"land reform, tenancy reform, the setting up of cooperatives, reinvigoration of village governance"—that were, following the Chinese model, expected to generate increased productivity and growth alongside declining rates of poverty and inequality (Gupta, 1998, 51). While limited gains in land reform were achieved in the immediate postcolonial context, particularly through the formal abolition of the colonial system of absentee landlordship (zamindari) and the redistribution of the lands therein freed to the middle peasantry and intermediate castes, the ongoing power of landed interests more generally did not allow for thoroughgoing land reforms "where ceilings would be placed on holdings, and excess land handed over to the landless" (Guha, 2007, 220). Inasmuch as such a "second stage of land reforms … was a task that the government was unable or unwilling to undertake," landless agrarian classes were generally left unaffected by redistribution via land reform, thus frustrating the promise of a program of expanded agricultural surpluses via equitable institutional and organizational reform.

In light of such limitations on the redistribution of existing agricultural lands, the Nehruvian Indian state, remaining committed to both the "catch-up" orientation and the "peasant basis" of decolonization, mobilized a particular dimension of the British colonial state's frontier strategy for the provisioning of the ecological surplus of "cheap natures." Specifically, employing colonial-era land acquisition technologies, the Nehruvian state promoted the redistribution of fertile forested lands—which it, deploying the racialized ideology of the colonial state, characterized as wasted by its Indigenous inhabitants—to peasant cultivators celebrated for their potential to provision the cheap food supplies necessary for India's rapid industrial development (Guha, 2007, 219; Varshney, 1998, 42). While peasants and forest dwellers had historically varied relations, ranging from competition over land use to a mutual recognition of one another's rights in a broader socio-ecological co-constitutive reproduction (Bhattacharya, 1996), the

developmental state intensified the antagonistic dimension by remobilizing the colonial state's privileging of the rational developmental promise of settled cultivation over the irrational waste signified by the shifting cultivation practices of "primitive" tribals (Gadgil and Guha, 1992, 1995). In addition to this strategy of frontier expansion, tribal populations were further displaced by the Nehruvian state's emphasis on enhancing production through large-scale irrigation projects which would provision the agricultural sector with more assured water supplies. In so much as such agricultural frontier colonization and irrigation expansion secured the initial ecological surplus underpinning postcolonial Indian industrial development (Varshney, 1998), it reinforced the foundational relationship, though here within the "national" space, between the production of "cheap nature" and racialized frontier formation.

This speaks, moreover, to how the primacy of the "catch-up" orientation, dependent as it is on resecuring the surplus provisioning zone of appropriation, not only marginalizes the decolonial option but, in fact, reintroduces relations of coloniality through which dehumanized and extra-human beings are rendered rightless. It is thus that Chakrabarty argues that "this emphasis on development as a catching-up-with-the-West produced a particular split that marked the relationship between … elites and subalterns within national boundaries" wherein the latter "were not quite full citizens in that they needed to be educated in the habits and manners of citizens." While this split constitutes the reaffirmation of coloniality, it is important that we not collapse all "subalterns" into a singular category of "rights-compromised" subjects, as the initial Nehruvian "agrarian transition" strategy involved the differential incorporation of peasants as settled cultivators, who were celebrated as subjects capable of being developed, and thus being able to contribute to the industrial development of the nation, and Indigenous peoples of the forested regions whose shifting cultivation practices, and hence "rights" to the land, were more fundamentally discarded through the lens of "misanthropic skepticism."

This strategy of increasing agricultural yields through a combination of limited land reform and acreage expansion into frontier zones, while resulting in a marked increase in domestic food availability as compared to the colonial era, was not, however, capable of securing the level of agrarian surplus necessary for the stated aim of rapid industrial development. The failure of the "productivity and equity" approach has been largely attributed to either the obstacles posed by the ongoing power of the dominant rural classes to a more comprehensive cooperative empowerment of the peasantry or, when such empowerment was advanced through institutional reform, to the lack of state investment in small-scale agriculture (Gupta, 1998, 51–52; Varshney, 1998, 46). Truncated land reform had the additional effect of

denying landless workers control over whatever limited surplus was generated from their labor, which thus precluded the possibility for the surplus to be recycled into small-scale industrial cooperatives by land reform beneficiaries as was the case in China (Saith, 2008, 736–739). Further emphasis has been placed on the limited surplus generating scope of "internal" frontier expansion within the Indian state, as many regions had already experienced substantial exhaustion under colonial rule and the opposition of the Indigenous inhabitants of frontier regions to such expansion continued into the postcolonial era (Farmer, 1974; Gadgil and Guha, 1992; Varshney, 1998, 49). Such "internal" constraints on surplus provisioning forced the Indian state, almost immediately after independence, to rely upon the "global" ecological surplus provisioning capacity, in the specific form of food aid imports, of the US state–capital nexus. This import dependence, while relatively manageable over the first decade and a half of independence, became considerably more consequential once agricultural production stagnated on account of the "expansion of arable land [being] virtually exhausted by the mid-1960s" (Varshney, 1998, 49).

The contested "postcolonial" world-ecological regime: food-aid and the era of long national developmentalism

The evident dependence of India's rapid industrialization strategy upon the ecological surplus mobilized by the ascendant hegemonic leadership of the US highlights the distinctive world-ecological regime forged in the face of the obstacles posed to racialized frontier appropriation by the "postcolonial" international state system. Recalling Moore's argument on the surplus-exhaustion cycles of the capitalist world-ecology, successive cycles of accumulation are secured by state–capital blocs whose hegemony is fundamentally premised upon their capacity to produce and mobilize frontier zones of appropriation which, on account of the "ecological surplus" of cheap natures provisioned therein, reduce production costs to the degree necessary for capitalist development to proceed on a world-scale. With its consolidation as a "continental state," the US was uniquely positioned to assume this hegemonic responsibility (Arrighi, 1994; Karuka, 2018). Specifically, such a continental scope freed the US state–capital nexus from the encumbrances confronting competing state–capital blocs—namely the exercise of sovereign power by newly independent Southern states—in their capacity to freely roam the earth and secure the necessary zones of appropriation. As Arrighi further elaborates, what distinguished the US from, in particular, German efforts to succeed British hegemonic leadership in the reorganization of the accumulation cycle was that the

> US state enclosed an economic space that was not only much larger and more diversified, but also far more malleable than the economic space enclosed by Imperial Germany—a space, that is, that could be depopulated and repopulated to suit the requirements of high-tech agricultural production more easily than the smaller and more densely populated German economic space could. (Arrighi, 1994, 301)

The US, in other words, did not need the external empire that Germany unsuccessfully pursued since it had essentially secured such imperial/colonial conditions by reorienting its "development" from "outward territorial expansion to the integration of the acquired territories into a cohesive national economy" (Arrighi, 1994, 300). These "acquired territories," through which the US "became continental in scope," consisted of the violent "wresting of the continent from the native Indian population." The "material-conceptual" landscape transformation that followed, involving the appropriation and erasure of the earth-worlding capacity of Indigenous peoples "depopulated" from the American Midwest, enabled the emergence of a model of large-scale, "high-tech agricultural production" provisioning a "large and growing agricultural surplus" (Arrighi, 1994, 300–301). The historically unprecedented scale of this surplus was central to US hegemonic ascension, particularly in so much as it promised newly independent states in the South access, in exchange for accepting integration into the US-led accumulation order, to the cheap natures necessary for rapid industrial development. The strategy of India, and postcolonial states more generally, to recast "development-as-a-catching-up-with-the-West" led ironically, then, to dependence upon the leading "Western" state, the US, for access to the ecological surplus mobilized from the racialized zone of appropriation.

As we mentioned earlier, however, it is important that we not uncritically follow conventional world-systems periodizations which erase the significance of the postcolonial "rise of the South" in an overly hasty confirmation of the determinative power of US hegemony in shaping the successive world-ecological regime of capitalist accumulation and development. A key point of Araghi's (2009b) reconceptualization of the immediate postcolonial context as an era of "long national developmentalism," in place of the "US mercantile-industrial era" designation favored by Friedmann and McMichael's (1989) food regime framework, is to shift emphasis onto the force exerted upon the reconstitution of the capitalist world-system by anticolonial and socialist movements, however much their more radical promise might have been compromised in favor of the catch-up orientation. Thus, the American provisioning of agrarian surpluses, as food aid, in service of the rapid industrial development of the South, is significantly informed by the imperative of containing the expansion of the radical socialist anticolonial path which, as

the Chinese case demonstrated, threatened an outright rejection of integration into the capitalist world-ecology in favor of more autonomous development (Ross, 2003, 449–450).

With China representing, in particular, the loss of a significant potential source of accumulation, Araghi suggests that the capitalist bloc of the cold war, led by the US, was compelled to underwrite the development of the South in ways that would not foreclose the accumulation imperatives of Northern capital.

Green revolution and national agricultural development

The "food aid order" (Araghi, 2003) proved, however, inadequate to sustaining the "development compromise" (Araghi, 2009b) that defined the "era of long national developmentalism." In particular, the contradiction between "autonomy" and "catching-up-with-the-west," would inform both the rejection, on the part of particular Southern states such as India, of the dependence implied by the "food aid order" and the embrace of technologically intensive agricultural production as an "internal" ecological surplus provisioning resolution. While the latter resolution—the "green revolution"—has been commonly interpreted as dictated by emergent US agro-industrial interests, Varshney (1998) has shown that for Indian planners the food shortage crisis of the mid 1960s—brought forth by a combination of "internal" frontier exhaustion, drought conditions, and state underinvestment—revealed, in so much as India became increasingly dependent upon food imports from the US that compromised national sovereignty, the pressing need to shift toward an agrarian transition strategy centered upon intensively increasing the productive capacity of existing agricultural lands. It remained the case, nonetheless, that such an "internal" resolution called for engagement with, or dependence upon, the US state–capital nexus that had exclusive access, on account of its "continental scope," to the inputs (hybrid seeds, chemical fertilizers, chemical pesticides) necessary for "high-tech agricultural production." From its perspective, the US actively supported those within India's planning apparatus advocating such a shift, as it suggested a comprehensive break from the more radical path of broad-based "peasant empowerment" and broadened the market for the emergent US agro-industrial complex (Bannerjee, 1980; Gupta, 1998).

The "development compromise" shifted, then, from the "food aid order" toward a new "internal" agrarian surplus provisioning strategy of "green revolution" that de-linked productivity from the advancement of equitable agrarian relations via institutional and organizational reform of the countryside (Gupta, 1998; Varshney, 1998). Exclusively privileging productivity,

the green revolution strategy emphasized the transfer of technologically-intensive agricultural inputs to cultivators who already possessed the scale of land ownership, and access to irrigation resources, necessary for the successful application of such inputs. In de-emphasizing land reform, and the broader empowerment of the peasantry and landless agrarian labor force, the green revolution marked, then, a definitive disavowal, by the Indian state, of the socialist delinking option, and its alternative place-based socio-ecological articulation, in favor of the market-driven capitalist road pursued by the rural bourgeoisie who had opposed comprehensive land reform (Desai, 2004; Ghosh, 1996). As a necessary implication of such a reorientation, the green revolution strategy recalled, and further extended, the agricultural frontier conditions mobilized by the British colonial state. Whereas the plains of Punjab and Haryana were once transformed, via racialized enclosure under the British colonial state, from the "waste" of nomadic pastoralism to the "value" of export-oriented wheat production, their identification as the most suitable lands for the advancement of the green revolution involves their subsequent transformation from the "waste" of "primitive" forms of agricultural knowledge and practice to the "value" of scientifically informed "high-tech agricultural production" (Gupta, 1998). The green revolution involved, then, an intensification of the denial of the reproductive socio-ecological conditions of the agricultural heartlands of Punjab and Haryana. In particular, Indigenous agro-ecological techniques of water preservation, polycropping, seed saving/selection, and field rotation were discounted in favor of the intensive application of water, hybrid seeds, petroleum-based fertilizers, and chemical pesticides on farms exclusively oriented toward maximizing the production of a single crop.

In discounting the reproductive conditions of the agricultural plains of Northern India in favor of the singular goal of raising a food surplus sufficient for the aim of rapid industrial development, the green revolution paradigm enabled a more intensive appropriation of the soil mineral wealth and water resources of the region, which resulted in a substantial increase in the agricultural production of grains such as wheat and rice (Varshney, 1998). While thus suggesting, on the one hand, an eventual ecological exhaustion, this grain surplus, on the other, enabled the Indian state, by the early 1970s, to cease its dependence upon food-aid imports of American grain surpluses, and further pointed toward the "reappropriation" of ecological resources in favor of national industrial development (Guha, 2007; Gupta, 1998; Varshney, 1998). The extent to which such an internal "ecological surplus" would provision a broader social basis of development was driven by the ongoing threat posed by insurgent peasant movements, such as the initial incarnation of the Naxalites, who, though unsuccessful in the fight for land reform, were nonetheless instrumental in compelling the Indian state to

institute socially protective measures, such as price supports and input subsidies for agricultural producers, and food subsidies for the proletariat and other marginalized social classes (Das, 2007). However, as Araghi (2009b) argues, such a broad basis was fundamentally purchased at the expense of the exhaustive appropriation of the soils and waters of the frontline green revolution lands. Such exhaustion has come, ultimately, to undermine the surplus provisioning capacity of the green revolution paradigm, the implications of which, particularly as they bear upon India's participation in the global land grab, will be taken up further in the next chapter.

The neoliberal reclamation of the imperialist rent

Whereas the ecologically exhaustive implications of the green revolution would manifest over the middle run, the more immediate threat to the "reappropriation" of an internal ecological surplus was posed by the "structural adjustment," from the national developmentalist paradigm to neoliberal globalization, imposed upon the South by Northern dominated international financial institutions seeking to resolve the over-accumulation crisis that took hold in the 1970s. The centrality of the "reopening" of the South as a "unit of Nature," via "ongoing global primitive accumulation," to the resolution of the over-accumulation crisis reflects, as Arrighi (2007) argues, the determinative role played by the "rise of the South" in compromising the global basis of capitalist reproduction in the North. While Arrighi is more concerned with how the rapidly rising industrial output of select Southern states undermined the accumulation capacity of Northern industrial powers, particularly in so much as it constrained the latter's profitable disposal of industrial goods, I emphasize the implications of the "national developmentalist" paradigm of agricultural production for the "cheap natures" premise of global capitalist accumulation. The "national developmentalist" reappropriation of ecological surplus, in service of national industrial development, undermined the capacity for the US state–capital nexus to secure the conditions for accumulation through the exercise of control over the mobilization and distribution of the "global" ecological surplus. This manifested in the growing "crisis of profitability" confronting US agribusiness in the 1970s, centered upon, in particular, the constraints that the protection of national agricultures in the South posed to the profitable disposal of American grain surpluses (McMichael, 2005).

A further implication of the protection of national agricultures in the South consisted of the disruption it posed to the strategic resolution of the double movement in the North. This became particularly significant as the Keynesian social democratic compromise in the North, involving as it did

high wages and protected non-commodified forms of social reproduction, proved increasingly incompatible with the accumulation cycle driving capitalist development (De Angelis, 2001, 2007; Harvey, 2003). As Utsa and Prabhat Patnaik have argued, a key factor in the unravelling of the postwar Keynesian order was the absence of a "substantial drain of surplus from the periphery" that was necessary to reconcile, by way of provisioning cheap food and industrial inputs, the high wages and profits that were central to the social democratic compromise of leading capitalist states (Patnaik and Patnaik, 2021, 230). The imperative of reconciling the right to live demand of the other movement with the endless accumulation demand of capital would, in so much as the latter called for wage repression and the commodification of key sectors of social reproduction, remain frustrated so long as the "reappropriation," via the protection of national agricultures, of the Southern ecological surplus, precluded the shift, which we earlier detailed during the English agrarian transition, from a strategy of non-market wage subsidization to one of wage repression via an enlarged appropriation of frontiers of unused natures capable of substantially reducing the input/consumption costs of the North.

The overcoming, then, of the accumulation crisis of the 1970s would necessitate that the hegemonic US state–capital bloc advance a strategy of global primitive accumulation capable of dismantling the "third movement" obstacle of protected national agriculture hindering the Global North's claim of "exclusive access to the planet's resources" (Amin, 2014). As I argued in the previous section, the national agricultural strategy of green revolution, though marking a definitive break with the anticolonial socio-ecological articulation, nonetheless provided the necessary protections, in the form of price supports, and food and input subsidies, for the cultivating classes to direct their growing surpluses toward the cause of rapid national industrial development. At the same time, however, the abandonment of "land reform" as the basis for a more internally coherent and self-sustaining path of sovereign national development imposed, as Patnaik and Patnaik (2021) have argued, a fiscal crisis upon third-world states. Namely, the consolidation of the power of the rural and urban propertied classes on the one hand, and of the deficient assets of landless peasants and workers on the other, constrained the ability of the state to finance expenditures through either taxation or revenue from state-run projects. This contradiction of the capitalist national agricultural development program would set the conditions for the debt crisis that was instrumentalized in favor of the neoliberal reclamation of the imperialist rent.

Informed by the broader neoliberal hegemony favoring deepening marketization as a solution to the over-accumulation crisis, Northern dominated international financial institutions, such as the World Bank, advanced

a "material-conceptual" transformation of the national developmentalist agrarian landscape which reconceptualized the latter as an "irrational" misuse, and hence waste, of the potentially abundant value producing capacity of the South's agro-ecological resources (Goldman, 2005, 9–10). In particular, the neoliberal reconceptualization posited that the protection of national agricultural sectors from American grain surpluses, and their subjection to the statist-developmentalist, rather than competitive market based, logic of national food self-sufficiency, resulted in the inefficient allocation of scarce agricultural resources toward the production of grains that could be more cheaply procured from the US. A more "rational" approach would involve the subjection of the South's agricultural resources to the competitive dictates of the global market, which would, on the basis of the Ricardian comparative advantage principle, compel cultivators in the South to privilege production of those crops which both cannot be produced more efficiently by producers in other regions, and for which they could get the highest global price.

In order to advance the material dimension of such a neoliberal transformation of the Agrarian South, the US exploited the deepening debt crisis confronting much of the South in the 1980s and 1990s by imposing loan conditionalities that required states to dismantle the protective measures they had instituted in support of the project of national agriculture. Such a strategy was clearly articulated by the US agricultural secretary who, in the midst of the Uruguay round negotiations over the liberalization of agricultural trade, argued that

> [t]he push by some developing countries to become more self-sufficient in food may be reminiscent of a bygone era. These countries could save more money by importing more food from the United States … The US has used the World Bank to back up this policy, going so far as making the dismantling of farmer support programs a condition for loans, as is the case for Morocco's support for the domestic cereal producers. (Agricultural Secretary John Block, cited in McMichael, 1997, 65)

Signifying the strategy of ongoing global primitive accumulation, the dismantling of farmer support programs of input subsidies, price supports, and trade controls, deepened the expropriation of peasantries from control over the means of production, shifting in the process the organization of agricultural production in the South from use-values of local/national food provisioning to exchange values determined by global commodity relations. More specifically, while direct agricultural producers, and rural and urban food consumers, could make claims upon the national developmental state for non-market based measures of social reproduction, neoliberal

conditionalities, imposed as they were by global financial institutions such as the World Bank, weakened such claim making capacities. Rather, however, than produce a Ricardian paradise, the removal of public supports for cultivators, in the form of input subsidies and trade controls, combined to both raise their input costs, which were already substantial owing to the escalating application of fertilizers and pesticides required by the growing ecological exhaustion of the green revolution, and lower their output prices, on account of the exposure to the more capital intensive, and hence competitive, American agricultural sector.

Combined with state withdrawal of agricultural infrastructural investment, and the failure of private capital to pick up the slack, contrary to the promise made by the neoliberal agrarian landscape transformation, the outcome for agricultural sectors across much of the South included declining yield increases and growing debt loads for cultivators (Patnaik, 2003; Reddy and Mishra, 2010). This, when not leading to outright land dispossession, compelled peasants to increasingly shift toward cash crop cultivation, which was often organized and financed, via contract farming, by transnational agribusiness oriented toward the Global North. Within a neoliberal evaluative framework, this might suggest a successful transformation of the "waste" of national developmentalist agricultural production, irrationally focussed as it was on the inefficient production of foodgrains, into the "value" of export-oriented cash-crop production. From our longer run triple movement perspective, on the other hand, the shift from national foodgrain production to cash crops oriented toward the Global North, signifies the re appropriation of the agricultural lands of the Global South in service of the cheap natures strategy necessary for reconciling the wage repression imperative of capital accumulation with the right to live demanded by the other movement of society in the North. The neoliberal reopening of the South's agrarian landscape enabled, in particular, a diversified expansion, via the provisioning of off-season fruits and vegetables otherwise inaccessible for much of the year, of "cheap" year round food baskets for consumers in the Global North (Patnaik, 2003; Patnaik and Moyo, 2011).

Within India, where neoliberal reforms were aggressively pursued in the 1990s and early 2000s, the consequences of this shift toward export-oriented agricultural production, and the reduction of state support for cultivators, consisted of an overall decrease in national food availability and the entrenchment of what has been referred to as an agrarian crisis marked, most dramatically, by an epidemic of farmer suicides driven by escalating debtloads (Reddy and Mishra, 2010). Such consequences recall the earlier subjection of India's agrarian landscape as a unit of nature under

British colonial rule, and further imply that the neoliberal material-conceptual transformation constitutes an appropriation, in the service of capitalist accumulation and development in the core, of the socio-ecological basis of national agricultural development. In particular, the enhanced production capacity of India's green revolution agricultural sector, originally developed to provision the internal ecological surplus necessary for the rapid industrial development promoted by the catch-up paradigm, comes to be appropriated into the neoliberal global ecological surplus organized under the hegemony of Northern dominated financial institutions. In addition, then, to the exhaustion of indebted farmers, the neoliberal appropriation of the green revolution further threatens the ecological exhaustion of soil and water resources. The achievement of the cheap food regime of neoliberal agriculture, rather, thus, than reflecting increased rational use, expresses the deepening of the denial of the socio-ecological reproductive conditions of the agrarian lands of the South.

Conclusion: neoliberal crisis

The ecological surplus appropriated in service of the neoliberal accumulation cycle would, in so much as it was premised upon a deepening of the ecological cost externalization of the green revolution and the discounting of the right to live of peasants and workers in the Agrarian South, begin to manifest signs of its exhaustion as extra-human natures and agrarian social movements increasingly disrupted and contested the subjugated zone of appropriation.

Most spectacularly, the food price shock of 2007–2008 and the food riots which followed, suggested, as Moore has argued, an end to the neoliberal cheap food regime and an exhaustion of the underlying ecological surplus from which it was provisioned. While Moore has centered the role of extra-human natures, such as superweeds, declining soil fertility, and arable land availability, in exhausting the surplus provisioning capacity of the long green revolution, I would further emphasize the significance of the reemergence of the national developmentalist rejection of the core Northern zone's claim of "exclusive access to the planet's resources." This contestation finds its most radical expression in the socio-ecological resistance and alternatives forwarded by the global peasant movement La Via Campesina, but can also be identified in the growing refusal of Southern states to submit to the "structural adjustment" dictates of Northern-dominated international financial institutions such as the WTO and IMF. This combination of the collapsing surplus provisioning capacity of the long green revolution, the

right to live demands placed upon the state by agrarian social movements, and the Southern challenge to the structural adjustment regime constitute the neoliberal crisis context giving rise to two distinct agrarian trajectories at the dawn of the twenty-first century: the global land grab and a renewed peasant-centered path of land reform grounding a reconstituted "agrarian question of national liberation."

5

Land grab or land reform? Colonial and anticolonial trajectories in an emergent multipolar conjuncture

In 2008, the Indian multinational agri-business firm Karuturi made international headlines when it signed an agreement to lease 300,000 hectares of land over a period of fifty years in the Gambella province of Ethiopia (Sethi, 2013). Having been offered what it believed to be a huge allotment of prime arable land for next to nothing (one dollar per hectare per year), Karuturi, at the time the world's largest rose producer, framed the deal as key to realizing its ambitions of global supremacy in food production and distribution (Dubey, 2012). Dismissing those who critiqued the deal as a paradigmatic example of global land grabbing, the company, along with the Ethiopian government, claimed the land was either unused or not being put to proper use by the Indigenous peoples of the province (Dubey, 2012; Rowden, 2011). Noting the incredibly rich organic content of Gambella's soils, along with the abundance of water resources available in the Baro-Akobo river basin in which the land was located, Karuturi's management expressed confidence that, with the proper application of modern industrial farming technology, the company would be able to extract from the land its full productive potential (Bose and Mehra, 2012). Such expectations were frustrated, however, by the very landscape that had seemed so inviting, as the Baro River repeatedly flooded Karuturi's land concession, leaving the future viability of the investment in serious doubt, despite the company having invested a considerable sum of capital (Davison, 2013b; Sethi, 2013). Rather than serve as the staging ground for its launch into global food supremacy, Gambella's rich soil and abundant water sunk Karuturi, as the losses incurred left the company with insufficient capital to carry out the operations at its flagship rose farm in Kenya (Badrinath, 2014).

The spectacular rise and dramatic fall of the Karuturi agricultural project can be made sense of through the theoretical and historical framework developed over the previous three chapters. This chapter considers, as such, how the Gambella land grab, informed by the contradictions posed to Southern states such as India by the neoliberal accumulation crisis, mobilizes racialized world-ecological processes of global primitive accumulation

that reinaugurate the foundational Cortesian society–nature distinction in forging an emergent frontier zone of appropriation. Building on the triple movement framework engaged in Chapter 4, I articulate the land grab as a strategy of "capitalist restoration" in the face of a global peasant counter-movement that was integral to bringing the neoliberal agrarian order to crisis and, in its more militant trajectories, advanced an alternative resolution to the neoliberal crisis in the form of a "re-peasantization" program premised upon renewing and deepening decolonial land reclamation. The capacity of emerging Southern states to resolve the neoliberal crisis in a decolonial direction would be contingent on the extent to which they responded to agrarian counter-movements by restructuring their development paths upon Fanon's "peasant basis" via a renewed project of land reform. Ultimately, it has been the case that the majority of Southern states, including India, remained incapable of instituting the land reform option, and thus found themselves structurally compelled to respond to the contradictions of the neoliberal accumulation crisis with a "land grab as development" strategy. Specifically, the foreclosure of a development path restructured upon the broad basis of land reform would intensify the contradictions between the welfarist response of Southern states to the neoliberal crisis and the imperatives of capitalist accumulation. This chapter focuses on how, in a context in which land reform is refused, the ecological exhaustion of the long green revolution and the "third movement" forces contesting the neoliberal zone of appropriation, while bringing the neoliberal accumulation cycle to crisis, pose particular problems, at both national and global scales, of ecological surplus regeneration to Southern states in pursuit of "development as-catching-up-with-the-West" (Chakrabarty, 2010). In India more specifically, the protective measures and large-scale welfare schemes the national state has been forced to institute in response to counter-movements generated by the neoliberal agrarian crisis, when combined with the ecological exhaustion of India's green revolution frontier, have contributed to a persistent problem of food-price inflation that threatens the ongoing consolidation of capitalist development. Propelled, then, by the imperative of enhancing the agrarian surplus in order to secure the cheap food basis of capitalist development, the transnationalization of Indian agricultural production into the Gambella province of Ethiopia signifies the "triple movement" logic wherein the hegemonic resolution of the contradictions of primitive accumulation in the core national zone necessitates "global primitive accumulation" in extra-national spaces. The land grab in Gambella thus constructs the necessary frontier zone of unused nature that can be exhaustively drawn upon to provision India's cheap food imperative.

Key to such frontier formation in Gambella, I will further argue, is the central role of racialization in collapsing Indigenous peoples into the

"inferior" sphere of unthinking "irrational" nature, and the corresponding elevation of a "superior" human rationality, embodied in the state–capital development nexus, uniquely capable of productive and efficient resource mobilization. Such a Cortesian epistemological framework privileges the "developmental" knowledge of the Ethiopian state and the "productive" knowledge of Indian capital as central to the urgent task of mastering nature and bringing dormant land to life, while at the same time it necessarily discounts the Indigenous peoples and non-human life forms of Gambella as beings incapable of efficient and productive economic activity. However, as we have seen, such epistemic and ontological denial of the reproductive conditions of the frontier, while imperative for the production of nature as cheap or free, ultimately comes to exhaust such surplus provisioning. Thus, while such knowledge production and mobilization has been critical to Karuturi's construction of the Gambella land concession as a staging ground for its launch into global prominence in agro-food provisioning, it has also proved fatal to the project, as the epistemological inability to incorporate Indigenous knowledge that accounts for extra-human agency left the company dramatically unaware of the particular socio-ecological dynamics of the Baro River ecosystem on whose floodplain the land concession was located.

Trajectories of land grabbing and land reform in the neoliberal crisis conjuncture

The contemporary global land-grabbing phenomenon references the rapid expansion of large-scale agricultural land acquisitions, often of a transnational character, across much of the Global South in the aftermath of the global economic crisis of 2007–2008. An initial "literature rush" was propelled by journalists, NGOs, policy experts, and academics motivated by immediate empirical questions regarding the scope, actors, location, implementation, and potential consequences of such large-scale land grabbing (Borras et al., 2011; Edelman et al., 2013; White et al., 2012; Wolford et al., 2013). Perhaps the most comprehensive overview of the rapid post-crisis increase in global agricultural land acquisitions was undertaken by the World Bank (Deininger et al., 2011), in a report titled *Rising Global Interest in Farmland*, where it argued that

> the demand for land has been enormous. Compared to an average annual expansion of global agricultural land of less than 4 million hectares before 2008, approximately 56 million hectares worth of large-scale farmland deals were announced even before the end of 2009. More than 70 percent of such

> demand has been in Africa; countries such as Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Sudan have transferred millions of hectares to investors in recent years. (Deininger et al., 2011, xiv)

The early literature was further able to foreground important links between transnational land deals and the global economic crisis, particularly in terms of the key role played by surging food and commodity prices in motivating states and corporations across North and South to acquire "cheap" land wherever it could be found in order to secure food/fuel security (for states) and/or profits (for both agribusiness and financial corporations). However, the limitations of the immediate empirical focus of this initial "making-sense period" were soon noted by critical scholars who sought to initiate a second phase of research more concerned with elaborating the deeper theoretical and historical significance of the land grab (Edelman et al., 2013). The point here was to advance theoretical and historical frameworks through which the immediate crisis context of the global land grab could be apprehended within the "*longue durée* of the development of capitalism," and further elucidated through a "deepened engagement with long-standing discussions in agrarian political economy" (Edelman et al., 2013, 1528).

Primitive accumulation, a key concept, as we have seen, in historical materialist approaches to the emergence and development of capitalism, has been widely deployed by critical agrarian studies scholars in the efforts to situate land-grab research within larger theoretical and historical frameworks (Borras et al., 2011, 2013; Geisler and Makki, 2014; Hall, 2013; Ince, 2014; Levien, 2015; Makki, 2014; White et al., 2012). In my estimation, however, such attempts, for the most part, have failed to move beyond the "Eurocentric-anthropocentric" frame of primitive accumulation critiqued in the first chapter. They have, in particular, interpreted the global rush for land precipitated by the global economic crisis as another moment of the extension of capitalist social relations—conceived narrowly as capital–labor—through processes of land enclosure that, insofar as they simultaneously transform land into capital and dispossess local land users, recall the historical origins of capitalism in rural England. The "origins–diffusion" framework suggested by such methodological internalism cannot adequately capture the relational global differentiations and historical specificities of the land grab/crises conjuncture within the *longue durée* of the capitalist world-ecology. It is for this reason that I have, throughout this book, elaborated instead a concept of "global primitive accumulation" capable of apprehending the differential ontological categories ascribed, through enclosures, to the core "human" zone of commodification and the peripheral "extra-human" zones of appropriation. A similar

critique has been advanced by Onar Ulas Ince (2014), who has undertaken a theoretically sophisticated "decolonial" consideration of the applicability of primitive accumulation to the land grab. Concerned that the critical agrarian political economy approach to the land grab "ultimately risks miring the concept of primitive accumulation in a diffusionist imaginary, first in Europe, then elsewhere," Ince argues that "one way to cast primitive accumulation in a nondiffusionist mold is to decenter the British experience and train our focus on the global topography of primitive accumulation" (Ince, 2014, 109). In so doing, we will be more attentive to how what is at work in the land grab is "less a replay of the English enclosures qua eviction of the peasantry but [more] an articulation of different social forms of production mediated and overdetermined by global circuits of capital" (Ince, 2014, 125).

This expansive concept of global primitive accumulation is central, moreover, to the framework through which this chapter situates the land grab/crises conjuncture as a moment of "contested transition" between contending state–capital blocs over the reconstitution of the accumulation capacity of the capitalist world-ecology. Global primitive accumulation as an engine of transition that reconstitutes, after the exhaustion of the neoliberal accumulation cycle, the world-ecological surplus necessary for the renewal of a subsequent accumulation cycle, expresses, as was discussed in the previous chapter, a component of an ongoing "class struggle on a world scale," or triple movement dynamic, wherein colonial capital seeks to reaffirm its foundational world-ecological relations in the face of the challenges posed by anticolonial social-ecological movements. Such a conceptualization of the land grab as global primitive accumulation, signifying a historically specific moment of transition between accumulation regimes, rather than standing as a "replay of the English enclosures," has been thus far most significantly developed through McMichael's food-regime analysis which, in its foregrounding of the "contradictory dynamics" undermining the neoliberal corporate food regime, "situates the land grab as something other than simply a contemporary enclosure of land for capitalist expansion" (McMichael, 2012, 682; 2013; 2014). For McMichael, the key point of departure is that the "rush to acquire land … is symptomatic of a crisis of accumulation in the neoliberal globalization project" brought about by three converging forces: ecological exhaustion, agrarian counter-movements, and Southern state opposition to the Northern control of global food and agricultural relations via international organizations such as the WTO. The three converging forces themselves arose out of the contradictions of neoliberalism, as the crisis that its accumulation imperative imposed upon the reproductive capacity of the "Agrarian South" instigated social-ecological struggles that would ultimately bring the accumulation capacity of neoliberalism itself to

crisis. The potential of these struggles to withstand the reaction of colonial capital, and evade subsumption under global primitive accumulation, continues, it will be shown below, to be contingent on the extent to which they can, recalling the Fanonian "agrarian question of national liberation," restructure the developmental trajectories of their respective states upon a peasant rather than bourgeois basis. An engagement with the deeper history of the food crisis, through an elaboration of what McMichael has identified as its three underlying forces, can further clarify how it signals both the undoing of the Northern-dominated neoliberal corporate food regime and the "contested transition," embodied in the global land grab, toward an "increasingly multi-centric global food system" (McMichael, 2013, 684).

Ecological exhaustion of the long green revolution

Informed by Moore's world-ecological account of the rise and fall of successive accumulation cycles, ecological exhaustion as a determinative force of the food crisis references, for McMichael, the rising contradictions of the industrial agricultural production model—what Patel (2013) refers to as the "long Green Revolution"—which had earlier secured the ecological surplus of cheap food across both the developmental and neoliberal eras of the "long twentieth century" (Arrighi, 1994). The cheap food surplus of the long green revolution was provisioned through a furthering of the radical simplification and intensification of many of the frontier lands—from the American Midwest to the Punjab—converted to commercial agricultural production under the British-led accumulation cycle of the long nineteenth century. Within the long green revolution paradigm, simplification involves the removal of non-value-producing practices and life forms, such as fallow land and polycropping, in favor of the total dedication of land to a single crop (e.g. rice, wheat, corn, soy), which is then productively grown and harvested through the water-intensive application of industrial inputs such as inorganic, petroleum-based fertilizers, chemical pesticides, and hybrid seeds (Moore, 2015; Patel, 2013; Weis, 2010). This institutes, then, a society–nature regime of "metabolic rift" wherein soil minerals and water resources can be intensively appropriated, and weeds/pests exterminated, without having to account for the costs that such appropriation and extermination impose on the reproductive conditions of the fertile soils and abundant waters being acted upon. In its initial stage, as an earlier engagement with Moore's work has shown, such a denial of the reproductive conditions of the frontier lowers production costs insofar as it constructs "extra-human" nature as a provisioner of "free gifts" such as soil fertility. During its specific upward swing from the 1950s to the 1970s, the massive, historically

unparalleled agricultural productivity gains of the long green revolution were achieved through the intensive application of the free gift of cheap oil, in the form of petroleum-based fertilizers and tractors, upon the free gift of fertile soils in the agricultural heartlands of the capitalist world-ecology (Moore, 2015, 252; Weis, 2010, 320).

As Moore further argues, however, the industrial model of the long green revolution has not resolved, once and for all, humanity's food problem, as its promoters promised, but rather has increasingly confronted the exhaustion of the "free gifts" and the increasing resistance posed to extermination by extra-human natures such as "superweeds" and "superpests" (Moore, 2010a, 400). Thus, the steady deterioration of soil fertility, on account of the disruption to nutrient recycling effected by monocropping and inorganic fertilizer use, contributed, from the mid-1980s onward, to the marked slowdown of global agricultural yield growth in relation to world population growth (Patnaik, 2009; Weis, 2010). Of perhaps even greater significance, the capacity to maintain some measure of yield growth has necessitated that declining soil fertility be offset by the even more intensive application of increasingly costly industrial fertilizers and pesticides (Weis, 2010, 320). This rising capitalization of industrial agriculture, as capital is now forced to carry the costs that "extra-human" natures increasingly refuse to bear, figures centrally into the reversal of the neoliberal cheap food regime and its ultimate denouement in the food price crisis of 2007–2008 (Moore, 2010a, 391). Such entrenchment of a secular, or irreversible, rise in agricultural capitalization and food costs, insofar as it further increases the reproductive costs of labor, signals, for Moore, the historical onset of the ecological exhaustion of the accumulation capacity of the neoliberal cycle.

Counter-movements to the neoliberal agrarian crisis

In largely focusing on the evident centrality of the ecological exhaustion of industrial agriculture to the neoliberal accumulation crisis, Moore, along with more "eco-centric" analyses (Weis, 2010), risks, however, covering over the key role played by peasants and workers in the "Agrarian South" to both the constitution of the neoliberal cheap food surplus (via the appropriation of national agricultural space) and its potential exhaustion. While Moore does, significantly, link the achievement of the neoliberal cheap food regime to the debt-enforced "structural adjustment" of the national agricultures of the South toward an export-orientation (Moore, 2015, 259–264), he does not take into serious analytical consideration the role played, in bringing the neoliberal regime to crisis, by the determinative resistance exercised by those subject to the exhaustive appropriation unleashed by

structural adjustment. It is precisely such concerns which have motivated this book, as seen in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, to elaborate a framework—the political ecology of colonial capitalism—capable of foregrounding both the racialized/colonial basis of the ecological surplus and the decolonial basis of exhaustion. Specifying the triple movement dynamic securing, and undermining, the particular global agrarian transition associated with each accumulation cycle, my own argument, as shown in the previous chapter, locates the neoliberal cheap food regime as an expression of the Northern reappropriation of the agricultural surpluses that the national developmentalist orientation of Southern states had sought to protect and appropriate in the service of rapid national industrial development. The racialized dimensions of the neoliberal cheap food regime are expressed both in its organizing conceptual premise regarding the "irrationality" imposed on Southern agricultural land use by protected national agricultural sectors and in the reaffirmation, as a result of the switch from national developmental to export orientated agriculture, of historical colonial patterns of over/underconsumption (Araghi, 2003, 2009b).

While the neoliberal reappropriation of the South's agricultural surplus was vital, as argued in Chapter 4, to the resolution of the double movement contradiction in the North between the imperative of wage repression and the right to live demand of labor movements, it ultimately had to contend with the "third movement" launched in advocacy of more sustaining decolonial socio-ecological co-productions of the peoples and natures of the Agrarian South. Arising out of the agrarian crisis—rising indebtedness and dispossession, stagnating yields, declining food availability—enveloping much of the South during the neoliberal regime as a result of the removal of protective trade controls and input/output subsidies, peasants across the South collectively organized to pressure their respective states to refuse the dictates of Northern-dominated institutions and develop a framework of "food sovereignty" in place of the impoverished neoliberal market-based conception of food security (Desmarais, 2008; McMichael, 2008; Wittman, 2009). The potentiality and limitations of the emergent global peasant counter-movements to neoliberalism, institutionalized most fully in La Via Campesina, would continue to be contingent upon the extent to which they variously contested, or sought welfarist reforms within, the structuring relations of the capitalist world-ecology. Specifically, the neoliberal crisis conjuncture generated both a renewal of the "agrarian question of national liberation," which had been undermined by imperial capital in the name of neoliberal "market-led agrarian reform," and, in those instances where its central demand of land reform remained precluded from consideration, a more welfarist road emphasizing the protection and subsidization

of national agricultures without an underlying structural transformation of land relations.

The welfarist road of this "third movement" against the cheap-food premise of the neoliberal accumulation cycle manifested in the rising pressure exerted, through protest and ballot, upon the states of the South to more actively contest structural adjustment imperatives, and in the physical disruption of successive WTO ministerials in Seattle (1999), Cancun (2001), and Hong Kong (2005) by large-scale street actions organized by international peasant movements such as La Via Campesina. Pressured internally by rising peasant protests, and emboldened internationally by the growing consensus among transnational social movements regarding the gross injustice, in favor of Northern states, of the WTO's agricultural regime, Southern states aligned to reject the conditions that were sought to be imposed upon them during the WTO's Doha round (Hopewell, 2015). McMichael (2012) has been exceptional among land-grab scholars in foregrounding the role played by the Southern challenge, both at the state and social movement scale, in bringing the neoliberal regime to crisis, arguing succinctly that

> Southern state opposition to the hypocrisy of Northern "food dumping" contributed to the breakdown of the Doha Round and WTO paralysis in the first decade of the twenty-first century, accompanied by a mushrooming "food sovereignty" countermovement with an alternative vision of democratic food security arrangements embedded in socio-ecological relations on local and regional scales. These institutional and political-economic contradictions combined with the reversal of food price trends in 2007–2008 as cheap food came to an end. (McMichael, 2012, 682)

Concretely, the opposition to the Doha round was accompanied by the reintroduction of a variety of protective measures, ranging from trade controls to input/output subsidies,[1] which further undermined the organizing socio-ecological relations of the neoliberal cheap food regime.

A more substantive renewal of the "agrarian question of national liberation," which advanced a decisive challenge to the neoliberal food regime, was identified by Moyo and Yeros in the flowering of land occupation and reclamation movements that potentiated an anti-imperialist regrounding of third-world states upon the peasant basis advocated by Fanon. While the more mainstream welfarist path of the food-sovereignty movement placed greater emphasis on overturning structural adjustment policies, such as trade liberalization, reduction in state support for agriculture, and privatization of agricultural marketing and distribution, a more radical anti-imperialist articulation emerged which deepened the transformative potential of

the global peasant movement by grounding demands for state reassertion of national agricultural and food sovereignty in a renewed project of land reform and reclamation (Moyo and Yeros, 2005).

This radical wing of the emergent global peasant movement arose out of, and based itself upon, in the first instance, a central component of neoliberal agrarian livelihood crisis that had been disavowed, Moyo and Yeros argue, by "small farmers unions [that] have generally fallen hostage to bourgeois elements within them" (Moyo and Yeros, 2005, 42). Specifically, neoliberal agrarian crisis was built upon an entrenchment of a "de-peasantization" path that deepened and broadened land dispossession and land scarcity for the majority in the Agrarian South. Entrenchment of "de-peasantization" proceeded through the defeat of the "compulsory land reform" basis of decolonization, seen most evidently in the negotiated compromises imposed upon liberation movements in Southern Africa, which greatly reduced the capacity for land reclamation by those dispossessed by colonialism. First in Zimbabwe, and then in South Africa, imperialist states and global governance institutions compelled the postcolonial and post-apartheid states to accept a co-opted and weakened version of "market-led agrarian reform" that made access to land for the dispossessed contingent upon a market-driven "willing buyer, willing seller" model that would ostensibly allow for both a more peaceful and productive basis of postcolonial development (Borras, 2003; Moyo, 2011). The result, however, of this model of land reform was largely to preserve the concentrated land holdings of large settler farmers, as only marginal lands of little agricultural value were redistributed. Alongside the deepening of existing land concentration and dispossession, neoliberal structural adjustment policies worked to impose a livelihood squeeze upon small peasants across the Agrarian South, which had the effect of broadening "de-peasantization" by expelling tens of millions more into either outright dispossession or semi-proletarianzied status (Araghi, 1995). The neoliberal entrenchment of land dispossession generated a labor surplus that could not be absorbed in other economic sectors, and consequently further deepened, in turn, the dependent character of third-world states as it foreclosed the "peasant basis" that had alone historically demonstrated the capacity of generating a stock of domestic investible capital that could overcome dependence on neocolonial capital investment.

Whereas, as Moyo and Yeros (2005) have argued, the "bourgeois elements" within the "small farmers unions" constituency of the global peasant movement "eschewed advocacy of land issues and development policies aimed at smallholder accumulation" (Moyo and Yeros, 2005, 42) such issues were forcefully recentered by a "new wave of land occupation movements, across the South" which constituted "one of the most important political facts of our time" (Moyo and Yeros, 2005, 42). This response

to the "de-peasantization" premise of the neoliberal agrarian crisis found its strongest expression in Zimbabwe, where a militant land reclamation movement forced the postcolonial state to abandon the "market-led agrarian reform" path, which was the result of its compromise with imperial capital, and pursue instead a compulsory program of redistributing land from larger white settler farmers to Indigenous peasants who had been historically dispossessed by colonialism. The "Zimbabwe model" (Moyo and Yeros, 2013), while subject to much early critique as a form of "authoritarianism" by Western agrarian studies scholars trapped within a colonial epistemology, was in reality driven by a "from-below" land reclamation movement on the part of those who had been dispossessed by the white supremacist settler colonial land regime of Rhodesia. This movement forced the Zimbabwe state, which had hitherto been pursuing an interdependent compromise with imperial capitalism, to implement a fast-track land-reform program that established a broad-based access to land. While this restoration of an "agrarian question of national liberation" was undermined by the punitive sanctions imposed by US imperialism on Zimbabwe, it is nonetheless the case that important development gains were experienced by Indigenous Zimbabwean peasant farmers who reclaimed land in service of small-scale labor intensive agriculture (Moyo and Yeros, 2013; Scoones et al., 2011). The Zimbabwe model stands, then, as a potential restoration of the radical peasant-centered land-reform path first opened by the Chinese revolution, and assumes further world-historical significance insofar as it has interrupted the neoliberal "end of history" thesis with the ontological reemergence—or what Moyo, Jha, and Yeros call the "restoration of humanity"—of those who had been dispossessed by racial colonial property regimes.

Though strongest in Zimbabwe, land-reclamation and redistribution movements reemerged, or were reaffirmed, in other Global South states, with Moyo, Jha, and Yeros (2013) identifying in particular here Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, and Nepal, and to which we could further add the proliferation of land-based counter-movements in larger states such as Brazil, India, and China (Arrighi, 2007; Tiejun, 2021). This demonstrated a "depth of political work that has been underway on all continents [and] has [thus] set the stage for consideration of 're-peasantization' as a modern, sovereign project in the twenty-first century" (Moyo, Jha, and Yeros, 2013, 112). Such a project would counter the de-peasantization basis of the neoliberal accumulation cycle, which had generated conditions of labor surplus, depressed wages, and precarious livelihoods, by opening a development path constructed upon a "re-peasantization" basis that, in broadening access to land in the countryside, could absorb, rather than displace, labor and generate forms of "smallholder accumulation" that could provision

Global South states with the resources with which to delink from dependence upon neocolonial capital. At its most fundamental level, re-peasantization, as the basis of a "modern, sovereign project in the twenty-first century," brings the cheap-food basis of neoliberalism to crisis by directly confronting the Cortesian premise of the capitalist world-ecology and, in restoring Indigenous land rights, establishes the material basis for overcoming the "misanthropic skepticism" imposed upon the "victims of primitive accumulation … thereby closing the circle which began with imperialist partition and ideological domination" (Moyo, Jha, and Yeros, 2013, 111).

Focusing on the convergence between the counter-movements of the Agrarian South, the Southern challenge to the WTO regime, and the ecological exhaustion of the long green revolution in our reading of the neoliberal accumulation crisis clarifies the particular propulsion the latter gives to the global land grab. While the rising capitalization of green revolution agriculture, in the form of intensified fertilizer and pesticide application to offset soil deterioration and "super weeds/pests," raises food prices and threatens the neoliberal wage repression strategy, the Southern rejection of the unprotected opening of its agricultural sectors to the dictates of the "free" global market problematizes efforts to resecure a global ecological surplus through neoliberal governance technologies. In my estimation, this further exacerbates the existential crisis that Moore (2010a) argues the neoliberal crisis poses for the reconstitution of the accumulation capacity of the capitalist world ecology. For Moore, as opposed to earlier cycles of surplus and exhaustion, capital, in its post-neoliberal moment, confronts the potential impossibility, on account of the arguably planetary scale of exhaustion, of the reconstruction of the frontier zone of "unused" externalized nature. Such a challenge of constructing and mobilizing the frontier is all the more enhanced in a context in which Southern states increasingly question their dependence upon transnational agricultural markets dominated by Northern agribusinesses, and peasant counter-movements undertake projects of land reclamation and redistribution. This suggests, as Moyo and Yeros have argued, that there are indeed two paths out of the neoliberal crisis conjuncture. The first, driven by the land-reclamation movements discussed above, renews the peasant basis of decolonization and in so doing opens toward the cultivation of earth-worlds beyond the "appropriation and erasure" logic of the capitalist world-ecology. This "re-peasantization" path specifically seeks to overcome the neoliberal regime's structural underinvestment in the Agrarian south through a program of land reform and sovereign subsidization and protection of national agricultures. The second path—the global land grab—is forged, in reaction to the land-reclamation basis of the peasant counter-movement against neoliberalism, as a means of restoration and renewal of the capitalist world-ecology, and represents

large-scale corporate land consolidation as the means for overcoming the agrarian crisis. It is as such a moment of racialized "class struggle on a world scale" motivated by restoring capitalism's underlying racialized society–nature basis. As I will argue further below, the land grab is forged out of the capitalist world ecology's dual necessity, however materially impossible, of constructing the necessary "post-WTO" global governance regime which can legitimize new frontiers of unused nature capable of overcoming the exhaustion of the long green revolution and neoliberal "North–South" geopolitical relations.

Southern states that were not capable, or willing, to consolidate a "re-peasantization" land-redistribution response to neoliberal agrarian crisis would, as will be demonstrated in the below discussion on attempted Indian agricultural expansion to Ethiopia, become implicated in the capitalist restoration logic of the global land grab. In short, insofar as they remained structured within the framework of the capitalist world-ecology, Southern states would find that their "welfarist" attempts to ameliorate the neoliberal crisis compelled, depending upon their particular position in the world-system, either a renewed dependence on inviting land-grabbing forms of agricultural investment or the expansion of their own agribusiness capitals in search of the external cheap natures that have historically stabilized capitalist development in the core. Capitalist development's fundamental dependence upon cheap nature, organized as it is through the Cortesian racialized society–nature ontology, compels state–capital blocs, seeking hegemony in the reconstituted accumulation cycle, to attempt to overcome neoliberal exhaustion and forge a new ecological surplus through the construction and mobilization of new frontiers of unused nature. This frontier pursuit, I argue, has been a central propulsive force driving the global land grab in general, as much of the rapid proliferation in large-scale agricultural investments has been mobilized by the belief, promoted by the World Bank in multiple post-crisis reports, that there is tremendous profit to be realized through the closing of what it characterizes as the "yield gap," which represents the difference between current and potential production levels on land identified as either "unused" or "under-used" (Deininger et al., 2011, xxviii; McMichael, 2012). Viewed through our "post-Cortesian" lens, elucidating as it does the socio-ecological foundations of even the most "pristine" landscapes, the yield-gap conceptual premise functions as a technology of "misanthropic skepticism" enabling the appropriation and erasure of the socio-ecological knowledge and practice of the Indigenous inhabitants of those frontier lands whose productive capacity has been hitherto wasted. Beyond the individual profits to be gained, the closing of the yield gap, through the rational application of the necessary capital and scale to "underused" land, is represented as having the potential to satisfy

the general systemic demand for affordable food supplies, and, in so doing, resolve both capital's accumulation crisis and the developmental crisis of states in the South (Deininger et al., 2011; McMichael, 2012).

South–South agricultural co-operation: new Bandung or deepening bifurcation?

A key distinction, though, from previous global transition conjunctures resolved through conventional "North–South" relations, wherein Northern based "rational" agencies act upon the "irrational" South as "unit of nature," consists of the evident prominence of "South–South" relations of transnational agricultural investments. Leading Southern states—particularly those included within the BRICS designation (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa)—have furthered, it seems, their challenge to the WTO regime by actively seeking to secure a post-crisis world ecological surplus of "cheap nature" through emergent South–South trade and investment frameworks capable of overriding the domination of the international food trade by Northern agribusiness. This distinctive feature of the contemporary land grab corresponds with the rising geopolitical assertiveness of Southern powers seen more generally in the post-crisis context, and which has generated considerable debate, among critical scholars within the fields of international relations and development studies, regarding the "emancipatory" implications of the "rise of the South" for the international state system and global political economy. While some have argued that the increased prominence of "South–South" relations embody the spirit of a "new Bandung" (Arrighi, 2007; Desai, 2013; Nederveen Pieterse, 2011), wherein the emancipatory promise of Southern "autonomy" and "de-linking" from Northern dominance is finally realized, other positions have emphasized that, insofar as rising Southern assertiveness is invested in the renewal of global capitalist accumulation, it constitutes a fundamental break from the decolonial and anti-capitalist promise of earlier Southern advocacy in support of a "New International Economic Order" (Bond, 2016; Cammack, 2012; Golub, 2013). Advancing such a position, Golub argues that

> the major actors of this systemic shift are realising what generations of nationalist anti-colonial and postcolonial leaders had fought for—upward mobility and greater international equality through a redistribution of world power at economic and political levels—by embracing and restructuring the world capitalist system from within rather than by exiting it from without. (Golub, 2013, 1002)

It is further argued, by Bond (2016) and Cammack (2012), that this Southern embrace of global capitalism does not signify a fundamental challenge to

Northern imperialism, as the latter instead accepts, and even encourages, the "rise of the South" as a "sub-imperialist" motor necessary for the post-crisis renewal of accumulation. For Golub, this "role of postcolonial states as drivers of a new phase of capitalist globalisation has blurred and in some cases completely erased the emancipatory message and critical vision of early anticolonial nationalism" (Golub, 2013, 1002). This erasure reflects, in particular, how such capitalist globalization, even in its "South–South" guise, must reproduce the exhaustive and hierarchical socio-ecological premises of capitalist development. When the role of Southern states and corporations in advancing the global land grab is taken into account, some IR scholars have argued that the new global inequalities produced through such actions reveal that, rather than presaging a challenge to the injustices of global capitalism, the implications of the "rise of the South" for the transformation of the international political system consists of the declining relevance of the "North–South" framework for the analysis and interpretation of global poverty and inequality. Margulis and Porter (2013) have, for instance, argued that "the institutional arrangements associated with US dominance and the earlier colonial period of land grabbing are being replaced by more complex, polycentric ones operating in an increasingly multipolar global political economy, rendering the previous North– South and West–East cleavages less relevant" (Margulis and Porter, 2013, 66), a key implication of which is that "traditional concepts of South–South solidarity or other traditional forms of interstate political conflict are therefore less relevant to understanding the [contemporary] type of global politics of land grabbing" (Margulis and Porter, 2013, 79). Furthering such a thesis, McMichael (2013), while centering Southern resistance in the collapse of what he terms the market based "corporate food regime" of the neoliberal era, expresses concern over the social and ecological implications of transition, embodied in the global land grab, toward what he has identified as a polycentric "security-mercantilist" food regime governing the transnational production and circulation of cheap food. Expressing a deep mistrust of the Northern-dominated global agricultural commodity trade, leading Southern states have engaged, through direct offshore land acquisition "for the purpose of repatriating agricultural products," in a post-crisis project of what McMichael describes as "reterritorialization … designed to avoid dependence on markets, or more particularly, market intermediaries. Thus: 'China wants to cut out the soy middleman. It clearly does not trust the large American-owned commodity traders like Cargill and Bunge'" (McMichael, 2013, 50–51). Insofar, however, as such "reterritorialization" is effected through coercive "land grabs," involving the displacement of Indigenous peoples in order to make way for the expansion of ecologically destructive large-scale industrial agriculture, the "polycentrism" of the emergent

"security-mercantilist" food regime further questions the usefulness of "North–South" as a marker of international inequality and "South–South" as a marker of emancipatory solidarity.

While such skepticism is important, particularly insofar as it helps to uncover the appropriation and exploitation obscured by the language of South–South solidarity and co-operation in agriculture (Mittal, 2013), it itself risks obscuring, under the guise of an emergent equivalence between North and South, how North–South hierarchies, and the importance of challenging them through South–South trade and partnerships, remain significant. For Fantu Cheru and his collaborators (Mittal, 2013), who have been prominent among those calling for cautious optimism regarding the emancipatory potential of "South–South" agricultural projects on the African continent, the latter have been unfairly weighed down by the burden of the history of European colonialism in Africa. It should not, in other words, be *a priori* assumed that the rise in South–South transnational agricultural investments in Africa constitute a replay of the grossly extractive, rather than productive, role played historically by the "foreign direct investment" of colonial powers in the "underdevelopment" of African agriculture. Cheru et al. further question why the charge of "neocolonialism" has been "disproportionately directed against foreign investors from China and India, while Western investors have not been labelled 'neocolonialists' and 'land grabbers,'" even though "Western multinationals are still the largest investors in African agriculture" (Cheru et al., 2013, 26). Troubled by the "infantilization" of Africa that this suggests—namely, that African states are passive in South–South partnerships—Cheru et al. instead seek to center the African state in attempting to leverage the rising investment capacity of the "emerging economies" of the South in order to overcome the dependence upon Western aid and investment that marked the post-Cold War international order. Such an approach foregrounds how key distinctions between emergent South–South partnerships and the North–South investment pattern have motivated Southern states to seek out the former as a means of overcoming the agrarian crisis that arose from the neoliberal conditionalities imposed by the latter. In the first instance, South–South agricultural trade and co-operation provide African states a means of accessing alternative capital investment that can alleviate dependence upon IMF and World Bank loans that restrict policy space due to the neoliberal conditionalities that are attached to them. The policy autonomy that thus arises from South–South agricultural investment has the potential to enhance the capacity of Southern states to channel capital toward supporting and protecting agricultural sectors in ways that build up domestic productive capacities rather than undermine them as had been the case with the North–South extractive neoliberal investment paradigm. Further distinctions consist of the unique

perspective on appropriate technologies and practices for enhancing agricultural productivity that Southern states can transfer to one another on account of the similar challenges they confront in overcoming the historical declines of their national agricultural sectors during the neoliberal era.

The drive to leverage Southern investment capacity in order to increase agricultural production, and thereby lessen dependence upon Northern-dominated aid and international food markets, might lead us to question the utility of the concept of the "land grab" to describe what are, in fact, consensual transfers of land from host governments to investing states and corporations. However, the utility of the land-grab concept is better apprehended when we consider that the land identified for transfer reflects the racialized distinctions of frontier formation forged "internally" by states quite explicitly informed by a capitalist "agrarian transition" imperative. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, such internal frontier formation assumes prominence as a national development imperative for Southern states that have proven incapable, or unwilling, to undertake a program of broadening access to land in the countryside either through the restoration of Indigenous land rights or peasant-centered land reform. This forecloses the possibility of a "growth with social justice" path of national development built upon the enhancement of agricultural capacity through labor-intensive small-scale and co-operative production on existing lands, and thus compels postcolonial states to instead seek productivity gains through the racialized construction and mobilization of frontiers of "unused"/"underused" land. In other words, the emergence of the "land grab as development strategy" (Lavers, 2012) reflects an understanding by Southern policymakers that "underused" land must be mobilized to provision the cheap food necessary for transition from an agrarian to an industrial-based economy. The land identified as such often belongs to communities involved in forms of nomadic pastoralism and shifting cultivation that the state views as an obstacle to productive development. The permanent settlement, or displacement, of these communities is thus necessary in order to transfer the lands they inhabit to investors. South–South relations of "land grabbing" are thus better conceptualized as the collaborative appropriation of the lands of marginalized Indigenous groups by both host and investor states united in their pursuit of an ecological surplus of "cheap food" capable of initiating, or renewing, the path of industrial capitalist development.

Rather than conclude that such displacement indeed reaffirms the declining relevance of the frames of "North–South" inequality or "South–South" solidarity, my own position is that the "South–South" dimensions of the global land grab reveal the renewed prominence of what, following Amin, was identified in the previous chapter as the contestation over the distribution of the imperialist rent. Where this dispute involves, as in the earlier

national developmental era, the suspension of the more radical trajectory, in this case the food sovereignty movement and land reform/reclamation movements, it comes to be structured by a national capitalist project to reappropriate Southern lands and resources in the service of the "catch-up" imperative and thus constitutes an important challenge to the reduction of the South as "unit of nature" for the North. The land rush signifies, then, a medium of contestation over the control of the production and mobilization of the frontier necessary for underwriting the expanded reconstitution of the accumulation capacity of the capitalist world-ecology. For Southern actors, the significance of such a contestation consists in the degree to which South–South agricultural investment potentiates the world-scale relations necessary for overcoming the obstacles that have contributed to what Li identifies as the "truncated agrarian transition" in the South. As discussed above, this potentiality is significantly shaped by which of the two roads out of the neoliberal agrarian crisis is pursued by Southern states. While the peasant basis, or the renewal of the "agrarian question of liberation," was advanced by land-based movements across the South, it only moved toward consolidation and/or renewal in a minority of cases, namely in Zimbabwe and more partially in China[2] (Moyo and Yeros, 2013; Tiejun, 2021; Van Der Ploeg and Ye, 2016). More generally, land redistribution remained foreclosed, and the welfarist reforms sought in response to the neoliberal agrarian crisis would consequently come into sharp contradiction with the imperatives of national capitalist development and propel "emerging" Southern states to transnationalize their agricultural sectors in an effort to overcome these contradictions. Such was the dynamic in India, where the state simultaneously fought to contain and deny the redistributive demands of land-based movements such as the Naxalites and advance welfare reforms to the neoliberal crisis that proved contradictory to the accumulation imperatives of Indian capital. We will now turn to examining how these contradictions propelled the Indian state–capital bloc to pursue, via land grabbing, the construction, on a transnational scale, of the racialized society–nature distinction that has historically stabilized national capitalist development.

The rise and fall of the Gambella land grab

The "cheap food" imperative and the transnationalization of Indian agricultural production

From the late 1990s to mid-2000s, the Indian agricultural sector, on account of the rising socio-ecological contradictions besetting the neoliberal world-ecology, which we detailed in the previous chapter, was in the throes of a deep

and persistent agrarian crisis marked by increasing indebtedness, declining food availability, and stagnating yield growth. With farming increasingly an untenable livelihood, many small and medium-scale producers were subject to market-based displacement and, in the extreme, indebtedness fed into a tragic epidemic of farmer suicides (Reddy and Mishra, 2010). The agrarian crisis in India reflected the convergence of the ecological exhaustion of the green revolution and the neoliberal subjection of agricultural production to the dictates of the global market. With soils deteriorating and weeds and pests proving more resilient, farmers were forced over time to substantially increase the rate of fertilizer and pesticide use, thereby raising the cost of production (Ghosh, 2011; Yadav, 2013).

The implementation of the neoliberal removal of public supports, in the form of public infrastructural investment, input/output subsidies, and trade controls, only further tilted the balance between costs and prices more unfavorably against Indian farmers (Reddy and Mishra, 2010). For lower-income consumers of food, stagnating yield growth combined with a growing export orientation to reduce the overall availability of food grains, thereby resulting in increasing levels of malnutrition and hunger among marginalized social groups in India (Patnaik, 2003; Patnaik, and Moyo 2011; Reddy and Mishra, 2010).

The crisis was further exacerbated by the neoliberal Indian state's strategy of expediting "agrarian transition"—all the more necessary, it was claimed, on account of the faltering agricultural sector—by forcefully acquiring land from farmers, via the colonial land acquisition act, for the purpose of instituting "special economic zones" (SEZs) where higher-value goods could be produced for export (Levien, 2011). Following the classical capitalist script, SEZs were represented as essential to India's development trajectory, as they promised to both increase outlets of profitability for global and domestic capital and transfer labor out of the low-paying agricultural sectors and into the higher waged industrial sectors (Vaswani, 2006). Such a script, as we have seen, however, is constructed on a false premise, one that specifically forgets the historical role that "settler-colonial" migration has played in providing an outlet for the surplus labor that the industrial sector is incapable of absorbing. In the absence of such a settler-colonial option, the SEZ strategy only further contributed, alongside the neoliberal agrarian policy regime, to increase the underemployment crisis triggered by neoliberal dispossession and displacement (Rawat et al., 2011).

However much it reflected the necessary "cost externalization" strategy of the neoliberal cheap-food regime, the agrarian crisis proved unsustainable within the context of the legitimation imperative that Kalyan Sanyal (2007) has suggested constitutes the distinctive logic of "postcolonial capitalism" in Southern states such as India. The rights based legacy of

decolonization, wherein all citizens of postcolonial India are constitutionally accorded the "right to live," has, argues Sanyal, posed serious obstacles in the way of efforts, by either the state or capital, to further capitalist development via processes of primitive accumulation (Sanyal, 2007, 185). While it is clear that such a right to live has been unevenly distributed, with subaltern groups, such as tribals, Dalits, and peasants, bearing a particularly disproportionate burden of the costs of India's postcolonial development trajectory, these same groups, through the avenues for contestation opened to them through postcolonial electoral democracy, have forced what Partha Chatterjee (2008), in an important elaboration of Sanyal's thesis, has identified as an "economic transformation" toward the distinctive regime of "postcolonial capitalism." For Sanyal, as opposed to the historical Western European experience,

> the context today has changed radically and the conditions of capital's reproduction have become far more complex. The discourses of democracy and human rights have emerged and consolidated themselves to form an inescapable and integral part of the political and social order. As relatively autonomous discourses, they have constituted an environment within which capital has to reproduce itself. A crucial condition of that reproduction is that the victim of primitive accumulation be addressed in terms of what Michel Foucault has called "governmentality"—interventions on the part of the developmental state (and non-state organizations) to promote the well-being of the population—and what I identify as a reversal of primitive accumulation refers to this realm of welfarist governmentality: the creation of the need economy is an imperative of governance. (Sanyal, 2007, 60)

In other words, the dispossession and immiseration effected by capital's reproduction via primitive accumulation simultaneously generates, through the "discourses of democracy and human rights," a legitimation crisis for capital which can only be resolved through a "reversal of primitive accumulation." It is thus that Sanyal argues that "it is this simultaneous process of primitive accumulation and its reversal … that characterizes the arising of capital in the post-colonial context" (Sanyal, 2007, 61). Insofar as postcolonial capital proves incapable of absorbing the totality of labor released by primitive accumulation, the denial of access to non-commodified means of social reproduction, particularly for those rendered surplus, must, in order to "secure the legitimation of its [postcolonial capital's] existence," be reversed through the institution of welfare schemes, which enable the "dispossessed producers inhabiting the outside [to] be reunited with means of labour so that they can subsist by engaging in economic activities outside the domain of capital" (Sanyal, 2007, 59).

Sanyal associates the emergence of the distinctive form of "postcolonial capitalism" with the legitimation crisis posed soon after independence by the "failure of [economic] growth to improve the conditions of the poor," which subsequently forced the state to implement, within the green-revolution paradigm of the 1970s and 1980s, large-scale welfare schemes "aimed at improving the condition of small and marginal farmers on the one hand, and creating employment opportunities for the landless agricultural labourers and artisans, on the other" (Sanyal, 2007, 186). This original articulation of "postcolonial capitalism" was quickly taken apart, as we have seen, by the renewed project of "global primitive accumulation" marking the neoliberal accumulation cycle. In particular, Sanyal argues that the "universal regime of property rights and market rules … enforced by the WTO is severely circumscribing the post-colonial nation states by denying them the space" to effect the reversal of primitive accumulation. However, the latter's constitutive force—the sustained rights-based mobilization of subaltern social classes—would be reactivated in response to the resulting agrarian crisis, the evidence of which was most powerfully seen in the 2004 general election where the "unabashed neoliberal agenda" of the ruling BJP was rejected in favor of the United Progressive Alliance coalition which had centered its campaign on a "critique of the NDA's reforms in neoliberal style and its consequences in terms of inequality, unemployment, and loss of livelihood" (Sanyal, 2007, 250). While the UPA government, in its guiding governance framework—the Common Minimum Program—remained, on the one hand, committed to the path of industrial capitalist development, it was compelled, on the other, to mitigate, or reverse, the effects of primitive accumulation entailed by such a path. This consolidation of the distinctive logic of postcolonial capitalism under the UPA government specifically involved the enactment of several large welfare schemes and protective measures—the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MNREGA), the Land Acquisition Act, the Food Security Act, and the Forest Rights Act—which combined to contain and reverse the impacts of neoliberal primitive accumulation by provisioning dispossessed surplus labor with access to non-market means of social reproduction.

Insofar as such concrete forms of reversal clashed with the WTO's "universal regime of property rights and market rules," as was particularly the case with the Food Security Act, the Indian state was compelled to assume greater leadership of the Southern resistance to Northern hegemony during the WTO Doha round (Hopewell, 2015). In the immediate context of the 2008 food and financial crisis, such resistance was informed, as India's trade minister at the time argued, by "concern about the livelihood of poor and subsistence farmers," and centered in particular upon the right of Southern states to impose trade controls and institute subsidy programs

(Stewart, 2008). This insistence on placing the "right to live" ahead of the cost-repression premise of profit maximization would bring the Doha round into a state of paralysis from which it would not recover, as India, along with other Southern states, ignored WTO norms in responding to the food crisis with enhanced input subsidies and a higher tariff regime for agricultural products.

As a result of these "reversals of primitive accumulation," some observers have argued that India has been able to lessen the severity of the agrarian crisis (Lerche, 2013). In particular, the MNREGA has functioned to guarantee living wages for dispossessed surplus labor, while many of the other measures have secured the land rights of farmers and forest dwellers and increased food availability. This non-market-based livelihood security, insofar as it secures legitimation for postcolonial capital, signifies, for Sanyal, the transcendence of the agrarian question's "transition" problematic for postcolonial states. While the agrarian question centers upon the transfer of capital and labor, through primitive accumulation, into commodified industrial production, the impossibility of the totality of surplus labor being absorbed by postcolonial capital truncates the agrarian transition. This "truncated agrarian transition" has been identified by Li as definitive of the development impasse confronting states across the South, and she thus follows Bernstein in pivoting toward an "agrarian question of labor" focused upon the problem of accounting for the livelihoods of redundant surplus labor. Li, in this sense, converges with Sanyal and Chatterjee in thinking beyond the "transition" problematic of transferring such labor into commodified industrial production, emphasizing instead that politically mobilized peasants and laborers can resolve their livelihood crisis through securing the "reversal of primitive accumulation," or what Li calls the "right to live," from the state. Li further follows Sanyal and Chatterjee in centering the large-scale welfare schemes of the UPA government, and particularly the MNREGA and Food Security Act, as indicative of the sorts of "right to live" measures necessary for resolving the "truncated agrarian transition." The persistence of peasants and surplus labor in spaces of non-capital need not, in other words, signify a "lack" of transition, but rather can, and indeed does in the Indian context, represent the "complex hegemonic" order of postcolonial capital wherein the latter's legitimation imperative calls forth the provisioning of non-market-based means of social reproduction.

A significant blind spot, however, of Sanyal's formulation of "postcolonial capitalism" consists of an apparent inability to recognize that the simultaneous advance and reversal of primitive accumulation recalls the Polanyian double movement dynamics of European agrarian transition across the long nineteenth century. Li, by contrast, has explicitly conceptualized the MNREGA and Food Security Act as recalling the "right to live"

measures that were necessary for securing the "classical" English agrarian transition. Indeed, this is how Sanyal's thesis, and Chatterjee's elaboration, were interpreted by scholars debating its relevance in a recent collection of essays regarding "understanding India's new political economy" (Corbridge et al., 2011). The editors of this collection asked in particular

> to what extent can one understand the changes that have taken place in the Indian political economy through the idea of a "double movement," to use Karl Polanyi's well-known phrase developed in reference to the historical European case, in which the attempt to create a market-oriented society from above compels a movement from below to moderate its severely dislocating effects? (Corbridge et al., 2011, 2)

Thus, rather than signifying a distinctive break from earlier forms of transition and accumulation, Sanyal's thesis works better if reformulated to argue that postcolonial capitalism reaffirms the foundational double movement—conceived here as the advance and reversal of primitive accumulation—which has historically constituted the legitimating conditions of capitalist development.

More significantly, attention to the longer history of the double movement compromise reveals, as we saw in Chapter 4, that "reversals of primitive accumulation" are, paradoxically, key to both the hegemonic consolidation and crisis of capitalist development and accumulation. In other words, the reintroduction of non-commodified bases of social reproduction, while necessary for the hegemonic incorporation of the surplus labor that capital is structurally incapable of absorbing, proves in short order to be incompatible with the cost-repression imperative of capital's accumulation drive. Neither Sanyal, Chatterjee, nor Li recognize this potentiality of the reversal of primitive accumulation to bring forth an accumulation crisis, and they thus cannot further consider, within their "methodologically nationalist" analyses, how both state and capital are subsequently compelled to search out other avenues for cost repression capable of resolving the contradictory imperatives of the double movement. In the case of the post-neoliberal reconstitution of Indian postcolonial capitalism, the welfare schemes and protective measures constituting "reversals of primitive accumulation" have compromised the "cheap" natures premise of capitalist accumulation by raising, through the MNREGA, agricultural wages, and imposing higher costs, through the reformed Land Acquisition Act and Forest Rights Act, on attempts by either state or capital to consolidate large-scale agriculture through frontier expansion. These "obstacles" to capital have combined with the even more substantial rise in costs associated with the ecological exhaustion of the green revolution to generate, for the first time

since the late 1960s and 1970s, a crisis of persistent food-price inflation (Bhattacharya and Gupta, 2015). While the origins of India's food-price crisis coincide with the more generalized global food-price hike of 2007, it has been "striking that even after global food inflation moderated, Indian food inflation persisted" (Gokarn, 2011). An increase in food prices, particularly in India, where food occupies a substantial portion of household costs, has the effect of raising production costs more generally and thus constrains the accumulation capacity of postcolonial capital. It is for this reason that both Indian capital and the Indian state have been increasingly preoccupied with resolving the food-price inflation which has persisted since 2007 (Anand et al., 2016).

It is important to note here that the reversal of primitive accumulation through welfare schemes such as the MNREGA and protective measures such as the Forest Rights Act, though generating an inflationary crisis for capitalist development, can, if constructed upon a program of land reform that grants more universal access to land, advance outcomes that regenerate land quality, enhance production, and thus restrain inflation. The centrality of land reform to sustainably raising productivity and containing inflation has been one of the major historical lessons drawn from the Chinese peasant-centered development path (Tiejun, 2021; Weber, 2021). It is thus that Patnaik and Patnaik (2021) argue that any sustainable development path forward for developing countries such as India must be premised upon thoroughgoing land reform that can increase productivity and thus contain inflation, while simultaneously raising incomes and increasing livelihood security. This has been noted by Jayati Ghosh, who has suggested that the MNREGA, through challenging capital's cheap natures premise, can advance what McMichael and Schneider have referred to as agrarian labor practices regenerating, rather than exhausting, soil fertility. Ghosh (2011) argues that

> what may be most alarming of all is how farming costs have been rising because of much heavier input use, which is required because of declining soil fertility and degradation of land. But this is something that the MNREGA can help to fix, because it can be used to engage in activities that improve soil quality over time. Indeed, it is precisely on this issue—of halting the drastic decline in land productivity and enabling more sustainable input use—that both farmers and rural workers can be brought under the MNREGA.

This would involve, specifically, a shift from petroleum-based, capital-intensive industrial agriculture to small-scale, labor-intensive agriculture oriented more toward socio-ecologically sustainable production. Moreover, the Forest Rights Act (FRA) has the potential to redress the historical cost

externalization that has been inflicted upon forests and their inhabitants through their reduction to key frontiers of "cheap nature" across both the colonial and postcolonial eras. In centering, rather than denying, the co-production of the forests' socio-ecology through Indigenous knowledge, practice, and extra-human agency, the FRA, if properly implemented to empower "forest dwellers with the authority over decision-making and forest governance," enables communities to manage "forests sustainably for meeting their needs relating to food, livelihoods and ecosystem services" (RRI, 2015).

However, the radical decolonial promise of the "reversals of primitive accumulation," insofar as it threatens the foundational basis of the capitalist development path through which Indian state and capital remain committed to "development as catching-up-with-the-West," compels both state and capital to search out frontiers of cheap natures, particularly those that can relieve the persistent food price crisis by enhancing supply. In light of the "postcolonial capitalist" compromise and the exhaustion of the green revolution, such frontier formation is increasingly foreclosed within India. This point has been made by official reports on food inflation, which, as the deputy governor of the Reserve Bank of India has argued, show that though "there is no alternative to curbing food inflation than raising supply rapidly … raising productivity is itself a serious challenge, given the pressures emanating from both labor costs and, over the longer horizon, what appears to be a structural reduction in the absolute amount of rainfall" (Gokarn, 2011). This "serious challenge" of internally securing cheap food is all the more pronounced when further costs, notably the severe deterioration in soil fertility, water-table collapse, and the land constraint imposed by social movements, are taken into account. At the same time, however, the existing international framework for "externally" securing cheap food is proving inadequate as India, like other "rising" Southern states, has grown "wary of relying on global markets [for enhancing food supply] due to the volatility in supply and prices," particularly insofar as such "volatility of global food market prices is due in part to the increasing dominance of international grain and food markets by a handful of international corporations who use their position to extract windfall profits" (Rowden, 2011). In challenging the WTO regime upholding such a Northern dominated global market, the Indian state can thus be seen to be simultaneously advocating for the "livelihood of poor and subsistence farmers" and seeking to construct the enabling conditions through which Indian capital can provision the necessary world-ecological surplus "autonomously" of the North.

It is thus that we can make sense of the juxtaposition of the collapse of the Doha round in 2008 with the organization, in that same year, of the first India–Africa forum. This initial forum was particularly centered on

how such a South–South partnership could be of mutual benefit in advancing food security and agricultural development. From the Indian perspective, Africa was clearly understood as containing large frontiers of "unused nature" that could potentially resolve India's food-price crisis, with Indian observers noting in particular that "Africa has 60 percent of the world's uncultivated arable land, making it ripe for a green revolution of the kind that changed Brazil and large parts of Asia" (Mitra and Bhuvaa, 2011). Based upon such conditions, the Indian commerce minister argued that "agriculture is one of the seven priority sectors of India's engagement with Africa … we import pulses and we will be more supportive of more land being brought under cultivation and for value addition—and India is the market" (cited in Rowden, 2011). This promotion of an offshoring food-production strategy, where cheap food in particular is secured through preferential bilateral frameworks rather than the "free" global market, reflects the shift, seen concretely through initiatives such as the India–Africa forum, from the neoliberal corporate food regime to what McMichael has referred to as an emergent "security-mercantilist food regime."

The crisis generated for India's capitalist development path by the "reversal of primitive accumulation," and, more importantly, the impetus that its attempted "cheap food" resolution gives toward the transnationalization of agricultural production, reveals a significant limitation of the frameworks through which India's "new political economy" is read as a successful compromise between the imperatives of capital accumulation and those of livelihood security for surplus labor. Insofar as Sanyal's "postcolonial capitalism," Li's "agrarian question of labor," and Chatterjee's "democratic economic transformation" foreclose, in their methodological nationalism, a global view of India's ongoing agrarian question, these approaches prove incapable of recognizing the link between India's participation in global land grabbing and the "complex hegemonic" (primitive accumulation and its reversal) order of its "new political economy." By contrast, the framework of political ecology of colonial capitalism, as elaborated in Chapters 2 and 3 of this book, articulates this link as being reflective of the racialized ontology of the capitalist world-ecology wherein the capitalist resolution of the capital–labor contradiction remains dependent upon the construction of an external zone of unused nature where "rightless" beings are incapable of making "right to live" claims. In this particular case, and viewed through a triple, rather than double, movement lens, the capitalist resolution of the contradictions of primitive accumulation in the "core" national space of India calls forth, though the practice of "global primitive accumulation," the construction of frontiers of unused nature in an emergent African zone of appropriation. As an examination of the expansion of Indian agricultural production into the Gambella province of Ethiopia reveals, the cheap

food provisioned from the frontier remains premised upon the "Cortesian" racialized appropriation and erasure of Indigenous knowledge and practice.

However, it is important to foreground that the Gambella frontier is not, recalling Cheru et al.'s concern that land-grabbing literature too often reduces African states to passive objects in transnational land acquisitions, solely imposed by active Indian agencies upon passive African objects. Rather, the core constituencies of the Ethiopian state have been central to Gambella's conceptualization as a frontier of unused nature by drawing on long-standing "internal" racialized distinctions between "civilized" highlanders and "primitive" lowlanders. It is necessary, therefore, to clarify how India's agricultural expansion into Gambella is actively enabled and embraced by the Ethiopian state in its own pursuit of a cheap-food strategy capable of advancing the national project of agrarian transition.

The "internal" frontier in the Ethiopian "land grab as development strategy"

Included within the World Bank's identification of yield-gap regions (Deininger et al., 2011, 189), the Gambella province of Ethiopia has been a particularly prominent, and controversial, site of the global land grab, due in large measure to the attention it has attracted from international human-rights NGOs concerned with questions of rural livelihood security and environmental sustainability (OI, 2011; HRW, 2012). While the post-crisis concern with global food production has focused increased attention on fertile lands such as Gambella, the province itself has long existed as a frontier within the Ethiopian state. Forcibly incorporated into the highlander dominated Ethiopian state, via imperial conquests, in the late nineteenth century, Gambella has historically come to be known, by successive governmental regimes—imperial, the socialist Derg, and the contemporary Ethiopian Peoples Democratic Revolutionary Front (EPDRF)—as containing lush and fertile lands that, insofar as they were "unused," could resolve the land constraint in the northern highlands and potentially serve as a breadbasket region for Ethiopia, provisioning the cheap inputs that could underwrite the desired national transition from an agrarian to an industrial economy (Makki, 2012, 83–84; Markakis, 2011, 6). Reflecting the integral role of racialization as a condition of possibility for frontier making, the ecological centrality of Gambella's "virgin" lands to the modernizing mission of the Ethiopian state is enabled by an ontological distinction between civilizing highlander elites and the Indigenous peoples of Gambella, whom the imperial highlanders have historically considered to be primitive and backward (Makki, 2012, 84).

While the nineteenth- and twentieth-century imperial state promoted "settler-colonial" migration of farmers and investors from the land-hungry highlands to Gambella, such initiatives were constrained by the resistance of the Indigenous Anywaa people of Gambella and by ecological challenges, particularly the intense heat and the heavy presence of malaria-spreading mosquitos (Makki, 2012). The socialist Derg state, which overthrew the imperial state in 1974, was more successful in resettling highlanders to Gambella, particularly after the devastating effects of the 1984 famine. For the modernizing Derg, the famine was evidence of the backwardness imposed on Ethiopian society due to the prevalence of low-productivity practices such as nomadic pastoralism, and the regime thus sought to rally Ethiopians to "free farming from the ugly forces of nature" (Scott, 1998, 248), which, beyond the promotion of settler farmers from the highlands, involved the introduction of large-scale mechanized state farms into Gambella (Scott, 1998). However, as with the earlier efforts of the imperial regime, the Derg's modernizing thrust was constrained by both ecological feedback, in the form of the abnormal flooding that the deforestation associated with large-scale agriculture triggered in the region (Woube, 1999), and by armed Indigenous resistance to the resettlement of highlanders and large-scale land appropriation (Markakis, 2011).

The current government of the EPRDF, which overthrew the Derg in 1991, has continued with the modernizing thrust of the previous regimes, but did initially shift the focus to achieving a program of what they termed "agricultural development led industrialization" through the empowerment, rather than displacement, of small-holder agriculture, which would localize development initiatives through greater political decentralization (Lavers, 2012, 108–109). The EPRDF, having come to power on the basis of widespread peasant mobilization and support, believed that the empowerment of small farmers would facilitate increased production and livelihood security, and thus offer a more sustainable and equitable path to industrialization than those attempted by previous regimes (Makki, 2014, 85). However, the failure of this program to achieve the desired gains in productivity and income, and thus facilitate industrial transition, compelled the EPRDF to pursue a dual-track strategy of protecting smallholder agriculture, particularly in the core highland regions, for reasons of livelihood security, while also opening space, through the identification of "unused" lands primarily found in the peripheral Southern lowlands of the country, for the initiation of large-scale agricultural production that could provision the food surplus necessary for underwriting industrialization (Lavers, 2012, 112; Rahmato, 2013). Large-scale agriculture would facilitate the transition by providing cheap food for an emergent industrial proletariat, and by generating foreign exchange, through the export of surplus food, that could then be used to

finance the import of the technology and machinery necessary for industrialization (Makki, 2014, 86).

While the EPRDF began to transition to such a dual-track strategy at the turn of the century, the lack of domestic capital and expertise suitable for large-scale agriculture led the regime to emphasize the importance of attracting foreign capital to undertake such initiatives (Rahmato, 2013, 96). Thus, when the political fallout of the global food crisis of 2008 manifested itself and impressed upon global development and governance organizations, such as the World Bank and the UN Food and Agricultural Organization, the pressing need to identify and close the remaining yield gaps for the sake of global food security (Geisler and Makki, 2014; McMichael, 2014), and revealed to transnational capital the enormous profits that could be potentially realized through agricultural investment, the Ethiopian state identified, and acted upon, such opportunities to operationalize its strategy for foreign capital-led large-scale agricultural production (Kebede, 2011).

Embracing the so-called Rise of the South, the Ethiopian state has sought to promote such a development strategy through the channel of South–South solidarity and cooperation. This geopolitical orientation is premised upon the belief that Ethiopia has much to gain by engaging with states and capital from the South who, in contrast to Northern actors, could best apply, owing to the similarity in transition and development challenges across the South, the appropriate practices and technology for enhancing agricultural productivity within Ethiopia (Cheru et al., 2013, 24–33). Within the South–South strategy, India has emerged as a particularly prominent partner in the field of agricultural investment and co-operation, as Ethiopia's desire to attract foreign investment in agriculture has converged with India's growing recognition of the need to secure offshore resources for food production (Rowden, 2013, 111).

The state–capital nexus

Such convergence has been furthered through India–Africa forums which, along with bilateral trade initiatives signed between India and Ethiopia, have helped facilitate an enabling trade and investment framework through which Indian capital seeking to expand into transnational agricultural production could align with the Ethiopian state's aim of seeking foreign investment to transform "unused" arable land into highly productive units of agricultural production. The Ethiopian state, for its part, has sought to attract Indian agricultural investors with the promise of extremely cheap and abundant fertile land, along with cheap labor, in peripheral lowland provinces such as Gambella. In return, the Ethiopian state expects Indian companies to

either enhance national food availability or contribute to the state's foreign-exchange reserves through commodity exports. For Indian capital, the motivation of expansion has been less the systemic need for capital in general to reconstitute, in the face of ecological exhaustion, the condition of possibility for accumulation through the forging of the ecological surplus, and more the profits to be gained through accessing cheap, fertile land that could facilitate low-cost (insofar as it requires less capitalization than the lower quality soils in India), high-productivity agriculture, that offers secure and high returns through the increasing global and national demand for cheap food (Rowden, 2013). Expansion to Africa, which Indian capital has imagined as a frontier of cheap land and labor (Mitra and Bhuvaa, 2011), would also enable Indian agribusiness capital to overcome its own profitability constraints that increasing costs of production—primarily land and labor—have imposed within India.

While the conducive post-crisis investment context has facilitated the expansion of numerous Indian firms into agricultural production in Ethiopia, with several operating in Gambella province alone,[3] the Bangalore-based Karuturi Global has been identified as a pioneer in Indo-African agricultural investment, both for leading the way, in 2008, as the first major investor in Gambella and for the large scale at which it has sought to undertake its project (Bose and Mehra, 2012; Dubey, 2012). Initially a floricultural firm, specializing in export-oriented rose production in India, Karuturi expanded its operations to Ethiopia and Kenya in the mid-2000s in order to take advantage of cheaper land and labor costs, more productive soils, and the lower tariff rates that the primary export market for roses, the European Union, offers to exporters based in African countries (Dubey, 2012). After consolidating itself as the largest rose producer in the world by 2007, Karuturi's ambitions turned to achieving supremacy in global food production, as it looked to capitalize on the convergence of the systemic drive to close the global yield gap, the desire of African states to leverage such an imperative to attract foreign investment that could facilitate the achievement of the agrarian surplus necessary for industrialization, and the push by the Indian state to secure a longer-run source of cheap food and biofuel sources necessary for the continuation of its development trajectory (Bose and Mehra, 2012; Dubey, 2012). For the company's chairman and managing director, Ramakrishna Karuturi, the increasing land-acquisition difficulties and labor costs associated with MNREGA meant that the "overall cost competitiveness of India for this kind of activity was not what it used to be" (quoted in Ahuja, 2014). In light of such domestic constraints, the huge 300,000 ha concession of prime fertile land in Gambella the company acquired from the Ethiopian state at a rate of one dollar per hectare per year constituted the necessary ground from which such ambitions of global food supremacy

could be secured. Furthermore, in contrast to the rising capitalization costs associated with maintaining yield growth on deteriorating soils in India, the company noted that what it was granted in Gambella was "very good land. It's quite cheap. In fact it is very cheap. We have no land like this in India. There you are lucky to get 1% of organic matter in the soil. Here it is more than 5%. We don't need fertiliser or herbicides. There is absolutely nothing that will not grow on it" (quoted in Vidal, 2011). Taking into further account the abundant water resources of the Baro-Akobo river basin in which the land was located, Karuturi's management expressed full confidence that with the proper application of modern industrial farming technology the company would be able to extract from the land its full productive potential.

While it is evident that the principal actors of the Gambella land rush are motivated by varying factors, it is my contention that the project as a whole is fundamentally constituted as the penetration of a new untapped frontier, with the aim of constructing an ecological surplus that can provision the cheap food necessary for underwriting a new round of global capitalist accumulation and the development trajectories of the Indian and Ethiopian states. In the process, the principal actor responsible for operationalizing the large-scale agricultural production, Karuturi, envisions that it will be rewarded for its role in such ecological surplus-making with sustained and high rates of profit. As this book argues, the historical drive to forge an ecological surplus, whether in order to overcome ecological exhaustion or to initiate agrarian transition and industrialization, calls forth processes of global primitive accumulation that are informed by, and further reaffirm, the racialized society–nature distinction in which the knowing and acting being, the rational human, acts upon the irrational, passive, and "un-thinking" non-being of nature in order to maximize efficiency through the extractive transfer of resources from low-value nature to higher-value industry. In this particular case, the Ethiopian State's claim that "this land is not used by anybody" and thus "it should be developed" (Rowden, 2011, 14), alongside the World Bank's emphasis on the "yield gap" and Karuturi's assertion that this is "virgin land, which has never been plowed for hundreds of years" (Maritz, 2012), suggests that the Indigenous pastoralists and subsistence farmers of Gambella are incapable of generating and deploying the knowledge necessary for most effectively utilizing the "free gift" of nature found in Gambella's rich soils and abundant water resources.

The use here of "global primitive accumulation" to describe the Karuturi land concession in Gambella is distinct from the concept of primitive accumulation that has been widely deployed, and critiqued (Levien, 2015; Martin and Palat, 2014), in the land-grabbing literature. As mentioned earlier, primitive accumulation has been conceptually deployed to suggest that

processes of land grabbing today are informed by the same logic of capital–labor formation first initiated in the English enclosures. By contrast, my argument here is that the land grab in Gambella is better understood as a moment of "global primitive accumulation," which I have argued throughout the book consists of the production and mobilization, via racialized enclosure involving the appropriation and erasure of Indigenous knowledge and practice, of frontiers of unused nature that can be exhaustively appropriated in service of the imperatives of development and accumulation in the core zones. In this case, however, the Cortesian premise through which Gambella's reproductive conditions were denied, in order to recast its soils and waters as a "free gift" of nature, would rapidly shift the frontier from a condition of "surplus" to "exhaustion" as the "third movement" of Indigenous resistance and extra-human natures converged to sink the project.

Socio-ecological formation in Gambella

It is mistaken to assume, as the principal actors in the Gambella agricultural project do, that its rich soils and abundant waters are constitutive of dormant virgin lands whose reproduction is not dependent upon the "primitive" inhabitants. An examination of the socio-ecology of the lands leased by Karuturi, which are located in the Jikaw district of Gambella province, reveals instead that the rich soils and abundant waters coveted by modernizing agents are constituted through a complex diversity of socio-ecological interactions in which the livelihood practices of the Anywaa people play a crucial role. While the Anywaa, depending upon the particular ecological region of Gambella within which they live (forests, grasslands, or riverbanks), practice a diverse array of livelihood strategies, those residing within or adjacent to Karuturi's land concession cultivate land along the banks of the Baro River, where annual floods are determinative in shaping the socio-ecological context. During the rainy season, which generally occurs between May and September, the Baro River rises and eventually inundates the lands in its floodplain. Much of this land is normally covered in dense forests, which perform the crucial function of absorbing much of the floodwaters (Woube, 1999, 247). The effects on the land vary depending upon the speed and volume with which the floodwaters cover the plains. On the outer curve of the river, where the water moves rapidly and in high volume, it sweeps away much of the nutrients of the land, leading to soil erosion. On the inner curve of the river, by contrast, the floodwaters move slowly over the land, allowing for the gentle depositing of nutrient rich organic matter (Kurimoto, 1996, 45; Woube 1999, 246).

As Eisei Kurimoto's ethnographic research has shown, the "Anywaa riverbank cultivation is an adaptation to this ecological condition" (Kurimoto, 1996, 44). Specifically, the Anywaa, utilizing a "folk knowledge of the environment," distinguish between the eroded and fertile soils by identifying "two different weeds as indicators of the two parts," and they cultivate exclusively on the fertile soils using a hoe to prepare the land for planting (Kurimoto, 1996, 44). During the rainy season, when the land is submerged under water for several weeks, Anywaa farmers plant local flood-resistant varieties of maize and sorghum which, over many generations, have "adapted to the wet ecological condition." During the dry season, the post-flood refertilized soil retains enough moisture to allow for a second planting, a process known as "flood-retreat cultivation" (Feyissa, 2011, 81; Kurimoto, 1996, 45). The flood's annual renewal of the soil's organic content removes the "problem of exhausting soil fertility," allowing for the field to be "continuously cultivated forever unless the river changes its course" (Kurimoto, 1996, 44). The relatively stable and sufficient production levels have provisioned the subsistence needs of the Anywaa, without, however, producing any significant surplus.

Beyond simply responding to non-human ecological forces, the cultivation practices of Anywaa farmers have, in turn, played an important role in reproducing the soil and hydrological properties of the riverbanks on which they live. In an investigation of "sustainable land-water management in the lower Baro-Akobo river basin," Mengistu Woube concluded that "floodwater farming systems have been an indispensable component of this humid tropical zone since the early Anuak [Anywaa] settlement" (Woube, 1999, 242). Specifically, Woube argues that the Anywaa's hoe-based cultivation, protection of surrounding forests, and management of wetlands have ensured the proper balance between flooding and land infiltration capacity to allow for annual refertilization, rather than erosion, of the soil.

These particular practices are informed by what we might consider a non-human-centered, embedded, and relational epistemology. The Anywaa scholar Ojut Ojulu (2013), in a recent study on the effects of large-scale land acquisitions on Indigenous people in Gambella, has argued that "for the Anywaa Indigenous people in Gambella land is something more than a productive economic resource" (Ojulu, 2013, 286), and their concept of territory is "not that of the human being controlling and commanding the way in which the territory and its environment has to be governed and exploited" (Ojulu, 2013, 289). Rather than celebrating a separation from, and mastery over, nature, for the Anywaa, "the human being is only part of the bigger community of the living beings taking care of and benefiting from the territory and its environment." Informed by such an epistemological premise, in which other "living beings" steward, and therefore have a

claim over, the territory, Anywaa socio-ecological practices do not accord the "right to destroy the forest, because it does not belong to them alone but also to the rest of the living beings dwelling in these forests," and they further maintain that the "water resources have to be used in a way that does not disrupt the survival of the fish and other living beings in it" (Ojulu, 2013, 288).

The inter-constitutive relations between Anywaa socio-ecological practices, epistemology, soil fertility, and water flows were, however, occluded from the Karuturi project's field of vision, which was restricted by what James Scott (1998) has referred to as the "cyclopean shortsightedness of high-modernist agriculture" (Scott, 1998, 264). The narrow focus of high modernist agriculture on production and profit "casts into relative obscurity all the outcomes lying outside the immediate relationship between farm inputs and yields" such as the long-term effects of agricultural practice on "soil structure, water quality, [and] land tenure relations." Reflective of what Scott has called the "imperialism of high-modernist ideology," which seeks to establish the "mastery of nature" through a process of "radical simplification" of socio-ecological landscapes, Karuturi and the Ethiopian state isolated, and privileged, the ecological inputs of soil fertility and abundant water which were particularly valuable for short-term productionist aims, and discounted those factors deemed of less immediate value.

Among those factors discounted were the local knowledge and agricultural practices of the Anywaa. During meetings convened in order to inform local communities of the state's intention to lease land to foreign companies for the purpose of large-scale agricultural production, state officials made it clear that the deals were premised upon the Anywaa's incapacity to productively employ the rich resources of Gambella. In one such meeting, the regional governor informed those present that the "lands you are using are not utilized. We have investors coming who will use more efficiently. Those who resist we will take all possible action" (quoted in HRW, 2012, 31). On another occasion, officials made clear that "we will invite investors who will grow cash crops. You do not use the land well. It is lying idle" (quoted in HRW, 2012, 54). Within the Cortesian epistemic order driving the Ethiopian development project, then, Anywaa land use is necessarily understood as expressive of an irrational, and hence dangerous, misuse of bountiful resources of fertile soils and abundant waters.

In order, then, for the land to be put to rational use, it is necessary for the productive potential of the capital relation to be deepened in Gambella through processes of primitive accumulation that separate Indigenous producers from critical means of subsistence, releasing in the process both land and labor from the "irrational" grip of non-commodified socio-ecological regimes. For those living on Karuturi's land concession, this has involved

the company's enclosure, and subsequent clearance, of thousands of hectares of forest that are vital to their socio-ecological reproduction. The forests, besides protecting against erosion, windstorms, and severe floods, provide local Anywaa communities with key resources for home building, medicine, and supplemental food gathering.[4] Karuturi's clearance of the forests in order to make way for large-scale agricultural production was undertaken without any consultation with, or approval from, the communities on whose territory the forests were located. As a farmer from an affected village pointed out, "the local community was not consulted … we simply see them [Karuturi] cutting down the trees but we don't know who allow them."[5]

Rather than meaningfully consult with local communities, Karuturi's project necessarily called forth the "civilizing mission" which has been integral to the construction and penetration of the colonial-capitalist frontier. In line with the premise that the Anywaa are mired in "backward" or "primitive" agricultural practices, the promoters of this large-scale land deal, including the World Bank, the Ethiopian state, and Karuturi, suggested that such a project of agrarian transformation could enhance the livelihood prospects of local communities by facilitating a transition from the poverty trap of subsistence agriculture into better-paying jobs on large-scale farms (HRW, 2012, 100, 114–115). In addition, the agricultural project promised, through practices of corporate social responsibility, to connect hitherto isolated Anywaa villages to modern health, education, transportation, and communication networks.

In rendering the Anywaa people and their lands as passive "irrational" natures awaiting modernization by the superior human rationality embodied in state and capital, both the Ethiopian state and Karuturi reveal an epistemic blindness to the complex diversity of mutually constituting human and extra-human ecological actors in Gambella. Such "cyclopean shortsightedness" then allows for rich resources, such as fertile soils and abundant water, to be conceived in isolation from less valuable actors, such as the forests and local knowledge systems. Reconfiguring the socio-ecological order, Karuturi sought instead to bring its land to productive life through the introduction of universal industrial farming methods (heavy machinery, chemical pesticides, artificial fertilizers) that they argued had proven their worth in a variety of large-scale farming contexts (Bose and Mehra, 2012; Dubey, 2012). In order to rationally manage such a massive and rapid injection of capital, Karuturi, citing again the lack of local expertise, employed experts in the form of agronomists and farm managers who had experience with industrial farming in India, and those with experience with large-scale agriculture from Uruguay (Bose and Mehra, 2012; Dubey, 2012). Armed with the necessary capital and expertise, Karuturi cleared its lands of tens of thousands of hectares of forests, built the necessary dykes to properly

harness and restrain the abundant water resources of the Baro River, and declared its intention of having 45,000 hectares under cultivation by 2012 (ICRA Equity Research Service, 2012a).

Can the river speak? The rise of the Baro and the fall of Karuturi

The potentiality of producing cheap food in Gambella is thus premised upon both the appropriation of Anywaa socio-ecological knowledge and practice, integral as it is to the sustenance of the fertile soils and abundant waters that Karuturi seeks to act upon, and its erasure, as material recognition of the creative socio-ecological agency of local Anywaa communities would compromise the low cost of the land lease. Further, denying Anywaa practice and knowledge, as well as the agency of less important "extra-human" natures such as the forests of Gambella, is necessary to the initiation of the productive powers of the capital relation, as it enables soil fertility to be intensively and exhaustively acted upon without having to account for its reproductive conditions. This denial of the frontier's reproductive conditions, while potentiating capital's productive powers, simultaneously forecloses, however, the possibility of recognizing, and responding to, signals of ecological distress and exhaustion.

Scholars of political ecology are increasingly noting the agency of extra-human natures in escaping projects of mastery and shaping the formation and collapse of socio-ecological regimes. Timothy Mitchell (2002), in his ground-breaking article "Can the Mosquito Speak?", revealed how massive attempts to master and control nature, such as large-scale irrigation development in mid-twentieth-century Egypt, have been profoundly undone and reshaped by non-human natures such as malaria-spreading mosquitos. Mitchell's point is that the success of development projects is not achieved by the application of an exterior human expertise upon passive non-human nature, but rather involves the formation and deployment of knowledge through a relational ontology in which human and extra-human nature remake one another (Mitchell, 2002, 37). While modernizing development projects have been premised upon the epistemic subjugation of the non-human, Mitchell argues that it is nonetheless the case that extra-human nature has "never quite accepted this secondary role," and, as was the case with the mosquito in Egypt, the non-human often exceeds "human intention" and profoundly reshapes the trajectories of the projects within which human expertise has sought to act upon passive nature (Mitchell, 2002, 37).

Mitchell's emphasis on non-human agency has been reaffirmed in recent years by critical political-ecology perspectives which foreground the "limitations of mastery," insofar as they uncover how the subordination of

nature is not equivalent to control (Schneider and McMichael, 2010, 465), and that a "forgotten nature … which could be said to be taking its revenge … is in fact reminding us of its existence" (Serres, cited in Wittman, 2009, 807). Moore (2010a) highlights the constitutive socio-ecological dialectic of capitalism as world-ecology, in which extra-human nature, while epistemologically discounted, continues to shape, and be shaped by, the emergence and reproduction of capitalist accumulation. The moment of neoliberal ecological exhaustion has, in particular, been defined by the "creative responses of extra-human natures to the disciplines of capitalism" (Moore, 2010a, 406). We can identify such a creative response as central to the stark failure of Karuturi's efforts at large-scale agriculture in Gambella where, despite having invested upwards of 150 million US dollars in heavy machinery, sprays, fertilizers, clearing operations, dyke construction, and so on, the operations were "sunk" as the Baro River repeatedly rose up, breached the flood-control dykes, decimated the company's cultivated area, and paralyzed much of the company's heavy machinery that was not designed to act upon waterlogged land (Davison, 2013b; Sethi, 2013). In early 2011, prior to attempting to cultivate its first harvest, Karuturi was attracting global interest in its shares, which were trading at the time at nearly 40 rupees per share, largely due to its successful rose operations in Kenya and the potential that investors recognized in the low-cost high fertile land that Karuturi had secured in Gambella (ICRA Equity Research Service, 2012a). Having cultivated 12,000 hectares of corn that year, Karuturi expected to employ the returns on its initial harvest to expand the cultivated area to 45,000 hectares by May 2012 (ICRA Equity Research Service, 2012a). However, in the fall of 2011, as Karuturi prepared to harvest its initial crop of corn, its entire cultivated area of 12,000 hectares was inundated with flash floods as the Baro River overflowed and breached the dykes that Karuturi had constructed (Davison, 2011b). The CEO of the company, Ramakrishna Karuturi, expressed shock at the power and scale of the flooding, claiming that the floods could not have been predicted, particularly since they were stronger than any flood in recent memory (Bose and Mehra, 2012; Davison, 2011b). Karuturi, whose epistemological premise rendered him incapable of accounting for such ecological agency or feedback, expressed the limits of his company's expertise in the face of an "irrational" nature, as he claimed that "this kind of flooding we haven't seen before … this is a crazy amount of water" (quoted in Davison, 2011b).

The financial consequences of the flash floods for Karuturi included an immediate 15 million dollar loss, in the form of expected revenue and damaged machinery, and a rapid 85 percent collapse in its share price, reflecting investor concerns over the future viability of the project, despite the low-cost, highly fertile lands on which it was located (Bose and Mehra, 2012;

ICRA Equity Research Service, 2012b; Sethi, 2013). Karuturi's response was not to consult with Indigenous farmers who had deep local knowledge of flood patterns and management, but rather to hire expert flood-control and drainage firms from India and Holland to assess how best to control any future flooding that might impact its operations (Dubey, 2012). Based upon such expert advice, the company moved to fortify its system of dykes, with the intention of completely altering the dynamics of the floodplain by preventing the flow of any floodwater near their land allotment (Bose and Mehra, 2012; Sethi, 2013). However, the following year, in August 2012, the fortified dykes only aggravated the overflowing waters, first pushing the water back toward the riverbank and causing serious damage to Anywaa villages and farmland; then eventually, due to the intensification of the force of the water caused by the dykes themselves, the overflowing waters once again breached the dykes and caused substantial damage to the cultivated areas of Karuturi's farm operations (Sethi, 2013).

The company could only make sense of the flooding through the same epistemic frames with which they had approached the investment, and which had foreclosed the agency of extra-human nature and Indigenous people, as they argued that the floods were only further evidence that the land, while fertile and cheap, had hitherto been unused due to the antagonistic nature of the floodplain, and thus there was no question of any sort of land grabbing. Responding to the land-grab narrative in light of the flooding, Karuturi argued that "we have been trying to convince people who've been making these allegations that these are floodplains where nobody stays, where nobody can reside or graze their cattle because most of the time they are under four or five feet of water" (Davison, 2013b). At the same time, Karuturi excused its own apparent incompetence in managing the floods by claiming that it had no prior knowledge of the extent of the flooding, due to a supposed lack of data on past flooding and rainfall in Gambella (Sethi, 2013).

In making the floods intelligible in this way, however, Karuturi only further reinforces the epistemic foreclosure of modernist epistemology, as it presents the floods as a natural force that must be subdued by modern human expertise, while at the same time denying the presence of Indigenous people as thinking and acting beings who have long co-existed with the abundant waters of the Baro River. Contrary to Karuturi's assertions, there have been studies carried out on flood patterns in the Baro Akobo river basin that covers much of Gambella, including one of particular relevance that involved a fifteen-year study of what were termed "abnormal" flooding patterns between 1985 and 1999 (Woube, 1999). The author of the study drew a distinction between normal and abnormal flooding in Gambella and argued that the latter, in the form of severe water overflow that negatively

affected the livelihoods of Indigenous farmers, could be primarily attributed to the ecological change induced by the Derg regime's attempts to introduce large-scale mechanized agriculture into Gambella. In particular, the study found that the deforestation necessary to make space for large-scale agriculture was a key factor in triggering the abnormal flooding insofar as it reduced the waterabsorption capacity of the land (Woube, 1999).

While the scientific data is not readily available to confirm any link between Karuturi's massive forest clearance and the reduction of water infiltration capacity, affected Anywaa cultivators argue that the floods were intensified by the agricultural practices of the company (Sethi, 2013). Besides the effects of forest clearance, the role of the dykes were identified as central to aggravating and intensifying the floodwaters of the Baro. The dykes, they argued, had blocked the natural flow of the waters and consequently effected a reverse flow back to the river.[6] In the absence of alternative infiltration areas, the floodwaters then gathered in even greater force and overwhelmed the dykes. Thus, far from signifying an "irrational" force of nature, the aggressive floodwaters were co-constitutive forces in an emergent socio-ecology of large-scale industrial agriculture.

From the perspective of the local Anywaa cultivators, the failure of the Karuturi project could be attributed to the epistemic rift that underpinned its efforts to institute a socio-ecological regime organized around the imperatives of profit-oriented production. As a resident of a village located in the heart of the Karuturi land concession made clear,

> It's because he [Karuturi] never consulted the local people about the seasons of planting, this is why he was victim of flood. There is no problem of Baro River for farming. He doesn't listen to any local people—they listened to the highlander experts, but naturally we know the nature of the land.[7]

This discounting of local knowledge left Karuturi unaware of the mutual constitution of a diversity of human and non-human ecological actors. Besides drowning Karuturi's project, the aggravated floods wrought by forest clearance and dyke construction risk undermining the fertile soils that had mobilized the project in the first place, as the increase in velocity and volume of the floodwaters threaten to carry away, rather than gently deposit, the rich organic nutrients responsible for the annual refertilization of the soils.

Beyond aggravating the flooding of the Baro, the failure to involve Anywaa communities as knowledge-producing actors fundamentally exposed the "development" or "civilizing mission" pretense of the Karuturi investment in Gambella. Fieldwork observation and interviews in Anywaa villages along the riverbank directly adjacent to Karuturi's cultivated

acreage revealed that, though the project disrupted Anywaa livelihoods, it offered little in the way of secure alternatives pointing to a more prosperous future.[8] Significant among the disruptions, in addition to the adverse social impacts of the flooding mentioned earlier, were the extra distance, due to Karuturi's forest clearance, that villagers had to travel to hunt, collect firewood, and gather medicinal plants. The loss of food supplies and materials, whether due to flooding or forest clearance, was not, as promoters of the project had promised, made up for by food provisioned by Karuturi's more productive farming methods. Much of the acreage was dedicated to cash flex crops, destined for extra-local national, regional, and global markets, rather than the variants of maize and sorghum preferred for local consumption. Locals had little to show, by way of concrete evidence, that could affirm the promises of enhancing village-level infrastructure for the health and education sectors. The limited employment generated was described by locals as offering insufficient compensation, particularly in comparison to the wages offered for similar work to highlander employees. Quite often, in fact, wages were simply not paid to Anywaa employees who had worked on the farm. This was reflective, many believed, of the inferiority ascribed to Anywaa labor, as evident most disturbingly in their characterization by Karuturi's farm managers as "non-people" (OI, 2015, 10).

Local Anywaa communities, it must be emphasized, have responded with various forms of resistance and opposition to the forms of alienation, exploitation, and exclusion visited upon them by large-scale agricultural schemes. Regarding Karuturi specifically, Anywaa workers collectively filed a lawsuit for unpaid wages in the provincial courts of Gambella, exposing in the process Karuturi's impending financial collapse.[9] More broadly, Anywaa alienation from large-scale agricultural projects has elsewhere been expressed in armed attacks on investors in the heart of "Anywaaland" (Johnson, 2012), as well as in the central role played in anti-land-grabbing global shaming campaigns by diasporic Anywaa communities, in collaboration with international NGOs, sharing the stories of those marginalized in Gambella who are unable to speak out directly themselves for fear of state repression (Dubey, 2012; OI, 2013, 2015) . As part of such efforts toward building international solidarity, Anywaa diasporic organizations have developed links with anti-land-grabbing peasant organizations in India, gesturing perhaps toward more decolonial South–South relationships (Mittal, 2013).

The Anywaa resistance, in exposing the social consequences of the exclusionary premise of Karuturi's venture, works alongside the Baro's floods to caution states and investors against supporting such projects. As a result, Karuturi has been unable to secure financing from creditors increasingly wary of being associated with such a publicized case of land grabbing

which, combined with the losses suffered from the persistent flooding detailed above, has significantly hindered the company's ability to continue with operations in Gambella and beyond (Balasubramanyam, 2013; Davison, 2013a; ICRA Equity Research Service, 2012b). Forced, by creditors seeking returns on outstanding debts, to relinquish control of its major rose farm in Kenya in 2014 (Wahome, 2014), Karuturi, though quite inactive in Gambella since 2013, formally closed down operations and declared bankruptcy there in early 2015 (Fekade, 2015).

Conclusion

The attempt to resolve, then, the contradictions of primitive accumulation in India through the initiation of a project of global primitive accumulation in Gambella failed on account of its very constituting conditions. Specifically, the distinctive "double movement" compromise of India's "new political economy" generated, in the necessarily extra-national space of Gambella, the construction of a frontier of unused nature capable of resolving the food-price crisis aggravated by ecological exhaustion and the "reversal of primitive accumulation" in the core national space. Here, however, the denial of the reproductive conditions of the Gambella frontier generated, in turn, the rising resistance of the Baro River and the local Anywaa Indigenous communities. In this sense, the "double movement" in India today is completed by the missing "third movements" in Gambella. This signifies a potential reemergence of the decolonial "South–South" option, a possibility which we will further probe in the conclusion to the book.

For now, I will conclude this chapter by noting two significant implications of the failure of the Karuturi investment in Gambella for wider debates on land grabbing, agrarian change, and development. The first concerns the limitations posed by concepts such as the "yield gap" in determining directives for agricultural investment and development. In assuming a "lack" in local capacity, the yield-gap epistemic frame ignores how the space between current and potential production levels is actively produced, rather than passively wasted, in order to sustain a given landbase's socio-ecological conditions of possibility. The second, and related, implication draws primarily from my fieldwork in Gambella, where an overwhelming majority of those I spoke with[10] in Anywaa communities expressed an eagerness to engage projects of agrarian change which would foster local agricultural innovation and further diversify their livelihood sources. Rather than express a resistance to any sort of change, they emphasized that what they were opposed to was their exclusion from efforts to enhance productivity or further regional and national development. If their participation was made more central,

Anywaa cultivators insisted that they could facilitate, based upon their own long-standing knowledge systems rooted in the local landbase, more ecologically sensitive and socially inclusive forms of agricultural development that would be less prone to failure than the Karuturi project. Such an approach to agrarian change would, however, require viewing Gambella, not as a frontier of virgin lands and primitive inhabitants, but rather as a dynamic socio-ecology of mutually constituting, and sustaining, human and extra-human life forces.

Notes

1 Trade controls, particularly on the export of food, were intensified by Southern nations in the context of the 2008 food crisis (Mittal, 2009). With regards to farmer and consumer support subsidies, states across the Global South, including India, Brazil, Mexico, Malawi, and China, for example, increased the level of input and food subsidies in order to reduce costs for farmers and prices for consumers (Hopewell, 2015; Lerche, 2013; McMichael, 2012).

2 As Arrighi (2007) has argued, China's turn toward greater marketization of its economy from the 1980s onward was historically distinct insofar as it was premised upon an "accumulation without dispossession" structural framework wherein land was owned collectively and used on a household basis. This distinct form of "re-peasantization" facilitated rapid gains in productivity and incomes among China's small-scale farmers. The "accumulation without dispossession" structural framework has enabled, as mentioned in Chapter 4, forms of labor subsidization that enhance the competitiveness of Chinese industries without creating dependence on a colonial resource drain (Arrighi, 2007). While increasing corporatization of agriculture and land use concentration from the 1990s onward generated a dynamic of class differentiation in the agrarian sectors, Chinese peasants responded with widespread protests that forced the Chinese state to implement a "new socialist countryside" policy framework that centered upon the defense and prosperity of peasant livelihoods (Tiejun, 2021; Van Der Ploeg and Ye, 2016). The future of agriculture in China remains subject to contestation, as tendencies toward greater corporate control over agriculture exist in tension with the commitment of the Communist Party of China toward maintaining a small farmer centered agricultural development model (Yan et al., 2021). The impact China's domestic agrarian order has on its South–South agricultural co-operation initiatives has been considered by McMichael (2020, 2023).

3 Please see OI (2011) for further details on specific Indian firms operating in Gambella and elsewhere in Ethiopia.

4 Fieldwork interviews, April 2014. This is further confirmed in a report released by the Oakland Institute (OI, 2015).

5 Fieldwork interview, April 26, 2014.

6 Fieldwork interviews, April 30, 2014.
7 Fieldwork interview, April 26, 2014.
8 Fieldwork interviews, April 26–30, 2014. A report released by the Oakland Institute (OI, 2015) presents similar findings.
9 Fieldwork interview, April 27, 2014.
10 I spoke with approximately twenty-five residents of four different Anywaa villages in April and May of 2014.

Conclusion

This book has been motivated by the imperative of clarifying the theoretical and historical significance of the motive forces and consequences of the global land grab, particularly as they have manifested in the "South–South" case of the Indian agribusiness firm Karuturi's attempted institution of a large-scale industrial farm in the Gambella province of Ethiopia. It has sought to do so by articulating a theoretical and historical framework which situates the global land grab within the *longue durée* of a colonial-capitalist modernity marked by accumulation cycles that rise and fall in association with the constitution, and ultimate exhaustion, of global ecological surpluses provisioned through racialized society–nature regimes. Placed within such an historical framework, the global land grab reveals the global and ecological premises and consequences of capitalist agrarian transition and development which have otherwise remained obscured within conventional approaches to the agrarian question and primitive accumulation. This challenges, in particular, the notion that capitalist development's founding condition of agrarian surplus is achieved on an endogenous national basis through the self-sustaining productivity advances of the market dependent capital–labor relation. This book has thus argued that the global land grab elucidates how capital's constituting agrarian surplus remains dependent upon the colonial appropriation and erasure, through the racialized technology of "misanthropic skepticism," of Indigenous peoples whose socio-ecological knowledges and practices have been fundamental to the co-constitution of the "natural" abundance of the surplus provisioning frontier zone.

Not only, then, does this book mark an important entry point of the co-production of race and nature into the literature on land grabbing, it does so by further clarifying the qualitative import of race and racialization, as a distinctive "human over nature" logic of power, to the emergence and reproduction of capitalist accumulation and development. In this sense, this work stands as an important deepening of the understanding of the significance of race to core concerns of critical political economy. In particular, it has undertaken a decolonial reconstruction of primitive accumulation, a key transformative mechanism identified by agrarian political economy in the successful resolution of the agrarian question. For conventional Marxian approaches to the agrarian question, as detailed in Chapter 1, primitive

accumulation involves the private enclosure of agrarian resources, within a contained national space, that give rise to the foundational productive antagonism between capital and dispossessed labor (Brenner, 1976; Byres, 1986). While this is certainly part of the story of agrarian transition, only going this far occludes the necessary "extra-national" reproductive premise of the capital–labor antagonism. For market-dependent labor to reproduce itself, to be subject to the wage repression necessary for capitalist profits and accumulation to proceed, and to offer, through its absorption of consumer goods, a home market for industrial outputs, it is necessary that the costs of the key wage-good, food, be repressed to the greatest possible extent. Here, I have followed world-historical approaches to the agrarian question in foregrounding the key role played by the constitution of cheap land and labor in politically subjugated colonies in provisioning the transitioning core with the surplus of cheap food necessary for the hegemonic resolution of the capital–labor antagonism (Wallerstein, 1974; Friedmann and McMichael, 1989). In order to capture such an expansive "extra-national" frame of transition, I have further developed the concept of "global primitive accumulation" (Araghi, 2009b; Moyo et al., 2012) wherein enclosures in the periphery give rise to forms of labor and labor control differentiated from those given by enclosures in the core zone. Specifically, conceived on a world scale and thus effected by mechanisms of global primitive accumulation, the resolution of the agrarian question involves the institution of "free" labor in the transitioning core, whose simultaneous "double movement" subjection to market-based exploitation and claim to non-market state protection stands upon the pedestal of absolutely exhaustible racialized labor supplies ontologically excluded from such claim-making capacity.

Insofar, however, that the world-historical approach to the agrarian question and global primitive accumulation did not go beyond the quantitative focus on "unfree" labor and cheap land, it remains unaware of the key qualitative relations set in motion by enclosures in the extra-national colonial space. This book has addressed this limitation by applying the decolonial concept of coloniality to the emergent theory of "capitalism as world-ecology" in order to argue that differentiated processes of global primitive accumulation institute distinctive, yet co-productive, zones of commodification centered upon the qualitative capital–labor relation, and zones of appropriation centered upon the qualitative racialized society–nature distinction. In this rendering, the co-constitution of racialization and global primitive accumulation stands for more than an ideological justification for the theft of land and labor. Rather, race signifies the necessary symbolic-material technology through which enclosure in the colonies effects the human–nature separation that enables a "rational" humanity to put to productive use the "free gifts"—soil fertility, mineral wealth, forest cover, water

abundance—bestowed upon, but not realized by, an "irrationally" unused nature. This society–nature distinction, I have argued, emerges through the racialized collapse of Indigenous people into the sphere of "irrational" passive nature, thereby making possible the effective disarticulation of the active co-production of Indigenous knowledge, practice, and extra-human natures. It is, moreover, such a denial of the socio-ecological reproductive conditions of extra-human nature that enables the latter to be recategorized as virgin, or pristine, resources which can, therefore, be freely appropriated in service of the transitioning core's cost-reducing imperatives.

A further dimension of the political ecology of colonial capitalism framework advanced in this book consists of the fundamental contradiction through which the very relations—the racialized denial of the reproductive conditions of "unused" nature—enabling "ecological surplus" to come, inevitably, to switch the frontier to a condition of ecological exhaustion wherein the increasing inability of extra-human nature to provision "unpaid" work, as evidenced in collapsing soil fertility, sets in motion a secular increase in input costs that, in turn, induces a systemic crisis of accumulation. Besides ecological signals of distress/refusal, exhaustion, I argued in Chapter 4, can, as was particularly the case in the collapse of the British-led accumulation cycle, be effected by the "hidden third movement" of anticolonial contestation launched by Indigenous peoples in opposition to their subjection to racialized technologies of misanthropic skepticism. The clarification, here, of the inevitable exhaustion of the surplus signifies a further challenge to the conventional Marxist approach which holds that the agrarian question is resolved in a linear temporal register. In other words, ecological exhaustion of the surplus, a phenomenon of which classical Marxism has been remarkably unaware (Bernstein, 2010), suggests that the agrarian question, rather than being resolved once and for all, is posed anew, even for "leading" capitalist states, in the racialized pursuit of fresh frontiers of unused nature capable of underwriting, via surpluses of cheap food, a successive accumulation cycle. The global land grab, I have argued, assumes historical significance precisely as a potential ecological surplus regenerating response to the neoliberal accumulation crisis that has taken hold since 2007–2008, and which has been significantly marked by a food-price inflation crisis. In Chapter 5, I drew attention to two competing trajectories of land relations that emerged in response to the neoliberal crisis conjuncture. The first trajectory arose out of a global peasant movement contesting the dispossessive "de-peasantization" logic of the privatized neoliberal agrarian order. In its more militant trajectories, the peasant counter-movement advanced a "re-peasantization" program premised upon renewing and deepening the land reform/reclamation basis of decolonization. Southern states, such as India, that proved incapable or unwilling to restructure their development paths

upon the "re-peasantization" trajectory found themselves structurally compelled to respond to the contradictions of the neoliberal accumulation crisis with the second trajectory of land relations—the "land grab as development" strategy. The South–South dimensions of the land rush thus express both a simultaneous challenge to the traditional "North–South" world-ecological order of surplus extraction and transfer, while simultaneously risking the reinstantiation, though now along "South–South" lines, of the racialized society–nature premise of capitalist development. In this sense, this book has argued that the radical decolonial potential of the South's original challenge to Northern world-ecological hegemony risks being compromised in favour of a capitalist developmental orientation wherein Southern states seek to catch up to the North through a program of rapid national industrial development which remains dependent upon the racialized production of terra nullius in extra-national space.

I have specified, in Chapter 5, such South–South dimensions of the global land grab by linking India's attempted transnationalization of agricultural production into Gambella with the food-price inflation crisis that India has confronted since the mid-2000s, on account of both its own shrinking "internal" frontier capacity and the unfavourable global market context of the Northern dominated foodgrain trade. The shrinking "internal" frontier reflects both the straightforward ecological exhaustion of the long green revolution, which had proven so essential to the cheap food surplus underwriting capitalist development across both statist and neoliberal eras, and the constraints imposed on further internal frontier expansion by social movements of peasants and tribals forcing protective non-market reproductive concessions from the Indian state. The key thesis of the chapter emerges here: Indian state and capital sought to overcome the crisis of food-price inflation, and hence the underlying frontier constraint, by mobilizing, through the racialized appropriation and erasure of Indigenous knowledge and practice, the fertile lands of Gambella as a site of "virgin" nature which could, on account of its lack of value-producing human presence, be freely, or very cheaply, appropriated.

In foregrounding, through an empirical investigation of the Karuturi investment in Gambella, land grabbing as a racialized appropriation and erasure of Indigenous knowledge and practice, this book has offered a more robust rejoinder to the "yield gap" epistemic premise of the global land grab than has hitherto been made by critical land grab scholars. Land-grab scholars have questioned the World Bank's assertion that large-scale investors are targeting unused/underused lands, defined by a significant gap between current and potential rates of production, by emphasizing that such lands are in fact used by Indigenous people, though perhaps in ways less visible to a narrow productivist lens, or that they provide important

ecosystem services, such as forest cover mitigating against climate change (Borras et al., 2011; McMichael, 2012). I deepen such a critique of the yield-gap premise by revealing, empirically, how the Indigenous Anywaa people of Gambella do not simply use such lands, a characterization which risks the representation of a passively given landscape, but rather actively co-produce their "natural" abundance through distinctive place-based socio-ecological practices and knowledges. In particular, I have highlighted the Anywaa's practices of flood-retreat agriculture and forest conservation as vital to the active co-production of the rich "organic" content of Gambella's soils. The Karuturi investment's racialized recategorization, via the yield-gap episteme, of Gambella as a virgin nature capable of delivering cheap surpluses of food clarifies, I argue, how a definitive feature of land grabbing consists of the appropriation and erasure of the co-constitutive force of Indigenous socio-ecological practice and knowledge. Not only, then, did the Karuturi project adversely impact Anywaa livelihoods through its enclosure of important ecological resources, but it further stood as an appropriation of the Anywaa's co-production of Gambella's fertile soils.

The erasure of the socio-ecological reproductive conditions of the Gambella frontier, while necessary for the institution of large-scale industrial agriculture envisioned by the promoters of the Karuturi investment, generated, in relatively short order, a series of oppositional responses, ranging from intensified flooding to Indigenous resistance, which proved to be fatal for the project. In empirically documenting such failure, and offering a theoretical framework through which it could be interpreted, this book has further expanded the parameters of land-grabbing debates which have generally neglected to take into serious consideration the significance of such implementation challenges. The failed project reveals, I argue, the risks posed to forms of development that are premised upon constructing lands targeted for investment as comprised of virgin soils and "primitive" inhabitants. While I have made such an argument through a specific empirical examination of the Karuturi investment, it is increasingly evident that the latter's experience of failure has been shared by most Indian investors in Gambella who have similarly discounted the co-productive presence of Indigenous knowledge and practice in the forging of the region's "natural" abundance (Endeshaw, 2016; GRAIN, 2016).

Although such failure, along with the sustained resistance and opposition expressed by Indigenous peoples (GRAIN, 2016) and global human-rights organizations (OI, 2015; Oxfam, 2012), has significantly lowered the enthusiasm surrounding large-scale agricultural investments, this study's elucidation of the systemic imperatives of capitalist accumulation and development suggests, nonetheless, that the latter will continue to motivate states and

corporations to pursue agricultural frontier expansion. Indeed, the international NGO GRAIN (2016), which has since 2008 been at the forefront of land-grabbing debates, noted with concern, in a study undertaken in 2016, that the "new research shows that, while some deals have fallen by the wayside, the global farmland grab is far from over. Rather, it is in many ways deepening, expanding to new frontiers and intensifying conflict around the world." The report further noted that "the food security agenda is still a factor driving farmland deals." For India, specifically, the ongoing food-price inflation crisis constituted a central concern for the Indian prime minister during his recent visit, in July 2016, to several African countries. As noted by a senior Indian government official in the lead up to the Africa visit, "the government is working over both short-term and long-term strategies to control the rising prices of food grains, including that of pulses. Exploring the option of contract farming with countries like Mozambique, Tanzania and Malawi is a long-term strategy" (Vikram, 2016). In addition to contract farming, India's food minister indicated at the time that, in order to "plug the demand–supply gap," the government is looking to directly "cultivate pulses there … for this, we are sending a team to Mozambique" (Karnik, 2016).

Insofar as this would involve an expansion of an ecologically exhaustive industrial agriculture, oriented toward long-distance food circulation and the displacement of sustainable, locally oriented forms of Indigenous agro-ecology, the ongoing land grab remains a significant threat to the global advancement of socio-ecological justice. Expressing even more urgency, Philip McMichael has argued that the

> land grab—to the extent that it is incapable of recognizing the salience of low-carbon bio-diverse agriculture—is the ultimate death wish as industrial biofuels and value-added agriculture will not resolve the combined problems of climate change and food insecurity. They will only buy time (and space!) in the short run for political and economic elites and consumers with purchasing power. In this scenario the longer run is destined to be catastrophic. (McMichael, 2012, 697)

Complementing McMichael's food-regime articulation of the existential crisis posed by the ongoing land grab, scholars of the "Agrarian South" school, though consistently ignored by Northern scholarship, have emphasized that such ecological and social consequences, particularly insofar as legacies of decolonization heighten their visibility, render the approach of "development as catching-up-with-the-West" (Chakrabarty, 2010) as increasingly a "systemic impossibility and an ecological dead end" (Agrarian South Editorial, 2012, 10). For Samir Amin, the "catch-up" paradigm is premised

upon the Eurocentric-anthropocentric myth of agrarian transition that was critiqued in Chapter 1 of this book, and thus ignores how the "classical" European agrarian transitions were

> sustainable only through the safety valve allowed by the mass emigration to the Americas. It would be absolutely impossible for the countries of the periphery today—who make up 80% of the world's people, of which almost half are rural—to reproduce this model. They would need five or six Americas to be able to "catch up" in the same way. "Catching up" is therefore an illusion, and any progress in this direction can only result in an impasse. This is why I say that the anti-imperialist struggles are potentially anti-capitalist. If we cannot "catch up," we might as well "do something else." (Amin, 2014, 15)

Amin is particularly concerned here with the potentially billions of peasant farmers who will be rendered permanently surplus if the expansion of labor-displacing industrial agriculture continues unchecked through ongoing land grabbing. Combined with the ecological consequences of such a model, this means, for Moyo, Jha, and Yeros that "to grab land and natural resources—is no solution for the large majority of humanity and in the long run it cannot but result in catastrophe for civilization. There is an urgent need to think creatively about alternatives in development and, indeed, rethink the fundamentals of modernity" (Moyo et al., 2013, 94). In light, then, of the evident colonial (global polarization) and ecologically exhaustive implications of capitalist modernity's rural/agrarian to urban/industrial evolutionary premise, which fuels the land grab yet is increasingly a "systemic impossibility" on account of the limited capacity for non-agrarian labor absorption, the food-regime political project and the Agrarian South intervention converge in articulating a new socio-ecologically emancipatory agrarian question. The new agrarian question quite explicitly challenges Bernstein's controversial thesis regarding the death of the agrarian question. Bernstein's thesis, it is argued, expresses "the conventional wisdom of the last quarter century [which] has been that the agrarian question is a thing of the past, given the many social and technological revolutions of the last two hundred years. 'We have been liberated from the constraints of agriculture, land and nature,' they proclaim!" (Agrarian South Editorial, 2012, 1). Arguing that such a liberation from nature is in fact at the root of intensifying ecological contradictions and global polarizations and exclusions, the new agrarian question is redefined as the challenge of instituting the land and labor relations through which agro-ecological (Altieri, 2011), rather than industrial-capitalist, forms of food production can ground the emergence of more just and diverse

socio-ecological futures. This privileges diverse agro-ecological models which are distinctive to the particular socio-ecological context within which they arise and emphasizes, as such, the replacement of expensive industrial inputs with labor-intensive practices that draw upon local knowledge of ecologically sensitive forms of sowing, fertilizing, crop rotation, harvesting, and weed/pest control.

The new agrarian question, it is important to note, does not, for either food regime-analysts or Agrarian South scholars, signify a top-down articulation advanced by academics and activists mystified by romanticist nostalgia for disappearing agrarian worlds. Rather, in the language of Agrarian South scholars, a wide spectrum of peasants, along with the growing "semi-proletariat" already rendered surplus by capitalist globalization, have "never abandoned the agrarian question, or the land question … Access to land for the expelled semi-proletariat is now also a question of regaining access to basic citizenship and social rights, in both rural and urban areas—a political motive which is, as before, distinct from the productionist" (Agrarian South Editorial, 2012, 8). In other words, the materiality of resistance waged by peasants, Indigenous peoples, and the semi-proletariat to their reduction to surplus/redundant labor, via measures such as ongoing land grabbing, gives rise to an agrarian question which captures the reemergence of more decolonial socio-ecological options. This recalls the triple movement framework I elaborated in Chapter 4, with the new agrarian question defined here by the "third movement" calling into question the extra-national socio-ecological cost externalizations underwriting, through the provisioning of cheap food, the double-movement compromise in core national zones. McMichael suggests as such, arguing that the "food-land sovereignty movements" at the heart of the new agrarian question,

> represent a Polanyian countermovement with a difference—whereas Polanyi's double movement problematic concerned protection against the market, the twenty-first century countermovement concerns protection against the reduction of life (habitats, food, natural cycles) to "bio-values" to justify land annexation in the interests of fungible commodities (food, feed, and fuel) and conservation emission offsets. Whereas the earlier countermovement was oriented toward public regulation of markets, the recent countermovement is oriented toward a civilizational goal of regulation of social life by ecological principles. This is the ontological difference. (McMichael, 2014, 50)

Such a counter-movement, problematizing modernity's racialized "mastery over nature" ontology, potentially stands as the basis of an alternative "decolonial" South–South paradigm. Indeed, the resistance of Anywaa

communities, in rendering Indian land grabbing in Gambella visible to Indian social movements, led to a "coming together of Indian and Ethiopian civil society groups … [that marked] a turning point in the struggle for land rights and livelihoods in the two countries and beyond," particularly insofar as it constituted a rejection, on a transnational scale, of "the idea that 'some have to be sacrificed' for the 'larger national good'" (Mittal, 2013). Substantively, as suggested above, the new agrarian question moves beyond such rejection in its contemplation of agro-ecological "re-peasantization" as an alternative to the "sacrifice zones" instituted, via ongoing land grabbing, in the transition to, or renewal of, capitalist world-ecologies. Re-peasantization signifies a strategy of revalorizing peasant forms of agriculture, through which labor-intensive production ensures both livelihood security and ecological sustainability.[1] This recalls the radical socialist decolonial path opened by the Chinese revolution that was discussed briefly in Chapter 4 and demonstrated the promise of a national development plan constructed on socialized and nationalized land reform. Beyond defending existing peasant and Indigenous communities against land grabbing, re-peasantization potentially involves a "counter-enclosure" whereby land, through direct actions such as "land occupation" or state-mediated land reform, is redistributed from concentrated landholdings to those hitherto consigned to the alienated fate of surplus labor. As Agrarian South scholars have emphasized, re-peasantization is already in motion across much of the South. Prominent cases include the occupation of agrarian land by the landless workers movement (MST) in Brazil (McMichael, 2014, 38); the Kudambashree initiative redistributing land to women laborers in the Indian state of Kerala, wherein social empowerment, poverty reduction, and food security have been advanced through solidaristic and cooperative forms of agricultural production (Mukherjee-Reed, 2015); and, perhaps most notably, the radical redistribution of land from large-scale white settler-colonial farms to smaller-scale Indigenous farmers in Zimbabwe since the early 2000s (Moyo, 2011).

Re-peasantization stands more fundamentally, it is argued, as a conscious reversal of capitalist modernity's anti-peasant "agro-pessimism" (McMichael, 2014, 50). For the latter, the "good life" is rendered commensurate with the liberation of humanity from the drudgery of agrarian labor and the dependence on an "irrational" nature. Offering, instead, a more consciously socio-ecological good life, re-peasantization involves, in this sense, more than simply the redistribution of land, but rather an explicit recognition of the co-production of both human life and extra-human nature through practices and knowledges informed by the immediate socio-ecological context. Such recognition, insofar as it potentially foregrounds deep place-based Indigenous socio-ecological knowledge and practices,

thus fundamentally unsettles the Cortesian premise of the colonial-capitalist world-ecology. This revaluation of the indispensable role played by Indigenous practice and knowledge in the restoration and sustenance of agrarian landscapes introduces a "land sovereignty" dimension into the new agrarian question which is "protective as well as redistributive, advocating preservation of land access for producers for whom land, forests, and waterways constitute collective lifeworlds" (McMichael, 2014, 49). Recognizing Indigenous socio-ecological lifeworlds as integral to more just and sustainable planetary horizons is not, it bears noting, simply a populist-romanticist return to a pre-capitalist utopia, as sometimes charged by critics (Bernstein, 2014; Jansen, 2015). It simply constitutes what should, in fact, be a rather evident premise of engagement: acknowledging and building from, rather than appropriating and erasing, the deep place-based knowledge and practices of Indigenous peoples. It is imperative, I would argue, that scholars attuned to the task of socio-ecological justice increase efforts to take into serious analytical consideration the extent to which such restitution of land rights, along with the broader recognition of place-based Indigenous lifeworlds, can ground "alternative" paths of development which can offer more meaningful and sustainable forms of labor and lifeworlds than the alienating and exhaustive forms offered by capitalist agrarian transition.

Note

1 This is not a call for an uncritically romantic reconstruction of peasant and Indigenous socio-ecological ways of being. It is, of course, the case that these "modes of existence" often include oppressive and exclusionary relations. The point here is simply to state that deep place-based knowledge and practice, which have been essential to a given socio-ecology's sustenance, should take evident priority in projects of development and agrarian change. This would not preclude challenging their oppressive and exclusionary tendencies.

Bibliography

Adams, W. and Mulligan, M. 2002. *Decolonizing Nature: Strategies for Conservation in a Post-Colonial Era* (London: Earthscan).

Agrarian South Editorial. 2012. "The Agrarian Question: Past, Present and Future" *Agrarian South: Journal of Political Economy* 1(1): 1–10.

Ahuja, R. 2014. "Africa Rising" *Millennium Post*. http://www.farmlandgrab.org/post/print/23461. Accessed August 11, 2024.

Ajl, M. 2021a. *A People's Green New Deal* (London: Pluto Press).

Ajl, M. 2021b. "The Arab Nation, the Chinese Model, and Theories of Self-Reliant Development" in *Beyond Nationalism and the Nation-State*, eds I. Corut and J. Jongerden (London: Routledge), pp. 139–157.

Akram-Lodhi, A. H. 2009. "Modernizing Subordination? A South Asian Perspective on the World Development Report 2008—Agriculture for Development" *Journal of Peasant Studies* 36(3): 611–619.

Akram-Lodhi, A. H. 2012. "Contextualising Land Grabbing: Contemporary Land Deals, the Global Subsistence Crisis and the World Food System" *Canadian Journal of Development Studies* 33(2): 119–142.

Akram-Lodhi, A. H. and Kay, C. 2009. "The Agrarian Question: Peasants and Rural Change" in *Peasants and Globalization: Political Economy, Rural Transformation and the Agrarian Question*, eds H. A. Lodhi and C. Kay (London: Routledge), pp. 3–34.

Akram-Lodhi, A. H. and Kay, C. 2010. "Surveying the Agrarian Question (Part 1): Unearthing Foundations, Exploring Diversity" *Journal of Peasant Studies* 37(1): 177–202.

Alavi, H. 1975. "India and the Colonial Mode of Production" *The Socialist Register* 12: 160–197.

Alden Wily, L. 2012. "Looking Back to See Forward: The Legal Niceties of Land Theft in Land Rushes" *Journal of Peasant Studies* 39(3–4): 751–775.

Altieri, M. 2011. "The Agroecological Revolution in Latin America: Rescuing Nature, Ensuring Food Sovereignty and Empowering Peasants" *Journal of Peasant Studies* 38(3): 587–612.

Amin, S. 1974. *Accumulation on a World-Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment* (New York: Monthly Review Press).

Amin, S. 2010. *Law of Worldwide Value* (New York: Monthly Review Press).

Amin, S. 2013. "China 2013" *Monthly Review* 64(10). https://monthlyreview.org/2013/03/01/china-2013/. Accessed August 11, 2024.

Amin, S. 2014. "Imperialist Rent and the Challenges for the Radical Left" *Globalizations* 11(1): 11–21.

Amin, S. 2015. "Contemporary Imperialism" *Monthly Review* 67(3): 4–17.

Amin, S. 2016. "The World without Bandung, or for a Polycentric System with No Hegemony" *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 17(1): 7–11.

Anand, R., Kumar, N. and Tulin, V. 2016. "Understanding India's Food Inflation: The Role of Demand and Supply Factors" *IMF Working Paper*.

Anderson, K. 2007. *Race and the Crisis of Humanism* (London: Routledge).

Araghi, F. 1995. "Global Depeasantization, 1945–1990" *The Sociological Quarterly* 36(2): 337–368.

Araghi, F. 2001. "The Great Global Enclosures of Our Times: Peasants and the Agrarian Question at the End of the Twentieth Century" in *Hungry for Profit: The Agribusiness Threat to Farmers, Food, and the Environment*, eds F. Magdoff, F. H. Buttel, and J. B. Foster (New York: Monthly Review Press), pp. 145–160.

Araghi, F. 2003. "Food Regimes and the Production of Value: Some Methodological Remarks" *Journal of Peasant Studies* 30(2): 41–70.

Araghi, F. 2009a. "Accumulation by Displacement: Global Enclosures, Food Crisis, and the Ecological Contradictions of Capitalism" *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)* 32(1): 113–146.

Araghi, F. 2009b. "The Invisible Hand and the Visible Foot: Peasants, Dispossession and Globalization" in *Peasants and Globalization: Political Economy, Rural Transformation and the Agrarian Question*, eds H. A. Lodhi and C. Kay (London: Routledge), pp. 111–147.

Araghi, F. 2012. "Land Dispossession and Global Crisis: Introduction to the Special Section on Land Rights in the World-System" *Journal of World-Systems Research* 18(1): 1–5.

Arnold, D. 1984. "Famine in Peasant Consciousness and Peasant Action: Madras, 1876–78" in *Subaltern Studies III,* ed. R. Guha (New Delhi: Oxford University Press), pp. 62–115.

Arnold, D. 1996. *The Problem of Nature: Environment, Culture and European Expansion* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers).

Arrighi, G. 1994. *The Long Twentieth Century* (London: Verso).

Arrighi, G. 2007. *Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the Twenty-First Century* (London: Verso).

Arrighi, G. and Zhang, L. 2011. "Beyond the Washington Consensus: A New Bandung?" in *Globalization and Beyond: New Examinations of Global Power and Its Alternatives*, eds J. Shefner and P. Fernandez-Kelly (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press).

Badrinath, R. 2014. "Karuturi's Valentine's Day Set to Be on a Sour Note" *Business Standard*, 13 February. http://www.business-standard.com/article/companies/karuturi-s-valentine-s-day-set-to-be-on-a-sour-note-114021301466_1.html. Accessed August 11, 2024.

Bagchi, A. K. 2009. "Nineteenth Century Imperialism and Structural Transformation in Colonized Countries" in *Peasants and Globalization: Political Economy, Rural Transformation and the Agrarian Question*, eds H. A. Lodhi and C. Kay (London: Routledge), pp. 83–110.

Balasubramanyam, K. R. 2013. "An Ambition Pricked" *Business Today*, 14 April. http://businesstoday.intoday.in/story/ram-karuturi-mulls-taking-his-rose-to-maize-company-private/1/193582.html. Accessed August 11, 2024.

Bannerjee, S. 1980. *India'' Simmering Revolution: The Naxalite Uprising* (London: Zed Books).

Bauer, A. and Bhan, M. 2018. *Climate Without Nature: A Critical Anthropology of the Anthropocene* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Bauer, A. and Ellis, E. 2018. "The Anthropocene Divide: Obscuring Understanding of Social-Environmental Change" *Current Anthropology* 59(2): 209–227.

Berhanu, K. and Poulton, C. 2014. "The Political Economy of Agricultural Extension in Ethiopia: Economic Growth and Political Control" *Development Policy Review* 32(2): 197–213.

Bernstein, H. 1996. "Agrarian Questions Then and Now" *Journal of Peasant Studies* 24(1/2): 22–59.

Bernstein, H. 2006. "Is There an Agrarian Question in the Twenty-First Century?" *Canadian Journal of Development Studies* 27(4): 449–460.

Bernstein, H. 2009. "Agrarian Questions from Transition to Globalization" in *Peasants and Globalization: Political Economy, Rural Transformation and the Agrarian Question*, eds H. A. Lodhi and C. Kay (London: Routledge), pp. 239–262.

Bernstein, H. 2010. "Introduction: Some Questions Concerning the Productive Forces" *Journal of Agrarian Change* 10(3): 300–314.

Bernstein, H. 2014. "Food Sovereignty via the 'Peasant Way': A Sceptical View" *Journal of Peasant Studies* 41(6): 1031–1063.

Bhambra, G. 2011. "Talking among Themselves? Weberian and Marxist Historical Sociologies as Dialogues without 'Others'" *Millennium* 39(3): 667–681.

Bhandar, B. 2018. *Colonial Lives of Property* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press).

Bhattacharya, A. 2010. "Green Revolution Over, Agriyields Staring at Dead End?" *Times of India*, 26 November. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/environment/developmental-issues/Green-revolution-over-agri-yields-staring-at-dead-end/articleshow/6991376.cms. Accessed August 11, 2024.

Bhattacharya, N. 1996. "Pastoralists in a Colonial World" in *Nature, Culture, Imperialism: Essays on the Environmental History of South Asia*, eds R. Guha and D. Arnold (Delhi: Oxford University Press), pp. 49–85.

Bhattacharya, R. and Gupta, A. 2015. *Food Inflation in India: Causes and Consequences* (New Delhi: National Institute of Public Finance and Policy).

Bigelow, A. 2020. *Mining Language: Racial Thinking, Indigenous Knowledge, and Colonial Metallurgy in the Early Modern Iberian World* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press).

Blackburn, R. 1998. *The Making of New World Slavery: From the Baroque to the Modern, 1492–1800* (London: Verso).

Blackburn, R. 2011. *The American Crucible: Slavery, Emancipation, and Human Rights* (London: Verso).

Blaut, J. M. 1993. *The Colonizer's Model of the World: Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric History* (New York: The Guilford Press).

Blaut, J. M. 1994. "Robert Brenner in the TUNNEL OF TIME" *Antipode* 26(4): 351–374.

Bond, P. 2016. "Brics Banking and the Debate over Sub-Imperialism" *Third World Quarterly* 37(4): 611–629.

Bonneuil, C. and Fressoz, J. B. 2017. *The Shock of the Anthropocene* (London: Verso).

Borras, S. 2003. "Questioning Market-Led Agrarian Reform: Experiences from Brazil, Columbia, and South Africa" *Journal of Agrarian Change* 3(3): 367–394.

Borras Jr., S., Hall R., Scoones I., White B. and Wolford W. 2011. "Towards a Better Understanding of Global Land Grabbing: An Editorial Introduction" *Journal of Peasant Studies* 38(2): 209–216.

Borras Jr., S. M., Franco, J. C. and Wang, C. 2013. "The Challenge of Global Governance of Land Grabbing: Changing International Agricultural Context and Competing Political Views and Strategies" *Globalizations* 10(1): 161–179.

Bose, N. and Mehra, S. 2012. "Karuturi Global—Don't Crave Roses If You Can't Grasp Thorns OR How a Small Indian Company Is Working Overtime to Transform East African Agriculture" London Business School. http://media1.intoday.in/businesstoday/images/Karuturi-case-study-full.pdf. Accessed August 11, 2024.

Brammal, C. 2009. *Chinese Economic Development* (New York: Routledge).

Brenner, R. 1976. "Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe" *Past and Present* 70(170): 30–75.

Brenner, R. 1977. "The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism" *New Left Review* I(104): 25–92.

Brenner, R. 1985. "The Agrarian Roots of European Capitalism" in *The Brenner Debate: Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe*, eds T. H. Aston and C. H. E. Philpin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 213–323.

Burkett, P. 1999. *Marx and Nature: A Red and Green Perspective* (Basingstoke: Macmillan).

Burke, A., Fishel, S. and Levine, D. 2016. "Planet Politics: A Manifesto from the Ends of IR" *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 44(3): 499–523.

Bush, R., Bujra, J. and Littlejohn, G. 2011. "The Accumulation of Dispossession" *Review of African Political Economy* 38(128): 187–192.

Butler, J. 2004. *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence* (London: Verso).

Byres, T. J. 1977. "Agrarian Transition and the Agrarian Question" *Journal of Peasant Studies* 4(3): 258–274.

Byres, T. J. 1986. "The Agrarian Question, Forms of Capitalist Agrarian Transition and the State: An Essay with References to Asia" *Social Scientist* 14(162/163): 3–67.

Byres, T. J. 1991. "The Agrarian Question and Differing Forms of Capitalist Agrarian Transition: An Essay with Reference to Asia" in *Rural Transformation in Asia*, eds J. Breman and S. Mundle (Delhi: Oxford University Press).

Byres, T. J. 1996. *Capitalism from Above and Capitalism from Below: An Essay in Comparative Political Economy* (London: Macmillan).

Byres, T. J. 2003. "Paths of Capitalist Agrarian Transition in the Past and in the Contemporary World" in *Agrarian Studies: Essays on Agrarian Relatinos in Less-Developed Countries*, eds V. K. Ramachandran and M. Swaminathan (London: Zed Books).

Byres, T. J. 2004. "Neo-Classical Neo-Populism 25 Years on: Déjà Vu and Deja Passe. Towards a Critique" *Journal of Agrarian Change* 4(1/2): 17–44.

Byres, T. J. 2009. "The Landlord Class, Peasant Differentiation, Class Struggle and the Transition to Capitalism: England, France, and Prussia Compared" in *Peasants and Globalization: Political Economy, Rural Transformation and the Agrarian Question*, eds H. A. Lodhi and C. Kay (London: Routledge), pp. 57–82.

Byres, T. J. 2012. "The Agrarian Question and the Peasantry" in *The Elgar Companion to Marxist Economics*, eds B. Fine and A. Saad-Filho (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing), pp. 10–15.

Cammack, P. 2012. "The G20, the Crisis, and the Rise of Global Developmental Liberalism" *Third World Quarterly* 33(1): 1–16.

Carney, J. 2002. *Black Rice: The African Origins of Rice Cultivation in the Americas* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).

Castree, N. 1995. "The Nature of Produced Nature: Materiality and Knowledge Construction in Marxism" *Antipode* 27(1): 12–48.

Chakrabarty, D. 2009. "The Climate of History: Four These" *Critical Inquiry* 35(2): 197–222.

Chakrabarty, D. 2010. "The Legacies of Bandung: Decolonization and the Politics of Culture" in *Making a World After Empire: The Bandung Moment and Its Political Afterlives*, ed. C. J. Lee (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press), pp 45–68.

Chakrabarty, D. 2014. "Climate and Capital: On Conjoined Histories" *Critical Inquiry* 41(1): 1–23.

Chandler, D., Cudworth, E. and Hobden, S. 2017. "Anthropocene, Capitalocene, and Liberal Cosmopolitan IR: A Response to Burke et al's Planet Politics" *Millennium: A Journal of International Studies* 46(2): 190–208.

Chatterjee, P. 2008. "Democracy and Economic Transformation in India" *Economic and Political Weekly* 43(16): 53–62.

Cheng, S. K. 2020. "Primitive Socialist Accumulation in China: An Alternative View of the Anomalies of Chinese 'Capitalism'" *Review of Radical Political Economics* 52(4): 693–715.

Cheru, F., Modi, R. and Naidu, S. 2013. "Catalysing an Agricultural Revolution in Africa: What Role for Foreign Direct Investment?" in *Agricultural Development and Food Security in Africa: The Impact of Chinese, Indian and Brazilian Investments*, eds F. Cheru and R. Modi (London: Zed Books), pp. 15–37.

Connolly, W. 1990. *Political Theory and Modernity* (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell).

Corbridge, S., Harriss, J., Ruparelia, S. and Reddy, S. 2011. "India's Transforming Political Economy" in *Understanding India's New Political Economy: A Great Transformation?*, eds S. Ruparelia, S. Reddy and J. Harriss (London: Routledge).

Cotula, L. 2012. "The International Political Economy of the Global Land Rush: A Critical Appraisal of Trends, Scale, Geography and Drivers" *Journal of Peasant Studies* 39(3–4): 649–680.

Cotula, L. 2013. *The Great African Land Grab? Agricultural Investments and the Global Food System* (London: Zed Books).

Coulthard, G. 2014. *Red Skin, White Masks* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota).

Cronon, W. 1983. *Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England* (New York: Hill and Wang).

Crutzen, P. 2002. "Geology of Mankind: The Anthropocene" *Nature*.

Das, R. 2007. "Looking, But Not Seeing: The State and/as Class in Rural India" *Journal of Peasant Studies* 34(3/4): 408–440.

Davis, H. and Todd, Z. 2017. "On the Importance of a Date, or Decolonizing the Anthropocene" *ACME* 16(4): 761–780.

Davis, J., Moulton, A., Van Sant, L. and Williams, B. 2018. "Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Plantationocene? A Manifesto for Ecological Justice in an Age of Global Crises" *Geography Compass* https://doi.org/10.1111/gec3.12438. Accessed August 11, 2024.

Davis, M. 2001. *Late Victorian Holocausts: El Nino Famines and the Making of the Third World* (London: Verso).

Davison, W. 2011a. "Ethiopian Government Slashes Karuturi Global Land Concession" *Bloomberg*, 4 May. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-05-04/ethiopian-government-slashes-karuturi-global-land-concession-by-two-thirds. Accessed August 11, 2024.

Davison, W. 2011b. "Flood Destroys Ethiopia's First Corn Crop" *Bloomberg*, 7 October. http://www.ethiopianreview.com/index/34462. Accessed August 11, 2024.

Davison, W. 2013a. "Karuturi to Borrow from Sovereign Fund after First Ethiopia Crop" *Bloomberg*, 28 March. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-03-28/karuturi-to-borrow-from-sovereign-fund-after-first-ethiopia-crop. Accessed August 11, 2024.

Davison, W. 2013b. "Ethiopia's Farm Investment Plan Falters on Floodplain" *Bloomberg*, 25 November. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-24/ethiopian-drive-to-lure-farm-investment-founders-on-flood-plain.html. Accessed August 11, 2024.

De Angelis, M. 2001. "Marx and Primitive Accumulation: The Continuous Character of Capital's 'Enclosures'" *The Commoner* 2 (September). http://www.commoner.org.uk/02deangelis.pdf. Accessed August 11, 2024.

De Angelis, M. 2004. "Separating the Doing and the Deed: Capital and the Continuous Character of Enclosures" *Historical Materialism* 12(2): 57–87.

De Angelis, M. 2007. *The Beginning of History: Value Struggles and Global Capital* (London: Pluto).

De Schutter, O. 2011. "How Not to Think of Land-Grabbing: Three Critiques of Large-Scale Investments in Farmland" *Journal of Peasant Studies* 38(2): 249–279.

Deininger, K., Byerlee, D., Lindsay, J., Norton, A., Selod, H. and Stickler, M. 2011. "Rising Global Interest in Farmland: Can It Yield Sustainable and Equitable Benefits?" World Bank. http://hdl.handle.net/10986/2263. Accessed August 11, 2024.

Denevan, W. 1992. "The Pristine Myth: The Landscape of the Americas in 1492" *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 82(3): 369–385.

Denevan, W. 2011. "The 'Pristine Myth' Revisited" *Geographical Review* 101(4): 576–591.

Desai, R. 2004. "Forward March of Hindutva Halted?" *New Left Review* (November/December).

Desai, R. 2013. "The BRICS are Building a Challenge to Western Economic Supremacy" *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/apr/02/brics-challenge-western-supremacy. Accessed August 11, 2024.

Desai, R. 2016. "The Slow Motion Counter-Revolution: Developmental Contradictions and the Emergence of Neoliberalism" in *Social Movements and the State in India*, eds K. B. Nielsen and A. G. Nielsen (London: Palgrave), pp. 25–51.

Desmarais, A. 2008. "The Power of Peasants: Reflections on the Meanings of La Via Campesina" *Journal of Rural Studies* 24(2): 138–149.

Dos Santos, B. 2007. *Another Knowledge Is Possible: Beyond Northern Epistemologies* (London: Verso).

Dubey, R. 2012. "Indian Farmer's African Safari" *Businessworld*, 2 June. https://www.farmlandgrab.org/post/20590-indian-farmer-s-african-safari. Accessed October 4, 2024.

Duncan, C. 1996. *The Centrality of Agriculture: Between Humankind and the Rest of Nature* (Buffalo, NY: McGill-Queen's University Press).

Dussel, E. 1995. *Invention of the Americas: Eclipse of the "Other" and the Myth of Modernity* (New York: Continuum).

Dussel, E. 1996. "Modernity, Eurocentrism, and Trans-Modernity: In Dialogue with Charles Taylor" in *The Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor, and the Philosophy of Liberation*, ed. E. Mendieta (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities), pp. 129–159.

Dussel, E. 1998. "Beyond Eurocentrism: The World-System and the Limits of Modernity" in *The Cultures of Globalization*, eds F. Jameson and M. Miyoshi (Durham, NC: Duke University Press), pp. 3–22.

Dussel, E. 2014. "Anti-Cartesian Meditations: On the Origin of the Philosophical Anti-Discourse of Modernity" *Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory* 13(1): 11–53.

Edelman, M., Oya, C. and Borras Jr, S. M. 2013. "Global Land Grabs: Historical Processes, Theoretical and Methodological Implications and Current Trajectories" *Third World Quarterly* 34(9): 1517–1531.

Ellis, E., Maslin, M., Boivin, N. and Bauer, A. 2016. "Involve Social Scientists in Defining the Anthropocene" *Nature*.

Endeshaw, D. 2016. "Ethiopia: Agency Gets Tough on Dormant Commercial Farms" *All Africa*, 26 July. http://allafrica.com/stories/201607261079.html. Accessed August 11, 2024.

Engels, F. 1894. "The Peasant Question in France and Germany" *Die Neue Zeit*. http://www.Marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1894/peasant-question/index.htm. Accessed August 11, 2024.

Fabian, J. 1983. *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object* (New York: Columbia University Press).

Fanon, F. 1952. *Black Skin, White Masks* (New York: Grove Press).

Fanon, F. 1961. *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press).

Farmer, B. H. 1974. *Agricultural Colonization in India since Independence* (London: Oxford University Press for The Royal Institute of International Affairs).

Federici, S. 2004. *Caliban and the Witch: Women, the Body, and Primitive Accumulation* (New York: Autonomedia).

Fekade, B. 2015. "Karuturi under the Spotlight" *The Reporter*, 17 January. http://www.thereporterethiopia.com/index.php/news-headlines/item/3045-karuturi-under-the-spotlight. Accessed August 11, 2024.

Feyissa, D. 2011. *Playing Different Games: The Paradox of Anywaa and Nuer Identification Strategies in the Gambella Region, Ethiopia* (New York: Berghahn Books).

Foster, J. B. 2000. *Marx's Ecology: Materialism and Nature* (New York: Monthly Review Press).

Fraser, N. 2013. "A Triple Movement? Parsing the Politics of Crisis after Polanyi" *New Left Review* 81(81): 119–132.

Friedmann, H. 2000. "What on Earth Is the Modern World-System? Foodgetting and Territory in the Modern Era and Beyond" *Journal of World-Systems Research* 1(2): 480–515.

Friedmann, H. 2004. "Feeding the Empire" in *Socialist Register 2005: The Empire Reloaded*, eds L. Panitch and C. Leys (London: Merlin Press), pp. 124–143.

Friedmann, H. 2009. "Discussion: Moving Food Regimes Forward: Reflections on Symposium Essays" *Agriculture and Human Values* 26: 335–344.

Friedmann, H. and McMichael, P. 1989. "Agriculture and the State System: The Rise and Decline of National Agricultures, 1870 to the Present" *Sociologia Ruralis* 29(2): 93–117.

Gadgil, M. and Guha, R. 1992. *This Fissured Land: An Ecological History of India* (Delhi: Oxford University Press).

Gadgil, M. and Guha, R. 1995. *Ecology and Equity: The Use and Abuse of Nature in Contemporary India* (London: Routledge).

Gaztambide-Fernandez, R. 2014. "Decolonial Options and Artistic/AestheSic Entanglements: An Interview with Walter Mignolo" *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society* 3(1): 196–212.

Geisler, C. 2012. "New Terra Nullius Narratives and the Gentrification of Africa's 'Empty Lands'" *Journal of World-Systems Research* 28(1): 15–29.

Geisler, C. and Makki, F. 2014. "People, Power, and Land: New Enclosures on a Global Scale" *Rural Sociology* 79(1): 28–33.

Ghosh, J. 1996. "Liberalization Debates" in *State, Development Planning and Liberalisation in India*, ed. T. J. Byres (Delhi: Oxford University Press), pp. 295–333.

Ghosh, J. 2011. "Is MNREGS Affecting Rural Wages?" *Macroscan*. http://www.macroscan.net/index.php?&view=article&aid=35. Accessed August 11, 2024.

Gill, B. 2016. "Can the River Speak? Epistemological Confrontation in the Rise and Fall of the Land Grab in Gambella, Ethiopia" *Environment and Planning "A"* 48(4): 699–717.

Gokarn, S. 2011. "Food Inflation—This Time It's Different" Kale Memorial Lecture, Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics.

Goldman, M. 2005. *Imperial Nature: The World Bank and Struggles for Social Justice in the Age of Globalization* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press).

Golub, P. 2013. "From the New International Economic Order to the G20: How the 'Global South' Is Restructuring World Capitalism from Within" *Third World Quarterly* 34(6): 1000–1015.

GRAIN. 2008. "Seized: The 2008 Landgrab for Food and Financial Security." https://www.grain.org/article/entries/93-seized-the-2008-landgrab-for-food-and-financial-security. Accessed August 11, 2024.

GRAIN. 2016. "The Global Farm Land Grab in 2016: How Big, How Bad?" http://www.countercurrents.org/2016/07/14/the-global-farm-land-grab-in-2016-how-big-how-bad/. Accessed August 11, 2024.

Grovogui, S. 2006. "Postcolonialism" in *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, eds T. Dunne, M. Kurki, and S. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 229–246.

Guaman, Poma F. 2009. *First New Chronicle and Good Government: On the History of the World and the Incas up to 1615* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press).

Guha, R. 1989. *Unquiet Woods: Ecological Change and Peasant Resistance in the Himalayas* (Delhi: Oxford University Press).

Guha, R. 2000. *Environmentalism: A Global History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Guha, R. 2007. *India after Gandhi: The History of the World's Largest Democracy* (London: Picador).

Guha, R. and Arnold, D. 1996. *Nature, Culture, Imperialism: Essays of the Environmental History of South Asia* (Delhi: Oxford University Press).

Gupta, A. 1998. *Postcolonial Developments: Agriculture in the Making of Modern India* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press).

Hall, D. 2013. "Primitive Accumulation, Accumulation by Dispossession and the Global Land Grab" *Third World Quarterly* 34(9): 1582–1604.

Haraway, D. 2015. "Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Plantationocene, Chthulucene: Making Kin" *Environmental Humanities* 6(1): 159–165.

Harvey, D. 2001. *Spaces of Capital: Towards a Critical Geography* (New York: Routledge).

Harvey, D. 2003. *The New Imperialism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Heller, H. 2013. *The Birth of Capitalism: A Twenty-First-Century Perspective* (Halifax, NS: Fernwood Publishing).

Hopewell, K. 2015. "Different Paths to Power: The Rise of Brazil, India and China at the World Trade Organization" *Review of International Political Economy* 22(2): 311–338.

HRW. 2012. "'Waiting Here for Death': Forced Displacement and 'Villagization' in Ethiopia's Gambella Region" Human Rights Watch, USA. http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ethiopia0112webwcover_0.pdf. Accessed August 11, 2024.

ICRA Equity Research Service. 2012a. "Karuturi Global Limited" ICRA, 3 January. http://www.icra.in/files/pdf/2011-Jan-Karuturi.pdf. Accessed August 11, 2024.

ICRA Equity Research Service. 2012b. "Karuturi Global Limited" ICRA, October. http://www.icra.in/Files/Reports/Rationale/Karuturi%20Global%20_r_08102012%20.pdf. Accessed August 11, 2024.

Ince, O. U. 2014. "Primitive Accumulation, New Enclosures, and Global Land Grabs: A Theoretical Intervention" *Rural Sociology* 79(1): 104–131.

Jabr, F. 2019. "The Earth Is Just as Alive as You Are" *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/20/opinion/sunday/amazon-earth-rain-forest-environment.html. Accessed August 11, 2024.

James, C. L. R. 1980. *The Black Jacobins* (London: Allison & Busby).

Jansen, K. 2015. "The Debate on Food Sovereignty Theory: Agrarian Capitalism, Dispossession and Agroecology" *Journal of Peasant Studies* 42(1): 213–232.

Johnson, N. 2012. "Enough Is Enough: Gambella, Ethiopia Update" Oakland Institute, 1 October. http://www.oaklandinstitute.org/enough-enough-gambella-ethiopia-update. Accessed August 11, 2024.

Karnik, M. 2016. "Food Is Getting So Expensive in India That It Now Wants to Farm in Africa and Myanmar" *Quartz India*, 23 June. http://qz.com/712244/food-is-getting-so-expensive-in-india-that-it-now-wants-to-farm-in-africa-and-myanmar/. Accessed August 11, 2024.

Karuka, M. 2018. *Empire's Tracks: Indigenous Nations, Chinese Workers, and the Transcontinental Railroad* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press).

Kautsky, K. 1988. *The Agrarian Question* (London: Zwan).

Kebede, B. 2011. "Land Deals in Ethiopia Bring Food Self-Sufficiency, and Prosperity" *The Guardian*, 4 April. http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/apr/04/ethiopia-land-deals-food-self-sufficiency. Accessed August 11, 2024.

Kiely, R. 2009. "The Globalization of Manufacturing Production: Warrenite Fantasies and Uneven and Unequal Realities" in *Peasants and Globalization: Political Economy, Rural Transformation and the Agrarian Question*, eds H. A. Lodhi and C. Kay (London: Routledge), pp. 169–189.

King, T. L. 2015. "Interview with Dr. Tiffany Lethabo King" *Feral Feminisms* 4(summer): 64–66.

Kitching, G. 1989. *Development and Underdevelopment in Historical Perspective* (London: Methuen).

Kitching, G. 2001. *Seeking Social Justice through Globalization* (Philadelphia, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press).

Kovel, J. 2002. *The Enemy of Nature: The End of Capitalism or the End of the World?* (Halifax, NS: Fernwood).

Kurimoto, E. 1996. "People of the River: Subsistence Economy of the Anywaa (Anuak) of Western Ethiopia" in *Essays in Northeast African Studies*, eds S. Sato and E. Kurimoto (Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology), pp. 29–57.

Lane, K. 2019. *Potosi: The Silver City that Changed the World* (Oakland, CA: University of California Press).

Lappe, F. and Collins, J. 1978. *Food First: Beyond the Myth of Scarcity* (New York: Ballantine Books).

Latour, B. 2016. *Politics in the New Climatic Regime* (Cambridge: Polity Press).

Lavers, T. 2012. "'Land Grab' as Development Strategy? The Political Economy of Agricultural Investment in Ethiopia" *Journal of Peasant Studies* 39(1): 105–132.

Leiss, W. 1972. *Domination of Nature* (New York: George Brazillier).

Lenin, V. I. 1899. *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*. http://www.Marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1899/devel/index.htm. Accessed August 11, 2024.

Lenin, V. I. 1914. *The Right of Nations to Self-Determination*. https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/self-det/ch08.htm. Accessed August 11, 2024.

Lenin, V. I. 1917. *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*. https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/imp-hsc/. Accessed August 11, 2024.

Lenin, V. I. 1920. *Draft Theses on the National and Colonial Questions*. https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1920/jun/05.htm. Accessed August 11, 2024.

Lerche, J. 2013. "The Agrarian Question in Neoliberal India: Agrarian Transition Bypassed?" *Journal of Agrarian Change* 13(3): 382–404.

Levien, M. 2011. "Special Economic Zones and Accumulation by Dispossession in India" *Journal of Agrarian Change* 11(4): 454–483.

Levien, M. 2015. "From Primitive Accumulation to Regimes of Dispossession: Six Theses on India's Land Question" *Economic and Political Weekly* 50(22): 146–157.

Levinas, E. 1969. *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority* (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press).

Lewis, S. and Maslin, M. 2015. "Defining the Anthropocene" *Nature* 519: 171–180.

Li, T. 2009. "Exit from Agriculture: A Step Forward or a Step Backward for the Rural Poor" *Journal of Peasant Studies* 36(3): 629–636.

Li, T. 2010. "To Make Live or Let Die? Rural Dispossession and the Protection of Surplus Populations" *Antipode* 41(s1): 66–93.

Li, T. 2011. "Centering Labor in the Land Grab Debate" *Journal of Peasant Studies* 38(2): 281–298.

Luke, T. 2020. "Tracing Race, Ethnicity, and Civilization in the Anthropocene" *Environment and Planning "D": Society and Space* 38(1): 129–146.

Lynas, M. 2011. *The God Species: Saving the Planet in the Age of Humans* (London: National Geographic).

Magubane, Z. 2003. *Simians, Savages, Skulls, and Sex: Science and Colonial Militarism in Nineteenth-Century South Africa*, eds D. Moore, A. Pandian, and J. Kosek (Durham, NC: Duke University Press).

Makki, F. 2012. "Power and Property: Commercialization, Enclosures, and the Transformation of Agrarian Relations in Ethiopia" *Journal of Peasant Studies* 39(1): 81–104.
Makki, F. 2014. "Development by Dispossession: Terra Nullius and the Socio-Ecology of New Enclosures in Ethiopia" *Rural Sociology* 79(1): 79–103.
Maldonado-Torres, N. 2007. "On the Coloniality of Being" *Cultural Studies* 21(2–3): 240–270.
Maldonado-Torres, N. 2008. *Against War: Views from the Underside of Colonial Modernity* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press).
Malm, A. 2016. *Fossil Capital: The Rise of Steam Power and the Roots of Global Warming* (London: Verso).
Malm, A. and Hornborg, A. 2014. "The Geology of Mankind? A Critique of the Anthropocene Narrative" *The Anthropocene Review* 1(1): 62–69.
Mann, C. 2002. "1491" *The Atlantic*. http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2002/03/1491/302445/. Accessed August 11, 2024.
Margulis, M. and Porter, T. 2013. "Governing the Global Land Grab: Multipolarity, Ideas, and Complexity in Transnational Governance" *Globalizations* 10(1): 65–86.
Maritz, J. 2012. "The Not So Rosy Realities of Running a Large Agricultural Project in Africa" *How We Made It in Africa*, 9 June. http://www.howwemadeitinafrica.com/the-not-so-rosy-realities-of-running-a-large-agriculture-project-in-africa/17344/. Accessed August 11, 2024.
Markakis, J. 2011. *Ethiopia: The Last Two Frontiers* (Woodbridge: James Currey).
Martin, W. G. and Palat, R. A. 2014. "Asian Land Acquisitions in Africa: Beyond the 'New Bandung' or a 'New Colonialism'?" *Agrarian South* 3(1): 125–150.
Marx, K. 1946. *Capital, Vol. 1* (Trowbridge: Redwood Press Limited).
Marx, K. 1978. *Capital, Volume One* in The Marx-Engels Reader (New York: W.W. Norton), pp. 294438.
Marx, K. and Engels, F. 1940. *The German Ideology: Parts I & III* (London: Lawrence & Wishart).
McClintock, A. 1995. *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Conquest* (New York: Routledge).
McKittrick, K. 2011. "On Plantations, Prisons, and a Black Sense of Place" *Social & Cultural Geography* 12(8): 947–963.
McMichael, P. 1997. "Rethinking Globalization: The Agrarian Question Revisited" *Review of International Political Economy* 4(4): 630–662.
McMichael, P. 2005. "Global Development and the Corporate Food Regime" *Research in Rural Sociology and Development* 11: 269–303.
McMichael, P. 2007. "Globalization and the Agrarian World" in *The Blackwell Companion to Globalization*, ed. G. Ritzer (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing), pp. 216–238.
McMichael, P. 2008. "Peasants Make Their Own History, But Not Just as They Please …" *Journal of Agrarian Change* 8(2/3): 205–228.
McMichael, P. 2012. "The Land Grab and Corporate Food Regime Restructuring" *Journal of Peasant Studies* 39(3–4): 681–701.

McMichael, P. 2013. "Land Grabbing as Security Mercantilism in International Relations" *Globalizations* 10(1): 47–64.
McMichael, P. 2014. "Rethinking Land Grab ontology" *Rural Sociology* 79(1): 34–55.
McMichael, P. 2020. "Does China's Going Out Strategy Prefigure a New Food Regime?" *Journal of Peasant Studies* 47(1): 116–154.
McMichael, P. 2023. "Critical Agrarian Studies and the Crises of the World-Historical Present" *Journal of Peasant Studies* 50(2): 725–757.
Mendoza, B. 2006. "The Undemocratic Foundations of Democracy: An Enunciation from Postoccidental Latin America" *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 31(4): 932–939.
Merchant, C. 2003. *Reinventing Eden: The Fate of Nature in Western Culture* (New York: Routledge).
Mies, M. 1986. *Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale: Women in the International Division of Labour* (London: Zed Books).
Mignolo, W. 2011. *The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press).
Mintz, S. 1985. *Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History* (New York: Viking).
Mitchell, T. 2002. *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Technopolitics, and Modernity* (Berkley, CA: University of California Press).
Mitra, K. and Bhuvaa, R. 2011. "This Time for Africa" *Business Today*. http://www.businesstoday.in/magazine/cover-story/corporate-india-explores-opportunities-in-africa/story/15440.html. Accessed August 11, 2024.
Mittal, A. 2009. "The 2008 Food Security Crisis: Rethinking Food Security Policies" UNCTAD, G-24 Paper Discussion Series. http://unctad.org/en/Docs/gdsmdpg2420093_en.pdf. Accessed August 11, 2024.
Mittal, A. 2013. "Indian Land Grabs in Ethiopia Show Dark Side of South–South Cooperation" *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2013/feb/25/indian-land-grabs-ethiopia. Accessed August 11, 2024.
Mittal, J. 2013. "Report from the Indian–Ethiopian Civil Society Summit on Land Investments New Delhi, February 5–7 2013" Oakland Institute. http://www.oaklandinstitute.org/report-indian-ethiopian-civil-society-summit-land-investments-new-delhi-february-5-7-2013. Accessed August 11, 2024.
Mollett, S. 2016. "The Power to Plunder: Rethinking Land Grabbing in Latin America" *Antipode* 48(2): 412–432.
Moore, D., Kosek, J. and Pandian, A. 2003. *Race, Nature, and the Politics of Difference* (Durham, NCDuke University Press).
Moore, J. W. 2000. "Environmental Crises and the Metabolic Rift in World-Historical Perspective" *Organization and Environment* 13(2): 123–157.
Moore, J. W. 2003. "The Modern World-System as Environmental History? Ecology and the Rise of Capitalism" *Theory and Society* 32: 307–377.
Moore, J. W. 2008. "Ecological Crises and the Agrarian Question in World-Historical Perspective" *Monthly Review* 60(6). https://monthlyreview.org/2008/11/01/

ecological-crises-and-the-agrarian-question-in-world-historical-perspective/. Accessed August 11, 2024.
Moore, J. W. 2010a. "The End of the Road? Agricultural Revolutions in the Capitalist World-Ecology" *Journal of Agrarian Change* 10(3): 389–413.
Moore, J. W. 2010b. "'Amsterdam Is Standing on Norway' Part I: The Alchemy of Capital, Empire and Nature in the Diaspora of Silver, 1545–1648" *Journal of Agrarian Change* 10(1): 33–68.
Moore, J. W. 2010c. "'Amsterdam Is Standing on Norway' Part II: The Global North Atlantic in the Ecological Revolution of the Long Seventeenth Century" *Journal of Agrarian Change* 10(2): 188–227.
Moore, J. W. 2011. "Transcending the Metabolic Rift: A Theory of Crises in the Capitalist World-Ecology" *Journal of Peasant Studies* 38(1): 1–41.
Moore, J. W. 2015. *Capitalism in the Web of Life* (London: Verso).
Moore, J. W. 2017. "The Capitalocene, Part I: On the Nature and Origins of Our Ecological Crisis" *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 44(3): 594–630.
Morrison, K. 2018. "Provincializing the Anthropocene: Eurocentrism in the Earth System" in *Nature's Edge: The Global Present and Long-Term History*, eds G. Cederlof and M. Rangarajan (New Delhi: Oxford University Press), pp. 1–18.
Moyo, S. 2011. "Land Concentration and Accumulation after Redistributive Reform in Post-Settler Zimbabwe" *Review of African Political Economy* 38(128): 257–276.
Moyo, S., Jha, P. and Yeros, P. 2013. "The Classical Agrarian Question: Myth, Reality and Relevance Today" *Agrarian South: Journal of Political Economy* 2(1): 93–119.
Moyo, S., Yeros, P. and Jha, P. 2012. "Imperialism and Primitive Accumulation: Notes on the New Scramble for Africa" *Agrarian South: Journal of Political Economy* 1(2): 181–203.
Moyo, S. and Yeros, P. 2005. "The Resurgence of Rural Movements under Neoliberalism" in *Reclaiming the Land: The Resurgence of Rural Movements in Africa, Asia, and Latin America*, eds S. Moyo and P. Yeros (London: Zed Books). pp. 8–64.
Moyo, S. and Yeros, P. 2013. "The Zimbabwe Model: Radicalisation, Reform, and Resistance" in *Land and Agrarian Reform in Zimbabwe: Beyond White-Settler Capitalism*, eds S. Moyo and W. Chambati (Dakar: Codesria), pp. 331–358.
Mukherjee-Reed, A. 2015. "Taking Solidarity Seriously: Analysing Kerala's Kudumbashree as a Women's SSE experiment" in *Social and Solidarity Economy: Beyond the Fringe?*, ed. P. Utting (London: Zed Books), pp. 300–312.
Nederveen Pieterse, J. 2011. "Global Rebalancing: Crisis and the East–South Turn" *Development and Social Change* 42(1): 22–48.
Nemser, D. 2014. "Primitive Spiritual Accumulation and the Colonial Extraction Economy" *Politica Comun 5*.
Neumann, R. 2005. *Making Political Ecology* (New York: Oxford University Press).
Niblett, M. 2011. "'When You Take the Thing out the Earth and You En't Put Nothing Back': Nature, Form and the Metabolic Rift in Jan Carew's Black Midas" *The Journal of Commonwealth Literature* 46(2): 237–255.

Nkrumah, K. 1965. *Neocolonialism: The Highest Stage of Imperialism* (New York: International Publishers).

O'Connor, J. 1998. *Natural Causes: Essays in Ecological Marxism* (New York: Guilford Press).

OI. 2011. "Understanding Land Investment Deals in Africa: Ethiopia" Oakland Institute. http://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/OI_Ethiopa_Land_Investment_report.pdf. Accessed August 11, 2024.

OI. 2013. "Unheard Voices: The Human Rights Impact of Land Investments on Indigenous Communities in Gambella" Oakland Institute. http://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/OI_Report_Unheard_Voices.pdf. Accessed August 11, 2024.

OI. 2015. "We Say the Land Is Not Yours: Breaking the Silence against Forced Displacement in Ethiopia" Oakland Institute. http://www.oaklandinstitute.org/we-say-land-not-yours-breaking-silence-against-forced-displacement-ethiopia. Accessed August 11, 2024.

Ojulu, O. M. 2013. "Large-Scale Land Acquisitions and Minorities/Indigenous Peoples' Rights under Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia" Ph.D. Thesis, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford.

Oliveira, G., Mckay, B. and Liu, J. 2021. "Beyond Land Grabs: New Insights on Land Struggles and Global Agrarian Charge" *Globalizations* 18(3): 321–338.

Oxfam. 2012. "'Our Land, Our Lives': Time Out on the Global Land Rush" Oxfam. https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bn-land-lives-freeze-041012-en_1.pdf. Accessed August 11, 2024.

Oya, C. 2008. "The World Development Report 2008: Inconsistencies, Silences, and the Myth of 'Win–Win' Scenarios" *Journal of Peasant Studies* 36(3): 593–601.

Oya, C. 2013. "The Land Rush and Classic Agrarian Questions of Capital and Labour: A Systematic Scoping Review of the Socioeconomic Impact of Land Grabs in Africa" *Third World Quarterly* 34(9): 1532–1557.

Palat, R. A. 2010. "The World Turned Upside Down: The Rise of the Global South and the Contemporary Global Financial Turbulence" *Third World Quarterly* 31(3): 365–384.

Pandey, G. 1988. "Peasant Revolt and Indian Nationalism: The Peasant Movement in Awadh, 1919–1922" in *Selected Subaltern Studies*, eds R. Guha and G. Spivak (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 233–287.

Pandian, J. 1985. *Anthropology and the Western Tradition* (Prospect Heights, NY: Waveland Press).

Patel, R. 2007. *Stuffed and Starved: The Hidden Battle for the World's Food System* (Brooklyn, NY: Melville House).

Patel, R. 2013. "The Long Green Revolution" *Journal of Peasant Studies* 40(1): 1–63.

Patnaik, U. 1995. "Economic Ideas of Mao Zedong on Agricultural Transformation and Its Relation to Capital Formation and Industrialization" *China Report* 31(1): 87–100.

Patnaik, U. 2003. "Global Capitalism, Deflation and Agrarian Crisis in Developing Countries" *Journal of Agrarian Change* 3(1–2): 33–62.

Patnaik, U. 2009. "Origins of the Food Crisis in India and Developing Countries" *Monthly Review* 61(3).

Patnaik, U. 2012. "Capitalism and the Production of Poverty" *Social Scientist* 40(1/2): 3–20.

Patnaik, U. and Moyo, S. 2011. *The Agrarian Question in the Neoliberal Era: Primitive Accumulation and the Peasantry* (Cape Town: Fahamu Books).

Patnaik, U. and Patnaik, P. 2021. *Capital and Imperialism: Theory, History, and the Present* (New York: Monthly Review Press).

Pawar, S. 2014. "Keynote Address" Asia–Africa Agribusiness Forum, New Delhi, 4 February. http://www.ficci.com/events/21682/ISP/Speech-copy-of-Shri-Sharad-Pawar.pdf. Accessed August 11, 2024.

Perelman, M. 2000. *The Invention of Capitalism: Classical Political Economy and the Secret History of Primitive Accumulation* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press).

Phillip, K. 2004. *Civilizing Natures: Race, Resources, and Modernity in Colonial India* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers).

Platt, T. and Quisbert, P. 2007. "Knowing Silence and Merging Horizons: The Case of the Great Potosi Cover-Up" in *Ways of Knowing: Anthropological Approaches to Crafting Experience and Knowledge*, ed. M. Harris (New York: Berghan Books).

Polanyi, K. 2001. *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press).

Povinelli, E. 1995. "Do Rocks Listen? The Cultural Politics of Apprehending Australian Aboriginal Labour" *American Anthropologist* 97(3): 505–518.

Pratt, M. L. 1991. "Arts of the Contact Zone" *Profession* 33–40.

Quijano, A. 2000. "Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America" *Nepantla: Views from South* 1(3): 533–580.

Quijano, A. 2007. "Coloniality and Modernity/Rationality" *Cultural Studies* 21(2–3): 168–178.

Rahmato, D. 2013. "Up for Grabs: the case of large Indian investments in Ethiopian agriculture", in *Agricultural Development and Food Security in Africa: The Impact of Chinese, Indian and Brazilian Investments*, eds. F. Cheru and R. Modi (London: Zed Books) pp 93–106.

Rawat, V. B., Bhushan, M. B. and Surepally, S. 2011. "The Impact of Special Economic Zones in India: A Caste Study of Pollepally SEZ" paper presented at the Interanational Conference on Global Land Grabbing. http://www.future-agricultures.org/papers-and-presentations/conference-papers-2/1092-the-impact-of-special-economic-zones-in-india-a-caste-study-of-polepally-sez/file. Accessed August 11, 2024.

Reddy, N. and Mishra, S. 2010. *Agrarian Crisis in India* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Robinson, C. 2000. *Black Marxism* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press).

Rodney, W. 1972. *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (London: Verso).

Ross, E. 2003. "Malthusianism, Capitalist Agriculture, and the Fate of Peasants in the Making of the Modern World Food System" *Review of Radical Political Economics* 35(4): 437–461.

Rostow, W. W. 1990. *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Rowden, R. 2011. "India's Role in the New Global Farmland Grab" GRAIN and the Economic Research Foundation. www.networkideas.org/featart/aug2011/Rick_Rowden.pdf. Accessed August 11, 2024.

Rowden, R. 2013. "Indian Agricultural Companies, 'Land Grabbing' in Africa and Activists' Responses" in *Agricultural Development and Food Security in Africa: The Impact of Chinese, Indian and Brazilian Investments*, eds F. Cheru and R. Modi (London: Zed Books), pp. 107–124.

RRI. 2015. "Potential for Recognition of Community Forest Resource Rights under India's Forest Rights Act" Rights and Resource Initiative. http://rightsandresources.org/wp-content/uploads/CommunityForest_July-20.pdf. Accessed August 11, 2024.

Saith, A. 2008. "China and India: The Institutional Roots of Differential Performance" *Development and Change* 39(5): 723–757.

Sanyal, K. 2007. *Rethinking Capitalist Development: Primitive Accumulation, Governmentality and Post-Colonial Capitalism* (London: Routledge).

Sauer, C. 1966. *The Early Spanish Main* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press).

Schneider, M. and McMichael P. 2010. "Deepening, and Repairing, the Metabolic Rift" *Journal of Peasant Studies* 37(3): 461–484.

Schoneveld, G. 2011. *The Anatomy of Large-Scale Farmland Acquisitions in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Bogor: Center for International Forestry Research).

Scoones, I., Marongwe, N., Mavedzenge, B., Murimbarimba, F., Mahenehene, J. and Sukume, C. 2011. "Zimbabwe's Land Reform: Challenging the Myths" *Journal of Peasant Studies* 38(5): 967–993.

Scott, J. 1998. *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press).

Sender, J. and Johnston, D. 2004. "Searching for a Weapon of Mass Production in Rural Africa: Unconvincing Arguments for Land Reform" *Journal of Agrarian Change* 4(1/2): 142–164.

Sender, J. and Smith, S. 1986. *The Development of Capitalism in Africa* (London: Methuen).

Sethi, A. 2013. "When the Levee Breaks" *The Hindu*, 19 May. http://m.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/when-the-levee-breaks-karuturis-defence/article4727839.ece/. Accessed August 11, 2024.

Shilliam, R. 2008. "What the Haitian Revolution Might Tell Us about Development, Security and the Politics of Race" *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 50(3): 778–808.

Simpson, A. 2014. *Mohawk Interruptus* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press).

Simpson, L. 2013. *Islands of Decolonial Love* (Winnipeg, MB: Arbeiter Ring Publishing).

Simpson, L. 2017. *As We Have Always Done* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press).

Singh, G. 2013. "India and Africa: New Trends in Sustainable Agricultural Development" in *Agricultural Development and Food Security in Africa: The Impact of Chinese, Indian and Brazilian Investments*, eds F. Cheru and R. Modi (London: Zed Books), pp. 59–75.

Singh, N. 2016. "On Race, Violence, and So-Called Primitive Accumulation" *Social Text* 34(3): 27–50.

Sluyter, A. 1999. "The Making of the Myth in Postcolonial Development: Material-Conceptual Landscape Transformation in Sixteenth-Century Veracruz" *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 89(3): 377–401.

Sluyter, A. 2001. "Colonialism and Landscape in the Americas: Material/Conceptual Transformations and Continuing Consequences" *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 91(2): 410–428.

Sluyter, A. 2014. "African Arrivals and Transformations" in N*orth American Odyssey: Historical Geographies for the Twenty-First Century*, eds C. Colten and G. Buckley (New York: Rowman and Littlefield), pp. 49–66.

Smith, A. 1993. *Wealth of Nations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Steffen, W., Broadgate W. and Ludwig, C. 2015. "The Trajectory of the Anthropocene: The Great Acceleration" *The Anthropocene Review* 2(1): 81–98.

Stern, S. 1988. "Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World-System in the Perspective of Latin America and the Caribbean" *The American Historical Review* 93(4): 829–872.

Stewart, H. 2008. "Tariffs: WTO Talks Collapse after Indian and China Clash with America over Farm Products" *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jul/30/wto.india. Accessed August 11, 2024.

Tiejun, W. 2021. *Ten Crises: The Political Economy of China's Development* (London: Palgrave Macmillan)

Trouillot, M. 2003. *Global Transformations: Anthropology and the Modern World* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).

Tsing, A. 2015. *The Mushroom at the End of the World: On the Possibility of Life in Capitalist Ruins* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).

Van Buren, M. and Weaver, B. 2012. "Contours of Labor and History: A Diachronic Perspective of Andean Mineral Production and the Making of Landscapes in Porco, Bolivia" *Historical Archaeology* 46(3): 79–101.

Van Der Ploeg, J. and Ye, J. 2016. *China's Peasant Agriculture and Rural Society: Changing Paradigms of Farming* (London: Routledge)

Varshney, A. 1998. *Democracy, Development and the Countryside: Urban–Rural struggles in India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Vaswani, K. 2006. "Anger over India's Special Economic Zones" BBC. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6054754.stm. Accessed August 11, 2024.

Verges, F. 2017. *Racial Capitalocene: Is the Anthropocene Racial?* (London: Verso) [online]. https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/3376-racial-capitalocene. Accessed August 11, 2024.

Vidal, J. 2011. "Ethiopia at Centre of Global Farmland Rush" *The Guardian*, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/21/ethiopia-centre-global-farmland-rush. Accessed August 11, 2024.

Vikram, K. 2016. "Modi to Visit African Countries to Check Rise in Pulse Prices" *India Today*, 20 June. http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/modi-to-visit-african-countries-to-check-racing-pulse-prices/1/695912.html. Accessed August 11, 2024.

Wahome, M. 2014. "Flower Farm Karuturi Put under Receivership" *Daily Nation*, 11 February. http://www.nation.co.ke/business/Flower-farm-Karuturi-sinks-with-Sh400-million-in-debt/-/996/2202436/-/29637lz/-/index.html. Accessed August 11, 2024.

Wai, Z. 2020. "Resurrecting Mudimbe" *International Politics Review* 8: 57–58.

Wallerstein, I. 1974. *The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Academic Press).

Wallerstein, I. 1979. *The Capitalist World-Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Wallerstein, I. 1991. "The Ideological Tensions of Capitalism: Universalism versus Racism and Sexism" in *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*, eds E. Balibar and I. Wallerstein (London: Verso), pp. 29–36.

Warren, B. 1980. *Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism* (London: Verso).

Watts, M. 2009. "The Southern Question: Agrarian Questions of Labour and Capital" in *Peasants and Globalization: Political Economy, Rural Transformation and the Agrarian Question*, eds A. H. Akram-Lodhi and C. Kay (London: Routledge), pp. 262–287.

Watts, V. 2013. "Indigenous Place-Thought and Agency among Humans and Non-Humans (First Woman and Sky Woman Go on a European World Tour!)" *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education and Society* 2(1): 20–34.

WB. 2008. *World Development Report: Agriculture for Development* (Washington, DC: World Bank).

Weber, I. 2021. *How China Escaped Shock Therapy: The Market Reform* Debate (New York: Routledge).

Weis, T. 2010. "The Accelerating Biophysical Contradictions of Industrial Capitalist Agriculture" *Journal of Agrarian Change* 10(3): 315–341.

White, B., Borras Jr., S. M., Hall, R., Scoones, I. and Wolford, W. 2012. "The New Enclosures: Critical Perspectives on Corporate Land Deals" *Journal of Peasant Studies* 38(2): 619–647.

Whyte, K. 2017. "Indigenous Climate Change Studies: Indigenizing Futures, Decolonizing the Anthropocene" *English Language Notes* 55(1–2): 153–162.

Williams, E. 2021. *Capitalism and Slavery* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press).

Wittman, H. 2009. "Reworking the Metabolic Rift: La Via Campesina, Agrarian Citizenship, and Food Sovereignty" *Journal of Peasant Studies* 36(4): 805–826.

Wolf, E. 1968. *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* (New York: Harper and Row).

Wolf, E. 1982. *Europe and the People without History* (Berkley, CA: University of California Press).

Wolford, W., Borras, S., Hall, R. and White, B. 2013. "Governing Global Land Deals: The Role of the State in the Rush for Land" *Development and Change* 44(2): 189–210.

Wolford, W., White, B., Scoones, I., Hall, R., Edelman, M. and Borras Jr, S. M. 2024. "Global Land Deals: What Has Been Done, What Has Changed, and What's Next" *Land Deal Politics Initiative* working paper.

Wood, E. M. 2000. "The Agrarian Origins of Capitalism" in *Hungry for Profit: The Agribusiness Threat to Farmers, Food, and the Environment*, eds F. Magdoff, J. Bellamy Foster, and F. H. Buttel (New York: Monthly Review Press), pp. 23–41.

Wood, E. M. 2009. "Peasants and the Market Imperative: The Origins of Capitalism" in *Peasants and Globalization: Political Economy, Rural Transformation and the Agrarian Question*, eds A. H. Akram-Lodhi and C. Kay (London and New York: Routledge), pp. 37–56.

Woube, M. 1999. "Flooding and Sustainable Land-Water Management in the Lower Baro-Akobo River Basin, Ethiopia" *Applied Geography* 19: 235–251.

Wynter, S. 1971. "Novel and History, Plot and Plantation" *Savacou* 5: 95–102.

Wynter, S. 1995. "1492: A New World View" in *Race, Discourse, and the Origin of the Americas*, eds V. L. Hyatt and R. Nettleford (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press), pp. 5–57.

Wynter, S. 2003. "Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, after Man, Its Overrepresentation—An Argument" *CR: The New Centennial Review* 3(3): 257–337.

Yadav, P. 2013. "Over 39% Soil in Punjab Completely Degraded" *The Times of India*. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Over-39-soil-in-Punjab-completely-degraded/articleshow/18358798.cms. Accessed August 11, 2024.

Yan, H., Bun, K. H. and Siyuan, X. 2021. "Rural Revitalization, Scholars, and the Dynamic of the Collective Future in China" *Journal of Peasant Studies* 48(4): 853–874.

Yusoff, K. 2019. *A Billion Black Anthropocenes or None* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press).

Index